Zwischen parlamentarischer Routine und exekutiven Kernbereichen: Die 
Kompetenzverteilung der auswärtigen Gewalt von Parlament und Regierung unter 
dem Grundgesetz

Ley, Isabelle

doi:10.1628/aoer-2021-0012

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Zwischen parlamentarischer Routine und exekutiven Kernbereichen: Die Kompetenzverteilung der auswärtigen Gewalt von Parlament und Regierung unter dem Grundgesetz

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Ley, Isabelle
Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law, Max Planck Society;

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Citation

Ley, I. (2021). Zwischen parlamentarischer Routine und exekutiven Kernbereichen: Die Kompetenzverteilung der auswärtigen Gewalt von Parlament und Regierung unter dem Grundgesetz. Archiv des Öffentlichen Rechts, 146(2), 299-352. doi:10.1628/aoer-2021-0012.

Cite as: https://hdl.handle.net/21.11116/0000-000D-D203-2

Abstract

The constitutional law of foreign relations after 1989 in Germany has often been characterized by the concept of a progressive »parliamentarization«, initiated by the Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) and implemented by parliamentary legislation. The following article challenges this description through a comparative analysis of four different fields of external affairs in their relation between parliament and government: treaty making power, military deployment abroad, European affairs and legislation as well as arms export control. The analysis finds that while the FCC has indeed strengthened parliamentary involvement in military deployment and European affairs, it follows a different logic in the areas of treaty making and arms export control, arguing that government is institutionally best designed to meet the needs for quick reaction and technical expertise.