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Judicial Self-Government in Italy: Merits, Limits and the Reality of an Export Model

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Paris,  Davide
Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law, Max Planck Society;

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Paris, D., & Benvenuti, S. (2018). Judicial Self-Government in Italy: Merits, Limits and the Reality of an Export Model. German Law Journal - open access to comparative, european and international law, 19(7), 1641-1669. doi:10.1017/S2071832200023191.


Cite as: http://hdl.handle.net/21.11116/0000-0003-E5AE-7
Abstract
The Italian model of judicial self-government is often presented as a successful example of institutional reform to be copied in young democracies. This paper provides a deeper and multifaceted image of it and takes stock of its performance in securing the independence and the accountability of the judiciary. It first maps the rationale and the actors of judicial self-government in Italy, stressing, in particular, that the Italian model of judicial self-government not only aims at preventing the influence of the judiciary by external powers, but it is also equally concerned by threats to judicial independence coming from within the judiciary. It then provides a longitudinal analysis of the impact of this model of judicial self-government on the values of the independence and the accountability of the judiciary after the establishment of the High Council of the Judiciary in 1958. While acknowledging the crucial role of this body in securing the independence of the judiciary, this article claims that the values of independence and accountability of the judiciary have been achieved only progressively and partially.