Why Do Trade Unions Engage in Wage Coordination, Although it Does Not Work? 
Evidence from the German Metal Sector

Seeliger, Martin

doi:10.15173/glj.v9i3.3358

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Why Do Trade Unions Engage in Wage Coordination, Although it Does Not Work? Evidence from the German Metal Sector

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Seeliger, Martin
Projekte von Gastwissenschaftlern und Postdoc-Stipendiaten, MPI for the Study of Societies, Max Planck Society;
Europa University Flensburg, Germany;

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https://mulpress.mcmaster.ca/globallabour/article/view/3358
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GLJ_9_2018_Seeliger.pdf
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引用

Seeliger, M. (2018). Why Do Trade Unions Engage in Wage Coordination, Although it Does Not Work? Evidence from the German Metal Sector. Global Labour Journal, 9(3), 303-318. doi:10.15173/glj.v9i3.3358.

引用: https://hdl.handle.net/21.11116/0000-0002-4EB7-9

要旨

The article addresses the following puzzle: if, as it appears, wage coordination under the European Monetary Union is unlikely to succeed, why do European trade unions continue to pursue it? The article examines German metal-sector trade unions’ ongoing participation in wage-coordination initiatives within the Eurozone. It argues that their participation can be explained by two factors – a decoupling of talk and action, as two complementary types of organisational output, and the reframing of wage coordination as an activity that will pay off in the distant future.