Decision Costs and Welfare Effects of Democratic Voting Rules: An Experimental 
Analysis

Glassmann, Ulrich; Sauermann, Jan

doi:10.1515/wpsr-2012-0008

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Decision Costs and Welfare Effects of Democratic Voting Rules: An Experimental Analysis

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Sauermann, Jan
University of Cologne, Germany;
International Max Planck Research School on the Social and Political Constitution of the Economy, MPI for the Study of Societies, Max Planck Society;

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https://doi.org/10.1515/wpsr-2012-0008
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http://hdl.handle.net/21.11116/0000-0006-96C2-5
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Citation

Glassmann, U., & Sauermann, J. (2012). Decision Costs and Welfare Effects of Democratic Voting Rules: An Experimental Analysis. World Political Science Review, 8(1), 159-183. doi:10.1515/wpsr-2012-0008.

Cite as: https://hdl.handle.net/21.11116/0000-0006-96D5-0

Abstract

What impact do majority rule and unanimity rule have on welfare and decision costs? According to Buchanan and Tullock ([1962] 1999) the unanimity principle must be regarded as a democratic norm, because it guarantees Pareto-efficient welfare effects. We present experimental results from a public goods game, which demonstrate in contrast to this assumption that majority rule can produce greater welfare effects than unanimity rule. This result suggests a critical revision of theoretical approaches which narrow the legitimacy of majority rule in this respect.