Compliance with endogenous audit probabilities

Konrad, Kai A.; Lohse, Tim; Qari, Salmai

doi:10.1111/sjoe.12182

アイテム詳細

登録内容を編集ファイル形式で保存

一時保存へ追加

タグ情報を表示リリース履歴を表示詳細要約

公開

学術論文

Compliance with endogenous audit probabilities

MPS-Authors

/persons/resource/persons51208

Konrad, Kai A.
Public Economics, MPI for Tax Law and Public Finance, Max Planck Society;

External Resource

There are no locators available

Fulltext (restricted access)

There are currently no full texts shared for your IP range.

フルテキスト (公開)

公開されているフルテキストはありません

付随資料 (公開)

There is no public supplementary material available

引用

Konrad, K. A., Lohse, T., & Qari, S. (2017). Compliance with endogenous audit probabilities. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 119(3), 821-850. doi:10.1111/sjoe.12182.

引用: https://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-002C-4032-1

要旨

This paper studies the effect of endogenous audit probabilities on reporting behavior in a face-to-face compliance situation such as at customs. In an experimental setting in which underreporting has a higher expected payoff than truthful reporting we find an increase in compliance of about 80% if subjects have reason to believe that their behavior towards an officer influences their endogenous audit probability. Higher compliance is driven by considerations about how own appearance and performance affect their audit probability, rather than by social and psychological effects of face-to-face contact.