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Paper

Level-k models rationalize overspending in contests

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Serena,  Marco
Public Economics, MPI for Tax Law and Public Finance, Max Planck Society;

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https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2874894
(Preprint)

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Citation

Serena, M., & Arve, M. (2016). Level-k models rationalize overspending in contests. Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance, 2018-09. doi:10.2139/ssrn.2874894.


Cite as: https://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-002C-4CCE-5
Abstract
The experimental evidence on contests often reports significant overspending of subjects as opposed to the Nash equilibrium. We complement the existing explanations by providing a theoretical rationale for overspending which is based on the level-k model.