要旨
In the growing collection of literature on the EU’s governance credentials, security and defence activities of the Union remain under-represented. This thesis attempts to fill that void by shedding light on the law and practice of accountability in EU civilian crisis management. Unknown to many, the EU has since 2003 launched more than 20 civilian missions across Europe, Africa, and Asia under its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Mandates cover a broad range of multidimensional tasks, such as rule of law support, police training, border assistance, security sector reform, and military capacity building. Currently, some 2,500 experts—comprising lawyers, police personnel, customs officers, and security sector specialists—work in ten ongoing EU civilian missions. In view of these numbers, it begs the question who is accountable (to whom) for the Union’s extraterritorial peacebuilding activities, all of which touch upon core State functions. The thesis begins by unpacking the governance set-up of civilian CSDP and shows that EU civilian crisis management is intergovernmental in form, but Europeanized in substance. While Treaty provisions set out an intergovernmental framework in which Member States—exclusively—pull the strings, the real world of civilian CSDP looks different: an influential and efficient Brussels-based bureaucracy runs the show, with high-level government representatives of Member States entering the stage from time to time to formalize or endorse, where necessary, the work which has been done or prepared by the Europeanized bureaucratic machinery. Yet, primary law largely remains silent about these Europeanized realities. Building on this observation, the thesis investigates both de jure and de facto accountability arrangements in EU civilian crisis management. Drawing on legal sources and empirical data, the thesis scrutinizes political, legal, and administrative accountability mechanisms existing in Member States, on the EU plane, and across levels. The study furthermore evaluates the appropriateness of existing accountability arrangements based on a combination of quantitative and qualitative criteria. The core finding is that, notwithstanding an accountability deficit observed de jure, several EU players—notably the European Parliament, the Court of Justice of the EU, the European Ombudsman, and the European Court of Auditors—have through practice managed to significantly increase parliamentary scrutiny, judicial review, and administrative oversight in civilian CSDP. In addition, civilian crisis management actors themselves have—also due to outside pressure—modified internal processes and institutional arrangements to facilitate accountability. As a result, checks and balances are stronger at EU than at Member State level, and individuals have de facto better—even though not perfect—judicial and administrative redress options at the supranational level. Hence, when focusing on the institutional and procedural framework set out by law, the accountability-glass is at best half-empty, but when glancing at it from a practice angle, the glass is at least half-full. Instead of aiming for codification by Treaty revision, the thesis suggests to consolidate the de facto accountability acquis at EU level by a combination of reinforced interinstitutional practice and agreements, on the one hand, and by tighter administrative rules and regulations, on the other hand.
