A Must Lie Situation: Avoiding Giving Negative Feedback

Gneezy, Uri; Gravert, Christina; Saccardo, Silvia; Tausch, Franziska

アイテム詳細

登録内容を編集ファイル形式で保存

一時保存へ追加

このアイテムの新しいバージョンが利用可能です:
https://pure.mpg.de/pubman/item/item_2326393_4

詳細要約

公開

学術論文

A Must Lie Situation: Avoiding Giving Negative Feedback

MPS-Authors

/persons/resource/persons183209

Tausch, Franziska
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society;

External Resource

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2800820
(全文テキスト（全般）)

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.01.008
(全文テキスト（全般）)

Fulltext (restricted access)

There are currently no full texts shared for your IP range.

フルテキスト (公開)

公開されているフルテキストはありません

付随資料 (公開)

There is no public supplementary material available

引用

Gneezy, U., Gravert, C., Saccardo, S., & Tausch, F. (2017). A Must Lie Situation: Avoiding Giving Negative Feedback. Games and Economic Behavior.

引用: https://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-002B-146C-A

要旨

We examine under what conditions people provide accurate feedback to others. We use feedback regarding attractiveness, a trait people care about, and for which objective information is hard to obtain. Our results show that people avoid giving accurate face-to-face feedback to less attractive individuals, even if lying in this context comes at a monetary cost to both the person who gives the feedback and the receiver. A substantial increase of these costs does not increase the accuracy of feedback. However, when feedback is provided anonymously, the aversion to giving negative feedback is reduced.