Abstract
Until a few years ago, the received wisdom about corporatism was that although it had once
been an important institutional alternative to liberal capitalism, it was crumbling everywhere
due to the combined effects of globalization, European integration, technological change, and
a generalized employer offensive. Against this backdrop, this paper argues that corporatism
survived as an institutional structure (at least in European countries), but became pointedly
less egalitarian. Essentially, it became a policy process by which governments that were
unable or unwilling to engage in unilateral reform (for example, due to parliamentary weakness
or fear of electoral retribution) managed to implement policy changes whose fundamental
orientation was neoliberal. Perhaps surprisingly, the new corporatism also became more
internally participatory and democratic than in the old days. This change compensated for
the disappearance of the political exchange traditionally associated with classic corporatism.
Because unions were no longer rewarded for bargaining moderation through more generous
social protection programs or other side payments, they began to pay more attention to issues
of procedural democracy in order to legitimize centrally negotiated agreements. The evidence
buttressing these claims comes from quantitative data for 16 OECD countries between 1974
and 2005 and case study evidence of Ireland and Italy.
