Compulsory Disclosure of Private Information: Theoretical and Experimental 
Results for the Acquiring-a-Company Game

Güth, Werner; Pull, Kerstin; Stadler, Manfred; Zaby, Alexandra

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Compulsory Disclosure of Private Information: Theoretical and Experimental Results for the Acquiring-a-Company Game

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Güth, Werner
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society;

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https://doi.org/10.1628/jite-2018-0013
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Güth, W., Pull, K., Stadler, M., & Zaby, A. (2019). Compulsory Disclosure of Private Information: Theoretical and Experimental Results for the Acquiring-a-Company Game. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 175(3), 502-523.

Cite as: https://hdl.handle.net/21.11116/0000-0009-9584-9

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