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Abstract

To what extent can political parties steer public preferences for international co- operation? International cooperation has become increasingly politicized, forcing governments to heed constituents’ preferences during international negotiations. While party cueing research suggests that parties have leverage over public pref- erences, it is unclear whether public opinion is responsive to partisan cueing on contentious, real-world international cooperation proposals that directly affect na- tional autonomy. We conduct a pre-registered information treatment experiment in five countries to study the effects of in- and out-party cues on public support for in- ternational cooperation using a real-world treatment, whilst avoiding pretreatment and self-selection bias. Applied to the highly contentious case of joint European debt, we find that political parties have ample latitude to shape preferences about international cooperation, as both in-party and out-party cues affect voter pref- erences. We further find that cue reception affects citizens’ preference certainty, suggesting the importance of cueing beyond direct persuasion.