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学術論文

The Constrained Politics of Local Public Investment Under Cooperative Federalism

MPS-Authors
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Bremer,  Björn
Politische Ökonomie, MPI for the Study of Societies, Max Planck Society;

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Di Carlo,  Donato
Politische Ökonomie der europäischen Integration, MPI for the Study of Societies, Max Planck Society;

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Wansleben,  Leon
Soziologie öffentlicher Finanzen und Schulden, MPI for the Study of Societies, Max Planck Society;

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SER_21_2023_Bremer.pdf
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引用

Bremer, B., Di Carlo, D., & Wansleben, L. (2023). The Constrained Politics of Local Public Investment Under Cooperative Federalism. Socio-Economic Review, 21(2), 1007-1034. doi:10.1093/ser/mwac026.


引用: https://hdl.handle.net/21.11116/0000-000A-97FD-F
要旨
Public investment spending declined steadily in advanced economies during the last three decades. Germany is a case in point where the aggregate decline coincided with growing inequality in investments across districts. What explains the variation in local investment spending? We assembled a novel data set to investigate the effects of structural constraints and partisanship on German districts’ investment spending from 1995 to 2018. We find that the lack of fiscal and administrative capacity significantly influences local investment patterns. Yet, within these constraints, partisanship matters. Conservative politicians tend to prioritize public investment more than the left. This is especially the case when revenues from local taxes are low. As the fiscal conditions improve, left-wing politicians increase investment more strongly and hence the difference between the left and the right disappears. Our findings are indicative of how regional economic divergence can emerge even within cooperative federal systems and show that, even when decision-makers operate under various institutional and structural constraints, partisanship matters for how these actors allocate discretionary spending.