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Journal Article

Saving the Internet? The Limits of Platform Power Amid the Techlash

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Kemmerling,  Michael       
International Max Planck Research School on the Social and Political Constitution of the Economy, MPI for the Study of Societies, Max Planck Society;
Universität zu Köln, Germany;

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Citation

Kemmerling, M. (2025). Saving the Internet? The Limits of Platform Power Amid the Techlash. Business and Politics, 27(1), 114-134. doi:10.1017/bap.2024.25.


Cite as: https://hdl.handle.net/21.11116/0000-000F-F329-1
Abstract
Research on platform power indicates a preference alignment between consumers and platforms against regulation. However, recent scandals have changed public opinion toward platforms and undermined their structural coalition with consumers. I argue that amid the techlash, platforms need to actively mobilize the public and face an uphill battle in doing so. Based on the outside lobbying literature, I expect that platforms’ success in reframing the debate and signaling public discontent to policymakers depends on the perceptibility of the target audience (the bonding surface) and the characteristics of competing interest groups. I test my expectations by analyzing platform outside lobbying against the 2019 European Copyright Directive. I combine process-tracing and time-series analysis with textual data. A comparison between the German and French debates revealed that platform outside lobbying failed because negative media reporting, public opinion, and a creative economy dominated by small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in France provided a favorable bonding surface for the frames of pro-copyright groups. Pro-copyright groups could credibly criticize platforms’ exploitative practices and demand fair artist remuneration, while platforms’ frames did not stick. This study demonstrates that claims of structural platform power are exaggerated and that careful attention needs to be paid to lobbying dynamics.