Quality contests

Serena, Marco

doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2016.10.008

Item

ITEM ACTIONSEXPORT

Add to Basket

Local TagsRelease HistoryDetailsSummary

Released

Journal Article

Quality contests

MPS-Authors

/persons/resource/persons201896

Serena, Marco
Public Economics, MPI for Tax Law and Public Finance, Max Planck Society;

External Resource

No external resources are shared

Fulltext (restricted access)

There are currently no full texts shared for your IP range.

Fulltext (public)

There are no public fulltexts stored in PuRe

Supplementary Material (public)

There is no public supplementary material available

Citation

Serena, M. (2017). Quality contests. European Journal of Political Economy, 46(January), 15-25. doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2016.10.008.

Cite as: https://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-002C-4B21-F

Abstract

In noisy contests where only the winner's entry will eventually be implemented, the suitable objective is to maximize the expected quality of the entry of the winner. We compare the optimal set of rules in contests under such an objective to the one under maximization of the sum of contestants’ efforts, which is commonly assumed in the literature, and find that it may be beneficial to exclude weak contestants, unlevel the playing field, and weaken the underdog.