English
 
User Manual Privacy Policy Disclaimer Contact us
  Advanced SearchBrowse

Item

ITEM ACTIONSEXPORT

Released

Paper

Sequential majoritarian Blotto Games

MPS-Authors
/persons/resource/persons51208

Konrad,  Kai A.
Public Economics, MPI for Tax Law and Public Finance, Max Planck Society;

External Ressource
Fulltext (public)
There are no public fulltexts stored in PuRe
Supplementary Material (public)
There is no public supplementary material available
Citation

Klumpp, T., & Konrad, K. A. (2018). Sequential majoritarian Blotto Games. Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance, No. 2018-5. doi:10.2139/ssrn.3190035.


Cite as: http://hdl.handle.net/21.11116/0000-0002-F44C-6
Abstract
We study Colonel Blotto games with sequential battles and a majoritarian objective. For a large class of contest success functions, the equilibrium is unique and characterized by an even split: Each battle that is reached before one of the players wins a majority of battles is allocated the same amount of resources from the player's overall budget. As a consequence, a player's chance of winning any particular battle is independent of the battlefield and of the number of victories and losses the player accumulated in prior battles. This result is in stark contrast to equilibrium behavior in sequential contests that do not involve either fixed budgets or a majoritarian objective. We also consider the equilibrium choice of an overall budget. For many contest success functions, if the sequence of battles is long enough the payoff structure in this extended games resembles an all-pay auction without noise.