How wise is the crowd: Can we infer people are accurate and competent merely 
because they agree with each other?

Pfänder, Jan; De Courson, Benoît; Mercier, Hugo

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How wise is the crowd: Can we infer people are accurate and competent merely because they agree with each other?

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De Courson, Benoît
Criminology, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Crime, Security and Law, Max Planck Society;

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Pfänder, J., De Courson, B., & Mercier, H. (2024). How wise is the crowd: Can we infer people are accurate and competent merely because they agree with each other? In L. K. Samuelson, S. L. Frank, M. Toneva, A. Mackey, & E. Hazeltine (Eds.), Proceedings of the 46th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society (pp. 3701-3707). Austin: Cognitive Science Society.

Cite as: https://hdl.handle.net/21.11116/0000-000F-6CE3-8

Abstract

Are people who agree on something more likely to be right and competent? Evidence suggests that people tend to make this inference. However, standard wisdom of crowds approaches only provide limited normative grounds. Using simulations, we argue that when individuals make independent and unbiased estimates, under a wide range of parameters, individuals whose answers converge with each other tend to have more accurate answers and to be more competent. In 2 experiments
(UK participants, total N = 399), we show that participants infer that informants who agree have more accurate answers and are more competent, even when they have no priors, and that these inferences are weakened when the informants are systematically biased. In conclusion, we speculate that inferences
from convergence to accuracy and competence might help explain why people deem scientists competent, even if they have little understanding of science.