

Evidentiality and intersubjectivity in Yurakaré:

An interactional account

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Evidentiality and intersubjectivity in Yurakaré:

An interactional account

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Abbreviations and conventions

Glosses

-	separates affixes or elements of compounds
=	clitic boundary
~	boundary of reduplication
.	separates meaning elements of portmanteau morphemes
-	separates multiple words of one gloss
:	separates meaning elements of fused morphemes
1	first person
2	second person
3	third person
ABL	ablative
ADAP	adaptive
ADV	adverbializer
ASSU	assumptive
.ATT	attention marker
AUG	augmentative
BEN	benefactive
CAU	causative
COL	collective
COM	comitative
COMM	commitment
CONT	continuous situation
DCSD	deceased
DEM	demonstrative
DES	desiderative
DIM	diminutive
DIR	directional
DIST	distributive
DS	different subject
F	female speaker
FR	frustrative
FUT	future
GOA	goal
HAB	habitual

HYP	hypothetical
IDEO	ideophone
IMP	imperative
INF	inferential
INS	instrument
INT	intentional
INTJ	interjection
INTS	intensifier
IRR	irrealis
JUS	jussive
LINK	linking morpheme
LOC	locative
M	male speaker
MAL	malefactive
MAN	manner
MEA	measure
MID	middle marker
MINTS	medium intensity
MOD	modal
MOM	momentaneous
NC	nearly completive
NEG	negation
NLIM	nominal limitative
NSIT	new situation
NUM	numeral
OBJ	object
PFV	perfective
PL	plural
POSS	possessive
PRES	presentative
PROG	progressive
PRON	pronoun
PROPX	proper name
PSUP	presuppositional
PURP	purposive
PV	possessive verbalizer
REA	realis
RC	recent completive
REF	referential
REP	reported
RES	resignative
SG	singular
SML	simulative
SP	Spanish loans or code switches
SUBJ	subjective
TOP	topic
VLOC	verbal locative

Interactional transcript

=	adjacent turns or utterances latched to each other
(0.5)	pause. duration in seconds
(.)	mini pause
[start of overlap between turns of different speakers
]	end of overlap
:	lengthening of sound
?	rising intonation
()	not fully audible
(...)	not audible
(())	non-linguistic actions and events
⇒	line containing the relevant phenomenon

Other symbols

+>	implicates
p	proposition

Examples

The Yurakaré examples in this dissertation consist of four lines. The first line is the interactional transcript, which represents the speech signal. It includes indications of sequential timing such as pauses and overlap. Furthermore, it contains other relevant information like non-linguistic actions or events. The second line shows the segmentation of the text line into morphemes, while the third line provides the glosses. The fourth line is a free translation to English.

Other conventions

Since this dissertation is concerned with the study of interaction, frequent mention is made of the terms ‘speaker’ and ‘addressee’. In the Yurakaré examples, the names of the speakers are used to identify them. In the case of a more abstract use of the terms, i.e. when no concrete example is discussed, the speaker will be considered female and the addressee male. This makes the resolution of reference easy, because the speaker is referred to with a feminine pronoun and the addressee with a masculine pronoun.

In the Yurakaré examples, speakers frequently address each other using the Spanish terms *comadre* and *compadre*. In Spanish, they usually mean ‘godmother’ and ‘godfather’, respectively. The Yurakaré use these terms in a different way, meaning ‘co-mother-in-law’ and ‘co-father-in-law’ (Vincent Hirtzel p.c.). Since these are not common words of English, the Spanish terms will be used in the translation lines of the examples.

Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 The aims of this study

In this dissertation, I investigate the linguistic category that is commonly called “evidentiality” as exhibited in Yurakaré, an unclassified endangered language spoken in Central Bolivia, taking an interactional perspective. How are the Yurakaré evidentials used in interaction? Is their only function to let the addressee know how the speaker acquired the information given in the proposition? These questions will be tackled in this dissertation.

Evidentiality is usually defined as expressing the speaker’s source of information for the proposition (e.g. Aikhenvald 2004). Evidential systems of the world’s languages include evidential types such as Direct, indicating that the speaker has observed the event herself, Reported, indicating that the event was reported to the speaker by another person, and Inferential, expressing that the speaker infers the proposition on the basis of some external evidence (Aikhenvald 2004, Plungian 2001, Willett 1988).

Yurakaré has a set of five verbal enclitics, four of which clearly express meanings in the domain of evidentiality. These verbal enclitics will be studied in this dissertation. A second semantic dimension that plays a role in this set of markers is epistemic intersubjectivity. Epistemic intersubjectivity is a linguistic category concerned with the distribution of information access between speaker and addressee (Bergqvist *forthc.*). In Yurakaré, the two meaning components of evidentiality and epistemic intersubjectivity interact in one grammatical system.

The Yurakaré data show that evidentials are not always used to merely inform the addressee about the speaker’s information source. Rather, they are frequently used for a variety of interactional functions. This is in line with studies like Donabédian (2001), Fox (2001), and Mushin (2001), which demonstrate that evidentials are not always chosen according to the speaker’s information source, but rather according to the interactional context and function.

This dissertation has three main goals. The first is to describe the basic semantics of the five verbal enclitics of Yurakaré. This description is based on

interactional data, supported with data from elicitation. The second and crucial research question is to identify the interactional uses of the five verbal enclitics of Yurakaré. This is done through a careful sequential analysis of interactional data, using methods from the Conversation Analysis research tradition. The third research question concerns the relationship between the basic semantics of the evidentials and their uses in interaction. The main research questions of this study are summarized in the following:

- What are the basic meanings of the Yurakaré verbal enclitics?
- What are their contexts of use in interaction?
- What is the relationship between the meaning of the markers and their interactional uses?

The analysis of the evidentials will reveal that their semantics influence the way in which they are used in interaction. Interactional uses are facilitated or blocked by the meanings of the evidential markers. This shows that the meaning of the Yurakaré evidentials has an impact on their use in interaction, which reveals the strong relationship between meaning and interaction. The direction of influence does, however, not only go from meaning to interaction. Interactional uses can also lead to a shift in meaning, which in some cases becomes apparent through the interactional uses. This means that meaning and interaction are in a relationship of mutual influence.


The present study shows that the category of evidentiality cannot be properly studied without taking interactional uses into account. It will be demonstrated that certain components of meaning can only be discovered in interaction. This is especially true for the intersubjective component, since the concept of distribution of information access only manifests itself in social interaction between people.

In this introduction, the following points will be reviewed. Section 1.2 introduces the Yurakaré people. In section 1.3, the category of evidentiality is presented. This section is divided in two parts: section 1.3.1 discusses the interactional perspective on evidentials taken in this study, and reviews the relevant literature on interactional uses of evidentials. Section 1.3.2 is concerned with the relation between the concepts of evidentiality and intersubjectivity. The data and methods used in this study are presented in section 1.4. Section 1.5 gives an overview of the dissertation.

1.2 The Yurakaré people

The Yurakaré people live in the Andean foothills of Central Bolivia, between the Amazonian lowlands and the Andes. They reside in small communities which are dispersed across a large area. There are two main areas of Yurakaré settlement, one in the Chapare area along the Chapare and Mamoré rivers, another in the area of the Isiboro and Sécure rivers. The latter area is a national park and indigenous territory called TIPNIS (Indigenous Territory and National Park Isiboro-Sécure). This area is mainly inhabited by three indigenous groups.

the Yurakaré, the Chimanés, and the Trinitarios. In some parts of the Yurakaré speaking area, colonization through Quechua and Aymara coca-farmers is constantly increasing. Apart from the two main Yurakaré areas, there are some smaller areas where Yurakaré live in other indigenous territories. Some Yurakaré people also live in towns and cities such as Trinidad and Cochabamba. Map 1.1 shows the areas where Yurakaré is spoken.



Map 1.1: The Yurakaré-speaking areas
(Courtesy of Vincent Hirtzel)

The Yurakaré-speaking areas are marked in dark gray on figure 1.1. It can be seen that Yurakaré is spread out across a large area. The geographical situation of the Yurakaré language is quite remarkable, since the language is situated in between three important cultural areas, the Amazon, the Andes, and the Chaco. As stated above, up to now there does not seem to be a genetic affiliation to languages in any of these areas. Crevels and van der Voort (2008) propose to consider the Guaporé-Mamoré region a linguistic area, since the languages we find there share various features. One of these languages is Yurakaré.

1.2.1 Historical background

This section is based mainly on Hirtzel (2010), an extensive study of the history of the Yurakaré both from the inside (based on field work) and from the outside (based on a study of colonial sources). The interested reader is referred to that study.

At the time of the arrival of the Spaniards, the Yurakaré territory was impacted by two main expansive movements, that of the Inca empire from the Andean side, and that of the Guaraní people from the area of the Paraná basin. Historical sources do not allow an explicit inference about the nature of the contact between the Yurakaré and the expanding Inca empire before the arrival of the Spaniards, but they suggest that the influence of the Inca on the Yurakaré was less important than on other groups.

The arrival of the Spaniards caused the Yurakaré to retreat further into isolation. This had the effect that the Yurakaré were relatively unaffected by missionary efforts carried out by the Jesuits. The Franciscans who entered Yurakaré territory in three phases (1775-1825, 1854-around 1884, 1904-1936 (Querajazú Lewis 2005:47)) were not much more successful. All attempts eventually ended in the abandonment of the missions, and the concentration of the Yurakaré people in missionary settlements failed.

Commercial activities had a greater impact on the Yurakaré than missionary efforts. The commercial axis that linked the Cochabamba valleys with the Beni went through the Yurakaré areas of the Chapare and Ichilo basins (Rodríguez Ostría 1997 cited in Hirtzel 2010:78-9). When rubber production boomed at the beginning of the 19th century, colonization in these areas increased. The Yurakaré people were affected by this movement, which we can infer from the fact that it was incorporated into versions of the main mythological narrative of the Yurakaré, the myth of Tiri (cf. also Hirtzel 2007).

The greatest change for the Yurakaré came with the expansion of coca farming colonizers from the Andes, especially during the 1970s and 1980s, which made the Yurakaré retreat further into the forest. This movement has affected mainly the Chapare and Ichilo areas, causing a movement of the Yurakaré toward the Sécura area. The coca colonization movement is still ongoing, and keeps encroaching upon Yurakaré territory. In the TIPNIS National Park, the expansion of cattle farming was an important movement during that time, which shaped the area to a good extent.

An important event for the Yurakaré and all indigenous people of the area was the 'March for Territory and Dignity' in 1991, the culmination of an indigenous movement for reclaiming their territories. This resulted in the recognition of land rights and rights to possession of land of the indigenous people by the state, and in the creation of various indigenous territories of which the TIPNIS is one. This movement also resulted in the creation of indigenous councils that represent the indigenous people of the areas. Until today they stand up for the interests of the indigenous people.

1.2.2 Social organization

The social life of the Yurakaré has been changed to a great extent by the historical processes described in section 1.2.1, especially during the 20th century. In the TIPNIS area, economy is still mainly based on subsistence, although many men also work on nearby cattle farms, or even go to the town of Trinidad for seasonal work. Another source of income is selling local products.

Today most Yurakaré live in centralized small communities in the indigenous areas, which allows them to benefit from the educational system and other

social benefits (Hirtzel 2010:353). They travel frequently between communities and go to the bigger towns or cities in the area. For the San Pablo people, the town of Trinidad is a place where they often go to buy and sell things, to look for work, and to study.

Basically, there is no strong hierarchy of power in Yurakaré society. A community usually has a *corregidor*, a kind of mayor, who however has no special power over the others, or power of making decisions by himself. All decisions in the village are made in a gathering of the community members, where everybody has the right to speak. The *corregidor* usually chairs this assembly. He can be considered a representative of the community rather than a governor.

Many Yurakaré communities are nowadays formally Catholic or Evangelic. The community of San Pablo is Catholic, and a mass is held on most Sundays. A celebration for the namesake Saint is held in June around Saint Paul's day. However, religious life is not highly organized otherwise in the community.

Animals and plants are associated with certain spirits that take care of them. The Yurakaré used to have shamans who could communicate with the *mororuma* spirits, who in turn helped them to communicate with the other spirits. They got into contact with the *mororuma* by eating tobacco and meditating.

The main mythological character of the Yurakaré is Tiri. Tiri is a character who is born the son of a human mother and a father from the world of the spirits, a guayabochi tree. Tiri is the one who gave the animals their current appearance, and who in some versions of the story created the Yurakaré people. At first he takes care of them after they have come out of the earth, but then he leaves into another world without taking them with him. The Yurakaré consider themselves the people who have been left behind by their founding father Tiri. For a detailed account of the myth of Tiri and how historical facts become crystallized in it, cf. Hirtzel (2007) and Hirtzel (2010). Another important mythological figure of the Yurakaré is Ayma Shunñe (lit. 'Fire Man'), a character that haunts the Yurakaré territories periodically with fire, leaving a wasteland behind.

An important ritual of the Yurakaré used to be the initiation of girls. When a girl had her first menstruation, she had to spend a period of several days isolated in her mosquito net. After this reclusion, her hair was cut short. Some time later, there would be a ritual where the girl was washed and for which she prepared *chicha* for the first time.¹ At such events, one of the rituals was called *kulukuta* 'piercing', where especially young people pierced their skin with sharpened bones.

Yurakaré men used to engage in ritual dueling, where two men would stand opposite each other and shoot arrows at each other's shoulders. Hirtzel (2010: chapter IV) argues that this ritual was related to particular friendship relations between men called *chee*.

¹ *Chicha* is an slightly alcoholic beverage common in many parts of South America made from manioc, corn, rice, or other kinds of crops. The fermentation is enhanced through chewing of part of the main ingredient. This drink is only prepared by Yurakaré women. The Yurakaré word is *yarruw*.

The Yurakaré used to mourn their dead by singing the mourning chants *wëwëti*. The mourners were sitting in their mosquito nets and chanted for a long time, singing about the dead person, for example listing things this person will not be able to do anymore. The language of these chants is not standard Yurakaré, but a different ritual language based on Yurakaré. This practice is almost forgotten by now, and only a few elder people remember it. Younger speakers are usually not able to understand most of the chants if a recording is played to them.

1.3 Evidentiality

Even though a grammatical category with the function of marking information source has already been identified for Kwakiutl by Franz Boas (e.g. 1911) at the beginning of the 20th century, systematic research on that category has only begun much later (cf. Jacobsen 1986:3-4 for a comprehensive overview of the early history of evidentiality). In 1981, the first symposium on evidentiality was held with the objective of arriving at a more systematic understanding of evidentiality and its cross-linguistic manifestations. An important outcome of this symposium was the seminal volume edited by Chafe and Nichols (1986). The interest in evidentiality has been flourishing ever since, and spread from the functional-typological framework to other linguistic disciplines. In spite of this constantly growing interest the category remains elusive, as noted by Aikhenvald (2004:3): “Despite the recent surge of interest in evidentiality, it remains one of the least known grammatical categories.”

Evidentials can for example express that the speaker acquired the information visually or through other senses, through a report by a specific person or through hearsay, through inference from observable evidence, or through assumption without having external evidence (e.g. Aikhenvald 2004:63-4). Languages vary considerably as to which evidential notions they express. An example is the evidential system of Cuzco Quechua. It has three evidentials: *-mi* with the basic meaning of direct visual evidence, *-si* for reported, and the conjunctural evidential *-chá* (Faller 2002:3):

- (1) a. *para-sha-n-mi*
rain-PROG-3-**mi**
p='It is raining.'
EVIDENCE= speaker sees that *p*
- b. *para-sha-u-si*
rain-PROG-3-**si**
p='It is raining.'
EVIDENCE= speaker was told that *p*
- c. *para-sha-n-chá*
rain-PROG-3-**chá**
p='It might/must be raining.'
EVIDENCE= speaker conjectures that *p*
(adapted from Faller 2002:3)

Studies of evidentials in particular languages usually focus on the semantics of the evidentials, and on how the evidentials are opposed to each other within the evidential system. There is a large number of such studies within the descriptive typological tradition (e.g. papers in Aikhenvald and Dixon (2002), Chafe and Nichols (1986), and Johanson and Utas (2000)). Comparative typological studies focus on the comparability of the semantics of evidentials across languages (e.g. Anderson 1986, Willett 1988, Plungian 2001, Aikhenvald 2004). and on the relation of evidentiality to other grammatical categories, especially epistemic modality (e.g. de Haan 2001). More recently scholars taking formal approaches to semantics and pragmatics have started investigating evidentials (e.g. Davis et al. 2007, Faller 2002, Izvorski 1997, Matthewson et al. 2007, McCready and Ogata 2007, Peterson 2009). The relation between evidentiality and epistemic modality has also been a prominent topic of inquiry in the formal semantic tradition. There have been various proposals to analyze evidentials as epistemic modals for particular languages (e.g. Izvorski 1997, Matthewson et al. 2007).

Syntacticians have addressed the question whether there is a universal syntactic projection of an evidential phrase. Cinque (1999) and Speas (2004) have argued for the existence of an evidential projection in a fixed syntactic position, whereas other authors have argued that different evidentials can operate on different levels of an utterance, and that we therefore cannot assume a universal syntactic projection for evidentiality that always occupies the same position in the syntactic representation (Blain and Déchaine 2006, 2007).

Evidentiality has recently also gained attention in the field of pragmatics. Studies in this tradition have been concerned with the question of how the implicatures that usually arise with the use of evidentials can be explained (Faller 2002), how evidentiality can be accommodated in Relevance Theory (Ifantidou 2001), and how evidentiality is used in narrative discourse to express the epistemic stance of the speaker (Mushin 2001). Finally, it has been proposed to capture the variable quantificational force of evidentials in a probabilistic pragmatics (Davis et al. 2007).

Challenging the common definition of evidentiality, Michael (2008) has argued that a definition in terms of ‘information source’ is not precise enough for the characterization of the semantics of evidentials. He introduces a definition of evidentiality as indicating “the nature of a speaker’s sensory/cognitive access to the event in question” (p. 137).

Strictly speaking, the source of information for a proposition is always some kind of event or state of affairs. Evidentials, however, do not refer to such events. Rather, evidentials express the way the speaker accesses the proposition she presents in her utterance on the basis of the external event or situation (i.e. the information source). For example, consider the following state of affairs as the information source:

- (2) The lights in Peter’s house are on.

Assume that the state of affairs in 2 can be visually observed by a speaker. Using this state of affairs as a source of information, the speaker could produce one of the two utterances in 3:

- (3) a. The lights in Peter's house are on. (\Rightarrow Visual access)
 b. Peter must be at home. (\Rightarrow Inferential access)

The two propositions in (3) are both based on the source proposition in (2). However, the two propositions are quite different from each other. This is because they represent two different ways of information access. In (3a), the proposition represents the state of affairs that is visually observed by the speaker, while the proposition in (3b) is accessed through an inference on the basis of the visually observed source proposition in (2). In English, the direct visual information access in (3a) is implicated by the modally unmarked declarative. The inferential information access in (3b) is indicated by the use of the necessity modal *must*. In languages with direct and inferential evidentials, the respective evidential morphemes would be used to indicate the two types of information access. The source proposition remains the same for both target propositions. This demonstrates that it is more precise to define evidentiality as indicating access to information rather than information source. In principle, the information source is the same for both utterances in (3), while the way of accessing it and arriving at the proposition of the utterance is different. Thus, Michael's (2008) definition of evidentiality in terms of access to information is more precise than a definition in terms of information source. Therefore, I will use Michael's definition in this dissertation.

1.3.1 An interactional perspective on evidentials

Studies of the use of evidentials in interaction show that such a purely semantic account of evidentials is not sufficient, demonstrating that evidentials are frequently not chosen according to the speaker's information source or information access, but rather according to the function of the utterance in the interaction. The question is now, do such functions correlate across languages, or are they idiosyncratic? To answer this question, it is necessary to compare the interactional functions in a range of particular languages. However, there are by far not enough studies of interactional uses of evidentials, so it is not possible to make a claim about this. The present study aims at providing such an interactional study of the Yurakaré evidentials.

Previous interactional studies of evidentials show that evidentials are frequently not used to indicate the source of information, but rather for other interactional functions. For example, Donabédian (2001) argues that an approach where evidentials are viewed to express exactly how the speaker came to the information is not sufficient to predict why an evidential is used in certain contexts and not in others (p. 428). This is demonstrated by her analysis of the Modern Western Armenian indirect evidential *-er*, which is used to indicate the evidential values of hearsay and inference, and also has a mirative interpretation indicating surprise (pp. 423-4). However, in conversational data uses of *-er* often cannot easily be assigned one of these semantic values, and the interpretation is always highly dependent on the conversational context (p. 425).

Donabédian shows that utterances in which the evidential is used are most frequently not informing, i.e. they are not transmitting information

to which the speaker has superior access, but convey information that can be accessed as well by the addressee. In such contexts, evidentials do not inform the addressee of the information access of the speaker, but are used for some other interactional function such as arguing (pp. 432-3). This shows that the interactional interpretation of *-er* highly depends on the distribution of information access between the participants of the interaction, and that evidentials are frequently not used to indicate the speaker's information source.

Even though many languages like English do not have grammaticalized evidentials, they still express evidential meanings by the use of evidential expressions. A comprehensive interactional account of evidentiality should take into account the use of such evidential expressions in languages without grammaticalized evidentiality as well. Fox (2001) investigates how evidential expressions in English are used to construct social meanings, focusing on authority, responsibility, and entitlement. In her study, she analyzes the use of evidential expressions like 'I hear', 'must', 'seems like', and 'apparently'. Her approach emphasizes the importance of sequential placement and social action in which an evidential expression occurs. She finds that the use and interpretation of evidential expressions depends heavily on these factors.

Like Donabédian, Fox finds that use of evidential expressions in English does not always depend on the actual evidence the speaker has for her statement, but rather on the interactional purpose of the utterance. For example, a speaker can choose to evidentially modify a statement when talking to one person, while using an evidentially unmarked statement for conveying the same information when talking to another person, even though the information source is the same.

Another study that supports the view that evidentials are not always used in interaction to indicate the speaker's information source is Mushin (2001). She studies the use of evidentials and evidential expressions in narrative retellings for Japanese, Macedonian, and English. She finds that

[...] even in languages with highly grammaticalised evidential systems, speakers' use of evidential forms does not necessarily reflect the actual means by which they acquired information. (Mushin 2001:53)

Michael (2008) shows that reported and quotative evidentials in the Arawak language Nanti are used for reducing the speaker's responsibility in interaction. He distinguishes between two types of responsibility that are negotiated in interaction through the use of evidentials, event and utterance responsibility. Event responsibility is concerned with "praiseworthiness and blameworthiness for events and states of affairs" (p. 121), while utterance responsibility concerns "the accountability of speakers for particular attributes of discourse" (p. 119). Evidentials in Nanti are important for negotiating epistemic stances and social responsibilities. These functions clearly go beyond the expression of an information source.

Michael uses the notion of evidential practice to refer to the communicational practices associated with the use of evidentials. This means that the use of evidentials is determined by social factors that manifest themselves in

interactional practices. On this account, evidentials can only be interpreted with the background of the cultural practice in which they are used:

I am not merely arguing that evidentiality *may* be studied from the perspective of communicative practice - we can presumably do so with any grammatical category - but rather that evidentiality is unlike many other well-known grammatical categories in that failure to understand its role in communicative practice leads to pervasive misunderstandings regarding the phenomenon. (Michael 2008:98-9. italics in original)

As has been shown, interactional studies of evidentiality show that evidentials are not only used to convey the information access of the speaker. They can also be employed strategically in interaction for diverse interactional functions. Often, their use is not conditioned by the type of information access of the speaker in the strict sense, but rather by the action the speaker performs with the utterance and its interactional purpose. A purely semantic account of evidentials in terms of 'source of information' or 'access to information' can thus not be sufficient for describing evidentials and accounting for their use.

Another flaw of the traditional definition of evidentials is that it focuses on the speaker's information source or access to information. Such a speaker-based analysis is not sufficient because evidentials can include an expression of the speaker's assumption about the addressee's access to the information (Bergqvist *forthc.*). Since this is the case in Yurakaré, the relation between evidentiality and the addressee's information access is discussed in the next section.

1.3.2 Evidentiality and (inter)subjectivity

Evidentials are often assumed to express the subjective perspective of the speaker. For example, de Haan (2005) proposes that the basic meaning of evidentials "is to mark the relation between the speaker and the action s/he is describing" and that they "are used to denote the relative distance between the speaker and the action" (p. 379), arguing that evidentials should therefore be analyzed as deictic elements. He suggests that "[a]s with deictic expressions like demonstratives, evidentials have as deictic center the speaker of the utterance" (p. 382).² This shows that de Haan considers evidentiality a speaker-based category.

However, this is not the complete picture. There are languages in which evidentials express the speaker's information access as well as the speaker's assumption about the addressee's information access (Bergqvist *forthc.*). Thus, evidentials cannot be considered to be purely subjective.

Traditionally, a distinction between subjectivity and objectivity has been made within the domain of epistemic modality. While a subjective epistemic expression introduces an intuitive evaluation of the speaker, an objective

²Note that also demonstrative elements can include assumptions about the addressee and can therefore be considered intersubjective in probably many languages. For example, de Haan (2005:393) notes that Ouva Iaaí, a language from New Caledonia, has a deictic marker for 'near speaker' and another for 'near hearer'. However, he does not let the addressee's perspective flow into his analysis of evidentials.

epistemic expression introduces an evaluation on the basis of a calculation of probability. Nuyts (2001:383) points out that this distinction in linguistics goes back to Lyons (1977). This distinction can be illustrated by the following example:

(4) It may rain tomorrow. (Papafragou 2006:1691)

(4) can be interpreted as objective if uttered by a meteorologist, or as subjective if uttered by a layperson. The meteorologist would base her conclusion on scientific data, while the layperson would use her personal subjective intuition (Papafragou 2006:1691).

Nuyts (2001) argues that this distinction between subjectivity and objectivity is not the only distinction that is possible in the semantic domain of 'subjectivity', and that probably intersubjectivity can capture the data better. His notion of intersubjectivity is concerned with the speaker's information access and the speaker's assumptions about the addressee's information access:

[...] one pole involves the speaker's indication that (s)he alone knows (or has access to) the evidence and draws conclusions from it; the other pole involves his/her indication that the evidence is known to (or accessible by) a larger group of people who share the same conclusion based on it." (Nuyts 2001:393)

Nuyts notes on the basis of corpus data from Dutch and German that often, an intersubjective reading of modal expressions seems to be preferred over an objective reading. He furthermore notes that the notion of intersubjectivity seems to have a stronger cross-linguistic basis than the distinction between subjectivity and objectivity (pp. 395-7).

Nuyts argues that this dimension of intersubjectivity seems to be an evidential dimension rather than an epistemic one, since it is concerned with the evaluation of evidence (p. 386), noting, however, that it is also possible that it is a semantic dimension on its own, which can find expression outside epistemic and evidential systems (p. 387).

Bergqvist (*forthc.*) proposes to call the type of intersubjectivity in language that is concerned with the (a)symmetry of access to information 'epistemic intersubjectivity'. He notes that there are languages in which epistemic intersubjectivity is expressed as a separate grammatical category, and that it can be considered a semantic category in its own right. Some languages have dedicated grammatical markers for indicating the distribution of information, like Duna (PNG, San Roque 2008).

