Exploiting ultimatum power when responders are better informed: Theoretical and 
experimental analysis of conflict resolution

Güth, Werner; Marazzi, Francesca; Panaccione, Luca

doi:10.1177/0022002723116784

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Exploiting ultimatum power when responders are better informed: Theoretical and experimental analysis of conflict resolution

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Güth, Werner
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society;

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Güth, W., Marazzi, F., & Panaccione, L. (2024). Exploiting ultimatum power when responders are better informed: Theoretical and experimental analysis of conflict resolution. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 68(2), 381-403. doi:10.1177/0022002723116784.

引用: https://hdl.handle.net/21.11116/0000-000D-78FC-1

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