English
 
Help Privacy Policy Disclaimer
  Advanced SearchBrowse

Item

ITEM ACTIONSEXPORT

Released

Preprint

Action anticipation based on an agent's epistemic state in toddlers and adults

MPS-Authors
/persons/resource/persons37975

Grosse Wiesmann,  Charlotte       
Minerva Fast Track Group Milestones of Early Cognitive Development, MPI for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences, Max Planck Society;

/persons/resource/persons251096

Rothmaler,  Katrin       
Minerva Fast Track Group Milestones of Early Cognitive Development, MPI for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences, Max Planck Society;

/persons/resource/persons251103

Tebbe,  Anna-Lena       
Minerva Fast Track Group Milestones of Early Cognitive Development, MPI for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences, Max Planck Society;

External Resource
No external resources are shared
Fulltext (restricted access)
There are currently no full texts shared for your IP range.
Fulltext (public)

Schuwerk_pre.pdf
(Preprint), 4MB

Supplementary Material (public)
There is no public supplementary material available
Citation

Schuwerk, T., Kampis, D., Baillargeon, R., Biro, S., Bohn, M., Byers-Heinlein, K., et al. (2021). Action anticipation based on an agent's epistemic state in toddlers and adults. PsyArXiv. doi:10.31234/osf.io/x4jbm.


Cite as: https://hdl.handle.net/21.11116/0000-000B-24B4-1
Abstract
Do toddlers and adults engage in spontaneous Theory of Mind (ToM)? Evidence from anticipatory looking (AL) studies suggests that they do. But a growing body of failed replication studies raised questions about the paradigm’s suitability. In this multi-lab collaboration, we test the robustness of spontaneous ToM measures. We examine whether 18- to 27-month-olds’ and adults’ anticipatory looks distinguish between two basic forms of an agent’s epistemic states: knowledge and ignorance. In toddlers [ANTICIPATED n = 520 50% FEMALE] and adults [ANTICIPATED n = 408, 50% FEMALE] from diverse ethnic backgrounds, we found [SUPPORT/NO SUPPORT] for epistemic state-based action anticipation. Future research can probe whether this conclusion extends to more complex kinds of epistemic states, such as true and false beliefs.