Subjectivity precedes intersubjectivity in grammaticalization and semantic change. More precisely, after a semantic subjectification has occurred, a linguistic item may further undergo the process of intersubjectification (Traugott 2004:551, Traugott and Dasher 2002:94). Subjectification means that lexical as well as grammatical items tend to go from describing events or states of affairs to expressing the speaker's inner state:

Meanings tend to become increasingly based in the speaker's subjective belief state/attitude toward the proposition. (Traugott 1989:35)

An example is the development of epistemic readings for the English modal verbs (e.g. Sweetser 1990). This can be illustrated with the following example:

- (5) a. John *must* be home by ten: Mother won't let him stay out any later.
b. John *must* be home already: I see his coat.
(Sweetser 1990:49)

While the modal verb *must* in (5a) gets a deontic reading, expressing that somebody is obliged to do something, in (5b) it gets an epistemic reading of the speaker evaluating a situation. Sweetser argues that such a development comes from metaphorically applying the socio-physical world to the inner, epistemic world (p. 59).

The crucial point for the discussion here is that it has been found that after an item has acquired a subjective reading, it may in turn develop an intersubjective meaning through a deeper grounding in the “communicative dyad” (Traugott 2004:551):

As a historical mechanism, intersubjectification motivates the semiological shift of meanings over time to encode or externalize implicatures regarding SP/W’s attention to the “self” of AD/R.³(Traugott 2004:551)

Thus, intersubjective meanings are argued to arise first as implicatures from subjective meanings, which can then become part of the lexical meaning of a linguistic item or expression. Traugott makes explicit that she does not expect an intersubjectification to occur before or without subjectification. As an example, she notes that even though honorifics could be seen as purely intersubjective, still they have first developed a subjective component (Traugott 2004:551).

In Yurakaré, the expression of epistemic intersubjectivity is strongly connected to the expression of the type of information access, i.e. evidentiality. It will be shown in this dissertation that the Yurakaré evidentials all have a component of epistemic intersubjectivity. We can therefore say that the Yurakaré evidentials have two semantic dimensions: the type of cognitive access to information, and the speech act participants who are accessing the information.

1.4 Methods and data


1.4.1 Field work

This study is based on nine months of field work carried out with the Yurakaré people in Bolivia. Around 4.5 months were spent in the Yurakaré community of San Pablo, located on the shore of the Isiboro river in the TIPNIS national park and indigenous territory. The other 4.5 months were spent working with speakers in the town of Trinidad and doing documentation work with the

³Traugott uses SP/W to stand for speaker/writer, and AD/R for addressee/reader.

project colleagues in the city of Cochabamba. The research was carried out during three separate field trips in the years 2006, 2007, and 2008.

The community of San Pablo is quite highly populated for Yurakaré standards. According to the local inhabitant count, it has around 200 inhabitants, of which about half are older than 18 and half younger. The village is situated around a lagoon that is an old curve of the Isiboro river. In the rainy season, the lagoon forms a circle, making the inner part of the community an island. The location of the community of San Pablo is indicated on Map 1.2.



Map 1.2: Location of San Pablo del Isiboro
(Courtesy of Vincent Hirtzel)

Subsistence in San Pablo consists of hunting, fishing, gathering some products of the rain forest, and rotating slash and burn horticulture. The traditional beliefs of the Yurakaré are still remembered in San Pablo, and it seems that they still have some validity. However, many cultural practices such as the initiation of girls and the mourning chants called *wëwëti* are not carried out anymore.

1.4.2 The data used in this study

The present study is an analysis of the use of the Yurakaré evidentials in interaction. The study is based on a corpus of conversational data of around 4,5 hours. The corpus mainly consists of dyadic conversations because the structure of sequential organization in interaction and the distribution of information

access between speaker and addressee can be most clearly observed in dyadic conversations. The corpus includes one multi-party interaction which is around 19 minutes long.

The data in the conversational corpus represent a variety of interaction types. There is one spontaneous multi-party conversation (040707_conv), where four speakers are talking about different topics. The gathering was spontaneous, and this conversation is the most natural of the data. The other conversations were recorded in a less spontaneous fashion. Two people were invited to the house where I lived during my stay and asked to have a conversation. In some cases, the topic was free, and the people talk about a variety of topics (160906_convI, 220906_convII, 270807_conv, 290906_convI).

The conversational corpus includes two picture story retellings of the frog story *Frog, where are you?* (Mayer 1969). The pictures of the frog story are reprinted in Berman and Slobin (1994:647-654). The reprint can be accessed online at <http://chilides.psy.cmu.edu/manuals/frog.pdf>. The numbering of the pictures used in the present dissertation correlate with the numbers of the pictures reprinted in Berman and Slobin. In addition, a verbal description of the pictures can be found in Bamberg and Marchman (1990:117-120). The procedure with this task was to present the story to one speaker, looking at all the pictures together and explaining what happened in case they could not make sense of something. Then, this speaker told the frog story to another person who has not seen the story before using the picture booklet. Thus, during the retelling both speakers were able to look at the pictures. This method turned out to trigger lively discussions about the pictures where evidentials were used in abundance. The files *mapI* and *mapII* are from one single session where the speakers were asked to collaboratively draw a map of the village.

In addition to the conversational corpus, examples from monological data are sometimes used, especially in the sketch grammar. My monological corpus consists of around 84 minutes of video-taped and transcribed discourse, including mythological narratives, a life history, and descriptions of Yurakaré traditions. All the sessions used in this study are archived in the DobeS archive for endangered languages.⁴ Table 1.1 gives an overview of the sessions used in this dissertation.

Table 1.2 summarizes the most important details about the speakers. They are all native speakers of Yurakaré of various ages. To protect their privacy, pseudonyms are used instead of their real names.

1.4.3 Methods of analysis

All data used in this study were video-taped by the author during three field trips undertaken within the project “The Documentation of Yurakaré”. The data were transcribed and translated by native speakers using the ELAN annotation program⁵. As a first step of analysis, all instances of the five verbal enclitics in the corpus were tagged. This was followed by a qualitative analysis of their uses. Then, all instances of the markers in the corpus were coded for the functions identified in the analysis.

⁴The archive can be accessed at http://corpus1.mpi.nl/ds/imdi_browser/index.jsp.

⁵For more information on this tool, see <http://www.lat-mpi.eu/tools/elan>.

Table 1.1: Overview of data sessions

File name	Type	Speakers	Content	Duration ¹
Conversational corpus				
160906_convI	dialogue	Miguel, Paulina	various topics	05:30
220906_convII	dialogue	Miguel, Paulina	various topics	02:45
220906_diablo	dialogue	Miguel, Paulina	mythological narrative	10:15
220906_pepesu	dialogue	Miguel, Paulina	mythological narrative	04:00
270807_conv	dialogue	Asunta, Magdalena	various topics	50:15
290906_convI	dialogue	Asunta, Elisa	various topics	41:00
pp-pf_frogstory	dialogue	Patricia, Juan	picture story retelling	15:00
al_cc_frogstory	dialogue	Asunta, Magdalena	picture story retelling	58:45
mapI	dialogue	Patricia, Juan	map drawing task	16:00
mapII	dialogue	Patricia, Juan	map drawing task	07:00
040707_conv	conversation (4 speakers) ²	Asunta, Paulina Virgilio, Santiago	various topics	19:15
Monological corpus				
tradiciones	monologue	Asunta	Yurakaré traditions	15:30
lifehistory	monologue	Miguel	life history of speaker	14:15
loreto	monologue	Asunta	narrative, traditions	08:30
duenoperros	monologue	Asunta	mythological narrative	06:00
hombretigre	monologue	Asunta	mythological narrative	03:00
tiri	monologue ³	Asunta	mythological narrative	36:15

¹ In min:sec format, seconds rounded up or down to quarters of a minute.

² Four speakers are present during the whole conversation. A few others join in from time to time.

³ Even though the speaker is telling the narrative to a Yurakaré audience, I consider it a monologue since there is almost no participation of the recipients.

Table 1.2: Overview of speakers

Speaker	Gender	Age in 2006
Asunta	f	43
Paulina	f	65
Magdalena	f	34
Patricia	f	46
Elisa	f	29
Virgilio	m	65?
Santiago	m	42
Juan	m	45
Miguel	m	67

Since this dissertation is a study of the use of grammatical markers in interaction, it draws heavily from methods developed in the research tradition that has as its goal the study of structures of social interaction: Conversation Analysis (CA, see e.g. Sacks et al. 1974, Schegloff 2007, and many more). An important field of research in CA is sequential organization in conversation. A sequence is a stretch of talk between participants that is in some way connected. This connection is determined by actions rather than by topics (Schegloff 2007:1-2). For example, a sequence like “Would you like to have coffee with me?” “I’d love to!” should be analyzed in terms of the action of an invitation rather than being about the topic ‘coffee’. Interpreting utterances includes understanding which action the speaker intends to perform with that utterance, which in turn may make relevant certain types of response by the addressee. Sequences are thus structured stretches of talk which can be analyzed in terms of performed actions and the actions they make relevant as responses.

An action implemented through an utterance together with its response by the other participant (where the response was made relevant by the action of the first participant) form an adjacency pair. An adjacency pair is the “basic unit of sequence construction” (Schegloff 2007:9). A most basic adjacency pair consists of two turns by two different speakers that are ordered with respect to each other. There is one utterance in the initial position of the adjacency pair, the initial utterance, and one utterance in the second position of the adjacency pair, the responsive utterance. It is important to note that the terms ‘initial/first position’ and ‘second position’ are used in this work to refer to the sequential placement of an utterance, not to syntactic position within a clause.

Initial utterances typically initiate the adjacency pair, like questions, invitations etc. Responsive utterances are responsive to the actions implemented by the initial action that precedes it, like answering a question or accepting an invitation. Initial utterances usually make specific responses relevant, i.e. not every response type can felicitously follow every initial utterance. Therefore, adjacency pairs are not only categorized in initial and responsive utterances, but can also be classified as pair types, such as question-answer, invitation-accept/decline, etc. (p. 9).

In many cases, initial utterances have two possible responses, a positive and a negative one. For example, an invitation can be accepted or rejected. Normally, initial utterances prefer one of these responses while they disprefer the other. In CA, this phenomenon is known as the organization of preference. It has been found, for example, that preferred responses are delivered without delay and are usually short, while dispreferred responses are often delayed and longer in that they include for example an account for why this specific response is given (e.g. Pomerantz 1984).

While this is the very basic characterization of an adjacency pair, the overall picture is more complicated (cf. Schegloff 2007:14). For example, many utterances have both responsive as well as initial properties. Furthermore, responses are not always made relevant by the initial utterance but can also be volunteered by the addressee. However, the basic sequential structure of initial and responsive utterances is pervasive in interaction, and is therefore important for the analysis in this dissertation. The Yurakaré data show that sequential placement can be an important factor for the use and interpretation of grammatical markers. For all the verbal enclitics, it makes a difference whether they are used in initial or second position. Because the sequential placement is important, the uses of the evidential-intersubjective markers in Yurakaré can only be understood through a careful analysis of the sequential structure of the utterances in which the marker occurs.

It has recently been argued by Stivers and Rossano (2010) that response relevance should not be considered conditional in a fixed binary way (i.e. a response is either made relevant or not), but rather that response relevance forms a cline where speakers can employ various response-mobilizing turn design features to make the addressee more accountable for producing a response. The features they study are interrogative morphosyntax, interrogative intonation, speaker gaze, and framing the content of the utterance as belonging to the epistemic realm of the addressee (p. 4). The study by Stivers and Rossano is

based on data from English and Italian interactions, while the features proposed by the authors can probably be considered to be used across languages for response mobilizing:

Although we expect that speakers of different languages rely to different degrees on response mobilizing resources, we nonetheless expect that across languages, ethnicities, and cultures people rely on the same resources gaze, lexico-morphosyntax, prosody, and epistemic asymmetry to mobilize response. Here we propose a model for how responses to social actions are regulated across the species rather than for speakers of one language. (Stivers and Rossano 2010:29)

The present study reveals that the use of the evidential-intersubjective markers of Yurakaré can be involved in mobilizing response. For example, the intersubjective reading of the marker =*ya* (see chapter 3) frequently triggers agreeing responses, as can be seen in example (6) below. This shows that the Yurakaré verbal enclitics participate in the organization of sequences, and thus play an important role in the structure of interaction.

An important methodological practice in CA is to base the analysis on how an utterance is treated by the participants, because this offers an insight into how the utterance was interpreted. This method has also been used in the present study. It shows that the use of evidentials often constitutes interactional practices. In many cases, it can be observed that the utterance containing the evidential in initial position is frequently attended to in a specific way by the addressee, or that the utterance containing the evidential in second position treats the initial utterance to which it is responsive in a specific way. For example, utterances containing intersubjective =*ya* in initial position have as their preferred response agreements which are again marked with intersubjective =*ya*. An example is (6), where Asunta suggests in line 1 that the frog of the frog story is a certain type of frog called *lojojo* in Yurakaré, using an utterance marked with intersubjective =*ya*. Magdalena's response in line 2 is an agreement also marked with =*ya*:

- (6) 1. A: *lojojoya* (.)
 lojojo=ya
 frog=REP
 'It seems to be a *lojojo*.'
2. M: *achamayla*
 achama=ya=la
 be_like_that=REP=COMM
 'That's right.'
 (al.ce.frogstory)

It has to be noted that the analysis could not be based purely on such a sequential analysis, since it is not always the case that speakers attend to utterances at all or in a specific way. Therefore, the analysis presented here

is additionally informed through semantic elicitation and discussions with the speakers. I used various elicitation methods, from translations to grammaticality judgments to presenting sentences in context or asking the speakers to invent a context for a sentence. This method was especially important to gain a first impression of the basic semantics of the evidentials, but also to collect negative evidence about things that are not said (cf. Matthewson 2004 for a discussion of the importance of gathering negative evidence through semantic elicitation). This method was for example important to find out whether combinations of evidentials that did not occur in the corpus were in fact ungrammatical or at least pragmatically odd. Non-occurrence in the corpus is *not strong enough* evidence for an expression to be ungrammatical or pragmatically infelicitous in all situations.

The approach taken in this study differs in an important way from usual CA practice. While conversation analysts normally identify a possible interactional practice and then build a collection of examples to see whether the assumption that it is a practice can be corroborated by the data, I first made a collection of all occurrences of all evidentials in the conversational corpus, and then investigated which conversational practices could be identified. This approach is in a way a reversal of the method generally used in CA.

1.5 Overview

This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 is a sketch grammar of Yurakaré where the basic features of the language are outlined as a background. In chapter 3, the reported evidential =*ya* and its second interpretation of epistemic intersubjectivity will be discussed. Chapter 4 deals with the inferential evidential =*tiba*. The subjective evidential =*laba* is the topic of chapter 5, while chapter 6 concerns the assumptive evidential =*jtë*. In chapter 7, the frustrative marker =*chi* is analyzed, which is not itself an evidential but shares important features with the evidentials as well as their morphosyntactic position. Chapter 8 deals with the possible and impossible combinations within the evidential set. Chapter 9 gives a summary and the conclusions of the study.

Chapter 2

Basic grammatical features of Yurakaré

This grammatical sketch of Yurakaré is meant to help the reader to understand the examples that are used in the main chapters. It outlines the basic features of the grammar. For a more comprehensive description of the Yurakaré language, the reader is referred to van Gijn (2006).

This chapter is organized as follows. In section 2.1, the current situation of the Yurakaré language and previous work on the language are described. Section 2.2 is concerned with the phonology of Yurakaré. Section 2.3 deals with the basic features of the morphology. The noun phrase is described in section 2.4, while the verb is the topic of section 2.5. Section 2.6 deals with the clause, and section 2.7 is concerned with interactional enclitics. Within that section, subsection 2.7.2 gives a brief introduction to the basic properties of the evidential-interactional markers that are the topic of this dissertation.

2.1 Situation of the language and previous work

The current number of Yurakaré speakers can only be estimated, which is in part due to the dispersion of their settlements over a large area. Estimates vary considerably from 200 to 4000 (van Gijn *in press b*). For a discussion of some prior proposals, cf. van Gijn (2006:1). A number of around 2500 speakers seems most reasonable. Yurakaré must be considered endangered, due to a severe break in transmission. Most of the children do not actively acquire Yurakaré anymore. Since Spanish is becoming more and more important in the everyday life of the Yurakaré, their original language is used less and less. The children only speak Spanish in school, and their parents want them to speak Spanish so they can have better opportunities later. Many parents think learning Yurakaré as well is unnecessary.

The name of the people and the language is Yurakaré or Yuracaré. The Yurakaré call themselves *yurujure*.

There have been various proposals for a genetic classification of Yurakaré (e.g. Greenberg 1987, Suárez 1974, Swadesh 1962), but none of them has proved

convincing. For example, Greenberg (1987) has grouped Yurakaré together with different language families such as Arawak, Tupi and Uro in the Equatorial group. This grouping has not been generally accepted, and Yurakaré must be considered an unclassified language which could be an isolate.

Even though there are slightly different varieties of the Yurakaré language, these do not seem to support a distinction of Yurakaré dialect groups. Yurakaré speakers from all areas can understand each other easily, and differences in grammar and vocabulary are minimal. For a discussion of earlier proposals, see van Gijn (2006:2-3).

The first known description of the Yurakaré language we owe to Franciscan Father La Cueva, who spent almost two decades living with the Yurakaré people in the beginning of the 19th century. During this time, he collected lexicographic and grammatical information, which was published years later by Adam (1893). Another Franciscan Father, Fulgencio Lassinger, produced a short grammatical sketch of the language much based on the structure of Latin grammar (1915).

The New Tribes Mission started their work in the Yurakaré territory in the 1960s, resulting in the production of a teaching manual for Yurakaré which was to be used to train missionaries in the language (n.d.) and the publication of a dictionary (1991). Van Gijn (2006) is the first comprehensive grammatical description of the Yurakaré language.

From June 2006 to February 2011, a documentation project was carried out funded by the DoBeS initiative of the Volkswagen Foundation. The members of the documentation team are Rik van Gijn, Vincent Hirtzel, and the author of this dissertation. The documentation project aims at providing a thorough and comprehensive multimedia documentation of the Yurakaré language and culture. The present work constitutes part of this documentation project.¹

2.2 Phonology

2.2.1 Phonemes

Yurakaré has 17 phonemic consonants and seven phonemic vowels. These are represented in Table 2.1 (adapted from van Gijn 2006:21²) and 2.2 (van Gijn 2006:27), respectively.

¹For more information on the language and culture of the Yurakaré and for information about the documentation project, see the project's website: <http://www.mpi.nl/DOBES/projects/yurakare>.

²The original table also includes a glottal stop. However, the glottal stop is not clearly phonemic in Yurakaré and is thus not represented in Table 2.1. It mostly appears in words that have a double vowel, and is inserted between the two vowels in careful speech to result in a bisyllabic word, like in [jɛʔe] 'woman' and [sæʔæ] 'I'. In everyday fast speech and in certain morphological environments these vowels are shortened, resulting in the pronunciation [je] and [sæ].

Table 2.1: Yurakaré phonemic consonants

	labial	alveolar	palatal	velar	glottal
Plosives	p	t	tʃ	k	
	b	d	d _j		
Fricatives		s	ʃ		h
		ɹ			
Nasals	m	n	ɲ		
Laterals		l			
Semivowels	w		j		

Table 2.2: Yurakaré phonemic vowels

	front		back
high	i	i	u
mid		e	o
low	æ	a	

2.2.2 Orthography

The orthography used in this study was established during a meeting of Yurakaré speakers on Yurakaré orthography held in 2007 in Santa Cruz, Bolivia. For some proposals made by other scholars, see van Gijn (2006:30-1). There was another convention decided upon at that meeting, namely the use of accents to mark non-penultimate stress, since stress on the penultimate syllable is the most frequent. For ease of exhibition and because word stress interacts with utterance intonation this convention is not used here. The graphemes for consonants are represented in Table 2.3, those for vowels in Table 2.4.

Table 2.3: The spelling of Yurakaré consonants

Phoneme	p	t	tʃ	k	b	d	d _j	s	ʃ	h	ɹ	m	n	ɲ	l	w	j
Grapheme	p	t	ch	k	b	d	dy	s	sh	j	r	m	n	ñ	l	w	v

Table 2.4: The spelling of Yurakaré vowels

Phoneme	i	i	u	e	o	æ	a
Grapheme	i	ü	u	e	o	é	a

2.2.3 Phonotactics

Yurakaré syllables have a (C)V(C) structure. The consonants /t/, /tʃ/, /k/, /b/, /d/, and /d_j/ cannot occur in coda position. An exception are ideophones, which allow the consonants /k/ and /t/ in the coda. Normally, if a morphological process would cause a cluster of three consonants, one of them is deleted. In (7), the second person plural subject suffix *-p* precedes the assumptive evidential \Rightarrow jtë. This would result in the consonant cluster [pht]. Since Yurakaré does generally not allow this, the [h] is dropped:

- (7) *bataptëri*

bata-p=jtë=ri
 go.FUT-2PL=ASSU=RES.M
 ‘You (pl.) will presumably go.’
 (040707_conv)

Another important morpho-phonological process is the lenition of onset [k] to [h] when following a prefix ending in a vowel. An example is (8). The sound [h] is represented by the letter <j>:

(8) *namashtay tajudawa yosse*
nama-shta=ya ta-kudawa yosse
 dry-FUT=REP 1PL.POSS-lagoon again
 ‘Our lagoon might dry out again.’
 (160906_conv1)

All Yurakaré consonants have phonemic geminate counterparts, represented in the orthography by doubling (e.g. *yokkoshe* ‘truth’). Doubling of consonants can also occur as a consequence of vowel deletion:

(9) *tappë*
ta-pëpë
 1PL.POSS-grandfather
 ‘our grandfather’

Lexical geminate consonants are often shortened in combination with certain morphology, especially possessive prefixes:

(10) a. *sibbë*
 ‘house’
 b. *tisibë*
ti-sibbë
 1SG.POSS-house
 ‘my house’

For a more comprehensive account of Yurakaré phonotactics, see van Gijn (2006: section 2.3).

2.2.4 Stress

Stress in Yurakaré is rather complex and interacts with morphology. The default stress pattern is based on a iambic foot structure constructed from left to right, with the main stress falling on the rightmost foot head. Words are usually not stressed on the last syllable. Van Gijn (2006:38) considers the last syllable extrametrical. Exceptions are ideophones, which are often stressed on the last syllable, and certain word-final clitics that can attract stress.³ An example for normal stress is (11):

³It seems that this final stress on certain clitics is especially frequent in the community of San Pablo where my field work was carried out: van Gijn (p.c.) has not found this phenomenon to the same extent in other Yurakaré communities. This final stress seems to be pragmatic in nature.

- (11) a. *pojóre*
 `canoe`
 b. *tipójore*
 1SG.POSS-canoe
 `my canoe`

In (11a), we can see that the iambic pattern picks out the second syllable for stress of the trisyllabic word *pojore*. When the first person possessive prefix is added as in (11b), stress is again placed on the second syllable of the word, following the iambic foot and leaving out the last syllable.

However, there are many other features interfering with this basic rule. The first is that there are some prefixes that attract stress, for example the plural possessive prefixes, as can be seen in (12b). The singular possessive prefixes do not attract stress, as demonstrated by (12a):

- (12) a. *tipójore*
 1SG.POSS-canoe
 `my canoe`
 mipójore
 2SG.POSS-canoe
 `your canoe`
 apójore
 3SG.POSS-canoe
 `his/her canoe`
 b. *tàpojóre*
 1PL.POSS-canoe
 `our canoe`
 pàpojóre
 2PL.POSS-canoe
 `your (pl.) canoe`
 màpojóre
 3PL.POSS-canoe
 `their canoe`

The pattern is further complicated by interaction of stress with syllable weight (cf. van Gijn 2006:40-1) and utterance intonation. Pragmatic factors also seem to play a role in some cases.

2.3 Morphology

Yurakaré is an agglutinating language with complex verbal morphology. It can be considered mildly polysynthetic, since subject and objects are cross-referenced on the verb. However, there is no noun incorporation. The basic verbal template is represented in (13). The slot for the verbal enclitics is in

bold face. The verbal enclitics are the evidential-intersubjective markers that are the topic of the present dissertation.

- (13) object(s)- applicative- aspect- verbal stem -derivation -TAM -subject
 =verbal enclitics =clausal enclitics

2.3.1 Parts of speech

Yurakaré distinguishes between verbs, nouns, adjectives, adverbs, ideophones, and interjections. These word classes can be distinguished on the basis of their syntactic function and their inflectional and derivational morphology. Further subclasses of nouns are *personal pronouns*, *demonstratives*, and the *interrogative pronoun*.

2.3.1.1 Verbs

Verbs in Yurakaré are morphologically complex. They obligatorily take subject and object cross-reference marking (the latter for transitive verbs), and can be marked for voice and TAM. Furthermore, verbs have some specific derivational morphology, such as degree of intensity marking (shared with adjectives) and the verbal locative prefix *li-*. For a more detailed description of Yurakaré verbal morphology, see section 2.5.

2.3.1.2 Nouns

Nouns in Yurakaré can carry nominal morphology, which distinguishes them from verbs and adjectives.

Nouns can be used predicatively without derivation and carry verbal inflectional morphology. An example is (14), where (a) shows a nominal and (b) a verbal use of the noun *kampana* ‘bell’:

- (14) a. *ajampanaja daja na ayoyoto doj*
a-kampana=ja daja naa a-yoyoto dojo=y
 3SG.POSS-bell(SP)=TOP hang DEM 3SG.POSS-bed body=LOC
 ‘That’s his bell hanging there above his bed.’
- b. *amashku kampanishtachi at*
amashku kampana-shta=chi ati
 how bell(SP)-FUT=FR DEM
 ‘How is that going to be a bell?’
 (270807_conv)

In (14a), the noun *kampana* ‘bell’ is used as a noun carrying nominal morphology (third person possessive *a-* and topic marker *=ja*). In contrast, in (14b), it is used as a predicate with the meaning of ‘be a bell’ and carries verbal morphology, namely the future marker *-shta*. This shows that nouns can be used predicatively without any derivation. *Every noun in Yurakaré can be used in this way.* The interpretation is usually straightforward: ‘be X’. In contrast, verbs cannot be used as nouns without derivation.

2.3.1.2.1 Personal pronouns

Yurakaré has four free personal pronouns, which can be considered a subclass of nouns:

1 Sg	<i>sëë</i>
2 Sg	<i>mëë</i>
1 Pl	<i>tuwa</i>
2 Pl	<i>paa</i>

The third person does not have specific personal pronouns. Instead, the demonstratives are used for third person referents (see section 2.3.1.2.2). They can only take restricted nominal morphology. For example, they cannot take the plural marker =w since they inherently express number, and they usually do not take nominal derivational morphology.

2.3.1.2.2 Demonstratives

Yurakaré has three demonstratives which are sensitive to distance from the speaker:

<i>ana</i>	proximal
<i>ati</i>	neutral
<i>naa</i>	distal

The demonstratives can be used adnominally as well as pronominally. In the pronominal use, the demonstratives can carry all nominal morphology apart from the possessive markers. The demonstratives can be marked with the referential prefix *l-*, which indicates that the demonstrative refers to a referent that was mentioned in a previous utterance. This marker is restricted to demonstratives, another property which distinguishes them from nouns.

