Strategic disinformation outperforms honesty in competition for social influence

Kurvers, Ralf H. J. M.; Hertz, Uri; Karpus, Jurgis; Balode, Marta P.; Jayles, Bertrand; Binmore, Ken; Bahrami, Bahador

doi:10.1016/j.isci.2021.103505

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Strategic disinformation outperforms honesty in competition for social influence

MPS-Authors

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Kurvers, Ralf H. J. M.
Center for Adaptive Rationality, Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Max Planck Society;

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Balode, Marta P.
Center for Adaptive Rationality, Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Max Planck Society;

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Jayles, Bertrand
Center for Adaptive Rationality, Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Max Planck Society;

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Bahrami, Bahador
Center for Adaptive Rationality, Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Max Planck Society;

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https://doi.org/10.1016/j.isci.2021.103505
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Citation

Kurvers, R. H. J. M., Hertz, U., Karpus, J., Balode, M. P., Jayles, B., Binmore, K., et al. (2021). Strategic disinformation outperforms honesty in competition for social influence. iScience, 24(12): 103505. doi:10.1016/j.isci.2021.103505.

Cite as: https://hdl.handle.net/21.11116/0000-0009-771C-3

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