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Journal Article

The dynamics of majoritarian Blotto games


Konrad,  Kai A.
Public Economics, MPI for Tax Law and Public Finance, Max Planck Society;

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Klumpp, T., Konrad, K. A., & Solomon, A. (2019). The dynamics of majoritarian Blotto games. Games and Economic Behavior, 117, 402-419. doi:10.1016/j.geb.2019.07.004.

Cite as: https://hdl.handle.net/21.11116/0000-0005-B61E-D
We study Colonel Blotto games with sequential battles and a majoritarian objective. For a large class of contest success functions, the equilibrium is unique and characterized by an even split: Each battle that is reached before one of the players wins a majority of battles is allocated the same amount of resources from the player's overall budget. As a consequence, a player's chance of winning any particular battle is independent of the battlefield and of the number of victories and losses the player has accumulated in prior battles. This result is in stark contrast to equilibrium behavior in sequential contests that do not involve either fixed budgets or a majoritarian objective. We also consider the equilibrium choice of an overall budget. For many contest success functions, if the sequence of battles is long enough the payoff structure in this extended game resembles an all-pay auction without noise.