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Detector decoy quantum key distribution

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Moroder,  Tobias
Max Planck Research Group, Max Planck Institute for the Science of Light, Max Planck Society;

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Curty,  Marcos
Max Planck Research Group, Max Planck Institute for the Science of Light, Max Planck Society;

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Luetkenhaus,  Norbert
Max Planck Research Group, Max Planck Institute for the Science of Light, Max Planck Society;

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Citation

Moroder, T., Curty, M., & Luetkenhaus, N. (2009). Detector decoy quantum key distribution. NEW JOURNAL OF PHYSICS, 11: 045008. doi:10.1088/1367-2630/11/4/045008.


Cite as: https://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-002D-6BFB-E
Abstract
Photon number resolving detectors can enhance the performance of many practical quantum cryptographic setups. In this paper, we employ a simple method to estimate the statistics provided by such a photon number resolving detector using only a threshold detector together with a variable attenuator. This idea is similar in spirit to that of the decoy state technique, and is especially suited to those scenarios where only a few parameters of the photon number statistics of the incoming signals have to be estimated. As an illustration of the potential applicability of the method in quantum communication protocols, we use it to prove security of an entanglement-based quantum key distribution scheme with an untrusted source without the need for a squash model and by solely using this extra idea. In this sense, this detector decoy method can be seen as a different conceptual approach to adapt a single-photon security proof to its physical, full optical implementation. We show that in this scenario, the legitimate users can now even discard the double click events from the raw key data without compromising the security of the scheme, and we present simulations on the performance of the BB84 and the 6-state quantum key distribution protocols.