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Building judicial authority: a comparison between the Italian Constitutional Court and the German Federal Constitutional Court

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von Bogdandy,  Armin
Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law, Max Planck Society;

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Paris,  Davide
Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law, Max Planck Society;

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Citation

von Bogdandy, A., & Paris, D. (2019). Building judicial authority: a comparison between the Italian Constitutional Court and the German Federal Constitutional Court. MPIL Research Paper Series, 2019-01. doi:10.2139/ssrn.3313641.


Cite as: https://hdl.handle.net/21.11116/0000-0008-759F-2
Abstract
This paper examines the foundations of the Italian Constitutional Court’s authority by comparing it with that of the German Federal Constitutional Court. In comparison to the German Court, la Corte had to build its authority on a particularly weak legal basis. However, it succeeded in developing a dynamic of “power in weakness” which explains important features of the Italian Constitutional Court: its exceptionally cooperative relationship with the ordinary courts, its terse style of reasoning, its deliberate low profile in public opinion, its activist interaction with the legislature, and its tactical dialogue with the EU Court of Justice.