Effect of detector dead times on the security evaluation of 
differential-phase-shift quantum key distribution against sequential attacks

Curty, Marcos; Tamaki, Kiyoshi; Moroder, Tobias

doi:10.1103/PhysRevA.77.052321

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Effect of detector dead times on the security evaluation of differential-phase-shift quantum key distribution against sequential attacks

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Curty, Marcos
Max Planck Research Group, Max Planck Institute for the Science of Light, Max Planck Society;

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Moroder, Tobias
Max Planck Research Group, Max Planck Institute for the Science of Light, Max Planck Society;

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Citation

Curty, M., Tamaki, K., & Moroder, T. (2008). Effect of detector dead times on the security evaluation of differential-phase-shift quantum key distribution against sequential attacks. PHYSICAL REVIEW A, 77(5): 052321. doi:10.1103/PhysRevA.77.052321.

Cite as: https://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-002D-6CA8-F

Abstract

We investigate limitations imposed by detector dead times on the performance of sequential attacks against a differential-phase-shift (DPS) quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol with weak coherent pulses. In particular; we analyze sequential attacks based on unambiguous state discrimination of the signal states emitted by the source and we obtain ultimate upper bounds on the maximal distance achievable by a DPS QKD scheme both for the case of calibrated and uncalibrated devices, respectively.