The adnominal use of demonstratives is grammaticalizing toward a new word class of definite articles, since their sensitivity to distance is becoming less important in this use, and their pronunciation is shortened (e.g. from *ana* to *an*).

2.3.1.3 The interrogative pronoun *ama*

Yurakaré has various question words, many of which consist of the interrogative pronoun *ama* in combination with a derivational affix or a post-position. These forms can be considered lexicalized. In addition, there are two further question words that are not derived from *ama*, *tërë* ‘which’ and *ëshë* ‘why’. Examples of interrogative pronouns derived from *ama* are the following:

<i>amchi</i>	<i>ama=chi</i>	(ama=DIR)	‘where, where to’
<i>amashku</i>	<i>ama-shku</i>	(ama-ADV.SML)	‘how’
<i>amaja</i>	<i>ama=ja</i>	(ama=TOP)	‘who’
<i>amti</i>	<i>ama-ti</i>	(ama-NUM)	‘how many’

2.3.1.4 Adjectives

Like nouns, adjectives can be used predicatively without derivation. In discourse, adjectives are most frequently used predicatively, while attributive uses are rather rare. An example for a predicative use is (15):

- (15) *yoj pero ñuñujulë tipojore*
yoj pero ñuñujulë ti-pojore
 INTJ but(SP) small 1SG.POSS-canoe
 ‘Yeah. but my canoe is small.’
 (290906_convI)

In (15), the speaker tells a story about a trip to another village. She had asked a man to give her a lift in his canoe. The example is a quote of his answer. The adjective *ñuñujulë* is used predicatively to form a predication about the man’s canoe.

A case where an adjective is used with verbal morphology is (16):

- (16) *bějmtulase*
bēmë-tu=la=se
 many-1PL=COMM=PSUP
 ‘We were many people.’
 (lifehistory)

In (16), *bēmë* is used predicatively and carries the verbal subject agreement marker *-tu* for first person plural.

Even though adjectives are most frequently used as predicates, they can still be distinguished from verbs on the basis of the morphology they take. Adjectives can be marked for collectivity with *-ima*, and they take the adverbializer *-sh* to form manner adverbs, while nouns and verbs mostly take *-shku*. This shows that we can distinguish adjectives from verbs and also from nouns. Furthermore, even though the predicative use is more frequent, adjectives can be used attributively. This also distinguishes them from verbs. An example is (17), where the adjective *matata* ‘big’ modifies the noun *bateria* ‘battery’ (loan from Spanish):

- (17) *kusu an matata bateriashku imbëtëjtwya*
kusu ana matata bateria-shku imbëtë-jti=w=ya
 maybe DEM big battery(SP)-ADV.SML behave-HAB=PL=REP
 ‘Maybe they are like those big batteries.’
 (220906_convII)

Quantifiers and numerals in Yurakaré share the basic properties of adjectives, and are therefore not considered a separate word class here (cf. van Gijn 2006:78-9).

2.3.1.5 Adverbs

Yurakaré has a small class of inherent adverbs. They have limited possibilities for carrying inflectional morphology. Examples are *kousono* ‘well’, *tishilë* ‘now’, *shinama* ‘long ago’, and *yosse* ‘again’.

2.3.1.6 Ideophones

Ideophones are a word class which shows special phonological, morphological, and syntactic properties. Ideophones can be monosyllabic or bisyllabic. In the latter case, they are stressed on the last syllable, which usually does not happen in other Yurakaré words. Furthermore, they can end in the phoneme /k/, which other words in Yurakaré cannot.

The syntactic properties of ideophones also identify them as a separate word class of Yurakaré. Ideophones can modify a verb in which case they directly precede the verb. An example is (18):

- (18) *lati bosh yupapa adalanñu*
l-ati=y **bosh** *yupa~pa a-dala-nñu*
REF-DEM=LOC IDEO enter~CAU 3SG.POSS-head-DIM
'Here, it put its head inside, bosh.'
(al_ce_frogstory)

The example refers to picture 4 of the frog story, where the dog is putting its head inside the frog's glass. The ideophone *bosh* 'pricking movement' specifies the action of the dog putting its head inside. The action is represented as a movement similar to pricking.

Some ideophones can also be used with the middle marker *-ta* (see section 2.5.2.1) to form predicates:

- (19) *latisha tapërujtati*
latijsha ta-përuk-ta=ti
then 1PL.OBJ-IDEO-MID=DS
'Then, when we turned over. ...'
(290906_convI)

In (19), the ideophone *përuk* 'turn over' is combined with the middle marker *-ta* to form a predicate that carries verbal morphology (first person plural object prefix *ta-*, different subject marker *=ti*).⁴ Another feature that identifies ideophones as a separate word class is that some of them have a causative counterpart formed with the suffix *-che* or reduplication of the first syllable.

2.3.1.7 Interjections

Interjections form a small class. They are mostly monosyllabic and express some attitude of the speaker. Examples are *të* and *otte* 'yeah', *voj* 'okay', *yutchi* 'let's see', and *ij* 'surprise'. They usually occur at the beginning of an utterance.

2.3.2 Morphological processes

The most common morphological process is affixing, with a slight preference for suffixing. While prefixes are also common, infixing is a very marginal process. Reduplication can occur as prefixing, suffixing, and infixing, with

⁴Van Gijn (2010) argues that the middle marker has diachronically emerged out of the use of the verb *ta* 'say' with ideophones.

different interpretations. Compounding is mainly a nominal process. Another morphological process is cliticization. There are some elements in Yurakaré that can clearly be identified as clitics, since they can attach to any kind of element and often attach to the last element of a clause. These are the clausal enclitics described in section 2.7.1 below. For the evidentials of Yurakaré, it is not so easy to determine their morphological status, since they always attach to the inflected verb. An argument to consider them clitics is that they follow the third person plural marker =w. Since this marker is considered a clitic (cf. section 2.4.2 below), the evidentials that follow it should also be analyzed as clitics, since affixes should usually not follow clitics (cf. Anderson 2005:35). A potential problem for this is posed by cases where a suffix does seem to follow a clitic, like in (20) and (21). Such cases are probably best explained with lexicalization. The locative clitic =y is lexicalized with days of the week, while demonstratives with the topic marker =ja can be considered lexicalized in some uses as well.

(20) *solamente duminkuyjti mali*

solamente duminku=y-jti mala-y
 only(SP) Sunday(SP)=LOC-LIM go.SG-1SG
 ‘I only go on Sundays.’
 (loreto)

(21) *atijajti remedio itta atijajti sorretebe*

ati=ja-jti remedio itta atija-jti sorre-tebe
 DEM=TOP-LIM medicine thing DEM:TOP-LIM diarrheah-PURP
 ‘This is the medicine, this is for diarrheah.’
 (remedios)

2.4 The noun phrase

The noun phrase in Yurakaré is headed by a noun, which determines the noun phrase’s syntactic status. It can be accompanied by demonstratives, adjectives, and possessors. Demonstratives usually precede all other items of a noun phrase. Adjectives and possessors also precede the noun in the noun phrase. The default interpretation of bare noun phrases is singular, while plural is marked with the plural enclitic =w. Furthermore, noun phrases can be followed by post-positional clitics.

In (22), some examples of noun phrases are presented:

(22) a. *dechuy lëtta yee*

deche=w=ya lëtta yee
 find=PL=REP one woman
 ‘They met a woman.’
 (ma_pu_diablo)

b. *anu daja apëp chimorela*

anu daja apēpe chimore=la
 like_that hang prominent almond_tree=INS
 ‘Like that they hang in the high almond tree.’
 (pp_pf_frogstory)

c. *nij imeyyejti an minñuye*
nij i-meyye-jti ana mi-nñu=ye
 NEG PV-ear-HAB DEM 2SG.POSS-child=ADAP.F
 ‘That child of yours doesn’t listen!’
 (Lit: ‘Your child doesn’t have ears!’)
 (al_ce_frogstory)

d. *anajaji na sewwe ayoyoto*
ana=ja-jti naa sewwe a-yoyoto
 DEM=TOP-HAB DEM boy 3SG.POSS-bed
 ‘That is the boy’s bed.’
 (al_ce_frogstory)

In (22a), the numeral adjective *lētta* precedes the noun *ye*. Example (22b) shows a noun phrase consisting of an adnominal adjective and a noun. In (22c), the possessed noun *mñu* ‘child’ is preceded by the demonstrative *ana*. Example (22d) shows a noun phrase in which the possessed noun *yoyoto* is preceded by the unmarked possessor *sewwe*, which is in turn preceded by the demonstrative *naa*.

2.4.1 Possession

Possession is marked by a possessive prefix on the possessum, while the possessor, if overtly expressed, is unmarked. The possessive prefixes are:

1 Sg *ti-*
 2 Sg *mi-*
 3 Sg *a-*
 1 Pl *ta-*
 2 Pl *pa-*
 3 Pl *ma-*

An example of the use of the first person singular possessive marker is (23):

(23) *achu tindyujuti shinama tipēpëshama*
achu ti-n-dyujtu-jti shinama ti-pēpē-shama
 like_this 1SG.OBJ-BEN-tell-HAB long_ago 1SG.POSS-grandfather-DCSD
 ‘My grandfather used to tell me this long ago.’
 (al_tradiciones)

Usually, if a possessor is overtly expressed by a noun phrase, it precedes the head noun. An example is (24):

(24) *ati lati abanu atih chajmu abanula*

ati l-ati a-banna=w a-tiba chajmu
 DEM REF-DEM 3SG.POSS-hand=PL 3SG.POSS-pet dog
a-banna=w=la
 3SG.POSS-hand=PL=COMM
 ‘Those are the paws of that one, the paws of his dog.’
 (al_ce_frogstory)

In (24), the possessor (which is in turn possessed) *atiba chajmu* ‘his dog’ precedes the possessum *abannawla* ‘its paws’.

2.4.2 Plural

Nominal plural in Yurakaré is indicated by the enclitic =w. Most nouns are interpreted as singular when unmarked, while they take the plural marker =w for plural. However, there are some nouns that are always marked for plural, such as *yarruw* ‘chicha’ (drink made from manioc) and *kamisaw* ‘shirt’, while others are never marked for plural, such as *ëshshë* ‘stone’ (van Gijn 2004).

Example (25) shows the use of the plural marker. We can see that it occurs on adjectives as well as nouns. Furthermore, =w is used on verbs to mark third person plural subjects. This supports an analysis of =w as a clitic rather than a suffix.

- (25) *sotu matatu sinkutiw madayujtiwya atiw*
- soto=w matata=w sinku-ti=w*
 spider_monkey=PL big=PL five(SP)-NUM=PL
ma-dayu-jti=w=ya ati=w
 3PL.OBJ-carry_on_back-HAB=PL=REP DEM=PL
 ‘They can carry five big spider monkeys!’
 (Lit.: ‘Spider monkeys, the big ones, five of them they can carry!’)
 (270807_conv)

In (25), the head noun of the first noun phrase *soto* ‘spider monkey’ is marked for plural. The qualifying adjective *matata* ‘big’ and the numeral *sinkuti* ‘five’ which follow the head noun are also both marked for plural. This kind of plural agreement on attributive adjectives usually occurs when they follow the head noun. The second noun phrase which consists of the demonstrative pronoun *ati* is also marked for plural with =w. The verb *dayu* ‘carry on back’ is marked with =w for third person plural subject.

When =w is used with noun phrases that consist of an adjective and a noun, =w can be used on both elements, like in (25), or only on the last element, like in (26). This furthermore supports the analysis of =w as a clitic.

- (26) *bēmē marraw atchi*
- bēmē marra=w ati=chi*
 many marra_tree=PL DEM=DIR
 ‘There were many marra trees.’
 (ma_lifehistory)

In (26), the plural enclitic =w is attached to the noun, while the preceding adjective is unmarked. The plural morpheme modifies the whole noun phrase in this case. Note that the reading here is predicative, with the whole noun phrase including the plural marking forming the existential predicate.

2.4.3 Nominal derivation

Commonly used derivational category-preserving nominal suffixes are *-nñu* ‘diminutive’, *-jti* ‘limitative’, and *-shama* ‘deceased’:

- (27) a. *atib chajmunñu wëy ta lacha*
 a-tiba chajmu-**nñu** wëy ta lacha
 3SG.POSS-pet dog-DIM IDEO say too
 ‘His dog is screaming as well.’
 (pp_pf_frogstory)
- b. *nij tiyaw dyalajta nij manchayu chajtiw korrejti bak korrejti bak korrejti bak*
 nij tiya=w dyalajta nij ma-u-chaya=w
 NEG eat=PL sweet NEG 3PL.OBJ-BEN-feed=PL
 chajti=w korre-**jti** bak korre-**jti** bak
 be_like_that.HAB=PL tobacco-LIM IDEO tobacco-LIM IDEO
 korre-**jti** bak
 tobacco-LIM IDEO
 ‘They did not eat sweet things, they didn’t eat that, it was like that, only tobacco, only tobacco, only tobacco.’
 (al_tradiciones)
- c. *chajtiw shinama tatejteshamu*
 chajti=w shinama ta-tejte-**shama**=w
 be_like_that.HAB=PL long-ago 1PL.POSS-grandmother-DCSD=PL
 ‘Like that were our late grandmothers before.’
 (al_tradiciones)

The diminutive indicates that the entity described by the modified noun is small, and it can be used to indicate affection toward a referent. In (27a), it is used to modify the noun *chajmu* ‘dog’. The limitative suffix *-jti* can be translated with ‘only’, and it indicates that the modified referent is the only one to whom the event described applies. In example (27b), the speaker is talking about the old traditions of the Yurakaré, saying that the shamans did not eat sweets but only tobacco. The noun *korre* ‘tobacco’ is marked with *-jti* to indicate this limitative semantics. The suffix *-shama* is most frequently used with deceased people, like in (27c). The speaker is talking about the old grandmothers, the female ancestors of the Yurakaré. They are all deceased, which is indicated by the suffix *-shama*. The suffix *-shama* is clearly related to the verb *shama* ‘die PL’. However, the suffix can also be used to indicate a change of state, in which case it is interpreted as English ‘ex-’. An example is (28), where *-shama* is used with the noun *bashti* ‘wife’ to indicate the status of an ex-wife:

- (28) *tütü ush atta abashtishama*
tütü ushta atta a-bashti-shama
 be before other 3SG.POSS-wife-DCSD
 ‘He had another wife before?’
 (270807_conv)

It has to be noted that the diminutive suffix is not restricted to nouns, and therefore cannot be considered diagnostic for distinguishing nouns from verbs (see example (43) below on page 41).

Commonly used derivational nominal suffixes that cause a change of category are *-kka* ‘measure’ (resulting in an adjective), *i-* ‘possessive verbalizer’, *-shi* ‘similative verb’ and *-shku* ‘similative adverbializer’. The suffix *-kka* is used on demonstratives and adjectives of size in combination with gestures to indicate the size of the object the speaker is talking about:

- (29) *kummë anakka miyja* ((indicating with her hands))
kummë ana-kka mii-y=ja
 tree DEM-MEA take.SG-1SG=REA
 ‘I took a stick of this size...’
 (290906_convI)

The possessive verbalizer *i-* mostly indicates that the subject of the resulting verb possesses an object. It can often be translated with the verb ‘have’:

- (30) *yitash ishinojsheya tappëshama*
yita-sh i-shinojshe=ya ta-pëpë-shama
 good-ADV.MAN PV-heart=REP 1PL.POSS-grandfather-DCSD
 ‘Our late grandfather had power.’
 (lit: ‘Our late grandfather had a heart in a good manner.’)
 (al_tradiciones)

The similative adverbializer *-shku* changes nouns into adverbs that can be used to modify verbs:

- (31) *nij tappëshamashku imbëtëtijtinaj tuwa*
nij ta-pëpë-shama-shku=w
 NEG 1PL.POSS-grandfather-DCSD-ADV.SML=PL
imbëtë-tijti=naja tuwa
 behave-HAB.1PL=NSIT 1PL.PRON
 ‘We don’t behave like our late grandfathers anymore.’
 (al_tradiciones)

Predicates can also be derived from nouns by using the similative marker *-shi*:

- (32) *ujma shuyashapëlëshi*
ujwa-ma shuyasha-pëlë-shi
 look-IMP.SG armadillo-skin-SML
 ‘Look, it is like an armadillo’s carapace.’
 (al_ce_frogstory)

2.4.4 Post-positional clitics

There are five post-positional clitics that attach to the last element of noun phrases that represent peripheral participant roles not marked on the head noun:

= <i>chi</i>	‘directional’	DIR
= <i>jsha</i>	‘ablative’	ABL
= <i>la</i>	‘instrument’	INS
= <i>tina</i>	‘comitative’	COM
= <i>y</i>	‘locative’	LOC

The directional post-position =*chi* and its allomorph =*yj* is used to indicate a direction of movement, and can also be used for expressing a stative location in some cases. The ablative clitic =*jsha* indicates the source of a movement. The instrument post-position =*la* is used to mark instruments and can also be used to indicate a path of a movement. Comitative =*tina* marks a participant with whom/which an action is carried out, while locative =*y* indicates a location. Examples for the post-positional clitics are given in (33):

- (33) a. *wayaraj malaj nij wilitay ati*
wayara=chi mala=ja nij wilita=ya ati
 Guayaramerín=DIR go.SG=REA NEG return=REP DEM
 ‘He went to Guayaramerín and did not return.’
 (280807_conv)
- b. *mororo ashujeshaj ujwaj asunta ati*
mororo a-shujeshaj ujwa=ya asunta ati
 hill 3SG.POSS-peak=ABL look=REP PROPN DEM
 ‘That one is watching from the top of the hill. Asunta.’
 (al_ce_frogstory)
- c. *mütam adalula kutaya*
müta-ma a-dalla=w=la ku-ta=ya
 pullOut-IMP.SG 3SG.POSS-hair=PL=INS 3SG.OBJ.COM-say=REP
 ‘“Pull her by her hair!” she said to him.’
 (ma_pu_diablo)
- d. *limmutin kandulaj kanessajtiw*
limmu=tina ka-n-dula=ya
 lemon(SP)=COM 3SG.OBJ-BEN-do=IRR
ka-n-essa-jti=w
 3SG.OBJ-BEN-give.to_drink-HAB=PL
 ‘With lemon they make it for her and give it to her to drink.’
 (remedios)
- e. *santo domingoy mwy ush ana*
santo domingo=y mii=w=ya ushta ana
 PROPN PROPN=LOC take.SG=PL=REP before DEM
 ‘They recorded that one in Santo Domingo.’
 (270807_conv)

2.4.5 The topic marker =*ja*

Noun phrases can carry the topic marker =*ja*, which emphasizes that the noun phrase constitutes the topic of an utterance. It is not grammatically obligatory, but rather determined by pragmatic principles concerning information structure. An example is (34):

- (34) 1. ⇒ A: *na pëpëj malasajtiya* (1.0)
naa pëpë=ja
 DEM grandfather=TOP
ma-la-saa~sa-jti=ya
 3PL.OBJ-MAL-leave~DIST-HAB=REP
 ‘It must have been that grandfather who left them (his wives).’
2. ⇒ M: *pëpëj kalasay alla*
pëpë=ja ka-la-saa=ya ati=la
 grandfather=TOP 3SG.OBJ-MAL-leave=REP DEM=COMM
 ‘He was the one who left that one (wife).’
 (270807.conv)

The topic marker =*ja* can also be used to introduce new topics, with the interpretation ‘what about *X*’, like in (35):

- (35) 1. M: *kayle mëdyërërë tabuybu* (0.7)
ka-ayle më-dyërërë ta-buybu
 3SG.OBJ-know 2SG.OBJ.COM-converse 1PL.POSS-language
 ‘He can speak in our language.’
2. A: *tabuybu* (0.4)
ta-buybu
 1PL.POSS-language
 ‘In our language!’
3. M: *tabuybu* (.) (...) (0.7) *taptash mëdyërërëj* (0.8)
ta-buybu ta-apta-sh
 1PL.POSS-language 1PL.POSS-kin-ADV.MAN
më-dyërërë-jti
 2SG.OBJ.COM-converse-HAB
 ‘In our language! He converses like one of our people.’
4. ⇒ A: *ë achuta* (.) *abashiti*? ((gazes to addressee)) (.)
ë achuta a-bashiti=ja
 INTJ be-like-that 3SG.POSS-wife=TOP
 ‘Oh, really. What about his wife?’
5. M: *nijta* ((shakes head))
nijta
 NEG
 ‘She doesn’t.’
 (270807.conv)

2.5 The verb

The verbal morphology of Yurakaré is complex. Subjects and objects are cross-referenced on the verb. Valency can be extended through the use of applicatives. The verb can carry a range of derivational suffixes and TAM markers.

2.5.1 Agreement and valency

Yurakaré agreement shows nominative-accusative alignment. Subjects and objects are both obligatorily cross-referenced on the verb. Subjects are indexed by suffixes, while objects are indexed by prefixes. An exception is the third person singular. Third person singular subjects are always unmarked, and third person singular objects are unmarked for inherently transitive verbs. For a detailed account of argument structure in Yurakaré, see van Gijn (2005 and *in press a*).

The subject cross-referencing suffixes are attached to the (derived) verbal stem. The paradigm looks as follows:

1 Sg	-y
2 Sg	-m
3 Sg	o
1 Pl	-tu
2 Pl	-p
3 Pl	=w

Verbs that are unmarked for person are interpreted as third singular, whereas the third person plural is encoded by the plural clitic =w. This marker is analyzed here since it is assumed to be the same as the nominal plural marker which is analyzed as a clitic (see section 2.4.2).

On inherently transitive verbs, direct objects are cross-referenced with the following prefixes:

1 Sg	ti-
2 Sg	mi-
3 Sg	o/ka-
1 Pl	ta-
2 Pl	pa-
3 Pl	ma-

With inherently transitive verbs, third person direct objects are only marked with *ka-* for singular collective nouns (cf. van Gijn 2004, *in press a*). For all other noun types, objects are unmarked. Apart from the third person singular, the object prefixes are homophonous with the possessive nominal prefixes.

Transitive and intransitive roots are distinguished by the property that transitives always have an object while intransitives do not. Intransitive verbs can be marked with object prefixes to yield a transitive interpretation. In this case, a third person singular object is also marked with *ka-*, like in (36):

(36) *kamali tammela*

ka-mala-y *ta-meme=la*
 3SG.OBJ-go.SG-1SG 1PL.POSS-mother=INS
 ‘I took Sonja⁵ with me.’
 (290906_convI)

The verb *mala* ‘go SG’ is inherently intransitive. In (36), a transitive interpretation arises through the use of the third person object marker *ka-*. The interpretation is ‘to take/bring something or someone’.

There are three applicative prefixes that can combine with the object markers, *la-* ‘malefactive’, *n-* ‘benefactive’, and *y-* ‘goal’. They follow the object markers, as we can see in (37):

- (37) a. *latchi kalamali sě tijompadre*
l-ati=chi *ka-la-mala-y* *sěě*
 REF-DEM=DIR 3SG.OBJ-MAL-go.SG-1SG 1SG.PRON
ti-kompadre
 1SG.POSS-compadre(SP)
 ‘Right there I left my compadre.’
 (160906_convI)
- b. *kannewew*
ka-n-ewe=w
 3SG.OBJ-BEN-sweep=PL
 ‘They sweep for her.’
 (loreto)
- c. *kaymalam kutam alampa*
ka-y-mala-ma *ku-ta-ma*
 3SG.OBJ-GOA-go.SG-IMP.SG 3SG.OBJ.COM-say-IMP.SG
a-lampa
 3SG.POSS-shovel(SP)
 ‘Tell him to go to get his shovel!’
 (270807_conv)

The malefactive applicative prefix is usually used when the corresponding object participant is in some way negatively affected by the described action. In (37a), it is used with the verb *mala* ‘go SG’, where it yields the interpretation of ‘leave’. The benefactive prefix *n-* is usually used when the action is in some way benefiting the object, like in (37b), where it is used to indicate that the people sweep for the Virgin of Loreto. The use of the malefactive and benefactive prefixes is conventionalized for some verbs, in which case they are not interpreted in a literal way. The goal object marker *y-* is used to indicate that the object is in some way the goal of the action described by the verb. In (37c), the shovel is the goal of the action described by the verb *mala* ‘go SG’.

The comitative object applicative is marked with a different paradigm of object prefixes:

⁵The Yurakaré sometimes called me *tamme*.

- 1 Sg *të-*
- 2 Sg *më-*
- 3 Sg *ku-*
- 1 Pl *tu-*
- 2 Pl *pu-*
- 3 Pl *mu-*

An example of the use of the comitative object is (38):

- (38) *tijumadre kutütütübë*
ti-komadre ku-tütü-tu=bë
 1SG.POSS-comadre(SP) 3SG.OBJ.COM-sit-1PL=MOM
 ‘We are sitting with my comadre.’
 (040707.conv)

In (38), the third person comitative object marker *ku-* indicates that object participant is performing the described action together with the subject participant. Comitative object marking renders a specific interpretation with some verbs, e.g. with the verb *mala/bali* ‘go SG/PL’ it yields the interpretation of the subject participant following the object participant. There are some verbs that take a comitative object in almost all cases, for example the speech act verb *ta* ‘say’.

Some verbs in Yurakaré have suppletive stems that are sensitive to participant number in terms of singular and plural. Intransitive verbs are sensitive to the number of subject participants, transitive verbs to the number of object participants. Examples for subject participants are *mala/bali* ‘go SG/PL’ and *wita/wiwi* ‘arrive SG/PL’. An example for a verb that is sensitive to object participant number is *mii/puu* ‘take SG/PL’, where *mii* is used for singular objects and *puu* for plural objects. Suppletive stems do not replace person marking. Subject and object cross-referencing are not influenced by the presence or absence of suppletive stems sensitive to participant number.

2.5.2 Voice

2.5.2.1 The middle voice marker *-ta*

Yurakaré has a middle voice (cf. Kemmer 1993) marker *-ta* which usually adapts its vowel to the last vowel of the word to which it is attached if that vowel is not high (cf. van Gijn 2006:35). It can be used when the participants of the event are not highly distinguishable, e.g. with reflexives and reciprocals, and when the causer of an action is not identified, e.g. with passives and spontaneous actions (van Gijn 2006:170). An example is (39):

- (39) a. *ti-buyusa*
 1SG.OBJ-kiss
 ‘(S)he kisses me.’
 b. *buyusa-ta=w*
 kiss-MID=PL

‘They kiss each other.’
 (van Gijn 2006:170, glosses modified)

The middle marker can be used to derive nouns from verbs. The meaning of such nouns is in some way associated to the semantics of the verb. Many of such nouns have become lexicalized. Examples are:

- (40) *chittuta* ‘bridge’ *chittu-ta* *chittu* ‘cross’
 pillētē ‘door’ *pillē-ta* *pillē* ‘mouth’
 yoyoto ‘bed’ *yoyo-ta* *yoyo* ‘be stretched’

For a comprehensive description of the middle marker and an account of its diachronic development, see van Gijn (2010).

2.5.2.2 Causative

Causativity in Yurakaré can be expressed by various strategies. There are verbs in Yurakaré which form their root with the middle voice marker *-ta* as a lexicalized form. Some of these verbs have a causative counterpart where the middle voice marker is replaced by causative *-che*, like *sawata* ‘work’ - *sawache* ‘make work’ and *kütta* ‘appear’ - *kütche* ‘show, make appear’.

