A Socialization Paradox: Trade Union Policy Cooperation in the Case of the 
Enforcement Directive of the Posting of Workers Directive

Seeliger, Martin; Wagner, Ines

doi:10.1093/ser/mwy037

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A Socialization Paradox: Trade Union Policy Cooperation in the Case of the Enforcement Directive of the Posting of Workers Directive

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Seeliger, Martin
Projekte von Gastwissenschaftlern und Postdoc-Stipendiaten, MPI for the Study of Societies, Max Planck Society;
Institute of Sociology, Europa-University Flensburg, Germany;

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https://doi.org/10.1093/ser/mwy037
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引用

Seeliger, M., & Wagner, I. (2020). A Socialization Paradox: Trade Union Policy Cooperation in the Case of the Enforcement Directive of the Posting of Workers Directive. Socio-Economic Review, 18(4), 1113-1131. doi:10.1093/ser/mwy037.

引用: https://hdl.handle.net/21.11116/0000-0002-0B3D-F

要旨

The formulation of common political positions from the trade union movement at
the European Union (EU) level mainly takes place at the European Trade Union
Confederation (ETUC). In the case of the Enforcement Directive of the Posting of
Workers Directive, a central cleavage line runs between neither countries nor political
parties, but between different vertical levels of the system of European labor
relations—the sectoral and interprofessional levels. Here, due to both horizontal and
vertical differences, trade unions were unable to effectively formulate and pursue
joint positions. On these grounds, we aspire to provide a theoretical argument on
political dynamics in the EU’s multilevel system. While the ETUC representatives
internalize supranational norms through their embeddedness in the EU’s institutional
landscape, this socialization process does not advance—but rather prevents—
integration by disrupting trade union power at the supranational level.