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Journal Article

Device Calibration Impacts Security of Quantum Key Distribution

MPS-Authors
/persons/resource/persons201098

Jain,  Nitin
Quantum Information Processing, Leuchs Division, Max Planck Institute for the Science of Light, Max Planck Society;

/persons/resource/persons201234

Wittmann,  Christoffer
Quantum Information Processing, Leuchs Division, Max Planck Institute for the Science of Light, Max Planck Society;

/persons/resource/persons201053

Elser,  Dominique
Quantum Information Processing, Leuchs Division, Max Planck Institute for the Science of Light, Max Planck Society;

/persons/resource/persons201126

Marquardt,  Christoph
Quantum Information Processing, Leuchs Division, Max Planck Institute for the Science of Light, Max Planck Society;

/persons/resource/persons201115

Leuchs,  Gerd
Leuchs Division, Max Planck Institute for the Science of Light, Max Planck Society;

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Citation

Jain, N., Wittmann, C., Lydersen, L., Wiechers, C., Elser, D., Marquardt, C., et al. (2011). Device Calibration Impacts Security of Quantum Key Distribution. PHYSICAL REVIEW LETTERS, 107(11): 110501. doi:10.1103/PhysRevLett.107.110501.


Cite as: https://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-002D-698F-C
Abstract
Characterizing the physical channel and calibrating the cryptosystem hardware are prerequisites for establishing a quantum channel for quantum key distribution (QKD). Moreover, an inappropriately implemented calibration routine can open a fatal security loophole. We propose and experimentally demonstrate a method to induce a large temporal detector efficiency mismatch in a commercial QKD system by deceiving a channel length calibration routine. We then devise an optimal and realistic strategy using faked states to break the security of the cryptosystem. A fix for this loophole is also suggested.