Some verbs, usually those consisting of an ideophone and the middle marker *-ta*, have a causative counterpart that is marked through reduplication of the first syllable at the end of the word, such as *pērujta* ‘turn over (intransitive)’ - *pērujpē* ‘turn over (transitive)’. Other verbs reduplicate the last syllable, like *yupa/yupata* ‘enter SG/PL’ - *yupapa* ‘make enter’. Some verbs reduplicate the last syllable of the root that comes before the middle marker, like *iñuta* ‘be ashamed’ - *iñuñuta* ‘cause to be ashamed’. There are also verbs that change their last vowel in the causative form. An example is *bushu* ‘lie down’ - *busha* ‘lay down’. For a more extensive account of strategies for indicating causativity, see van Gijn (2006: section 5.3.2).

In addition to the above-mentioned morphological strategies for causative marking, there is a periphrastic strategy involving the verb *ibēbē* ‘treat’. An example is (41):

- (41) *ani irebe ibēbūya*
 ana=y *i-rebe* *ibēbē=w=y*
 DEM=LOC PV-wound treat=PL=REP
 ‘They wounded him here.’
 (270807_conv)

With all persons except for the third person singular *ibēbē* is shortened to *bē* and takes a benefactive object (e.g. *ta-n-bē* for first person plural).

2.5.3 Verbal derivation

There are some categories that are marked as derivations on the verb. One is degree of intensity with which the action is carried out. A medium (to low) intensity is indicated by the medium intensity marker *-mashi*, which is attached to the verb stem like in (42):

(42) *primero nēmmuy chiwwatamashiwya ushta*

primero lēmmuy chiwwa-ta-mashi=w=ya ushta
 first(SP) only try-MID-MINTS=PL=REP before

‘In the beginning, they tried only a little.’
 (270807_conv)

Another way to express that an action is carried out with low intensity is the use of the diminutive marker *-nūu*:

(43) *kumalajtichi kumalanūuya kalasajti an bēshē (ana)*

ku-mala-jti=chi ku-mala-nūu=ya
 3SG.OBJ.COM-go.SG-HAB=FR 3SG.OBJ.COM-go.SG-DIM=IRR
ka-la-saa-jti ana bēshē ana
 3SG.OBJ-MAL-finish-HAB DEM entity DEM

‘He follows it (but doesn’t fulfill the purpose of trapping it in its cave), following it a little it leaves the animal again.’
 (040707_conv)

On adjectives, *-nūu* usually results in a predicative interpretation:

(44) *pēpēnūunaj an pēp*

pēpē-nūu=naja ana pēpē
 old-DIM=NSIT DEM grandfather

‘He is a little old already, that grandfather.’
 (270807_conv)

In (44), the diminutive is attached to the adjective *pēpē* ‘old’, which gets a predicative interpretation (‘be old’). Examples (43) and (44) show that the diminutive suffix *-nūu* cannot be considered a purely nominal morpheme, and we can see again that nouns and verbs share some morphology.

Intensification of an event is expressed by reduplication of the first one or two syllables of the verb word followed by [h]:

(45) *majmaporese latij wo woj mutaja*

maj~ma-porese latiji woj woj mi-ta=ja
 INTS~3PL.OBJ-spread_out then IDEO IDEO 3PL.OBJ.COM-way=REA

‘It (the dog) is making them spread out very much by barking at them.’
 (pp_pf_frogstory)

Another verbal derivational morpheme is the verbal locative prefix *li-*. It indicates in most cases that the action described by the verb is carried out in a specific, spatially bounded place, like in (46):

(46) *atib chamutima lati lētta lbushu*

a-tiba chajmu=tima l-ati=y lētta=y li-bushu
 3SG.POSS-pet dog REF-DEM=LOC one=LOC VLOC-lic

‘He is lying here in one place together with his dog.’
 (al_ce_frogstory)

In (46), the verbal locative prefix *li-* is used to mark that the lying of the boy and the dog is taking place in a specific location (the bed). The prefix *li-* precedes the object prefixes, as we can see in (47). It can only be preceded by intensifying reduplication.

- (47) *ineli yupaḡ lijutütüya*
ineli yupa=ja li-ku-tütü=va
 inside enter=REA VLOC-3SG.OBJ.COM-sit=REP
 ‘It entered [the peccary’s burrow] and stayed there together with the peccary.’
 (160906.convI)

Category-changing derivation is not very common with verbs. One possibility to derive a noun from a verb is the use of the middle voice marker *-ta* (see section 2.5.2.1). Furthermore, the noun *-bēshēē* ‘entity’ can be attached to uninflected verbs to derive nouns, usually referring to persons with certain properties:

- (48) *wēwēti maylepshē dyajuy sē*
wēwēti ma-ayle-bēshēē dyaju-y sēē
wēwēti 3PL.OBJ-know-entity inform-1SG 1SG.PRON
 ‘I am talking about the people who know the *wēwēti* mourning chants.’
 (270807.conv)

2.5.4 TAM marking related to the event

This section describes TAM marking possibilities of the verb in Yurakaré. In addition to the markers described here, there are clausal enclitics which mark aspectual notions which anchor the described event to the speech event. These will be discussed below in 2.7.

2.5.4.1 Tense: the future marker *-shṭa*

The future marker *-shṭa* is the only tense marker of Yurakaré. Past and present are not distinguished and are always unmarked. The interpretation of the future marker can be absolute as well as relative, i.e. it can point to a future event with respect to the time of the utterance, but it can also express a future relative to another event in the past. In (49), the future is used with respect to the time of speech:

- (49) *petche w mamambēbishtatubē*
petche=w ma-ma-n-bēbē-shṭa-tu=bē
 fish=PL 3PL.OBJ-3PL.OBJ-BEN-search-FUT-1PL=MOM
 ‘We are going to look for fish for them.’
 (040707.conv)

The speaker indicates that he and his son will go to look for fish. This event is in the future with respect to the time when the utterance was made.

2.5.4.2 Aspect

2.5.4.2.1 Habitual *-jti*

The habitual suffix *-jti* is used for events with some regularity in occurrence. In example (50), the speaker talks about the old traditions of the Yurakaré. She uses the habitual marker *-jti* to describe the habitual nature of the ritual:

- (50) *adalatebew anchi shooj kamandulajtiwya*
a-dala-tebe=w ana=chi shoo
1SG.POSS-head-PURP=PL DEM=DIR IDEO
ka-ma-n-dula-jti=w=ya
3SG.OBJ-3PL.OBJ-BEN-do-HAB=PL=REP
'They used to make a veil for her, all the way down her body.'
(aLtradiciones)

The interpretation in (50) is past, since the speaker refers to old rituals that are not practiced anymore in San Pablo. Habitual *-jti* can also be interpreted as present depending on the context, like in (51):

- (51) *ushwe kutajtiw*
ushwe ku-ta-jti=w
Ushwe 3SG.OBJ.COM-say-HAB=PL
'They call it Ushwe.'
(270807_conv)

In (51), the speaker says that a certain community is called Ushwe. She uses the habitual marker to indicate the habitual character of the event of people calling this place Ushwe.

2.5.4.2.2 Progressive *a-*

The progressive aspectual prefix *a-* marks that an action or event is ongoing. An example is (52):

- (52) *aense aptutma*
a-ense a-apta=w=tina
PROG-drink 3SG.POSS-kin=PL=COM
'He was drinking with his people.'
(ma_lifehistory)

2.5.4.2.3 Perfective *i-*

There is a perfective prefix *i-* which is used to indicate that an event is viewed as bounded. It often co-occurs with a distributive suffix to indicate that the event is distributed over several instances or participants. Yurakaré has two distributive suffixes, *-mma* and reduplication of the last syllable. There does not seem to be a semantic difference between the two (cf. van Gijn 2006:189). An example is (53), where *i-* co-occurs with the distributive marker *-mma*:

(53) *naki naki ibalimuya*

naa-kka=y naa-kka=y i-bali-uma=w=ya
 DEM-MEA=LOC DEM-MEA=LOC PFV-go.PL-DIST=PL=REP
 ‘One after another they (the fish) are said to be going.’
 (040707_conv)

The perfective marker *i-* in combination with the distributive marker *-uma* in example (53) indicates that the event of arriving is distributed over several fish, where one is arriving after the other. Each of the fish arriving is viewed as one bounded event.

An example for the perfective marker *i-* co-occurring with a reduplication of the last syllable is (54):

(54) *lani ibēbēbishtabbēla*

l-ana=y i-bēbē~bē-shta=bēla
 REF-DEM=LOC PVF-search~DIST-FUT=CONT
 ‘There he will go on searching everywhere.’
 (al_ce_frogstory)

The perfective marker and the distributive marker express that the boy is searching in various places. The event of searching is repeated several times.

2.5.4.2.4 Nearly and recent completive aspect *-nishi* and *-lē*

There are two aspectual suffixes for indicating nearly completive and the recent completive aspect. *-Nishi* indicates that an event is about to be completed or executed, while *-lē* encodes that an event has just been completed:

(55) a. *lash wiwinishitu achittuyj*

latijsha wiwi-nishi-tu achittu=chi
 then arrive.PL-NC-1PL other_side=DIR
 ‘Then, we were about to arrive on the other side.’
 (2090906_convI)

b. *witalē malulēya*

wita-lē ma-hulē=ya
 arrive.SG-RC 3PL.OBJ-pluck=REP
 ‘As soon as he arrived he plucked them.’
 (al_tiri)

2.5.4.3 Modality

Event modality refers to “events that are not actualized, events that have not taken place but are merely potential” (Palmer 2001:8). In Yurakaré, this kind of event-related modality is expressed by modal suffixes that precede the subject cross-reference markers. Yurakaré marks intentional, desiderative, jussive, and hypothetical in this way:

2.5.4.3.1 Intentional *-ni*

The ‘intentional’ marker *-ni* expresses that an event is intended by the subject. An example is (56):

- (56) *lisetantu kutuya*
li-seta-ni-tu ku-ta=w=ya
VLOC-grab-INT-1PL 3SG.OBJ.COM-say=PL=REP
‘Let us grab him.’ they said.
(al.tiri)

In some cases, the suffix *-ni* is interpreted as ‘audative’, which means that it expresses that the subject goes somewhere to perform an action. This is often the case when it co-occurs with the verbal locative *li-*, like in (57):

- (57) 1. *nij chitta bali jiw latij kandala*
nij chitta bali-jti=w latiji ka-u-dala
NEG throw_away.SG go.PL-HAB=PL then 3SG.OBJ-BEN-head
‘Then, they did not leave her alone anymore.’
2. *liwjanuw*
li-ujwa-ni=w
VLOC-look-INT=PL
‘They go to see her.’
(loreto)

Some cases seem to be ambiguous or at least vague between an intentional and an audative reading:

- (58) *achamaj mandyujuniya aptaw*
achama=ja ma-n-dyuju-ni=ya a-apta=w
be_like_that=REA 3PL.OBJ-tell-INT=REP 3SG.POSS-kin=PL
‘Then she intended to tell it to her folks.’
‘Then she went to tell it to her folks.’
(loreto)

In (58), there are two possible interpretations for *-ni*: one in terms of intentional and the other in terms of audative. There is a strong connection between the two concepts, since going somewhere to do something implicates that one intends to do it. In Yurakaré, we can observe this connection in the two interpretations of the intentional marker *-ni*.

2.5.4.3.2 Desiderative *-nta*

The desiderative marker *-nta* expresses that the subject of the clause has the wish to perform the action described by the verb to which it is attached. An example is (59):

- (59) 1. *pero nij kütta*

- pero nij kütta*
 but(SP) NEG appear
 ‘But it did not appear.’
2. *bějtantatuyjse*
bějta-nta-tu=chi=se
 see-DES-1PL=FR=PSUP
 ‘We wanted to see it again.’
3. *kanktchenti atantise*
ka-n-kütche-nta-y *a-tauti=se*
 3SG.OBJ-BEN-show-DES-1SG 3SG.POSS-face=PSUP
 ‘I wanted to show her its face.’
 (290906.convI)

The speaker is telling the addressee about a fishing trip on which she took me. She has told the addressee that a crocodile appeared and that I did not see it. We were waiting for the crocodile to come up again, but it did not show up (line 1). In line 2, the speaker says that we wanted to see it again. This wish is expressed with the desiderative marker *-nta* for a first person plural subject. In line 3, the speaker expresses another wish by using *-nta*, saying that she wanted to show me its face. Here, a first person singular subject is used.

2.5.4.3.3 Jussive *-cha*

The jussive marker *-cha* is only used with second and third persons. With second persons, it is often used to form a directive:

- (60) *kamalacham achittuchi*
ka-mala-cha-m *achittu=chi*
 3SG.OBJ-go.SG-JUS-2SG other_side=DIR
 ‘Take him to the other side.’
 (duenoperros)

With third persons, *-cha* usually co-occurs with the reported evidential *=ya* in its intersubjective epistemic interpretation. Such constructions yield an optative interpretation, where the intersubjective component of *=ya* indicates that the expressed wish is not entertained by the speaker alone but is also in the interest of the addressee, or that the person who entertains the wish is another person (i.e. not the speaker nor the addressee). This use of *-cha* is described in detail in section 3.2.1.3 of the chapter on the reported/intersubjective evidential *=ya*.

2.5.4.3.4 Hypothetical *-ta*

The hypothetical suffix *-ta* is often found in the antecedent of counterfactual conditionals. It indicates that the event described by the verb is not actualized but merely hypothetical. An example is (61):

- (61) *yítaychibēla tishilē achu imbētēytita pero tishalē*

yita=ya=chi=bëla tishilë achu imbëtë-jti-ta pero
 good=REP=FR=CONT now like_this behave-HAB-HYP but(SP)
tishilë
 now
 ‘It would be good if it still was like that, but now...’
 (aLtradiciones)

In (61), the speaker says that it would be good if the Yurakaré were still practicing their old traditions. The protasis is marked with *-ta*, while the apodosis is marked with frustrative *=chi* yielding a counterfactual interpretation (see section 7.1.1). Usually, the protasis precedes the apodosis in conditionals in Yurakaré, but it can also follow it, as we can see in (61). This example also shows that *-ta* can co-occur with other TAM suffixes, in this case with habitual *-jti*.

The hypothetical suffix *-ta* can also be used in declaratives, as can be seen in (62):

- (62) 1. *respetatijti layj tuwa ati dia porke*
respetat-tijti lacha tuwa ati dia porke
 respect-1PL.HAB too 1PL.PRON DEM day(SP) because(SP)
 ‘We also respect that day because...’
2. *nentaya tapasataja bëshëëse*
nentaya ta-pasa-ta=ja bëshëë=se
 maybe 1PL.OBJ-happen(SP)-HYP=REA entity=PSUP
 ‘Maybe something would happen to us.’
3. *nentay tatajtata machitu*
nentaya ta-tajta-ta machitu
 maybe 1PL.OBJ-cut-HYP machete(SP)
 ‘Maybe we get cut by a machete.’
4. *tatajtata bëshëë katcha*
ta-tajta-ta bëshëë katcha
 1PL.OBJ-cut-HYP entity axe
 ‘Maybe something would cut us, an axe.’
5. *algo tasusedetaj kutay nij tajusujti ati diay sawatantuti*
algo ta-susede-ta=ja
 something(SP) 1PL.OBJ-happen(SP)-HYP=REA
ku-ta=ya nij ta-kusu-jti ati
 3SG.OBJ.COM-say=IRR NEG 1PL.OBJ-please-HAB DEM
dia=v sawata-ni-tu=ti
 day(SP)=LOC work-INT-1PL=DS
 ‘Thinking that something would happen to us we do not want to work on that day.’
 (loreto)

The speaker is talking about the day of the Virgin of Loreto. She says that the people in San Pablo also respect that day as a holiday (line 1). In lines 2-5,

she gives the reason for why they respect that day, namely that otherwise bad things could happen to them. To express the mere hypotheticality of these bad events, the speaker uses the hypothetical marker *-ta* in these utterances.

2.5.4.3.5 Imperatives

The imperative singular suffix *-ma* occupies the same slot as the other modality suffixes described in this section and is therefore analyzed as a marker of modality. Since it can only refer to the second person singular, it is used without person marking. Its form is clearly related to the second person subject marker *-m*. An example is (63):

- (63) *motcho mëpëntanti tētama*
motcho mappē-n-tanti tē-ta-ma
 cayman big-LINK-eye 1SG.OBJ.COM-say-IMP.SG
 ‘Call me big-eyed cayman!’
 (duenoperros)

(63) is from a narrative where a man is crossing a river on a cayman’s back. The cayman uses the imperative singular marker *-ma* to command the man to insult it.

The imperative plural is only rarely expressed by the suffix *-pa*. Most frequently, the prefix *pi-* is used:

- (64) *piamanaju tuta*
pi-ama=naja tu-ta
 IMP.PL-come.IMP=NSIT 1PL.OBJ.COM-say
 ‘“Come,” he said to us.’
 (290906_convI)

In (64), the imperative plural prefix is embedded under a quotative. It is attached to the suppletive imperative stem *ama* of the verb *anala* ‘come’. Some of the Yurakaré verbs have such imperative stems.

The suffix *-yu* expresses a negative imperative. It replaces the second person subject marker *-m*, as we can see in (65):

- (65) *mayayu ñowwo palantatina*
ma-ava-yu ñowwo palanta=tina
 3PL.OBJ-reply-IMP.NEG manioc banana=COM
 ‘Don’t reply mixing Spanish and Yurakaré!’
 (Lit: ‘Don’t reply with manioc and banana!’)
 (al_cc_frogstory)

If more than one person is addressed, the imperative plural prefix *pi-* is used in addition to the negative imperative marker *-yu*:

- (66) *tuyshama lipijukkatayu mutaya*

tuwi-shama li-pi-ijukkata-yu *mu-ta=ya*
 dead-DCSD VLOC-IMP.PL-observe-IMP.NEG 3PL.OBJ.COM-say=REP
 ‘It’s a dead person, don’t look at him!’ he said to them.
 (270807_conv)

2.5.5 Adverbs

Adverbs do not have a fixed position in a clause. Rather, it seems that each adverb has its own preference for placement. Examples for temporal adverbs are *shinama* ‘long ago’, *ushta* ‘before’, *tishilē* ‘now’. Aspectual adverbs are for example *yosse* ‘again’, and *lacha* ‘too’. The negative adverb *nij* directly precedes the verb. Modal adverbs are *kusu* ‘maybe’, and *nentaya* ‘maybe’. Place adverbs are formed with demonstratives in combination with post-positional clitics (e.g. *ani* from *ana=y*, DEM=LOC). These forms can be considered lexicalized, since they can be followed by nominal suffixes, which is not allowed for clitics in Yurakaré. A frequent degree adverb is *binta* ‘strong’, which indicates a high degree of intensity.

Some adverbs are entirely free in their placement, i.e. they can occur pre-as well as post-verbally, while others always either precede or follow the verb. In (67), we can see that the time adverb *tishilē* ‘now’ can precede the verb (a) as well as follow the verb (b):

- (67) a. *tishilē nijtajtinaja*
 tishilē *nijta-jti=naja*
 now NEG-HAB=NSIT
 ‘It is not like that anymore now.’
 (al_tradiciones)
- b. *wishta tishu tiwēshu*
 wita-shta ***tishilē*** *ti-wēshi*
 arrive-FUT now 1SG.POSS-brother_in_law
 ‘Is my brother-in-law going to arrive now?’
 (290906_convI)

The adverb *ushta* ‘before’ always follows the verb. It can be followed by an overtly expressed noun phrase, like in (68). It seems that such noun phrases cannot be inserted between the verb and the adverb *ushta*.

- (68) *achu tindyuju ush sē lētta tñeme*
 achu *ti-n-dyujū* ***ushta*** *sēē* *lētta*
 like_that 1SG.OBJ-BEN-tell before 1SG.PRON one
 ti-ñemme
 1SG.POSS-female_friend
 ‘One of my friends told me so before.’
 (remedios)

Manner adverbs derived from adjectives by use of the manner adverbializer *-sh* always precede the verb, like in (69):

- (69) *shudyush lijantütü layj na atiba tumumu*
shudyu-sh li-ka-n-tütü lacha naa a-tiba
 beautiful-ADV.MAN VLOC-3SG.OBJ-BEN-be too DEM 3SG.POSS-pet
tunumu
 frog
 ‘His frog is there together with him beautifully.’
 (al_ce_frogstory)

2.5.6 Serial verb constructions

In Aikhenvald (2006:1), the term ‘serial verb construction’ is defined as “a sequence of verbs which act together as a single predicate, without any overt marker of coordination, subordination, or syntactic dependency of any other sort.” Serial verb constructions in Yurakaré usually involve two verbs of which the first is not inflected for subject and TAM, and the second verb gets subject and TAM marking:

- (70) *ati danda kolatütüwya*
ati=y danda ka-la-tütü=w=ya
 DEM=LOC GO_up 3SG.OBJ-MAL-sit=PL=REP
 ‘Going up they sat there (away from him).’
 (ma_pu_pepesu)

(70) is from the *Pëpësu* narrative. To get away from *Pëpësu*, the people climb a tree and sit there, where *Pëpësu* cannot reach them (this explains the malefactive marking on the main verb). The first verb of the serial verb construction *danda* is uninflected, while the second verb is marked for third person plural. The verbs indicate two highly integrated events. There are a number of verbs which often form serial verb construction, such as phasals, modals, and manipulatives (cf. van Gijn *in press a*).

2.6 The clause

2.6.1 Constituent order

The order of constituents is relatively free in Yurakaré. Overtly expressed subjects and objects cannot be distinguished through their position in the clause by syntactic placement. This leads to possible ambiguities when there are two third persons which cannot be distinguished through the cross-reference markers either. For subject noun phrases, the post-verbal position is more common than the pre-verbal position (van Gijn 2006:278). The ordering of constituents is meaningful and determined by pragmatic principles, probably mostly related to information structure, such as topicality, focus, and accessibility. In (71), the subject noun phrase precedes the verb, while two object noun phrases follow it:

- (71) *ana tipëpëshama tindyujujti shinam na kuento së*
 [ana ti-pëpë-shama]_{Subject} ti-n-dyuju-jti shinama
 DEM 1SG.POSS-grandfather-DCSD 1SG.OBJ-BEN-tell-HAB long_ago
 [naa kuento]_{Patient} [sëë]_{BenefactiveObject}
 DEM story(SP) 1SG.PRON
 ‘My late grandfather used to tell this story to me in the old days.’
 (al_tiri)

The subject noun phrase *ana tipëpëshama* ‘this grandfather of mine’ precedes the verb *dyuju* ‘tell’. This verb obligatorily takes a benefactive object which encodes the addressee. The object noun phrase that encodes this addressee participant in (71) consists of the first person singular personal pronoun *sëë* and is the last element of the sentence. It is preceded by another object noun phrase *naa kuento* ‘that story’, which is a patient argument. What exactly constitutes the contrast between the different constituent orders has to be determined by further research.

2.6.2 Major sentence types

Three major sentence types can be identified in many languages, declarative, interrogative, and imperative (Sadock and Zwicky 1985). In Yurakaré, the two major sentence types that can be identified on a syntactic basis are declaratives and content interrogatives. A declarative is formed by at least an inflected verb. In addition, overtly expressed noun phrases may be present. A content question is formed by the use of a question word at the beginning of the sentence, and can thereby be distinguished from declaratives. Polar questions cannot be identified syntactically and are therefore not considered a major sentence type of Yurakaré. Rising intonation can be used as a response-mobilizing feature, but there are many other strategies to mobilize a response with a declarative. There is no syntactic construction to indicate polar interrogativity, which correlates with the free constituent order of Yurakaré. The imperative should not be considered a major sentence type of Yurakaré in the syntactic sense, since the imperatives are inflections on the verb and thus have no special syntactic properties.

2.6.3 Clause combining

Yurakaré has three switch reference subordination strategies, for which we can observe that semantic integration correlates with morphosyntactic integration (van Gijn 2011). These types of clause combining are realis same subject, irrealis same subject, and different subject subordination. The main properties of these three types are summarized in Table 2.5. In the following, the subordination strategies will be discussed in more detail.

2.6.3.1 Same subject subordination

Same subject subordination in Yurakaré is sensitive to a realis-irrealis distinction. Realis subordinate clauses are marked for subject and can carry TAM marking.

Table 2.5: Same and different subject subordination

	Same subject		Different subject
	Realis	Irrealis	
Switch reference marker	= <i>ja</i>	= <i>ya</i>	= <i>ti</i>
Subject marking	+	-	+
TAM marking	full potential	limited	full potential
Irrealis TAM on main verb	-	+	+/-

while irrealis clauses are not marked for subject and have limited possibilities for TAM marking. Furthermore, realis clauses are marked with the subordinator =*ja*, while for irrealis clauses =*ya* is used. Irrealis marking on same subject subordinate clauses is triggered by the use of certain TAM markers in the main verb: *-shita* ‘future’, *-jti* ‘habitual’, *-ni* ‘intentional’, *-nta* ‘desiderative’, *-cha* ‘jussive’, hypothetical *-ta*, and the imperatives. Apart from the imperative plural, which is expressed by a prefix, all these markers occupy the same slot right before the subject markers. The verb *iba* which indicates ability is on the way to grammaticalizing into a TAM suffix in the same slot, and also seems to trigger irrealis marking in same subject subordinate clauses.

This distinction between realis and irrealis same subject subordinate clauses is an instance of mood marking in the sense of Palmer (2001:4), because it involves a forced binary choice. Every same subject subordinate clause has to be marked as either realis or irrealis. The Yurakaré mood marking system is a joint-marking system in Palmer’s (2001:145) terms, because the choice of the mood depends on the TAM markers in the main clause. On the semantic basis of the irrealis TAM categories in Yurakaré, see van Gijn and Gipper (2009). Examples for realis and irrealis same subject subordination are given in (72):

- (72) a. *lanu malij limadechi sē*
l-anu mala-y=ja li-ma-dche-y sēē
 REF-like_that go.SG-1SG=REA VLOC-3PL.OBJ-find-1SG 1SG.PRON
 ‘Like that I went and I found them there.’
 (290906_convI)
- b. *tipēpēsham lilimlēya kuytetetantajti amumu sē*
ti-pēpē-shaana li-limlē=ya
 1SG.POSS-grandfather-DCSD VLOC-wake_up=REP
ku-ite~te-ta-nta-jti-y amumuy sēē
 3SG.OBJ.COM-ask~DIST-HYP-DES-HAB-1SG all 1SG.PRON
 ‘I would like to be able to revive my grandfather and ask him all these things.’
 (al_tradiciones)

In (72a), the realis subordinator =*ja* is used on the subordinate verb. There is no irrealis TAM marker on the main verb which would trigger irrealis subordination. The realis subordinator is attached to the verb *mala* ‘go SG’, which is inflected for first person singular just like the main verb. In contrast, in (72b) the subordinate clause is marked with the irrealis subordinator =*ya* and does not carry a subject cross-reference marker. The irrealis subordinate

marking is triggered by the use of the TAM suffixes *-ta* ‘hypothetical’, *-nta* ‘desiderative’, and *-jti* ‘habitual’. This also shows also that these TAM suffixes can occur together on the same verb.

In general, irrealis same subject subordination shows a higher degree of semantic and morphosyntactic integration with the main event, since it inherits its TAM values. Morphosyntactically, irrealis subordinate clauses also show a high degree of integration since they are deranked in that they are not marked for subject and have limited possibilities for TAM marking. Realis subordinate clauses are morphosyntactically less integrated, since they carry their own person marking and can be marked for TAM (see also van Gijn 2011).

