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Monetary and Social Incentives in Multi-Tasking: The Ranking Substitution Effect

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Sutter,  Matthias
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society;

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Stefan, M., Huber, J., Kirchler, M., Sutter, M., & Walzl, M. (2020). Monetary and Social Incentives in Multi-Tasking: The Ranking Substitution Effect.


Cite as: http://hdl.handle.net/21.11116/0000-0006-66F3-5
Abstract
Rankings are prevalent information and incentive tools in labor markets with strong competition for talent. In a dynamic model of multi-tasking and an accompanying experiment with financial professionals, we identify hidden ranking costs when performance in one task is incentivized and ranked while another prosocial task is not: (i) a ranking influences behavior if individuals lag behind: they spend more total effort and substitute effort in the prosocial task with effort in the ranked task; (ii) those ahead in the ranking spend less total effort and lower relative effort in the ranked task. Implications for incentive schemes are discussed.