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Collective Action and Intra-group Conflict with Fixed Budgets

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Konrad,  Kai A.
Public Economics, MPI for Tax Law and Public Finance, Max Planck Society;

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Morath,  Florian
Public Economics, MPI for Tax Law and Public Finance, Max Planck Society;

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Citation

Konrad, K. A., & Morath, F. (2024). Collective Action and Intra-group Conflict with Fixed Budgets. Defence and Peace Economics, 35(1), 1-23. doi:10.1080/10242694.2022.2151083.


Cite as: https://hdl.handle.net/21.11116/0000-000C-B884-F
Abstract
We study collective action under adverse incentives: each member of the group has a given budget (‘use-it-or-lose-it’) that is private information and can be used for contributions to make the group win a prize and for internal fights over this very prize. Even in the face of such rivalry in resource use, the group often succeeds in overcoming the collective action problem in the non-cooperative equilibrium. In one type of equili-brium, all group members jointly contribute; in the other type of equili-brium, volunteers make full standalone contributions. Both types of equilibrium exist for larger and partially overlapping parameter ranges.