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Collective action and intra-group conflict with fixed budgets

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Konrad,  Kai A.
Public Economics, MPI for Tax Law and Public Finance, Max Planck Society;

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Morath,  Florian
Public Economics, MPI for Tax Law and Public Finance, Max Planck Society;

External Resource

https://ssrn.com/abstract=3909789
(Preprint)

https://ssrn.com/abstract=3928769
(Preprint)

https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2022.2151083
(Publisher version)

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Citation

Konrad, K. A., & Morath, F. (2021). Collective action and intra-group conflict with fixed budgets. Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance, No. 2021-13. doi:10.2139/ssrn.3909789.


Cite as: https://hdl.handle.net/21.11116/0000-000A-5494-0
Abstract
We study collective action under adverse incentives: each member of the group has a given budget ('use-it-or-lose-it') that is his private information and that can be used for contributions to make the group win a prize and for internal fights about this very prize. Even in the face of such rivalry in resource use, the group often succeeds to overcome the collective action problem in non-cooperative equilibrium. One type of equilibrium has group members who both contribute, the other type has volunteers who make full stand-alone contributions. Both types of equilibrium exist for larger and partially overlapping parameter ranges.