2.6.3.2 Different subject subordination

The third subordination strategy is different subject marking. In this case, the subordinator $=ti$ is used. There is no realis-irrealis distinction with different subject subordination. In (73), the subordinate verb marked with the different subject marker $=ti$ is also marked for third person plural with the plural marker $=w$. Furthermore, it carries its independent TAM marking in the form of the desiderative marker *-nta*. This shows that the $=ti$ -marked verb is fully inflected. The main verb is unmarked and thus interpreted as third person singular.

- (73) *bobontuti puchuy*
bobo-nta=w=ti puchu=va
 kill-DES=PL=DS save_oneself=REP
 ‘When they wanted to kill him he saved himself.’
 (270807_conv)

Verbs marked with the different subject marker $=ti$ can carry post-positional clitics. Such constructions indicate specific relations between the events of the subordinate and the main clause. Different subject marking in combination with directional $=chi$ indicates that the place of the event of the subordinate clause was also the place where the event of the main verb occurred, like in (74):

- (74) *nij mashi kompadre mijompadre liwanitchi*
nij mashi kompadre mi-kompadre
 NEG rain kompadre(SP) 2SG.POSS-kompadre(SP)
li-winani=ti=chi
 VLOC-walk=DS=DIR
 ‘It didn’t rain where your kompadre was, kompadre.’
 (160906_conv1)

With the ablative post-positional clitic $=jsha$, a temporal interpretation arises, where the event of the subordinate verb precedes the event of the main verb. This temporal interpretation always seems to be implicated by the use of $=ti$, but in combination with $=jsha$ this order is emphasized. In (75), the speaker emphasizes that she has not seen the wives of some men who are visiting a certain house in San Pablo, but that they could have arrived after she left the house these men are visiting:

- (75) *kusu malitish wiwuy mabashtiw*
kusu mala-y=ti=jsha wiwi=w=ya ma-bashti=w
 maybe go.SG-1SG=DS=ABL return.PL=PL=REP 3PL.OBJ-wife=PL
 ‘Maybe their wives arrived after I left.’
 (290906_convI)

The ablative marker =*jsha* in combination with the different subject marker =*ti* can also yield a concessive interpretation, where it is interpreted as ‘even though’:

- (76) *nij mabējti sē nachi wiwiwj massētisha*
nij ma-bētja-y sēc naa=chi wiwi=w=ja
 NEG 3PL.OBJ-see-1SG 1SG.PRON DEM=DIR arrive.PL=PL=REA
ma-tēsē=ti=jsha
 3PL.OBJ-stand=DS=ABL
 ‘I didn’t see them, even though they were standing there after arriving.’
 (290906_convI)

With the instrumental marker =*la*, a causal interpretation arises, which can be translated with ‘because’:

- (77) *kusuti anuta nij lwjatijtiti awēwēya*
kusuti anuta nij li-ujwa-tijti=ti=la a-wēwē=ya
 maybe like_that NEG VLOC-look1PL.HAB=DS=INS PROG-cry=REP
 ‘Maybe because we did not look at her she cried.’
 (loreto)

When the different subject marker =*ti* is used in combination with a postpositional clitic, it can also be used when both subordinate and main clause have the same subject, like in (78). This is probably due to factors of semantic integration (van Gijn 2011).

- (78) *korre chejtwitila ati ifejtwya an tappëshamu*
korre che-jti=w=ti=la ati i-fe-jti=w=ya ana
 tobacco eat-HAB=PL=DS=INS DEM PV-faith(SP)=PL=REP DEM
ta-pöpö-shama=w
 1PL.POSS-grandfather-DCSD=PL
 ‘Because they ate tobacco our grandfathers had faith in this.’
 (loreto)

2.7 Interactional enclitics

Yurakaré has two sets of enclitics that are analyzed here as interactional clitics because they relate the speech situation to the information given in the proposition. The two sets occupy two different morphosyntactic slots. The verbal enclitics are attached to the predicate directly after the subject cross-reference suffix, while the clausal enclitics attach to the last element of a clause.

The markers of the verbal enclitic set indicate notions of evidentiality and intersubjectivity. These markers are the topic of this dissertation. In section 2.7.2, an introduction to their basic properties is given. The semantics and interactional uses of these markers are described in detail in chapters 3 to 7. The following section 2.7.1 describes the basic functions of the clausal enclitics.

2.7.1 Clausal enclitics

The clausal enclitics are usually attached to the last element of the clause. Thus, they can be attached to all kinds of word classes. There are seven clausal enclitics in Yurakaré:

= <i>la</i>	‘commitment’
= <i>naja</i>	‘new situation’
= <i>bëla</i>	‘continuous situation’
= <i>bë</i>	‘momentaneous’
= <i>se</i>	‘presuppositional’
= <i>vu/ri</i>	‘resignative (female/male speaker)’
= <i>ve/ra</i>	‘adaptive (female/male speaker)’

Semantically, the clausal enclitics relate the proposition in some way to the conversational context and the speech situation. The meanings of the seven clausal enclitics are briefly described in the following.

2.7.1.1 The commitment marker =*la*

A very frequent clausal enclitic is the commitment marker =*la*. It expresses speaker commitment, not so much in the sense of degree of certainty regarding the truth of the proposition, but more in an interactional way. Often, the commitment marker is used to affiliate with the addressee. Example (79) is a short conversational break in the life history monologue by Miguel. We can see that =*la* expresses speaker commitment as an affiliative notion toward the addressee, myself, since it is used in an utterance that expresses approval:

- (79) 1. M: *wilitam kutama* (0.9)
 wilita-m ku-ta-ma
 return-2SG 3SG.OBJ.COM-say-IMP.SG
 ‘Say to her: “Have you returned?”’
2. S: *wilitam* (.)
 wilita-m
 return-2SG
 ‘Have you returned?’
3. A: *të wilita=*
 të wilita-y
 INTJ return-1SG
 ‘Yeah, I have returned.’
4. M: =*eso* (0.5)

- eso*
DEM(SP)
'That's it.'
5. *aora si* (0.6)
aora si
now(SP) yes(SP)
'Now you got it.'
6. ⇒ *jitala* (0.6)
yita=la
good=COMM
'That was good.'
7. *mëylela tiyijñula*
më-ayle=la *ti-yijñu=la*
2SG.OBJ.COM-know=COMM 1SG.POSS-child=COMM
'You really know it, my daughter.'
(*ma_lifehistory*)

Miguel was telling his life history while I was filming him when Asunta came home. Miguel then tells me in line 1 that I should ask her in Yurakaré if she has already returned (this is common as a greeting), so I repeat what he has told me in line 2. Asunta gives her conventionalized response in line 3, and Miguel expresses his satisfaction by telling me that I did well. In lines 6 and 7, he uses *=la* for expressing his commitment toward the quality of my performance. This is affiliative here, since it strengthens the approval expressed by the utterances. In line 7, *=la* occurs twice, on the verb and on the address term. The fact that it can attach to different kinds of host supports the view that *=la* is an enclitic.

In agreeing and confirming responses, *=la* is used very frequently. It seems that upgrading responses in this way is the default strategy for agreeing as well as confirming in Yurakaré. An example for an agreement use of *=la* is (80):

- (80) 1. A: *lojojoya* (.)
lojojo=ya
lojojo=REP
'It could be a *lojojo*.'
2. ⇒ M: *achamayla*
achama=ya=la
be_like_that=REP=COMM
'That's right.'
(*al_ce_frogstory*)

In line 1, Asunta suggests that the frog of the frog story could be a *lojojo*, a specific kind of frog. In her agreement in line 2, Magdalena uses *=la*. This expression of commitment in second position seems a fairly affiliative strategy, where the speaker expresses affiliation with the addressee by expressing commitment to something the addressee suggested. However, *=la* can also be used for the strengthening of the speaker's position in disagreeing contexts.

2.7.1.2 The ‘new situation’ marker =*naja*

The clausal enclitic =*naja* expresses that a new situation has arisen or that it is about to arise. It expresses that a new situation has arisen. The translation is ‘already’, like in (81):

- (81) *kampələ́naja tajantoronaja*
ka-n-pələ́=naja ta-ka-n-toro=naja
3SG.OBJ-BEN-be_finished=NSIT 1PL.OBJ-3SG.OBJ-BEN-finish=NSIT
‘It’s finished already. we have finished already.’
(220906_convII)

2.7.1.3 The ‘continuous situation’ marker =*bēla*

In contrast to =*naja* which marks a new situation, the enclitic =*bēla* indicates a continuous situation. It can be translated into English with ‘still’, as we can see in example (82):

- (82) *ujma kumalabəl na wəsho*
ujwa-ma ku-mala=bēla naa wəsho
look-IMP.SG 3SG.OBJ.COM-go.SG=CONT DEM harpy_eagle
‘Look, that harpy eagle is still following him!’
(al_ce_frogstory)

Example (82) refers to picture 13 of the frog story, where the owl is in the left corner of the picture. The speaker notes that it is still following the boy, which indicates a continuing situation.

2.7.1.4 Momentaneous =*bē*

The marker =*bē* indicates that the described event is taking place for a short period in some way relevant to the speech situation. An example is (83):

- (83) 1. M: *amchi* (0.4)
amchi
where
‘Where?’
2. P: *pujtach* (0.4)
pujta=chi
outside=DIR
‘Outside.’
3. M: ((looking outside)) *pujtayj mala=*
pujta=chi mala
outside=DIR go.SG
‘She went outside?’
4. P: =*otte* (1.8)

otte

INTJ

‘Yeah.’

5. ⇒ M: *kantüshtibë* (.)

ka-n-tütü-shta-y=bë

3SG.OBJ-BEN-be-FUT-1SG=MOM

‘I’ll wait for her a little.’

6. ⇒ P: *kantütüntu kompadrebë*

ka-n-tütü-ni-tu

kompadre=bë

3SG.OBJ-BEN-be-INT-1PL kompadre(SP)=MOM

‘Let’s wait for her a little, compadre.’

(220906_convII)

Miguel and Paulina are sitting at a table inside a hut talking. Miguel has just asked Paulina where I am, and she had pointed out a direction. In line 1, Miguel asks for clarification, and Paulina responds in line 2 that I am outside. In line 5, Miguel states that he is going to wait for me, using =*bë* to indicate that this action will be carried out only for a little while. Paulina agrees to this in line 6, now using a first person plural. She also uses =*bë* to emphasize the short period of time for which the event is going to last.

2.7.1.5 The presuppositional marker =*se*

The clausal enclitic =*se* has a variety of uses. It refers back to another past event which is not overtly mentioned but presupposed. This presupposition can be accommodated, it does not have to be common knowledge between the participants. Since all uses of =*se* have in common that they introduce a presupposition, it is analyzed here as a presupposition marker. This does not mean that =*se* marks the proposition to which it is attached as presupposed; rather, it indicates that the event described by the proposition should be compared to some other, presupposed event. The presupposition introduced by =*se* should be considered a pragmatic rather than a semantic one. A semantic presupposition concerns the relation that holds between propositions, while a pragmatic presupposition concerns the background assumptions of the speaker (Stalnaker 1974).

One use of =*se* is to mark that an event has occurred before. The translation is in these cases ‘again’. This interpretation carries the presupposition of the event having occurred before. Consider (84):

(84) *witaj kunirise*

wita=ja

ku-niri=se

arrive.SG=REA 3SG.OBJ.COM-greet=PSUP

‘When he arrived he greeted him again.’

(duenoperros)

(84) is from the narrative about the Lord of the dogs. When a man goes to see him to get his dogs back, he greets him but he does not react. Only when

he goes again and greets him again does the Lord of the dogs respond to him. The marker =se indicates that this is not the first time the event occurs.

When =se is used in content questions, it refers back to some information that is presupposed, like in (85):

- (85) 1. J: *kummë kuta(yj) anase* (1.1)
kummë ku-ta=chi ana=se
 tree 3SG.OBJ.COM-say=FR DEM=PSUP
 ‘He thought it was a tree.’
2. ⇒ P: *tëpshëse*
tëtë-bëshëë=se
 which-entity=PSUP
 ‘What is it, then?’
 (pp_pf_frogstory)

In line 1, Juan states that the boy wrongfully thought that the deer’s antlers were a tree. By using =se in her question in line 2, Patricia refers back to this information which is presupposed. The question can be interpreted as ‘If it is not a tree, then what is it?’.

2.7.1.6 The resignative marker =yu/ri

There are two clausal enclitics in Yurakaré that have different forms for female and male speakers. These are =yu/ri ‘resignative f/m’ and =ye/ra ‘adaptive f/m’. The resignative marker is used when the speaker considers the information a fact in the world which nobody can do anything about. The adaptive marker is used in contexts where the information must in some way be adapted to by either the speaker or the addressee.

The resignative marker =yu/ri most frequently occurs in combination with the assumptive evidential =jtë, with which it forms a strong collocation. This use will be described in detail in chapter 6, where =jtë is discussed. (86) shows an example of this usage:

- (86) *yij mashi-shta=jtë=yu*
 good rain-FUT=ASSU=RES.F
 ‘It seems it’s going to rain very hard.’
 (al_ce_frogstory)

In (86), the speaker treats the rain she is predicting as something that cannot be influenced by using the resignative marker =yu for female speakers. =Yu/ri expresses a comment by the speaker on the relation between the proposition and the speech situation: the speaker expresses resignation toward the information given in the proposition. By using =yu/ri the speaker asserts that she takes this information to be a fact in the world over which she has no control. This can and often but not necessarily does include a component of disappointment about the lack of control, and about how the situation turned out to be.

2.7.1.7 The adaptive marker =ye/ra

The adaptive marker =ye/ra has a variety of uses, and its interpretation is not always entirely clear. It is called ‘adaptive’ here because it is used when the speaker wants the addressee to adapt to a certain state of knowledge. This gloss is however probably not ideal for this marker.

In example (87), =ye is used to give the addressee information that she should actually be aware of. In this case, =ye is used to mark information that the addressee should know but has not demonstrated knowledge of, i.e. adaptation is expected by the speaker but not demonstrated by the addressee.

- (87) 1. M: *asibē ineli na tumumu* (0.4)
a-sibbē ineli naa tumumu
 3SG.POSS-house inside DEM frog
 ‘That frog is inside his house!’
2. A: *isi asibē meli katütü* (.)
a-sibbē incli ka-tütü
 3SG.POSS-house inside 3SG.OBJ-be
 ‘He [the frog] lives with him [the boy] inside his house.’
3. ⇒ *amaj nij [achu kattüjti tatib bēshēē] itiba{yaye*
amaja nij achu ka-tütü-jti ta-tiba bēshēē
 how NEG like_that 3SG.OBJ-be-HAB 1PL.POSS-pet entity
i-tiba=yə=ye
 PV-pet=IRR=ADAP.F
 ‘Look, when we raise animals as pets they also stay with us like that.’
4. M: *[(...)] [ē achu ibēbētiba(la)=*
ē achu ibēbē=tiba=la
 INTJ like_that treat=INF=COMM
 ‘Ah, so that’s how he treats it.’
5. A: *=achu ibēbē layyla*
achu ibēbē lacha=la
 like_that treat too=COMM
 ‘That’s how he treats it as well.’
 (alCe_frogstory)

In line 1, Magdalena notes that the boy is keeping the frog inside his house. This is notable since the Yurakaré do not keep frogs inside their houses. In line 2, Asunta confirms that he has it inside his house, and then gives an account for this in line 3, where she notes that the Yurakaré themselves keep animals which they raise as pets inside. At the end of this utterance, she uses =ye to indicate that this information is not new to the addressee, but rather that it is something which the addressee is not considering at the moment. The addressee is then expected to adapt to the information. She gives a news-receiving response in line 4, saying that she now understands that this is how the boy treats his frog as well. Asunta gives a confirmation in line 5.

Because the adaptive marker =*ye/ra* can be used for reminding the addressee of information she is not considering at the moment, it is often used in ‘I told you so’ utterances. An example is (88), where the male form of the adaptive marker is used in this way:

- (88) 1. *ujmachi* (0.6)
 ujwa-ma ati=chi
 look-IMP.SG DEM=DIR
 ‘Look, there.’
2. *sierbuynaja* (.)
 sierbu=ya=naja
 deer(SP)=REP=NSIT
 ‘It’s a deer now.’
3. *nij acham mētira*
 nij achama mē-ta-y=ra
 NEG be_like_that 2SG.OBJ.COM-say-1SG=ADAP.M
 ‘Didn’t I tell you so.’
 (pp-pf_frogstory)

The speaker is talking about picture 15 of the frog story, where the deer appears from behind the rock. He had told the addressee before already that a deer would appear, when discussing the previous pictures where only the antlers can be seen. After the deer appeared, he uses an ‘I told you so’ construction marked with =*ra* in line 3.

2.7.2 The verbal evidential-intersubjective enclitics

Yurakaré has a set of five verbal enclitics which have evidential-intersubjective semantics. These enclitics are the topic of the present work. Their morphosyntactic position differs from that of the clausal enclitics in that they are attached to the verb directly after the subject cross-reference markers. The relations expressed by the verbal enclitics also differ from those expressed by the clausal enclitics in that the clausal enclitics relate the proposition to the speech situation, while the verbal enclitics relate the proposition to the knowledge state of the speaker and the addressee.

In this section, a brief description of the general properties of the verbal enclitics is given, while their semantics and interactional uses are discussed in the following chapters. The verbal enclitic set of Yurakaré consists of five markers:

= <i>va</i>	‘reported/intersubjective’
= <i>tiba</i>	‘inference’
= <i>laba</i>	‘subjective’
= <i>jtě</i>	‘assumption’
= <i>chi</i>	‘frustrative’

The verbal enclitics are considered clitics rather than affixes because they follow the plural clitic =*w*. This is usually not the case for suffixes (cf. Anderson 2005:35).

2.7.2.1 Morphosyntactic position

The verbal enclitics attach to the predicate directly after the subject marker. Even though they are not clausal in nature they should still be considered clitics rather than affixes, since they follow the plural enclitic =w. The position of the verbal enclitics in the verbal template is shown in 89:

- (89) verbal stem -derivation -TAM -subject =**verbal enclitics** =clausal enclitics

The verbal enclitics express evidential semantics, with the exception of the frustrative marker =*chi*. This marker cannot be considered an evidential since it does not express a type of information access. All five markers have in common that they include an intersubjective value, expressing an assumption about the addressee's access to the information (or explicitly exclude it, as is the case with subjective =*laba*). For =*chi*, this is only the case in its interactional use, where it is used as a politeness marker (cf. chapter 7).

The markers within the verbal enclitic set do not occupy exactly the same slot, which can be inferred from the fact that in combinations, =*chi* follows =*ya* but precedes =*laba*. This shows that =*ya* is in a slot closer to the verb than =*laba*. We cannot say anything about the position of the other two evidentials since they cannot combine with =*chi* nor with any other of the evidentials (cf. chapter 8).

2.7.2.2 Scope of the verbal enclitics

The four Yurakaré evidential-intersubjective markers take scope over the proposition. If a subordinate clause is present, the evidential frequently scopes over both the main and the subordinate clause as well as over the relation between the two clauses. We can see this in (90) (scope is indicated with brackets):

- (90) *attaw mabějtaj kalasalab (layj)ʔ*
 { [*atta=w ma-bějta=ja*] *ka-la-saa* } =**laba** *layj*
 [[*other=PL 3PL.OBJ-see=REA*] *3SG.OBJ-MAL-leave*] =SUBJ too
 'I think when he saw the others he left her as well.'
 (270807_conv)

In (90), the speaker is talking about a certain man who left his wife. She suggests that probably he left her when he saw the other women. This utterance is marked with subjective =*laba* to indicate that the information is the personal subjective opinion of the speaker. =*Laba* does not take scope only over the main clause here, since the speaker knows that the man left his wife from what the addressee had told her before. Rather, =*laba* takes scope over the subordinate verb and the relation between the two events as well. The speaker suggests that he left her because he saw the other women. =*Laba* scopes over this whole verbal chain.

The frustrative marker =*chi* behaves differently. In its frustrative reading, it takes scope over the event rather than the proposition, indicating that the

event was not actualized. In its interactional politeness reading, it seems to relate to the speech situation rather than to the proposition as such.

2.7.2.3 Scope with direct speech complements

The Yurakaré evidentials can be used within direct speech complements.⁶ This leads to a deictic shift in interpretation. Since the verbal enclitics are always anchored to the speaker, in direct speech complements they are anchored to the subject of the matrix verb. They are interpreted as belonging to the utterance encoded by the direct speech complement. An example where the assumptive evidential =jtě occurs in a direct speech complement is (91):

- (91) *nij litapěrujtashtatěy(u) tětati*
 [*nij li-ta-pěruk-ta-shta=jtě=yu*]
 [NEG VLOC-1PL.OBJ-IDEO-MID-FUT=ASSU=RES.F]
tě-ta=ti
 1SG.OBJ.COM-say=DS
 ‘“I assume we are not going to turn over?” she asked me.’
 (200906_convI)

Elisa is telling Asunta about a fishing trip on which she took me. In (91), she tells Asunta that I asked her whether we are not going to turn over with the canoe. The embedded direct speech complement is marked with assumptive =jtě. The speaker of the direct speech complement expresses her lack of evidence for assuming that the canoe will not capsize by using =jtě. The evidential =jtě is anchored to the subject of the main clause speech act verb *ta* ‘say’ rather than to the speaker of the whole utterance.

Another example for the occurrence of an evidential in a direct speech complement is (92). Here, the reported/intersubjective marker =ya is embedded in the speech complement in its epistemic intersubjective interpretation:

- (92) *kus uypiyaya ta na ta(wěshi) pěpi*
 [*kusu uypi=w=ya*] *ta naa*
 [maybe bec=PL=REP] say DEM 1PL.POSS-brother_in_law
ta-wěshi pěpi
 Pepín
 ‘“Maybe they are bees.” said our brother-in-law Pepín.’
 (al_cc_frogstory)

The speaker states that her brother-in-law said that the insects of the frog story might be bees. The epistemic intersubjective marker =ya is embedded within the direct speech complement and thus anchored to the subject of the matrix verb *ta* ‘say’, the speaker’s brother-in-law.

The evidentials can also be used with quotatives outside the direct speech complement, attaching to the speech act verb. In this case, there is no deictic

⁶Direct speech is the only way of expressing speech and thought in Yurakaré. There is no indirect speech.

shift, but the evidential stays anchored to the speaker. In such constructions, two evidentials can occur in one utterance, the first embedded within the direct speech complement and anchored to the subject of the main clause, the second attached to the main verb and anchored to the speaker. An example is (93), where =*laba* is embedded within the direct speech complement, while =*tiba* is attached to the main verb *ta* ‘say’:

- (93) *litütülab ani kutatiba*
 [*li-tütü*=***laba*** *ana=y*] *ku-ta*=***tiba***
 [VLOC-be=SUBJ DEM=LOC] 3SG.OBJ.COM-say=INF
 ‘I think it’s in here.’ he must be thinking.’
 (al_cc_frogstory)

Talking about picture 9 where the boy is looking into a hole in the ground, the speaker infers from the fact that the boy is looking into the hole in which he assumes the frog to be. The inference made by the speaker is marked with =*tiba* on the matrix verb *ta* ‘say’, indicating that the speaker infers something the boy says or thinks. The embedded direct speech complement represents the thought of the boy. It is marked with =*laba* for indicating the boy’s information access, which is subjective. The boy thinks that the frog could be in the hole.

2.7.2.4 Direct evidence

The four evidential markers of Yurakaré all represent indirect types of evidentiality. Yurakaré does not have a marker for direct evidentiality, e.g. experiential or visual access to information. Direct evidentiality is indicated by evidentially unmarked statements. However, unmarked statements do not encode but only implicate direct information access. Unmarked statements can also be used in contexts where it is clear that another type of evidentiality holds. For example, in a story telling based on a report, =*ya* is used to mark reported evidentiality. However, it does not have to be used in every utterance of the story telling (see section 3.1.1.1). Furthermore, it is not obligatory to indicate the type of evidence. Thus, unmarked statements can also be used in cases where the speaker actually has indirect evidence only.

An example that illustrates the use of evidentially marked and unmarked statements is (94), where Paulina is telling Miguel that her husband’s dog got bitten by a peccary while hunting. This story has been told to her by her husband. She uses =*ya* where her only available evidence is her husband’s report (line 13). In the first utterance of that story in line 1, Paulina says that her husband has killed a peccary and brought it home:

- (94) 1. P: *lëtta wejshe bobo(j) (.) [kawi]ta=*
lëtra wejshe bobo=ja ka-wita
 one collared-peccary kill=REA 3SG-arrive.SG
 ‘He brought a peccary home that he had killed.’
 2. M: [*achama*]

- achama*
 be_like_that
 ‘Really?’
3. P: =o[tt]e (0.5)
otte
 INTJ
 ‘Yeah.’
4. M: [suerte]
suerte
 good_luck(SP)
 ‘That’s good luck.’
5. P: *hh amaj nij* (.) *amumi tiya na* (0.7) *wejshe* (0.4) *chajmu* (0.6)
amaja nij a-mumuy tiya naa wejshe
 how NEG 3SG.POSS-all eat DEM collared_peccary
chajmu
 dog
 ‘Yeah. however the peccary bit our dog all over!’
6. M: *acham(la)=*
achama=la
 be_like_that=COMM
 ‘Really!’
7. P: =*acham [kompadre*
achama kompadre
 be_like_that compadre(SP)
 ‘Really compadre.’
8. M: [chajmu? (.)
chajmu
 dog
 ‘The dog?’
9. P: *chajmu=*
chajmu
 dog
 ‘The dog.’
10. M: =*tiyaw=*
tiya
 eat
 ‘It has bitten it?’
11. P: =*büüsüja atulluy* (0.4)
büüsüja a-tullu=y
 break_off 3SG.POSS-lip=LOC
 ‘It tore off a piece of its snout.’
12. M: *jm=*

jm
INTJ
'Hm.'

13. ⇒ P: *=ineli yupaj lijutütüya*

ineli yupa=ja li-ku-tütü=ya
inside enter=REA VLOC-3SG.OBJ.COM-sit=REP

'It entered [the peccary's burrow] and stayed there together with the peccary.'

(160906_convI)

The utterance in line 1 is not marked with *=ya* for reported evidence because Paulina directly witnessed that her husband came home with the dead animal. Then she states in line 5 that the peccary had bitten her husband's dog all over. Even though she has not directly witnessed this event, she does not use *=ya* in this utterance either, since she has observed the results of this event. The utterance in line 11 where Paulina says that the peccary has torn off a piece of the dog's snout is also unmarked, since she has seen the snout of the dog herself. When she starts telling about how these events happened in line 13, Paulina eventually uses *=ya* to indicate that this information is based on a report by her husband. She says that the dog entered the burrow and was inside there together with the peccary. For this information, she has to rely completely on her husband's report, and she uses *=ya* to indicate this. Example (94) shows that the reported marker *=ya* is only used when the only available evidence is a report.

In this last section of the sketch grammar, a brief overview over the evidential-intersubjective markers of Yurakaré has been given. The semantics and pragmatics of the verbal enclitics are discussed in more detail in the following chapters. It will be shown that the semantics of the markers is closely connected to their use in interaction. Certain interactional uses are facilitated by the semantics of the evidentials, and in some cases, particular interactional uses can lead to a shift in interpretation. This shows that meaning and language use influence each other in both directions.

