Unconditional security of the Bennett 1992 quantum key-distribution protocol 
over a lossy and noisy channel

Tamaki, K; Lutkenhaus, N

doi:10.1103/PhysRevA.69.032316

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Unconditional security of the Bennett 1992 quantum key-distribution protocol over a lossy and noisy channel

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Lutkenhaus, N
Max Planck Research Group, Max Planck Institute for the Science of Light, Max Planck Society;

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Citation

Tamaki, K., & Lutkenhaus, N. (2004). Unconditional security of the Bennett 1992 quantum key-distribution protocol over a lossy and noisy channel. PHYSICAL REVIEW A, 69(3): 032316. doi:10.1103/PhysRevA.69.032316.

Cite as: https://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-002D-6DEA-2

Abstract

We show that the security proof of the Bennett 1992 protocol over loss-free channel given by Tamaki, Koashi, and Imoto [Phys. Rev. Lett. 90, 167904 (2003)] can be adapted to accommodate loss. We assumed that Bob's detectors discriminate between single-photon states on one hand and vacuum state or multiphoton states on the other hand.