日本語
 
User Manual Privacy Policy ポリシー/免責事項 連絡先
  詳細検索ブラウズ

アイテム詳細


公開

学術論文

Normative conflict and the limits of self-governance in heterogeneous populations

MPS-Authors
/persons/resource/persons183177

Nikiforakis,  Nikos
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society;

URL

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2017.07.013
(全文テキスト(全般))

フルテキスト (公開)
公開されているフルテキストはありません
付随資料 (公開)
There is no public supplementary material available
引用

Gangadharan, L., Nikiforakis, N., & Villeval, M. C. (2017). Normative conflict and the limits of self-governance in heterogeneous populations. European Economic Review, 100, 143-156.


引用: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-002D-E409-8
要旨
Mechanisms to overcome social dilemmas provide incentives to maximize efficiency. However, often – such as when agents are heterogeneous – there is a trade-off between efficiency and equality – a normative conflict – which is overlooked. Agents’ concerns for equality in such instances can limit the ability of mechanisms to promote efficiency. We provide evidence for this from a public good experiment using a simple mechanism allowing individuals to communicate periodically with other group members and reward them for their actions. We show that, in homogeneous populations – where there is no conflict between efficiency and equality – the mechanism permits groups to obtain maximum efficiency. This is not the case in heterogeneous populations despite the fact that individuals could use rewards to resolve the normative conflict. Although almost all heterogeneous groups agree to follow specific contribution rules with positive contributions, most of them either prioritize equality over efficiency or strike a compromise between the two. These findings suggest normative conflict can be difficult to overcome, imposing limits on the ability of heterogeneous populations to reach efficient outcomes through self-governance.