Chapter 3

Reported evidence and intersubjectivity: =ya ‘reported/intersubjective’

The verbal enclitic =ya is the most frequent of the Yurakaré evidentials in discourse, with 697 occurrences in the corpus. It has two basic interpretations, reported evidence and epistemic intersubjectivity. In this chapter, I argue that the epistemic reading of =ya is derived from the reported evidential reading. Therefore, throughout this dissertation =ya is glossed with one single gloss REP for ‘reported’, even in cases where the epistemic reading arises.

Both the reported and the epistemic use of =ya occur frequently in the corpus. The distribution of the uses in a conversation depends strongly on the conversational context. In mythological narratives or tellings of events that have been reported to the speaker, =ya is used in its reported interpretation. In discussions of events or situations of which both speakers have no direct knowledge, the epistemic use of =ya predominates. This is especially clear in the frog story retelling with Asunta and Magdalena, where there are 212 instances of epistemic =ya and only 18 of reported =ya. In the corpus as a whole, the distribution of the two uses is even: each use accounts for about half of the occurrences.

‘Reported’ is a cross-linguistic evidential type (e.g. Aikhenvald 2004, Plum-gian 2001). Some languages that express this evidential notion grammatically make various further distinctions within this category. For example, some languages distinguish between Reported and Quotative. With the Quotative, a particular person is specified as the source of the report, whereas this is not the case for Reported evidentials (Aikhenvald 2004:177). Languages can also distinguish between Secondhand and Thirdhand evidence, and some even have a more fine-grained distinction of “‘degrees’ of hearsay” (p. 179). Furthermore, languages can have distinct evidentials for different kinds of narrative, while other languages use the reported evidential in all types of narratives (pp. 310-5). The Yurakaré reported evidential =ya is used for all types of reports. Section 3.1 of this chapter presents examples for the reported interpretation of =ya.

The second use of =*ya* is to indicate epistemic possibility with an intersubjective component. The interactional data show that utterances with =*ya* in its epistemic reading often receive agreeing responses. Moreover, epistemic =*ya* is also used in agreeing responses. These uses suggest that epistemic =*ya* includes a notion of epistemic intersubjectivity. Epistemic intersubjectivity is concerned with the distribution of information access between speaker and addressee (Bergqvist *forthc.*: cf. section 1.3.2). In this aspect, =*ya* contrasts with the subjective marker =*laba*, which expresses subjective epistemic access without including an expectation about the addressee's information access (see chapter 5). The epistemic use of =*ya* will be discussed in section 3.2. The interactional uses of epistemic =*ya* will be discussed in separate subsections: mobilizing agreement (section 3.2.1.2), expressing epistemically dependent agreement (section 3.2.2.1), and expressing non-personal wishes in optative constructions with the jussive marker =*cha* (section 3.2.1.3). It will be argued that these interactional uses constitute evidence for the intersubjective nature of =*ya*.

3.1 =*Ya* as a reported evidential

In its reported reading, =*ya* can occur in initial as well as in second position within the adjacency pair. In the following, it will be shown that the interactional context for utterances with =*ya* is always informing, i.e. the utterances in which =*ya* occurs are intended to inform the addressee of some information the speaker does not expect the addressee to know. The use of =*ya* makes explicit that the speaker obtained the information through a report by another person, and has not witnessed the events herself. The use in initial position is described in section 3.1.1, the use in responsive position in 3.1.2.

3.1.1 Reported =*ya* in initial position

In initial position declaratives, reported =*ya* is always used in informing contexts. This means that the speaker gives information to the addressee to which the addressee did not have access before. This use is discussed in section 3.1.1.1. Section 3.1.1.2 describes a very marginal use of reported =*ya* in initial position, the use in content questions to refer to the addressee's expected information source.

3.1.1.1 Reported =*ya* in informing actions

An interactional environment where =*ya* typically occurs in its reported reading is in story tellings. Story tellings constitute an informing interactional context, because the speaker informs the addressee about events of which the addressee had no prior knowledge. An example is (95), where Miguel is engaged in a telling to Paulina about an event where her brother accidentally shot their sister's dog. He uses =*ya* to mark the information as a report in lines 1, 9, 10, 11, and 13. Paulina did not know about the events before, which becomes clear from her question in line 3:

- (95) 1. ⇒ M: *bēchut(aya)* (0.7) *eleyj malaj* (2.9)
bēchuta=ya elle=chi mala=jā
 be_like_this=REP earth=DIR go.SG=REA
 ‘It was just like that. when he went downriver ...’
2. *miyama teshental inanija ě a (.) ayee aw atibu kayashiw (...)*
 (.) *chajmu=*
mi-dyama teshe-nta=la
 2SG.POSS-younger_sibling_of_woman sleep-DES=INS
winani=jā a-vee a-tiba=w kayashi=w
 walk=REA 3SG.POSS-woman 3SG.POSS-pet=PL shoot=PL
chajmu
 dog
 ‘When your brother went to stay overnight, they shot his
 sister’s pets, the dog.’
3. ⇒ P: =a::*majcha kompadre=*
amajcha kompadre
 when compadre(SP)
 ‘When was that, compadre?’
4. M: =*ushta bēcha baliw (.) tolombe baliwja* (0.9)
ushta bēcha bali=w tolombe bali=w=jā
 before like_that go.PL=PL wild_boar go.PL=PL=REA
 ‘Before, they went like that, when they went to hunt wild
 boar.’
5. [*mabobo(jsh)*]
ma-bobo=ti=jsha
 3PL.OBJ-hit=DS=ABL
 ‘After he killed some.’
6. P: [ě] ě a[::*cha(ma)*]
 ě ě *achama*
 INTJ INTJ be_like_that
 ‘Ah, ah, really.’
7. M: [*teshental baliw(ja)*] (0.7)
teshe-nta=la bali=w=jā
 sleep-DES=INS go.PL=PL=REA
 ‘When they went overnight.’
8. P: *utti=*
utti
 INTJ
 ‘Yeah.’
9. ⇒ M: =*achu eleyj wejshē kujaymanwiy (.)*

- achu elle=chi wejshe*
 like_that earth=DIR collared_peccary
ku-ja-winani=w=ya
 3SG.OBJ.COM-3SG.OBJ-walk=PL=REP
 ‘Like that they followed a peccary downriver.’
10. ⇒ *kayashiw(y) wejshe* (1.4)
kayashi=w=ya wejshe
 shoot=PL=REP collared_peccary
 ‘They shot the peccary.’
11. ⇒ *wejsheshku-ta amalashiya layj chajmu* (1.1)
wcjshe-shkuta amalashiya layj chajmu
 collared_peccary-ADV.SML-MID come-SML=REP too
chajmu
 dog
 ‘The dog seemed to come like a peccary, too.’
12. P: *i:/:*
ij
 INTJ
 ‘Geez.’
13. ⇒ M: *[achamaj netaj kayashiya a(. . .) (.) ayta ucharbi=*
achama=ja neta=ja kayashi=ya
 like_this=REA fire=REA shoot=REP
a-charaba=y
 3SG.POSS-shoulder=LOC
 ‘So he fired and shot it in the shoulder.’
14. P: *=ləjh kompadre (.)*
ləjlē=v kompadre
 day=LOC compadre(SP)
 ‘In daylight. compadre?’
15. M: *ləjli*
ləjlē=v
 day=LOC
 ‘In daylight!’
 (160906_conv1)

The =*ya*-marked utterances in (95) are meant to inform Paulina about the events which were not known to her before. That she did not know about the events can be inferred from her responses. After Miguel introduces the story with a broad summary of what happened in line 2, Paulina asks him when these events took place. This indicates that she has not heard of it before. She also gives a typical news receipt response in line 6, by which she treats the information given by Miguel as new to her.

In (95), we can see that Miguel does not use =*ya* in every utterance, even though they all belong to the telling of the events reported to him. This shows

that the use of =ya to mark a report is not obligatory in the grammatical sense once the reported information source is established in the conversational context.

The use of =ya in story tellings extends to mythological narratives, which are transmitted orally in the Yurakaré culture. Such a use for reported evidentials is quite common cross-linguistically (cf. Aikhenvald 2004:310-5). Like with other story tellings, it is not obligatory to use =ya in every utterance of a mythological narrative, as we can see in example (96) from the Pëpësu narrative. Miguel has just explained to Paulina that some people went fishing, walking along the river, and that Pëpësu, a trickster who captures people and carries them away in his basket to eat them, followed them, stealing the fish they have caught.

- (96) 1. P: *lmey mumala?*=
limeye mu-mala
 behind 3PL.OBJ.COM-go.SG
 ‘Did he follow behind them?’
2. ⇒ M: *=li:mey mumalaya*=
limeye mu-mala=ya
 behind 3PL.OBJ.COM-go.SG=REP
 ‘He followed behind them.’
3. P: *=kayle(lēlaye)*=
ka-ayle-lē=la=ye
 3SG.OBJ-know-AUG=COMM=ADAP.F
 ‘Geez, incredible that he realized it.’
4. M: *=tē ma[:la] yosse ma:la*
tē mala yosse=se mala
 INTJ go.SG again=PSUP go.SG
 ‘Yeah, he went, again he went.’
5. P: *[jm]*
jm
 INTJ
 ‘Hm.’
 (1.0)
6. M: *mumala yosse pëpësu*=
mu-mala yosse pëpësu
 3PL.OBJ.COM-go.SG again PROP.N
 ‘Pëpësu followed them again.’
7. P: *=atti* (0.8)
atti
 INTJ
 ‘Yeah.’
8. ⇒ M: *baliv baliv bčjtuya* (0.6)

- bali=w bali=w bějta=w=ya*
 go.PL=PL go.PL=PL see=PL=REP
 ‘They went and went and they saw him.’
9. *pěpěsulam na amala kutu=*
pěpěsu=laba naa amala ku-ta=w
 PROP=SUBJ DEM come 3SG.OBJ.COM-say=PL
 ‘It’s Pěpěsu, the one who’s coming there!’ they said.’
10. *=la:tilabla(ri kutu)=*
l-ati=laba=la=ri *ku-ta=w*
 REF-DEM=SUBJ=COMM=RES.M 3SG.OBJ.COM-say=PL
 ‘That’s who it is!’ they said.’
11. P: *=hh kutuběʔ=*
ku-ta=w=bě
 3SG.OBJ.COM-say=PL=MOM
 ‘They said in that moment?’
12. ⇒ M: *=kaladandantu kutuya=*
ka-la-danda-ni-tu *ku-ta=w=ya*
 3SG.OBJ-MAL-go.up-INT-2PL 3SG.OBJ.COM-say=PL=REP
 ‘Let’s climb up, away from him.’ they said.’
13. P: *=tě (0.5)*
tě
 INTJ
 ‘Yeah.’
14. ⇒ M: *kalaj:danduy putipula*
ka-la-danda=w=ya *putipu=la*
 3SG.OBJ-MAL-go.up=PL inga_tree=INS
 ‘They climbed an inga tree (away from Pěpěsu).’
 (ma_pu-pepesu)

Paulina asks in line 1 whether Pěpěsu followed behind them. This question is confirmed by Miguel in line 2, using a repeat marked with =*ya* for reported evidence. In lines 4 and 6, he uses utterances not marked with =*ya* to say that Pěpěsu continued to follow the people. In line 8, then, after using two unmarked main verbs indicating that the people went on and on, the next verb is again marked with =*ya*: the people notice Pěpěsu. This is followed again by two unmarked utterances, where Miguel describes how the people identify Pěpěsu in lines 9 and 10. He uses =*ya* again after that when he explains that the people climbed a tree to get away from Pěpěsu (lines 12 and 14).

We can see in (96) that =*ya* does not occur obligatorily in every utterance of a mythological narrative. It is not entirely clear what determines the use of =*ya* in this context. One factor could be backgrounding and foregrounding. While the events that are important for the story are marked with =*ya*, some of the backgrounded events and repetitions of events mentioned earlier are unmarked. For example, when Pěpěsu just walks and keeps on following the

people (lines 4 and 6). =*ya* is not used. These events do not push the story further and rather belong to the background, and are furthermore repetitions of already mentioned events. Similarly, in line 8 only the event of the people noticing Pëpësu is marked, while the events of the people walking on and on are unmarked. Only the event of noticing is new and important for the story. Along similar lines, the events of the people identifying Pëpësu in lines 9 and 10 do not push the story any further, while the events of the people deciding to climb a tree to escape him described in lines 12 and 14 do. Foregrounding seems one of the factors that determines the use of =*ya* in mythological narratives. Further research is necessary here.

Mythological narratives, just as other types of tellings, have the function to inform the addressee about the events that are part of the story. With mythological narratives that are part of the shared cultural knowledge of an ethnic group, such as the Pëpësu narrative for the Yurakaré people, we can expect that many people are familiar with the events that happen in the story. However, as receivers of mythological narratives, addressees pretend not to have knowledge of the events, as is good practice in story telling. In (96), even though Paulina knows the story of Pëpësu, she pretends that the events reported to her by Miguel are new to her. We can see this for example in line 1, where she asks a question. This action is only performed if the speaker seeks to get new information. Furthermore, Paulina gives continuers in the form of interjections in lines 5, 7, and 13, as well as a news receiving response in line 11. All this shows that Paulina pretends that she had no prior knowledge of the events in the narrative. This means that the use of =*ya* in tellings of mythological narratives is comparable to tellings of other types of events, and the interactional context is informing.

Reported =*ya* is not only used in tellings of events, but also in other informing interactional contexts like explanations. An example is (97), where =*ya* occurs in a response to a clarification question:

- (97) 1. M: *amashku kabush atib chajmu la(cha) ayoyoti?=
amashku ka-bushu a-tiba chajmu lacha
how 3SG.OBJ-lie 3SG.POSS-pet dog too
a-yoyoto=y
3SG.POSS-bed=LOC
‘How is that, he is lying in bed together with his dog?’*
2. ⇒ A: =*ayoyo achu kapetajtiwya* (0.9)
*a-yoyo[to=y] achu
3SG.POSS-bed=LOC like_that
ka-peta-jti=w=**ya**
3SG.OBJ-lie_down-HAB=PL=REP
‘In his bed, like that they lie down.’*
3. M: *[(...)]*
4. A: *[anu (.) mapaischi] matib chajmu (.)
anu ma-pais=chi ma-tiba chajmu
like_that 3PL.POSS-country(SP)=DIR 3PL.POSS-pet dog*

- ‘Like that, their dogs in their country.’
5. M: *[(anuta)*
anuta
be_like_that
 ‘Like that.’
6. ⇒ A: *[nij bushajtiwya puji=*
nij busha-jti=w=ya puja=y
 NEG lay_down-HAB=PL=REP outside=LOC
 ‘They don’t put their dogs outside to sleep.’
7. *=ashtët shëy*
achu-të-ta shëy
 like_that-1SG.OBJ.COM-say yesterday
 ‘She told me so yesterday.’
 (al.ce.frogstory)

Asunta and Magdalena are talking about picture 2 of the frog story, where the boy and his dog are both sleeping in the boy’s bed. Magdalena asks Asunta in line 1 of the sequence how that is possible, as the Yurakaré usually do not let their dogs enter their houses. Asunta’s response in which she provides an explanation for the situation consists of several utterances, two of which are marked with =*ya* (lines 2 and 5). She explains that in the country where the researcher is from, people sometimes let their dogs sleep in their beds, and that they sometimes do not keep them outside. Asunta then adds in line 6 that I had told her so the day before, thus making explicit reference to the event of reporting marked by =*ya* in lines 2 and 5. The explicit mentioning of the event of reporting supports a reported analysis of =*ya* in example (97). The actions performed by the two utterances containing =*ya* in (97) are informing the addressee about how dogs are kept in the researcher’s country, while =*ya* is used to specify the information source as a report. The addressee had asked beforehand in line 1 for a clarification of the situation depicted on the picture, i.e. she had requested to be informed and thereby demonstrated that she did not have the relevant information.

We have seen in this section that =*ya* in its reported reading occurs in informing actions in initial position. Another initial position use that has to be mentioned even though it is very marginal is the use in content questions, where =*ya* is used to refer to the information access of the addressee. This use is discussed in the following section.

3.1.1.2 Reported =*ya* in content questions

=*Ya* rarely occurs in content questions, with only three instances of around 700 in the whole corpus. In content questions, =*ya* refers to the expected information access of the addressee rather than of the speaker, i.e. it indicates that the speaker expects the addressee to base his answer on reported evidence. This phenomenon is not uncommon for the use of evidentials in content questions cross-linguistically (cf. Aikhenvald 2004:244). An example is (98), where Asunta

and Magdalena are talking about their grandfather who is buried on a cemetery close to Oromomo:

- (98) 1. A: *bějtamashijtim tappësham atumba mē atchi* (1.3)
bějta-mashi-jti-in ta-pëpë-shama
 see-MINTS-HAB-2SG 1PL.POSS-grandfather-DCSD
a-tumba mēē ati=chi
 3SG.POSS-grave(SP) 2SG.PRON DEM=DIR
 ‘Do you sometimes go to see the grave of our grandfather there?’
2. M: *nij bėjtajt tappëshama atumba* (0.6)
nij bėjta-jt[i-y] ta-pëpë-shama
 NEG see-HAB-1SG 1PL.POSS-grandfather-DCSD
a-tumba
 3SG.POSS-grave(SP)
 ‘I don’t see our grandfather’s grave.’
3. *ma:tatimuy panteo* (0.4)
matata-ina=w=ya panteo
 big-COL=PL=REP graveyard(SP)
 ‘The graveyard is big.’
4. ⇒ A: *amchi bushu[ya tappësham*
amchi bushu=ya ta-pëpë-shama
 where lie=REP 1PL.POSS-grandfather-DCSD
 ‘Where is it our grandfather lies, they say?’
5. M: *[(...) (ana) amujchi*
ana amujchi
 DEM inside
 ‘That one, inside (in the jungle).’
 (270807.conv)

Asunta asks Magdalena whether she sometimes goes to see his grave in line 1. Magdalena negates this in line 2. She then says in line 3 that the graveyard is big, using =*ya* to indicate that she only has reported evidence about this. This utterance is informing, since it conveys information to Asunta to which she did not have access before. Asunta now knows that Magdalena has never seen the graveyard, but only knows it through reports of other people. Then, in line 5 Asunta poses the content question that is marked with =*ya*, inquiring about the location of the place where their grandfather lies buried. She uses =*ya* to acknowledge Magdalena’s reported information access. The question now arises why it would be necessary to indicate this, since both speakers now know that the addressee has reported access to the information. As stated above, usually this is not indicated in content questions in Yurakaré, resulting in a very low frequency of the use of the reported marker in content questions. The question why it is used in (98) must remain unanswered for the time being.

The other two uses of =*ya* in content questions reading both occur in situations where the speaker did not understand something another speaker has

said, and asks the addressee who is expected to have understood for clarification. One of the examples is represented in (99):

- (99) 1. ⇒ V: *a:mchi liwjaníwya* (0.4)
amchi li-ujwa-ni=w=ya
 where VLOC-see-INT=PL=REP
 ‘Where did they go to visit?’
2. A: *a:njelika* (1.6)
anjelika
 PROPX
 ‘Ángelica.’
3. V: *ë anjelika?*
ë anjelika
 INTJ Ángelica
 ‘Ah, Ángelica?’
 (040707.conv)

While Virgilio and Asunta are in a conversation with two more people in front of the house, some other people pass by behind the house. They have a short conversation with Asunta, shouting because they are some distance away. It cannot be understood in the recording what these people say, so their speech is not represented in the extract. Obviously, one of them has just said that they were visiting Ángelica, and Virgilio has not understood who exactly they went to visit. He asks Asunta in line 1, marking his question with =*ya*. It is clear that Asunta has reported evidence for the requested information, since she has just been told by the people who are passing by who they went to visit. Thus, the use of =*ya* in (99) refers to the reported information access of the addressee.

The use of =*ya* in content questions is so scarce that there is not enough evidence to consider it a conversational practice. However, it shows that =*ya* can be used to refer to the information source of the addressee (excluding the speaker, who does not have any access to the information but asks the addressee to provide it). Even though this is quite common for evidentials cross-linguistically (cf. Speas and Tenny 2003 and Aikhenvald 2004:244-9 for an overview), it has to be noted that it does not seem to be a frequent phenomenon for Yurakaré evidentials. Reported =*ya* is the only evidential that occurs in this reading at all. Inferential =*tiba* and subjective =*laba* are never used in content questions, while assumptive =*jtö* expresses an intersubjective value in content questions, referring to both the speaker’s and the addressee’s access to information, never to the addressee’s access alone.

This section has demonstrated the uses of reported =*ya* in initial position. In the following section, the uses of reported =*ya* in second position are discussed.

3.1.2 Reported =ya in second position

As in initial position, the interactional context for the use of =ya in second position is always informing. A frequent responsive use of reported =ya is in answers to content questions, like in (100):

- (100) 1. M: *tijumpadreja* (.)
ti-jumpadre=ja
 1SG.POSS-compadre(SP)=TOP
 ‘And my compadre?’
2. ⇒ P: *ma:la itta* (0.6) *kancha* (.) *arosashtuy kom[padrebë*
mala kancha a-rosa-shta=w=yä
 go.SG field PROG-mow(SP)-FUT=PL=REP
kompadre=bë
 compadre(SP)=MOM
 ‘He went, they are going to mow the sports field, compadre.’
3. M: *[atchi arosa(bë)=*
ati=chi a-rosa=bë
 DEM=DIR PROG-mow(SP)=MOM
 ‘There he is mowing?’
4. P: =*otte*
otte
 INTJ
 ‘Yeah.’
 (160906_conv1)

In line 1, Miguel asks Paulina what his *koupadre*, her husband, is doing.¹ In line 2, Paulina gives her answer, saying that he went away to mow the sports field. The utterance is marked with =ya to indicate that it was reported to Paulina that her husband is going to mow the field. The most probable interpretation is that her husband himself has given her that information. The context of the =ya-marked response in line 2 is informing: Miguel has asked Paulina in line 1 to provide the information, and gives a news receiving response in form of a modified repetition in line 3.

In (100), =ya occurs in a future context in combination with the future marker *-shta*. A reported interpretation of =ya in co-occurrence with a TAM marker indicating future time reference is facilitated if the person who reported the information to the speaker holds some authority or control over the future event. We can see this in example (100), where Paulina’s husband is the probable source of the report, who can be considered to have some authority over his own plans.

Another second position use of =ya is in confirming responses to polar questions and confirmation requests. The interactional context for these uses is also informing. (101) is an example of this usage:

¹The format of the utterance with the topic marker is a practice to ask about what or how a person or thing is doing or where (s)he is.

- (101) 1. A: *atchi kabaliw tachosham lacha=*
ati=chi ka-bali=w ta-choo-shama lacha
 DEM=DIR 3SG.OBJ-go.PL=PL 1PL.POSS-uncle-DCSD too
 ‘There they brought our late uncle as well?’
2. ⇒ M: *=atchiya* (1.2)
ati=chi=ya
 DEM=DIR=REP
 ‘There (they say).’
3. A: *nij bējtam mē an tachoshama* (.)
nij bējta-m mēcē ana ta-choo-shama
 NEG see-2SG 2SG.PRON DEM 1PL.POSS-uncle-DCSD
 ‘You haven’t seen our late uncle?’
4. M: ((shaking head)) *nij bējti lacha*
nij bējta-y lacha
 NEG see-1SG too
 ‘I haven’t seen him either.’
 (270807_conv)

Asunta and Magdalena have been talking about the cemetery of Oromomo, the place where Magdalena lives with her husband. Asunta has never been to that place. In line 1, Asunta asks Magdalena whether their late uncle has been brought to that cemetery. Magdalena confirms this in line 2, using a modified repetition of Asunta’s initial utterance marked with =*ya* to indicate that she obtained that information through a report. This use in a confirming response is clearly informing, since Magdalena has been asked for confirmation in the initial utterance in line 1.

To summarize, the reported reading of =*ya* in declaratives always occurs in informing contexts in interaction, where the speaker gives new information to the addressee. In initial position, reported =*ya* typically occurs in story tellings. Furthermore, there is a marginal use of reported =*ya* in content questions, where it refers to the information source the speaker expects the addressee to have for the queried information. In second position, reported =*ya* is used in answers to content questions and in confirming responses to polar questions and confirmation requests. The frequencies of the three contexts for reported =*ya* are summarized in Table 3.1:

Table 3.1: The frequencies of the uses of reported =*ya*

Use	Frequency	Percent of total ¹
Reported initial	282	85.5%
Reported responsive	45	13.5%
Reported content question	3	1%
Total	330	100%

¹ In all the frequency tables of this dissertation, the percentage numbers are rounded.

The table shows that the use of reported =ya in initial position predominates with 85.5%. The use in second position accounts for 13.5% of the instances of reported =ya , while the use in content questions is marginal with less than 1%.

The following section describes the second use of =ya as a marker of epistemic intersubjectivity.

3.2 =Ya as an epistemic marker

In addition to the reported evidential reading, the marker =ya has a second interpretation which is epistemic rather than evidential in nature. In this epistemic reading, =ya expresses that the speaker considers the embedded proposition a possibility and does not know it to be a fact. This semantic component is shared between the reported and the epistemic readings. In addition, the epistemic reading of =ya has a component of epistemic intersubjectivity (Bergqvist *forthc.*, see section 1.3.2). It includes the assumption of the speaker that the addressee has access to the circumstances that make the speaker believe the embedded proposition, and that the addressee should take the same epistemic stance toward the proposition as the speaker.

The epistemic intersubjective interpretation of =ya occurs in initial as well as in second position. Section 3.2.1 describes the uses in initial position, while section 3.2.2 deals with the uses in second position.

3.2.1 Epistemic =ya in initial position

In initial position, epistemic =ya can be used in informing contexts. In these cases, modal expressions are added to the utterance to disambiguate between the reported and the epistemic readings of =ya (section 3.2.1.1). Outside informing contexts, utterances with =ya often receive agreeing responses by the addressee (section 3.2.1.2).

3.2.1.1 Resolving the interpretation of =ya in informing contexts

Given that =ya has two basic interpretations, the question arises how addressees can figure out which of the two readings, reported or epistemic, is intended. One cue for resolving the interpretation is the interactional context in which =ya occurs. Since the reported reading only occurs in informing actions, where the speaker informs the addressee of something she expects him not to have known before, addressees can use the action type to figure out which reading of =ya is intended. If the action is not informing, the epistemic interpretation is intended. If the action is informing, either the reported interpretation is intended, or a modal expression is added to make explicit that the epistemic interpretation is intended. Typical responses to utterances that contain epistemic =ya in non-informing contexts are agreements. This shows that addressees treat these utterances differently from those where =ya is interpreted as reported. The actions performed by utterances with epistemic =ya in first position are making suggestions about situations in the world of which the speaker does not have full knowledge, joking, and mobilizing agreement.

