Incentives for Data Sharing as a Case on (Regulating) Knowledge Externalities

Kim, Daria

doi:10.1007/978-3-662-65974-8_16

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Incentives for Data Sharing as a Case on (Regulating) Knowledge Externalities

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Kim, Daria
MPI for Innovation and Competition, Max Planck Society;

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Citation

Kim, D. (2023). Incentives for Data Sharing as a Case on (Regulating) Knowledge Externalities. In C. Godt, & M. Lamping (Eds.), A Critical Mind. Hanns Ullrich’s Footprint in Internal Market Law, Antitrust and Intellectual Property (pp. 407-439). Berlin: Springer.

Cite as: https://hdl.handle.net/21.11116/0000-0007-B7EE-F

Abstract

This contribution reflects on the question posed by Professor Hanns Ullrich: Which concepts and principles of intellectual property law inform the design of a regulatory framework for the data economy? Even though data and knowledge do not lend themselves to form a perfect analogy, their governance underlies the same dilemma of whether, and to what extent, resources that are non-rivalrous in use should be treated as excludable or a non-excludable economic goods. The analysis focuses on the ‘access-incentives stalemate’ over device-generated data and takes recourse to literature on economics of knowledge and innovation in search of guidance as to how the trade-off between the broad accessibility of data and the protection of innovation incentives should be resolved.