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An empirical analysis of stubborn bargaining

MPS-Authors
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Send,  Jonas
Public Economics, MPI for Tax Law and Public Finance, Max Planck Society;

/persons/resource/persons201896

Serena,  Marco
Public Economics, MPI for Tax Law and Public Finance, Max Planck Society;

External Resource

https://ssrn.com/abstract=3787029
(Preprint)

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2022.102516
(Publisher version)

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Citation

Send, J., & Serena, M. (2021). An empirical analysis of stubborn bargaining. Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance, No. 2021-05. doi:10.2139/ssrn.3787029.


Cite as: https://hdl.handle.net/21.11116/0000-000A-E03B-7
Abstract
In alternating-offer bargaining, a seller is "stubborn" if she demands the same asking price more than once. We provide empirical evidence on stubbornness and inform the theoretical literature by analyzing millions of eBay bargaining threads taken from Backus et al. (2020). Focusing on the best predictors of first-period stubbornness, we find that stubbornness is sticky, exploitative, and vengeful; a seller who was stubborn in the past is more likely to be stubborn in the future, and a seller is more likely stubborn if the buyer has been particularly lenient or tough in her counteroffer.