English
 
Help Privacy Policy Disclaimer
  Advanced SearchBrowse

Item

ITEM ACTIONSEXPORT

Released

Conference Paper

Between prudence and paranoia: Theory of Mind gone right, and wrong

MPS-Authors
/persons/resource/persons242761

Alon,  N       
Department of Computational Neuroscience, Max Planck Institute for Biological Cybernetics, Max Planck Society;

/persons/resource/persons241804

Schulz,  L       
Department of Computational Neuroscience, Max Planck Institute for Biological Cybernetics, Max Planck Society;

/persons/resource/persons217460

Dayan,  P       
Department of Computational Neuroscience, Max Planck Institute for Biological Cybernetics, Max Planck Society;

External Resource
Fulltext (restricted access)
There are currently no full texts shared for your IP range.
Fulltext (public)
There are no public fulltexts stored in PuRe
Supplementary Material (public)
There is no public supplementary material available
Citation

Alon, N., Schulz, L., Dayan, P., & Barnby, J. (2023). Between prudence and paranoia: Theory of Mind gone right, and wrong. In ICML 2023: First Workshop on Theory of Mind in Communicating Agents (ToM 2023).


Cite as: https://hdl.handle.net/21.11116/0000-000D-90CA-C
Abstract
Agents need to be on their toes when interacting with competitive others to avoid being duped. Too much vigilance out of context can, however, be detrimental and produce paranoia. Here, we offer a formal account of this phenomenon through the lens of theory of mind. We simulate agents of different depths of mentalization and show how, if aligned well, deep recursive mentalisation gives rise to both successful deception as well as reasonable skepticism. However, we also show how, if theory of mind is too sophisticated, agents become paranoid, losing trust and reward in the process. We discuss our findings in light of computational psychiatry and AI safety.