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The Mind-Matter Dichotomy: A Persistent Challenge for Neuroscientific and Philosophical Theories

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Singer,  Wolf       
Ernst Strüngmann Institute (ESI) for Neuroscience in Cooperation with Max Planck Society, Max Planck Society;
Singer Lab, Ernst Strüngmann Institute (ESI) for Neuroscience in Cooperation with Max Planck Society, Max Planck Society;

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Citation

Singer, W. (2025). The Mind-Matter Dichotomy: A Persistent Challenge for Neuroscientific and Philosophical Theories. European Journal of Neuroscience, 61(10): e70143. doi:10.1111/ejn.70143.


Cite as: https://hdl.handle.net/21.11116/0000-0011-E7AA-9
Abstract
Several areas of cognitive neuroscience tackle traditional philosophical questions. Among the range of problems, two closely related issues will be addressed in more detail from both neurobiological and philosophical perspectives: the relationship between mind and matter and the nature of perception. Neuropsychological and neurophysiological studies are reviewed that examine the connection between neuronal processes and consciousness. The most prominent theories on the neuronal correlates of consciousness (NCC) are then compared with philosophical attempts to address the epistemic gap between the material processes in the brain and mental phenomena. Before exploring whether neurobiological discoveries can help resolve philosophical problems, the epistemic challenges are discussed, stemming from the fact that perceptions are shaped by the brain's functional architecture. It is suggested that the 'hard problem of consciousness'-the challenge of explaining how the qualia of subjective experience can arise from neuronal processes-can be alleviated if two conditions are met: first, that perception depends on priors and, second, that some of these priors are formed through interactions with the immaterial realities of cultural concepts. Although this approach offers a coherent naturalistic explanation for the emergence of mental phenomena, it does not resolve the cognitive dissonance between our intuitions and scientific evidence regarding the relationship between matter and mind.