Help Privacy Policy Disclaimer
  Advanced SearchBrowse




Journal Article

The deterrence effect of whistleblowing


Stolper,  Tim B.M.
Public Economics, MPI for Tax Law and Public Finance, Max Planck Society;

External Resource
No external resources are shared
Fulltext (restricted access)
There are currently no full texts shared for your IP range.
Fulltext (public)
There are no public fulltexts stored in PuRe
Supplementary Material (public)
There is no public supplementary material available

Johannesen, N., & Stolper, T. B. (2021). The deterrence effect of whistleblowing. The Journal of Law and Economics, 64(4), 821-855. doi:10.1086/715197.

Cite as: https://hdl.handle.net/21.11116/0000-000A-2784-5
We document that the first leak of customer information from a tax-haven bank caused a sudden flight of deposits from tax havens and a sharp decrease in the market value of banks known to be assisting with tax evasion. The loss of market value was largest for the banks most strongly involved in tax evasion. Subsequent leaks had qualitatively similar although smaller effects. Our findings suggest that whistleblowing in tax-haven banks deters offshore tax evaders by increasing the perceived risk of committing and assisting with tax evasion.