English
 
Help Privacy Policy Disclaimer
  Advanced SearchBrowse

Item

ITEM ACTIONSEXPORT
Add to Basket
  Local TagsRelease HistoryDetailsSummary

Released
Book Chapter

The evolution of deliberate ignorance in strategic interaction

MPS-Authors
/persons/resource/persons61106

Hilbe,  Christian       
Max Planck Research Group Dynamics of Social Behavior (Hilbe), Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Max Planck Society;

External Resource
No external resources are shared
Fulltext (restricted access)
There are currently no full texts shared for your IP range.
Fulltext (public)
There are no public fulltexts stored in PuRe
Supplementary Material (public)
There is no public supplementary material available
Citation

Schmid, L., & Hilbe, C. (2021). The evolution of deliberate ignorance in strategic interaction. In R. Hertwig, & C. Engel (Eds.), Deliberate Ignorance: Choosing Not to Know (pp. 139-152). Cambridge: MIT Press. doi:10.7551/mitpress/13757.001.0001.


Cite as: https://hdl.handle.net/21.11116/0000-0007-9CA2-2
Abstract
Optimal decision making requires individuals to know their available options and to
anticipate correctly what consequences these options have. In many social interactions,
however, we refrain from gathering all relevant information, even if this information
would help us make better decisions and is costless to obtain. This chapter examines
several examples of “deliberate ignorance.” Two simple models are proposed to illustrate how ignorance can evolve among self-interested and payoff - maximizing individuals, and open problems are highlighted that lie ahead for future research to explore.