Deutsch
 
Hilfe Datenschutzhinweis Impressum
  DetailsucheBrowse

Datensatz

DATENSATZ AKTIONENEXPORT

Freigegeben

Buchkapitel

Differences Between Natural and Artificial Cognitive Systems

MPG-Autoren
/persons/resource/persons141798

Singer,  Wolf
Neurophysiology Department, Max Planck Institute for Brain Research, Max Planck Society;

Externe Ressourcen
Es sind keine externen Ressourcen hinterlegt
Volltexte (beschränkter Zugriff)
Für Ihren IP-Bereich sind aktuell keine Volltexte freigegeben.
Volltexte (frei zugänglich)
Es sind keine frei zugänglichen Volltexte in PuRe verfügbar
Ergänzendes Material (frei zugänglich)
Es sind keine frei zugänglichen Ergänzenden Materialien verfügbar
Zitation

Singer, W. (2021). Differences Between Natural and Artificial Cognitive Systems. In J. von Braun, M. S. Archer, G. M. Reichberg, & M. Sánchez Sorondo (Eds.), Robotics, AI, and Humanity (pp. 17-27). Springer. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-54173-6_2.


Zitierlink: https://hdl.handle.net/21.11116/0000-0008-FF3F-4
Zusammenfassung
This chapter identifies the differences between natural and artifical cognitive systems. Benchmarking robots against brains may suggest that organisms and robots both need to possess an internal model of the restricted environment in which they act and both need to adjust their actions to the conditions of the respective environment in order to accomplish their tasks. However, computational strategies to cope with these challenges are different for natural and artificial systems. Many of the specific human qualities cannot be deduced from the neuronal functions of individual brains alone but owe their existence to cultural evolution. Social interactions between agents endowed with the cognitive abilities of humans generate immaterial realities, addressed as social or cultural realities. Intentionality, morality, responsibility and certain aspects of consciousness such as the qualia of subjective experience belong to the immaterial dimension of social realities. It is premature to enter discussions as to whether artificial systems can acquire functions that we consider as intentional and conscious or whether artificial agents can be considered as moral agents with responsibility for their actions.