Deutsch
 
Hilfe Datenschutzhinweis Impressum
  DetailsucheBrowse

Datensatz

DATENSATZ AKTIONENEXPORT

Freigegeben

Forschungspapier

Heuristics From Bounded Meta-Learned Inference

MPG-Autoren
/persons/resource/persons139782

Schulz,  E
Research Group Computational Principles of Intelligence, Max Planck Institute for Biological Cybernetics, Max Planck Society;
Max Planck Institute for Biological Cybernetics, Max Planck Society;

Externe Ressourcen

https://psyarxiv.com/5du2b/
(beliebiger Volltext)

Volltexte (beschränkter Zugriff)
Für Ihren IP-Bereich sind aktuell keine Volltexte freigegeben.
Volltexte (frei zugänglich)
Es sind keine frei zugänglichen Volltexte in PuRe verfügbar
Ergänzendes Material (frei zugänglich)
Es sind keine frei zugänglichen Ergänzenden Materialien verfügbar
Zitation

Binz, M., Gershman, S., Schulz, E., & Endres, D. (submitted). Heuristics From Bounded Meta-Learned Inference.


Zitierlink: https://hdl.handle.net/21.11116/0000-0006-D3F1-B
Zusammenfassung
Numerous researchers have put forward heuristics as models of human decision making. However, where such heuristics come from is still a topic of ongoing debates. In this work we propose a novel computational model that advances our understanding of heuristic decision making by explaining how different heuristics are discovered and how they are selected. This model, called bounded meta-learned inference, is based on the idea that people make environment-specific inferences about which strategies to use, while being efficient in terms of how they use computational resources. We show that our approach discovers two previously suggested types of heuristics -- one reason decision making and equal weighting -- in specific environments. Furthermore, the model provides clear and precise predictions about when each heuristic should be applied: knowing the correct ranking of attributes leads to one reason decision making, knowing the directions of the attributes leads to equal weighting, and not knowing about either leads to strategies that use weighted combinations of multiple attributes. This allows us to gain new insights on mixed results of prior empirical work on heuristic decision making. In three empirical paired comparison studies with continuous features, we verify predictions of our theory, and show that it captures several characteristics of human decision making not explained by alternative theories.