Peer-Punishment in a Cooperation and a Coordination Game

Albrecht, Felix; Kube, Sebastian

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Peer-Punishment in a Cooperation and a Coordination Game

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Kube, Sebastian
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society;

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https://doi.org/10.3390/g9030054
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Citation

Albrecht, F., & Kube, S. (2018). Peer-Punishment in a Cooperation and a Coordination Game. Games, 9(3): 54.

Cite as: https://hdl.handle.net/21.11116/0000-0002-B699-4

Abstract

We elicit individual-level peer-punishment types in a cooperation (social dilemma) and a coordination (weakest link) problem. In line with previous literature, we find heterogeneity in peer-punishment in both environments. Comparing punishment behavior across the two environments within subject, we observe a high degree of individuals’ punishment type stability. However, the aggregate punishment demand is higher in the weakest-link game. The difference between the two environments is driven by subjects whose behavioral types are inconsistent rather than by a change in the punishment demand of those who punish in both environments.