In cases where the epistemic reading is intended in an informing context and it is not clear from the general context that the speaker does not have reported access to the information, modal expressions can be added to the utterance to make this explicit. Most commonly, the epistemic possibility adverb *kusu(ti)* is used for this purpose. An example of such a use is (102):

- (102) 1. A: *wijwilli asunta layjla=*
wij~willë=y asunta lacha=la
 INTS~far=LOC PROPN too=COMM
 ‘Asunta is far away, too?’
2. M: *=wij:willila=*
wij~willë=y=la
 INTS~far=LOC=COMM
 ‘It’s far indeed.’
3. *=un dia y mediojti (0.5) de arribada (0.9)*
un dia y medio-jti de arribada
 one(SP) day(SP) and(SP) half(SP)-NLIM of(SP) arrival(SP)
 ‘One and a half days to get there.’
4. A: *(të) (0.8)*
të
 INTJ
 ‘Ah.’
5. ⇒ M: *kus doj diajtiya (0.5)*
kusu** dos dia-jti=**ya
 maybe two(SP) day(SP)-NLIM=REP
 ‘Maybe two days.’
6. *doj diajtiya (.) a la ves norpela (1.8)*
*dos dia-jti=**ya** a la ves*
 two(SP) day(SP)-NLIM=REP at(SP) the(SP) time(SP)
norpe=la
 oar=INS
 ‘Maybe two days in one go, rowing.’
7. A: *motory?*
motor=y
 motor(SP)=LOC
 ‘And in a motor boat?’
 (270807_conv)

In line 1, Asunta asks Magdalena whether Asunta is far away from Oromomo. Magdalena lives in Oromomo with her husband and thus has superior knowledge of that place. Magdalena confirms in line 2, and then states in line 3 that it takes one and a half days to get there. She uses an evidentially unmarked utterance thus implicating direct access to this information through her own experience (see section 2.7.2.4). The action performed by this utterance is

clearly informing: Magdalena gives Asunta some information Asunta did not have access to before, which we can infer from her question in line 1. After a short continuer token by Asunta in line 4, Magdalena adds in lines 5-6 that it could also take two days to do the trip. These two basically repetitive utterances are marked with =*va* to express that the speaker does not know this to be a fact. The function of =*va* is thus to epistemically downgrade the information. The action here is still informing, since the utterances are still part of Magdalena's informing Asunta how far it is from Oromomo to Asunta, information to which only the speaker has access. The epistemic reading is resolved here by the co-occurrence with the epistemic possibility modal adverb *kusu* in line 5. Without the modal *kusu*, the use of =*va* would remain vague in an informing context like in (102), since the interpretation could also be reported. The function of =*va* in informing contexts is epistemic downgrading, indicating that the speaker does not have direct knowledge of the information and is thus not entirely sure about it.

Another example for the use of =*va* in combination with the adverb *kusu* is (103):

- (103) 1. J: *ati ajamma* (0.5)
 ati=v a-kamma
 DEM=LOC PROG-call
 ‘Here he is calling.’
2. ⇒ *kus atib chajmu kalajammaya* (1.2)
 kusu a-tiba chajmu ka-la-kamma=ya
 maybe 3SG.POSS-pet dog 3SG.OBJ-MAL-call=REP
 ‘Maybe he is calling for his dog.’
3. ⇒ *kus atumumu=*
 kusu a-tumumu
 maybe 3SG.POSS-frog
 ‘Maybe for his frog.’
4. P: =*bu:shunaja adyindyise*
 bushu=naja adyindyise
 lie=NSIT sad=PSUP
 ‘It (the dog) is lying down, it is sad.’
 (pp_pf_frogstory)

On picture 14 of the frog story, the boy is depicted with his mouth wide open and cupping it with his hands. Talking about this picture, Juan gives a descriptive utterance in line 1, saying that the boy is calling. This utterance describes the picture, and is therefore evidentially and epistemically unmarked. Juan then gives an utterance in line 2 which contains the modal adverb *kusu* ‘maybe’ and =*va*, suggesting that the boy may be calling his dog. The modal *kusu* makes clear here that the epistemic interpretation of =*va* is intended. Without *kusu*, the reported interpretation would also be possible.

The action of the =*va*-marked utterance in line 2 is not entirely clear. It could be informing in that it is embedded in the situation of story telling,

However, there is another possibility. As we will see below in section 3.2.1.2, utterances with epistemic =*ya* in initial position are often used to mobilize agreement by the addressee. It is possible that Juan also tries to mobilize an agreeing response, since there is a pause of over one second after this utterance. Whether this is correct or not we cannot know, since Patricia does not give any response and Juan does not pursue it. Rather, he adds in line 3 that the boy could also be calling his frog.²

Apart from *kusu* ‘maybe’, another means of making explicit that the epistemic reading of =*ya* is intended in informing contexts is the use of self quotation. Line 2 of example (104) shows this usage, while line 3 shows another instance of =*ya* with *kusu*:

- (104) 1. M: *shuwi na? tēp(shēchi)* (.)
shuwi naa tētē-bēshēē=chi
 moon DEM which-entity=FR
 ‘Is that the moon, or what is it?’
2. ⇒ A: *shuwiya* (.) *em kuti=*
shuwi=yā ku-ta-y
 moon=REP 3SG.OBJ.COM-say-1SG
 ‘It could be the moon. I think.’
3. ⇒ =*shuwi naa* ((pointing at picture)) *kusu na abentani kūtaya*
an shuwi
shuwi naa kusu naa a-bentana=y
 moon DEM maybe DEM 3SG.POSS-window(SP)=LOC
kūta=yā ana shuwi
 appear=REP DEM moon
 ‘That’s the moon, maybe the moon can be seen from his window.’
 (al_ce_frogstory)

Magdalena asks Asunta in line 1 whether what she sees on the picture (cf. pictures 1 and 2) is the moon, or what else it could be. Asunta’s answer is a proposition marked with =*ya* embedded under a first person singular quotative with the verb *ta* ‘say’, which here gets an epistemic interpretation of ‘I think’. This introduces the perspective of the speaker and presents the proposition as what she believes, which facilitates an epistemic interpretation of =*ya*. The context of this utterance is informing, since it is a confirmation of Magdalena’s initial utterance in line 1. Self quotation is used to make explicit the epistemic interpretation, since the reported interpretation would also be possible here (I could have told Asunta that it is the moon when showing the picture story

²We can see in (102) and (103) that =*ya* in its epistemic reading should be analyzed as a possibility rather than a necessity operator. In both examples, it is used in a context where the information marked with =*ya* is presented as one of two options of possible reality. In (102), the speaker states that it could also take two days instead of one and a half, and in (103) the speaker states that the boy could be calling his dog or his frog. This shows that a possibility interpretation is correct for =*ya*, and a necessity interpretation does not hold.

to her). Epistemic =*ya* epistemically downgrades the utterance, marking the information as not being based on direct knowledge.

In this section, we have seen that =*ya* has a second interpretation of epistemic possibility in addition to the reported interpretation. In informing contexts, modal expressions are added to the utterance to make the epistemic reading explicit. In informing contexts, the function of epistemic =*ya* is epistemic downgrading, indicating that the speaker does not claim to have direct knowledge of the proposition.

Utterances with epistemic =*ya* frequently get agreements as a response. This use of =*ya* is discussed in the following section.

3.2.1.2 Facilitating agreement

Utterances with =*ya* in its epistemic reading often get an agreement as a response. Agreement to such utterances preferably takes the format of an *achama* ‘be like that’ token marked again with =*ya* and often also with the commitment marker =*la*. This use of =*ya* in agreeing responses will be discussed below in section 3.2.2.1. The distribution of responses to initial utterances with epistemic =*ya* is represented in Table 3.2.

Table 3.2: Responses to epistemic =*ya* in initial position

Response	Frequency	Percent of total
Agreement repeat with epistemic = <i>ya</i>	13	6%
Agreement <i>achama</i> with epistemic =<i>ya</i>	46	22%
Agreement other format ¹	7	3%
(Dis)confirmation	27	13%
Mirative news receipt <i>achama</i> with = <i>tiba</i>	4	2%
No response	81	39%
Other/unclear	32	15%
Total	210	100%

¹ Includes interjections and self-quotations.

Table 3.2 shows that there is a clear preference for agreements of the format *achama* ‘be like that’ marked with epistemic =*ya* if a response is given to an initial utterance marked with epistemic =*ya*. This shows that utterances with epistemic =*ya* prefer responses that express a symmetric epistemic stance.

An example of the mobilize-response use of epistemic =*ya* is (105), an extension of (95) on page 71. Miguel is telling Paulina about some events of which she has had no prior knowledge. Her brother went hunting and shot their sister’s dog by accident because he mistook it for a peccary. In line 1, Paulina asks Miguel how it is possible that her brother did not recognize the dog. Miguel explains this in lines 2 and 4, using =*ya* to indicate reported evidence (line 4). After a continuer (line 3) and an expression of attitude (line 5) by Paulina, Miguel suggests in line 6 that it was the dog’s destiny, using a =*ya*-marked utterance. Paulina agrees to this with an *achama* ‘be like that’ agreement format marked with =*ya* and the commitment marker =*la* in line 7:

(105) 1. P: *ton nij iyepɛ* (0.8)

- tonto nij iyepe*
 how NEG know
 ‘How come he didn’t recognize it [the dog]?’
2. M: *nij wejsheshish tēta* (.)
nij wejsheshi-sh tē-ta
 NEG collared_peccary-SML-ADV.MAN 1SG.OBJ.COM-say
 ‘It looked so much like a peccary he told me.’
3. P: *[utti]*
utti
 INTJ
 ‘Yeah.’
4. M: *[(lē[mmuy pe])tes petes amalashiya=*
lēmmy petes petes amala-shi=ya
 just IDEO IDEO come-SML=REP
 ‘Like one of them it came running.’
5. P: *=nts i:j* (0.5)
ts ij
 INTJ INTJ
 ‘Geez.’
6. ⇒ M: *adejtinoy k{omadre*
a-destino=ya komadre
 3SG.POSS-destiny(SP)=REP comadre(SP)
 ‘Probably it was its destiny, comadre.’
7. ⇒ P: *[a:chamay kompadrela* (0.7)
achama=ya kompadre=la
 be.like.that=REP compadre(SP)=COMM
 ‘It probably was indeed, compadre.’
8. M: *otte*
otte
 INTJ
 ‘Yeah.’
 (160906.conv1)

The use of *=ya* in line 6 marks the information as a possibility rather than a fact: Miguel cannot know from direct experience that it was the destiny of the dog to be shot. Paulina’s response takes the preferred format of an *achama* ‘be like that’ token marked with epistemic *=ya* and the commitment marker *=la*. Initial utterances with *=ya* that receive agreements do usually not display any response-mobilizing turn design feature such as interrogative intonation or speaker gaze (Stivers and Rossano 2010). This suggests that initial utterances with epistemic *=ya* can facilitate agreement by themselves. In example (105), another possible response-mobilizing feature is the use of the address term *komadre*.

Even though agreements in the *achama* format are preferred to utterances marked with *=ya*, other responses also occur (cf. Table 3.2). An example for a disconfirming response is (106), where Patricia suggests in line 3 that the object (a tree) depicted on picture 19 of the frog story is a cayman, which is disconfirmed by Juan in line 4:

- (106) 1. J: *anchi dandishtannaja* (0.8)
ana=chi danda-shta=naja
 DEM=DIR go_up-FUT=NSIT
 ‘He will go up here.’
2. *sammay winani* (0.4)
samma=y winani
 water=LOC walk
 ‘He’s walking in the water.’
3. ⇒ P: *motchoynaj naa=*
motcho=ya=naja naa
 cayman=REP=NSIT DEM
 ‘This could be a cayman.’
4. ⇒ J: *=nijta kummë* (.)
nijta kummë
 NEG tree
 ‘No, it’s a tree.’
5. P: *a kummë*
a kummë
 INTJ tree
 ‘Ah, a tree.’
 (pp-pf.frogstory)

While describing picture 19 of the frog story, Juan shows Patricia on the picture where the boy will climb up (line 1). After Juan states that the boy is in the water (line 2), Patricia identifies the tree onto which the boy will climb as a cayman using a *=ya*-marked utterance (line 3). The use of *=ya* indicates that she does not claim to know for a fact that it is a cayman, but rather considers it a possibility. Juan disconfirms in line 4 and states that the object is a tree. This is received by Patricia with a news receiving response in line 5.

This section has demonstrated that utterances with epistemic *=ya* show a preference for agreements as responses. Facilitating agreement is thus one of the functions of epistemic *=ya* in interaction. It will be argued below in section 3.3.2 that this function is due to the intersubjective semantics of *=ya*.

The following section deals with a specific use of epistemic *=ya*, which seems to be grammaticalized to some extent. It describes the use of *=ya* in optative constructions in combination with the jussive marker *-cha*.

3.2.1.3 Optatives marked with epistemic *=ya*

=Ya can be used with the jussive modal suffix *-cha* to yield an optative construction expressing a wish that an event should occur. This construction

only occurs with third persons. The jussive marker can also occur with second persons (not with first persons), but then it is never marked with =*ya*. In the singular, *-cha* often changes its vowel to [i] before =*ya*. In principle, the phonological form would allow an analysis of this marker as the frustrative marker =*chi*. However, in the third person plural, the vowel changes to [u] due to the coalescence with the plural marker =*w*. This shows that the morpheme is jussive *-cha* rather than frustrative =*chi*, since as a verbal enclitic =*chi* can never precede the plural marker. Furthermore, some older speakers realize the vowel as [a]. The construction seems to be grammaticalized to some degree.

There are two possible interpretations of optatives with =*ya*. The first is that the occurrence of the event is of interest to the speaker as well as the addressee, the second is that it is in the interest of a third person. An example for the use where the wish is in the interest of both addressee and speaker is (107). The speaker feels disturbed by her child who is walking around in the room, so she takes the child outside and leaves him there. Coming back, she says that the child should walk outside for a while:

(107) ((returning from outside where she left her child))

inanichiya pujtayjbë

winaui-cha=yä pujta=chi=bë

walk-JUS=REP outside=DIR=MOM

‘He should walk around outside for a while.’

(a_lce_lfrogstory)

That the child should go outside is not only a wish of the speaker, but also in the interest of the addressee, since the child was disturbing their work. Furthermore, the addressee had complained about the child before and suggested that his mother leave him in the kitchen with his cousin so that he would not disturb them anymore.

In (108), we can see an example of an optative with =*ya* where a wish in the interest of a third person seems to be represented. Paulina and Virgilio want to leave Asunta’s place where they are having a conversation that is being recorded. Asunta suggests in line 1 that the tape should finish before they go. She repeats it in line 3:

(108) 1. ⇒ A: *mimpëlëchiya koma ka kompadre kasebë* [komadre ((laughs))
hehe=

mi-n-pëlë-cha=yä kase=bë

2SG.OBJ-BEN-finish-JUS=REP tape(SP)=MOM

komadre

comadre(SP)

‘You should finish the tape first, compadre, comadre!’

2. ⇒ P: ((laughs, looks at camera)) *[hehehe*

3. *=na kase mimpëlëchiya*

naa kase mi-n-pëlë-cha=yä

DEM tape(SP) 2SG.OBJ-BEN-finish-JUS=REP

‘That tape should finish first.’

(040707_conv)

In (108), the wish expressed by the optative most probably represents an expression of the interests of myself, the researcher, since Asunta knows that it is important for me to record such conversations and to fill the tapes. In terms of actions, the optatives in (108) can be interpreted as indirect requests.

Another example of an indirect request is (109), where Elisa suggests in line 3 that Asunta should take her (Elisa's) daughter with her on a trip:

- (109) 1. E: *amajshi batamchi* (0.3)
amashi bata-m=chi
 when go.FUT-2SG=FR
 'When will you go?'
2. A: *sewwu ottishti* (0.3)
sewwe=w otto-shta=w=ti
 child=PL go.out-FUT=PL=DS
 'When the children finish school.'
3. ⇒ E: *mēmalachiya tiyijñu* (.)
mē-mala-cha=ya ti-yijñu
 2SG.OBJ.COM-go.SG-JUS=REP 1SG.POSS-daughter
 'My daughter should go with you.'
4. A: *yo=*
vo
 INTJ
 'Ok.'
5. E: *=m*
m
 INTJ
 'Mh.'
 (290906_conv1)

Asunta has told Elisa that she is planning to go to a certain place. Elisa asks her when she will go in line 1. Asunta answers that she will go when the children have come back from school (line 2). In line 3, Elisa uses an optative to suggest that her daughter should go with Asunta. By framing this utterance as an optative rather than a directive, it is presented as being in the interest of the addressee as well as the speaker, which makes it more difficult to resist. Asunta accepts the indirect request in line 4. From this response we can see that she treats the initial utterance as a request rather than the expression of a wish. Since optatives with =*ya* and requests in general are very scarce in the corpus, it is hard to say whether this use is a conversational practice associated to a conventional indirect politeness strategy (cf. Brown and Levinson 1978).

To summarize, =*ya* is used with *-cha* 'jussive' to yield an optative interpretation, representing a wish that is not only in the interest of the speaker. The interpretation can be that the wish is in the interest of both addressee and speaker, or that it is in the interest of some third party. Such optatives can be exploited for indirect requests. It is however not clear whether this is a

common conversational practice, representing a conventional indirect usage of the optative construction. The use of =ya in optatives that do not express a personal wish of the speaker supports the view that =ya is intersubjective in nature.

In this section, we have seen that epistemic =ya in initial position prefers agreeing responses in the format of an *achama* ‘be like that’ token marked with epistemic =ya and the commitment marker =la. In the following section, second position uses of epistemic =ya will be presented.

3.2.2 Epistemic =ya in second position

Within the adjacency pair in interaction, epistemic =ya is frequently used in second position to indicate agreement. There are basically two formats for second position utterances with =ya, modified repeat format (cf. Stivers 2005) and a form of the verb *achama* ‘be like that’ marked with epistemic =ya and often also with the commitment marker =la. In modified repeats, epistemic =ya marks the statement as an agreement rather than a confirmation, indicating that the speaker does not have direct access to the information and does therefore not know it to be a fact.

If we compare the distribution of initial and responsive utterances for reported and epistemic, we can observe that the ratio of second position utterances is much higher for the epistemic interpretation than for the reported. About one third of the epistemic uses are in second position, while only 13.5% of the reported uses are in responses (cf. Table 3.3). This shows that the intersubjective reading of =ya seems to lend itself more to second position uses than the reported reading.

Table 3.3: The frequencies of initial and second position utterances for the two readings of =ya

Reported			Epistemic		
Initial	Responsive	Total	Initial	Responsive	Total
282	45	327	209	113	322
86%	14%	100%	65%	35%	100%

3.2.2.1 Marking agreement with repeats

Stivers (2005) distinguishes between confirmations and agreements as two different types of response. While confirmations are most commonly requested by the other speaker through a confirmation request, agreements can be requested as well as volunteered. Moreover, agreements do not convey a claim of epistemic primacy (cf. Heritage 2002; Heritage and Raymond 2005), which means that they do not claim that the speaker held the expressed position or stance previously, i.e. before it was mentioned by the other speaker (Stivers 2005:135). In contrast, confirmations usually do convey a claim of epistemic primacy and are also treated as such by the addressee if it is made relevant by a confirmation request (p. 136). By producing a confirmation request, the

speaker indicates that she expects the addressee to have superior access to the requested information.

Responses in English conversations frequently take the form of repeating (part of) the utterance made by the previous speaker. Such a repeat can be full or partial, and it can be modified to varying degrees, for example by changing part of the wording (see Stivers 2005 for a summary). Repeats are also used in Yurakaré as a common response format. In fact, repeat format is a standard, unmarked format for confirming and agreeing responses. An evidentially and epistemically unmarked repeat in Yurakaré is usually understood as a confirmation. The confirmation expresses that the speaker has superior access to the information and is thus in a position to confirm. By marking a repeat response with epistemic =*ya*, the response is understood to convey agreement rather than confirmation, the agreement being epistemically dependent on the initial utterance.

Stivers (2005) discusses a specific type of what she calls “modified repeat”, a repeat format where the copula or auxiliary is “expanded and stressed” (p. 132). In this dissertation, I will use the term ‘modified repeat’ for a response format which shows any kind modification of the initial utterance.

Agreements are second position actions by nature, and they are always understood as being dependent on the initial utterance (Stivers 2005:133). By marking a second position modified repeat as an agreement, epistemic =*ya* can be understood as indicating epistemic dependence in second position.

Example (110) shows the use of an agreement with epistemic =*ya* and modified repeat format where the initial utterance is marked with the inferential marker =*tiba*. The speakers are talking about picture 16 of the frog story, where the deer is running with the boy on its head. In line 1, Patricia produces a confirmation request marked with the inferential evidential =*tiba* (see section 4.1.2), suggesting that the boy must be holding on tightly to the deer:

- (110) 1. P: *tü:j kalassëtibanaja?* (0.4)
tüj ka-la-tčsč=tiba=naja
 IDEO 3SG.OBJ-MAL-stand=INF=NSIT
 ‘So he probably holds on to it tightly.’
2. ⇒ J: *tü:j kalassëynaja*
*tüj ka-la-tčsč=**ya**=naja*
 IDEO 3SG.OBJ-MAL-stand=REP=NSIT
 ‘He probably holds on to it tightly.’
 (pp.pf.frogstory)

In line 2, Juan responds to Patricia’s utterance using a modified repeat format marked with =*ya*. Since Juan is the teller of the story, he is supposed to have superior authority over the events of the story. This was projected by the format of Patricia’s initial utterance as a confirmation request marked with inferential =*tiba*. By using =*ya*, Juan marks his response as an epistemically dependent agreement rather than a confirmation.

In English conversations, modified repeat format with expanded and stressed copula or auxiliary in confirming responses indicates that the speaker claims

epistemic authority over the information (Stivers 2005). Epistemic authority means here that a speaker claims to have substantial knowledge of the matter at hand.

In Yurakaré, modified repeat format with =*ya*-marked agreements also conveys a claim of epistemic authority. In the case of example (110), Juan is the teller of the story, and he thus holds a higher epistemic authority over the events of the story because he knows what is going to happen. To summarize, modified repeat responses can be marked with =*ya* to indicate that they are agreements rather than confirmations and thus epistemically dependent on the initial utterance, while the modified repeat format conveys a claim of epistemic authority.

Another common format for agreements is a form of the verb *achama* ‘be like that’ marked with epistemic =*ya* and often also the commitment marker =*la*. This format is presented in the following section.

3.2.2.2 Fully dependent agreements with =*ya*

It has already been shown in section 3.2.1.2 that the preferred format of agreement to utterances marked with epistemic =*ya* are *achama* ‘be like that’ tokens marked themselves with epistemic =*ya* and often also the commitment marker =*la*. In this section, agreements of this format are discussed in more detail.

An example is (111), where the speakers are talking about picture 21 of the frog story where the boots of the boy can be seen again after being submerged under water. Magdalena wonders why the boy’s boots did not drown him after he fell into the water (line 1). In line 2, Asunta gives a possible explanation for this, saying that the water may be shallow. This utterance is marked with =*ya* in co-occurrence with the epistemic modal *kusu* ‘maybe’ to make explicit that the intended interpretation is epistemic rather than reported. Magdalena responds to this with an agreement in the form of an *achama* ‘be like that’ token marked with =*ya* and the commitment marker =*la*:

- (111) 1. M: *tonto nij kabliwchi abotu sammay* (.)
tonto nij ka-bali=w=chi a-bota=w
 how NEG 3SG.OBJ-go.PL=PL=FR 3SG.POSS-boot(SP)=PL
samma=y
 water=LOC
 ‘How come his boots didn’t drown him!’
2. ⇒ A: *aj kusu pupupuja* (.)
aj kusu pupupu=ya
 INTJ maybe shallow=REP
 ‘Well, maybe the water is shallow.’
3. ⇒ M: *achamayla*
achama=ya=la
 be_like_that=REP=COMM

‘It seems to be like that indeed.’
 (al.ce.frogstory)

Magdalena’s agreement is fully dependent on Asunta’s initial utterance. Evidence for this is provided by her utterance in line 1, where it becomes clear that she did not see before that the water was shallow - otherwise she would not have asked the question in line 1. The fully dependent agreement is expressed by the use of the verb *achama* marked with =*ya* and the commitment marker =*la*. Since it occurs quite frequently, this agreement format is a conversational practice in Yurakaré.

Another example of the full agreement format as a response to a =*ya*-marked utterance is (112) from the *demon* narrative. In line 1, Miguel states that the boy of the story killed his sister. In line 2, Paulina asks why he did not pity her. Miguel gives a possible account marked with epistemic =*ya* in line 3, saying that maybe the boy was angry with his sister. The epistemic interpretation of =*ya* in this utterance is triggered by the co-occurrence with the epistemic modal *kusu*. This use of =*ya* facilitates agreement, which is given in line 4 in the form of an *achama* token marked with =*ya* and the commitment marker =*la*:

- (112) 1. M: *atuwil bobo* (.)
 a-tuwi=la bobo
 PROG-die=INS hit
 ‘He killed her.’
2. P: *ton nij kubenememash* [l...]
 tonto nij ku-benebenc-mashi
 how NEG 3SG.OBJ.COM-pity-MINTS
 ‘How come he did not pity her?’
3. ⇒ M: [*ka:j amash kus ku adyojtiy komadre=*
 amashku kusu a-dyojti=ya komadre
 how maybe PROG-be_angry=REP comadre(SP)
 ‘How, maybe he was angry, comadre.’
4. ⇒ P: =*a::chamayla*
 achama=ya=la
 be_like_that=REP=COMM
 ‘It seems to be like that.’
 (ma_pu_diablo)

In (112), we can see that Paulina asks Miguel to provide an explanation for why the boy did not pity his sister, which shows that she has no access to this information. Her agreement in line 4 is thus fully dependent on Miguel’s explanation. This is reflected in the format of her agreement.

The distribution of initial and second position uses of =*ya* is again presented in Table 3.4 (see Table 3.3 above for a comparison of the frequencies for both readings of =*ya*).

In this section, it has been shown that epistemic =*ya* is used in second position to mark responses as agreements. Agreements of the form *achama* ‘be

Table 3.4: The frequencies of the uses of epistemic =ya

Use	Frequency	Percent of total
Initial	209	65%
Responsive	113	35%
Total	322	100%

like that’ marked with epistemic =ya and the commitment marker =la indicate that the agreement is epistemically fully dependent on the initial utterance.

3.3 Discussion

It has been argued in this chapter that the verbal enclitic =ya has two basic interpretations, reported evidence and epistemic intersubjectivity. In the following, it will be argued that the epistemic reading is diachronically derived from the reported reading (section 3.3.1). In section 3.3.2, it will be discussed how the interactional data can be used as evidence for the claim that =ya conveys a component of epistemic intersubjectivity.

3.3.1 The diachronic development of =ya

In this chapter, =ya was presented as a marker with two basic interpretations, reported evidence and intersubjective epistemic possibility. On this account, =ya is polysemous in nature, with two different but related meanings. There is at least one further possible analysis for =ya, which is to consider it a semantically underspecified marker of ‘non-witnessed’ evidence, indicating that the speaker has not personally witnessed the event. On this account, =ya would be considered underspecified rather than polysemous. It cannot be decided here which of these two possibilities is correct, because there is no clear evidence for any of them in the data.

In the following, it will be argued that historically, the reported interpretation is the underlying meaning of =ya, and that the reported reading thus should have preceded the epistemic interpretation diachronically. The argument is based on the probable diachronic source of =ya, which seems to be the speech verb *aya* ‘respond’. In the dictionary of Yurakaré collected by Father LaCueva and published by Adam (1893), we find the following entry for this lexical item: “Responder, cu-aya-i”³ (p. 110). The verb also occurs in one of the examples in the grammatical sketch that accompanies the dictionary: “nis m-aya-tante-i ‘No pudiera cantar’”⁴ (p. 15). In the dictionary by New Tribes Mission (1991), there is an entry “aya, v: contestar (contestale cunya)”⁵ (p. 16), and another

³“Respond: ku-aya-y (3SG.OBJ.COM-aya-1SG)”, my translation and glosses.

