English
 
Help Privacy Policy Disclaimer
  Advanced SearchBrowse

Item

ITEM ACTIONSEXPORT

Released

Preprint

Quashing protests abroad: The CSTO’s intervention in Kazakhstan

MPS-Authors
/persons/resource/persons246378

Kriener,  Florian
Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law, Max Planck Society;

/persons/resource/persons299199

Brassat,  Leonie
Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law, Max Planck Society;

Fulltext (restricted access)
There are currently no full texts shared for your IP range.
Fulltext (public)
There are no public fulltexts stored in PuRe
Supplementary Material (public)
There is no public supplementary material available
Citation

Kriener, F., & Brassat, L. (2023). Quashing protests abroad: The CSTO’s intervention in Kazakhstan. MPIL Research Paper Series, 2023-10. doi:10.2139/ssrn.4421275.


Cite as: https://hdl.handle.net/21.11116/0000-000F-A03F-6
Abstract
A recent trend in the literature has identified the significance of nonviolent protest movements in international law, in particular with regard to the right of self-determination, democracy, and human rights. Protests, so it is argued, are the only avenue for popular involvement in public affairs when the institutional participation mechanisms are dysfunctional or shut-off. Against this backdrop, a foreign military intervention that supports an embattled government in quashing popular and nonviolent protests raises questions under international law even when exercised at the request of the respective government. Taking into account the January 2022 intervention by the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in Kazakhstan we develop an argument to outlaw outside military interventions in support of a government faced with a nonviolent protest movement. First, we outline the events in Kazakhstan and justifications for the intervention (B.). Then, the three possible limitations upon an intervention by invitation are detailed (C.). If a nonviolent protest movement fulfills certain criteria and faces an autocratic government that government could lose its authority to issue invitations (C.I.). Furthermore, an intervention to quash a nonviolent protest movement could violate the population’s right to self-determination (C.II.). Additionally, quashing popular and nonviolent dissent is a purpose incompatible with fundamental principles of International Law (C.III.). Drawing upon the example of the intervention in Kazakhstan, we show how these limitations would apply in practice. To conclude, we set out the argument against military interventions by invitation to quash nonviolent protests and provide an outlook for the further development of this practice (D.).