Capacity precommitment, communication, and collusive pricing: Theoretical 
benchmark and experimental evidence

Güth, Werner; Stadler, Manfred; Zaby, Alexandra

doi:10.1007/s00182-020-00718-0

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Capacity precommitment, communication, and collusive pricing: Theoretical benchmark and experimental evidence

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Güth, Werner
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society;

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Güth, W., Stadler, M., & Zaby, A. (2020). Capacity precommitment, communication, and collusive pricing: Theoretical benchmark and experimental evidence. International Journal of Game Theory, 49, 495-524. doi:10.1007/s00182-020-00718-0.

Cite as: https://hdl.handle.net/21.11116/0000-000C-9891-4

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