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Journal Article

Complete information pivotal-voter model with asymmetric group size


Serena,  Marco
Public Economics, MPI for Tax Law and Public Finance, Max Planck Society;

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Mavridis, C., & Serena, M. (2018). Complete information pivotal-voter model with asymmetric group size. Public Choice, 177(1-2), 53-66. doi:10.1007/s11127-018-0585-6.

Cite as: https://hdl.handle.net/21.11116/0000-0002-CD46-9
We study the equilibria of the standard pivotal-voter participation game between two groups of voters of asymmetric sizes (majority and minority), as originally proposed by Palfrey and Rosenthal (Public Choice 41(1):7–53, 1983). We find a unique equilibrium wherein the minority votes with certainty and the majority votes with probability in (0, 1); we prove that this is the only equilibrium in which voters of only one group play a pure strategy, and we provide sufficient conditions for its existence. Equilibria where voters of both groups vote with probability in (0, 1) are analyzed numerically.