The Moral-Hazard Effect of Liquidated Damages: An Experiment on Contract 
Remedies

Hoeppner, Sven; Freund, Lars; Depoorter, Ben

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The Moral-Hazard Effect of Liquidated Damages: An Experiment on Contract Remedies

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Freund, Lars
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society;

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https://doi.org/10.1628/093245616X14785139251341
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Hoeppner, S., Freund, L., & Depoorter, B. (2017). The Moral-Hazard Effect of Liquidated Damages: An Experiment on Contract Remedies. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 173(1), 84-105.

Cite as: https://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-002C-EB47-5

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