English
 
User Manual Privacy Policy Disclaimer Contact us
  Advanced SearchBrowse

Item

ITEM ACTIONSEXPORT

Released

Paper

Corporate tax regime and international allocation of ownership

MPS-Authors
/persons/resource/persons51166

Becker,  Johannes
Public Economics, MPI for Intellectual Property, Competition and Tax Law, Max Planck Society;

External Ressource
No external resources are shared
Fulltext (public)

WP1010.pdf
(Preprint), 284KB

Supplementary Material (public)
There is no public supplementary material available
Citation

Becker, J., & Runkel, M. (2010). Corporate tax regime and international allocation of ownership. Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation Working Paper Series, Nr. 10/10.


Cite as: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0011-4DFE-F
Abstract
Would the introduction of a corporate tax system with consolidated tax base and formula apportionment lead to socially wasteful mergers and acquisitions across borders? This paper analyzes a two-country model with an international investor considering acquisitions of already existing target firms in a high-tax country and a low-tax country. The investor is able to shift profits from one location to another for tax saving purposes. Two systems of corporate taxation are compared, a system with separate accounting and a system with tax base consolidation and formula apportionment. It is shown that, under separate accounting, the number of acquisitions is inefficiently high in both the high tax and the low tax country. Under formula apportionment, the number of acquisitions is inefficiently high in the low tax country and inefficiently low in the high tax country. Under tax competition, a novel externality arises that worsens the efficiency properties of equilibrium tax rates under separate accounting, but may play an efficiency enhancing role under formula apportionment.