The stability of conditional cooperation: Beliefs alone cannot explain the 
decline of cooperation in social dilemmas

Andreozzi, Luciano; Ploner, Matteo; Saral, Ali Seyhun

doi:10.1038/s41598-020-70681-z

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The stability of conditional cooperation: Beliefs alone cannot explain the decline of cooperation in social dilemmas

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Saral, Ali Seyhun
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society;

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Andreozzi, L., Ploner, M., & Saral, A. S. (2020). The stability of conditional cooperation: Beliefs alone cannot explain the decline of cooperation in social dilemmas. Scientific Reports, 10(1): 13610. doi:10.1038/s41598-020-70681-z.

Cite as: https://hdl.handle.net/21.11116/0000-0006-DD1B-4

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