⁴“nij ma-aya-ta-ita-y (NEG 3PL.OBJ-aya-HYP-DES-1SG) ‘I would not be able to sing’”, my translation and glosses.

⁵“aya, verb: to answer; answer him: ku-n-ya (3SG.OBJ.COM-IMP.SG-aya)”, my translation and glosses.

entry “calaya(ya). v: 1. exhortar: aconsejar (cada vez); 2. hacer calmar”⁶ (p. 25).

Reported evidentials cross-linguistically often develop out of speech act verbs (cf. e.g. Aikhenvald 2004:271-3). If the verb *aya* ‘respond’ is the source of the verbal enclitic =*ya*, this supports the claim that the reported interpretation of =*ya* diachronically preceded the epistemic interpretation. However, the lack of diachronic corpus data does not permit to make more than an assumption about the source of =*ya*. We would need examples from older texts where the verb *aya* was used as a speech act verb with a direct speech complement, as well as examples showing its use with an indirect speech complement to account for its current use as a verbal enclitic occurring after the subject marker. Unfortunately, the only diachronic data we have are the data in Adam (1893), where no such example can be found. In the recent data, the verb *aya* is not used very much as a complement taking verb. We can see a typical use of *aya* in (113), where it is used without a complement with the meaning ‘respond’:

(113) *pero witaj kuni nij kuyaya*

pero wita=ja ku-niri nij
but(SP) arrive.SG=REA 3SG.OBJ.COM-greet NEG

ku-aya=ya
3SG.OBJ.COM-respond=REP

‘But when he arrived and talked to him, he did not respond.’
(duenoperros)

In (113), we can see that *aya* is not used as a complement taking verb with a direct speech complement. Therefore, the use presented here gives us no hint regarding a possible development of the verbal enclitic =*ya*.

Unfortunately, the data do not provide any evidence as to how the epistemic reading could have been derived from the reported. This question must therefore remain unanswered. A possible hint is offered by the use of epistemic =*ya* in second position. It could be the case that reported =*ya* came to be used in second position within the adjacency pair to mark that the speaker acknowledges the information given by the other speaker in the initial utterance. Reported =*ya* would then refer to a report of the addressee. This use could have developed into a more epistemic intersubjective reading, where it expresses agreement, taking the knowledge state of the speaker of the initial utterance into account. From this second position use, the epistemic interpretation of =*ya* could have spread to initial position. However, this scenario remains speculative.

To conclude, even though there are no diachronic data to prove that =*ya* is derived from the verb *aya* ‘respond’, it is still the most probable source for this marker. If this is correct, this means that reported evidentiality was the initial meaning of =*ya*, whereas the epistemic interpretation is derived.

⁶ “ka-la-aya~ya (3SG.OBJ-MAL-aya~DIST), verb: 1. To tell somebody to do sth: to give advice (every time); 2. to make somebody calm down”, my translation and glosses.

3.3.2 Evidence for the intersubjective component of the epistemic reading of =ya

It has been argued in this chapter that in its epistemic reading, =ya has an intersubjective component indicating an assumption of the speaker that the addressee should take the same epistemic stance toward the proposition. In this section, it will be discussed in which way the interactional data provide evidence for this intersubjective component of =ya. There are three uses of =ya that provide evidence for its intersubjective component: 1. its frequent triggering of epistemically dependent agreements as responses, 2. its use in non-personal optatives, and 3. its use to mark responses as epistemically dependent. It will be argued that these interactional uses serve as evidence for the intersubjective component of =ya.

Utterances with epistemic =ya frequently trigger epistemically dependent agreements in the format of an *aachama* 'be like that' token marked again with epistemic =ya as a response in interaction (section 3.2.1.2). This means that the addressee in second position often mirrors the stance of the initial =ya-marked utterance. The fact that utterances with =ya can trigger such epistemically dependent agreements in interaction suggests that the use of =ya mobilizes or at least facilitates agreement. It suggests that the speaker of the initial utterance expects the addressee to take the same epistemic stance as herself and agree with her, i.e. that =ya conveys a component of epistemic intersubjectivity.

In section 3.2.1.3, it has been shown that epistemic =ya occurs in optative constructions in combination with the jussive marker *-chia*. These optatives were shown to mark that the wish expressed by the optative is not a personal wish by the speaker, but rather a wish that is of advantage for either the speaker and the addressee, or for a third person. This interpretation of wishes of others is intersubjective in that it carries an assumption about the epistemic stances of other people. This intersubjective component becomes especially clear in the cases where a wish is presented as being of interest for both the speaker and the addressee. Therefore, the use of =ya in optatives provides evidence for the intersubjective component of epistemic =ya.

The clearest evidence for the intersubjective component of epistemic =ya comes from its use in responses. In section 3.2.2, it has been shown that =ya marks responses as agreements rather than confirmations. Agreements are typically second position actions which are therefore always dependent on the initial utterance (Stivers 2005). Epistemic =ya indicates epistemic dependence in second position by marking the response as an agreement rather than a confirmation. An agreement is intersubjective in nature in that it epistemically depends on the initial utterance, which supports the claim that =ya conveys an intersubjective component which facilitates its use in epistemically dependent agreeing responses.

To conclude, the present discussion shows that interactional data can provide important evidence for the semantics of grammatical markers. This is because the semantics lends itself to specific uses in interaction. In the case of intersubjective =ya, the intersubjective component is compatible its use as

a trigger for agreement, in agreeing responses, and in non-personal optatives. Since intersubjectivity concerns the relation between the speaker and the addressee(s), this type of meaning can be expected to be less visible outside interaction. Therefore, to study the phenomenon of intersubjectivity as a linguistic category it is crucial to investigate interactional data.

It has been argued above in section (3.3.1) that the reported reading of =*ya* probably preceded the epistemic intersubjective reading diachronically. Unfortunately, the interactional data do not provide evidence as to how the intersubjective reading was derived from the reported reading. To investigate this question, *historical data would be necessary*. This is different for the inferential marker =*tiba*, which has developed a secondary interpretation of mirative. The interactional data provide evidence that the mirative interpretation arose through the specific interactional uses of inferential =*tiba*. This marker and its interactional uses are presented in the following chapter.

Chapter 4

From inferential to mirative: =*tiba* ‘inferential’

The inferential evidential =*tiba* expresses that the embedded proposition is accessed by the speaker through an inference based on external evidence. In what follows, the proposition which constitutes the external evidence will be called ‘source proposition’, while the inferred proposition marked with =*tiba* will be called ‘target proposition’.

A crucial feature of =*tiba* is that it is only used in the corpus when the source proposition is accessible to both the speaker and the addressee. It is never used in the corpus when the speaker makes an inference from a source proposition only accessible to herself.¹ Thus, =*tiba* is not completely speaker-based and subjective, but rather includes an intersubjective component. This feature of =*tiba* will be called the ‘mutual access condition’ in the following. It only applies to the source proposition, while the target proposition allows for asymmetric access. While the speaker never has direct access to the target proposition when using =*tiba*, the addressee may or may not have direct access to it. The distribution of access between speaker and hearer for the use of =*tiba* is summarized in Table 4.1.

Table 4.1: The distribution of information access with =*tiba*

Proposition	Speaker	Addressee
Source proposition	+	+
Target proposition	-	+/-

Within the adjacency pair in interaction, =*tiba* can occur in initial as well as in second position. While in initial position, the interpretation of =*tiba* is inferential, in second position there is a gradual shift to a mirative interpretation. Mirativity is a grammatical category concerned with the marking of unexpected information (e.g. DeLancey 1997, 2001). A cross-linguistic semantic affinity between inferential evidentiality and mirativity has often been noted (e.g. Aksu-Koç and Slobin 1986, DeLancey 2001). In this chapter, I will argue that the

¹This is rather one of the uses of =*laba*; cf. chapter 5.

interactional data show that social interaction was the driving force in the semantic expansion of =*tiba* from inferential to mirative.

This chapter is organized as follows. In 4.1, the uses of =*tiba* in initial position are presented: the use in informing contexts (section 4.1.1) and in confirmation requests (4.1.2). The use of =*tiba* in second position will be discussed in section 4.2. There are two second position uses of =*tiba*: in reconfirmation requests (section 4.2.1), and in mirative news receiving responses (section 4.2.2). In 4.3, it is discussed how the different uses of =*tiba* are connected. I will argue that the expansion from inferential to mirative is driven by the use of =*tiba* in interaction.

4.1 Inferential =*tiba* in initial position

The inferential evidential =*tiba* is used in two interactional environments in initial position, in informing contexts and in confirmation requests. These two uses are presented in the following sections.

4.1.1 Informing contexts

The evidential =*tiba* can be used to mark inferences based on various types of external evidence. It expresses that there exists a source proposition which made the speaker infer the target proposition, and has thus led the speaker to believe the target proposition to be true. The source proposition can be accessed by the speaker in various ways: visually, through the general conversational context, general world knowledge, or through a proposition uttered by the addressee in a previous turn. For all these types of access, the mutual access condition holds: the source proposition is accessible to both the speaker and the addressee. In the following, examples for the different access types are presented, showing that =*tiba* is an evidential with inferential semantics including a mutual access condition to the source proposition. The examples in this section demonstrate the use of =*tiba* in informing contexts, where the speaker informs the addressee of something the addressee is assumed not to have known before.

Inferential =*tiba* can be used for inferences based on a visually perceived event or situation. In this case, the event that is observed by the speaker can also be observed by the addressee, since the event takes place within the deictic sphere of the speech situation. An example is (114), where Asunta, Magdalena, and Asunta's daughter are talking about some older people from Oromomo (lines 1-2). Asunta interrupts the conversation in line 3 to note that the chicken that is walking around under the table must have fleas. She uses an utterance marked with =*tiba*:

- (114) 1. A: *latchibēshē lacha?* (0.8)
 l-ati=chi-bēshēē lacha
 REF-DEM=DIR-entity too
 ‘Is he from there as well?’
 2. M: *atchibēshē lacha* (1.3)

ati=chi-bēshēē lacha

DEM=DIR-entity too

‘He is from there as well.’

3. ⇒ A: ((looks under the table)) *mjm isiñarutib mij na talpa* (1.0)

mjm i-sinñaru=w=tiba mija naa talipa

INTJ PV-flea=PL=INF my-daughter(SP) DEM chicken

‘Hm, that chicken must have fleas. my daughter.’

4. M: *minechetati* (1.0)

mi-necheta ati

2SG.OBJ-kick DEM

‘It is kicking you.’

5. A: ((laughs))

(270807.conv)

In (114), =*tiba* is used to inform the other speech act participants that the speaker inferred that the chicken must have fleas from a visually perceivable event that is accessible to all the speech act participants. In this case, it is inferred from some behavior of the chicken, which is accessible to all of them because they are at the table and can all access the space under it visually. The interactional context is informing, since the speaker is informing the addressee’s about the condition of the chicken.

The source proposition for an inference marked with =*tiba* can also be provided by the general conversational context. Since this context is always available to the addressee as well, the mutual access condition of =*tiba* holds. An example for such a use is (115), where Magdalena reports to Asunta an event that happened to her father-in-law:

- (115) 1. M: *setuy anajsha*= ((gestures towards her back))

seta=w=va ana=jsha

grab=PL=REP DEM=ABL

‘They grabbed him from here.’

2. =*ana* (.) *medio* (.) (m) *entiendejti mabuybu naa* (1.0)

ana medio entiende-jti ma-buybu

DEM half(SP) understand(SP)-HAB 3SG.POSS-language

naa

DEM

‘He understands some of their language.’

3. *malawshēmashiya ushta*=

ma-la-wēshē-mashi=va ushta

3PL.OBJ-MAL-listen-MINTS=REP before

‘He could understand them a little before.’

4. ⇒ =*pu[watib] lat*=

puwa=tiba lat (iji)

drunk=INF then

‘He must have been drunk.’

5. A: [jm]
 jm
 INTJ
 ‘Hm.’
6. ⇒ M: =*puwashtatib latiji*=
puwa-shta=tiba latiji
 drunk-FUT=INF then
 ‘He must have been going to get drunk then.’
7. A: =*të*
të
 INTJ
 ‘I see.’
 (270807.conv)

When Magdalena’s father-in-law was visiting another community, some people tried to attack him. Magdalena uses the reported marker =*ya* to indicate that this story was reported to her by her father-in-law in lines 1 and 3. In line 2, she does not use =*ya* because there she states something that she knows from direct experience, namely that her father-in-law knows the language of the people who attacked him. In line 4 and 6, on the other hand, she uses the inference marker =*tiba* to express that her father-in-law has not told her that he was drunk or going to get drunk, but that she inferred it. The interactional context of the =*tiba*-marked utterance is informing, since it belongs to the events of the story of which the speaker informs the addressee. This is supported by the response given by Asunta which is a continuer, typically used as a response in story-tellings with informing context.

The source propositions for the inference in (115) are not explicitly specified, but rather provided by the general context of the story and world knowledge: people sometimes like to get drunk when they travel to other places, and that they tend to get into a fight when they are drinking. As general world knowledge, this source proposition is accessible to the addressee as well.

The examples presented in this section show that =*tiba* is an inferential evidential. They also show that it is used in informing interactional contexts, where the speaker informs the addressee about the proposition she is inferring, and also informs the addressee that she is inferring the proposition rather than having direct knowledge of it.

4.1.2 Requesting confirmation in initial position

Inferential =*tiba* is frequently used in confirmation requests that receive a confirmation (or, less frequently, a disconfirmation) as a response. These *confirmation* requests are used in situations where the addressee has superior access to the target proposition. We can see in Table 4.2 below that confirmation requests with =*tiba* most frequently receive a response that demonstrates the addressee’s superior access to the information. Confirmation requests usually get rising interrogative intonation at the end of the utterance. Speakers also use gaze as a response-mobilizing feature, like e.g. speakers of English and Italian

do (Stivers and Rossano 2010). In some cases, confirmations (and agreements) are given as responses to =*tiba*-marked utterances that do not show any of these response-mobilizing features. It is not entirely clear whether =*tiba* on its own can be used to mobilize a response or whether these responses are volunteered.

Confirmations most frequently take the format of a modified repeat of the addressee's utterance (cf. Stivers 2005), either evidentially unmarked or marked with =*ya* for reported evidence. Table 4.2 summarizes the responses given to initial utterances marked with =*tiba*. Two interactional contexts are represented in the table, informing utterances and confirmation requests.

Table 4.2: Responses to initial utterances marked with =*tiba*

Utterance type	Response given			
	(Dis)confirmation	Agreement	No response	Total
Informing	5	3	21	29
Confirmation request	18	3	8	29

The response types that were counted are (dis)confirmations, agreements, and cases where no response was given. (Dis)confirmations express that the speaker has direct knowledge of the information, and also superior access to it. Agreements are usually marked with epistemic =*ya* for indicating epistemic dependence (see section 3.2.2.1). Agreements express that the speaker does not claim superior access to the information. Agreements usually take the format of a repeat marked with epistemic =*ya* or an *achama* 'be like that' token marked with epistemic =*ya* (cf. section 3.2.2.1). The category 'no response' includes cases where the addressee takes his turn but does not produce a response that relates to the initial utterance marked with =*tiba*.

In Table 4.2, we can see that informing utterances with =*tiba*, i.e. utterances which are not accompanied by interrogative intonation or gaze to mobilize response, most frequently receive no confirming or agreeing responses (72%). Confirmation requests, in contrast, mostly receive a response of the confirming type (including disconfirmations) in 62% of the cases. The cases where no response is given can often be explained by overlap. This shows that =*tiba* is frequently used in confirmation requests, where the addressee is expected to have superior access to the information.

A typical situation where one speaker has superior access to the information is the telling of mythological narratives. Even if both participants know the story, the recipient always behaves as though the information was new to him. In this context, recipients can ask polar questions marked with =*tiba*, like in example (116) from the *diablo* narrative. Miguel has just explained to Paulina that the two children are captured by a demon. Now this demon wants to make them grow fat and eat them (line 1). After going on for some time he loses track of the story and wonders how it might go on in line 3. This is where Paulina produces a =*tiba*-marked confirmation request:

(116) 1. M: *naa sēsēsē mambēya machishtaynaja(se)*

- naa sējsē ma-n-ibēbē=ya*
 DEM fat 3PL.OBJ-BEN-treat=IRR
ma-che-shta=chi=naja=se
 3PL.OBJ-eat-FUT=FR=NSIT=PSUP
 ‘She was going to make them fat and eat them.’
2. ((20 seconds omitted))
3. M: *ama(shku im)bēshtaya* (.) *amshku imbēshtachi?* (0.5)
amashku imbētē-shta=ya amashku imbētē-shta=chi
 how behave-FUT=IRR how behave-FUT=FR
 ‘What was going to happen then. what was going to happen?’
4. ⇒ P: *dyulujtamashiw[tiḃ latiji?]*
dyulujta-mashi=w=tiba latiji
 scared-MINTS=PL=INF then
 ‘So they must have been quite scared then.’
5. ⇒ M: *[dyulujtuy] mij [komala]*
dyulujta=w=ya komadre=la
 scared=PL=REP comadre(SP)=COMM
 ‘They were scared indeed. comadre.’
6. P: *[m baj*
m baj
 INTJ INTJ
 ‘Ok.’
 (ma_pu_diablo)

In her confirmation request in line 4, Paulina uses =*tiba* to indicate that she infers that the children must have been scared. The source proposition for this inference is provided by Miguel in his previous turns where he explains what happens to the children, like in line 1. Since Miguel is the teller of the narrative, he is expected to have superior access to the target proposition. This is supported by his response in line 5, which is a confirmation indicated by a modified repeat marked with =*ya* for reported evidence and with =*la* for commitment. The interrogative intonation marks the utterance as a confirmation request.

Confirmation requests with =*tiba* have confirmations as their preferred responses. Of course, disconfirmations are also possible in case the inference made by the speaker is not correct. We can see that disconfirmations are dispreferred when looking at the form of delivery. While the confirming response in (116) is given without delay and with overlap, disconfirmations are delivered with delay. Adjacency is a common feature of preferred responses, while delay is common for dispreferred responses (e.g. Pomerantz 1984). An example of a delayed delivery of a disconfirming response is (117). Asunta has been telling Elisa about what happened the day before, when some people were walking through San Pablo with a cow. At one point, the cow sat down and did not move anymore. Since they could not get it to move again, they killed it right on the spot:

- (117) 1. A: *bēchu du bobuj kabliw [tēptuye*
bēchu bobo=w=ja ka-bali=w
 like_that kill=PL=REA 3SG.OBJ-go.PL=PL
tēptē=w=ye
 wash=PL=ADAP.F
 ‘Like that, after killing it they took it, probably they washed it.’
2. ⇒ E: *[shunsha baliwtiba? (2.8)*
*shunsha[ta] bali=w=**tiba***
 noon go.PL=INF
 ‘They must have gone at noon?’
3. *[a las onse?]*
a las onse
 at(SP) the(SP) eleven(SP)
 ‘At eleven?’
4. ⇒ A: *[a las] dos (0.7)*
a las dos
 at(SP) the(SP) two(SP)
 ‘At two.’
5. E: *a las dos de [la tarde*
a las dos de la tarde
 at(SP) the(SP) two(SP) of(SP) the(SP) afternoon(SP)
 ‘At two pm!’
6. A: *[a las dos de la tarde=*
a las dos de la tarde
 at(SP) the(SP) two(SP) of(SP) the(SP) afternoon(SP)
 ‘At two pm.’
7. E: *=a:::yyj*
 ay
 INTJ
 ‘Geez!’
 (290906_convI)

In line 2, Elisa gives a confirmation request marked with *=tiba* and interrogative intonation, asking Asunta whether the described events happened at noon. The source proposition is provided by the general context of the conversation, although it is not very clear what exactly leads Elisa to infer that the events took place at noon. After a delay of 2.8 seconds, Asunta disconfirms this with a correction, saying that it happened at two o'clock. Elisa's news receiving response in line 5 and her expression of attitude in line 7 show that this information is unexpected to her, which supports the analysis of Asunta's response as a disconfirmation, even though it does not include a negated element.

(118) is another example for a delayed response. Here, the response indicates that the speaker has no knowledge of the information and is thus in no position to confirm or disconfirm. Asunta and Magdalena are talking about the people of Oromomo:

- (118) 1. M: *pē:pēññunaj na pēpē (.) tappē itta* (0.3)
pēpē-nñu=na ja ana pēpē ta-pēpē
 old-DIM=NSIT DEM grandfather IPL.POSS-grandfather
itta
 thing
 ‘He is quite old already, this grandfather, our grandfather
 what’s-his-name.’
2. ⇒ A: *kaylejtitib ati(ye)?* (0.4)
ka-yle-jti=tiba ati=ye
 3SG.OBJ-know-HAB=INF DEM=ADAP.F
 ‘So he must know [to perform the traditional mourning
 chants]?’
3. ⇒ M: *a::amashi=*
amashi
 how
 ‘How is that?’
4. *=nij konson nij kudyērērējti layj (...) an tapp sē*
nij konsono nij ku-dyērērē-jti-y lacha ana
 NEG well NEG 3SG.OBJ.COM-talk-HAB-1SG too DEM
ta-pēpē sēē
 1PL.POSS-grandfather 1SG.PRON
 ‘I don’t really talk to him either.’
 (270807.conv)

Asunta infers in line 2 that a certain man must know how to chant the *wēwēti* mourning based on the fact introduced by Magdalena’s preceding turn in line 1 that this man is quite old. The *wēwēti* is an almost forgotten practice of the Yurakaré, usually only remembered by old people. Since Magdalena knows the man, Asunta expects her to know whether or not he can chant *wēwēti*. Magdalena’s response in line 3 and 4, however, reveals that she does not know. The fact that she gives an account for her ignorance in line 5 suggests that she feels that she should know it, and that she should be able to give a response based on direct access. Her response shows a delay of 0.4 seconds.

In some cases, utterances with *=tiba* receive confirming responses even though they do not show any response-mobilizing feature such as interrogative intonation. An example is (119) from the demon narrative. The boy is attacked by a bull which breathes fire. From this, Paulina infers that it must be a demon as well in line 3, which Miguel confirms in line 4:

- (119) 1. M: *asorejtash duta a[pilē(sh) duta] (.) atantish duta amalay*

a-sorejta=jsha *duta a-pilē=jsha* *duta*
 3SG.POSS-anus=ABL burn 3SG.POSS-mouth=ABL burn
a-tanti=jsha *duta amala=ya*
 3SG.POSS-face=ABL burn come=REP
 ‘Burning from his anus, burning from his mouth, burning
 from his face he came.’

2. P: [*a::*]
aaa
 INTJ
 ‘Geez.’
 (0.3)
3. ⇒ *diablotib lacha=*
diablo=tiba *lacha*
 demon(SP)=INF too
 ‘It must have been a demon as well!’
4. ⇒ M: =*diablo komalara*
diablo *komadrc=la=ra*
 demon(SP) comadre=COMM=ADAP.M
 ‘It was a demon indeed, comadre.’
 (ma_pu_diablo)

The =*tiba*-marked utterance in line 3 does not get interrogative intonation, but it still receives a confirming response in line 4. It is not clear whether these confirmations are volunteered by the addressee or actually mobilized by some design feature of the initial utterance. The same is true for the cases where the response given to an utterance marked with =*tiba* is not a confirmation but an agreement, like in (120). Miguel and Paulina are talking about the researcher’s field equipment:

- (120) 1. M: *buyta aytatib ana=*
buyta a-itta=tiba *ana*
 chief 3SG.POSS-thing=INF DEM
 ‘So this must belong to a chief.’
2. P: =*a::chamay(la)*
achama=ya=la
 be_like_that=REP=COMM
 ‘That should be right.’
 (220906_convII)

Miguel and Paulina have been talking about my field equipment for some time. Miguel then suggests in line 1 that all the equipment must belong to a chief, a powerful man, using an utterance marked for inferential access with =*tiba*. Paulina gives a full agreement response consisting of an *achama* ‘be like that’ token in combination with =*ya* and the commitment marker =*la* (see section 3.2.2.1 on this type of agreement), conveying agreement without claiming superior access to the information. Such agreeing responses to utterances

marked with *=tiba* are not very frequent (cf. Table 4.2). It is not very clear whether they are mobilized by the initial utterance or rather volunteered by the addressee.

In this section, it has been shown that inferential *=tiba* is frequently used in confirmation requests, where the addressee is expected to have superior access to the target proposition. Given that this is not the case for the other evidentials of Yurakaré, the question arises why inferential *=tiba* is used in this interactional environment. The answer to this question is not clear. I suggest that *=tiba* increases the pressure on the addressee by connecting the confirmation request to the general context of the conversation, and crucially often to some information provided by the addressee. Frequently, the inference marked with *=tiba* was based on some source proposition(s) introduced by the addressee in some preceding turn(s). The use of *=tiba* in a confirmation request where the target proposition is inferred on the basis of some information given by the addressee increases his responsibility for the information, since by using *=tiba* the speaker expresses that the addressee made her infer (i.e. made her believe) the target proposition.

This section has described the use of *=tiba* in confirmation requests in initial position. In the following section, the use of *=tiba* in second position will be discussed. I will argue that the use of *=tiba* in confirmation requests has facilitated its interpretation as mirative in responsive position. This shows that the change of interpretation is shaped by interactional use.

4.2 From confirmation requests to mirative: the use of *=tiba* in second position

As has been demonstrated in the previous section, inferential *=tiba* is frequently used in initial position confirmation requests. This can also be found in second position within the adjacency pair, where *=tiba* is used in reconfirmation requests (section 4.2.1). It will be argued that the use of *=tiba* in reconfirmation requests has led to a re-interpretation of *=tiba* as mirative in news receiving responses where no inferential step is present at all. This use of *=tiba* is presented in section (4.2.2). In this section, it will be argued that the interpretation of *=tiba* as mirative in news receipt responses arose through the use in second position reconfirmation requests by pragmatic inference based on the reasoning that if the speaker asks for reconfirmation, the information must be in some way unexpected to her, since otherwise a reconfirmation would not be asked for.

4.2.1 Requesting reconfirmation in second position

The first step toward a mirative interpretation is the use of *=tiba* in second position confirmation requests. These will be called ‘reconfirmation requests’ in the following, since they ask the addressee to reconfirm what he has just said. Formally, reconfirmation requests differ from confirmation requests in that they are modified repeats of the addressee’s previous turn. Another difference is

that with reconfirmation requests, there is either no inferential step involved from the source to the target proposition, or the inferential step is very small. Note furthermore that while in confirmation requests, the speaker of the =*tiba*-marked utterance can still be wrong about her expectations that the addressee has superior access to the information, this is much less the case in reconfirmation requests, since the target proposition is either very close or identical to the source proposition.

The distinction between confirmation and reconfirmation requests is not absolute. Rather, we will see in this section that there is a cline from confirmation requests to reconfirmation requests, which eventually leads to the interpretation of =*tiba* as mirative.

A reconfirmation request has both responsive and initial properties. It is responsive in that it refers back to the preceding turn of the addressee, requesting a reconfirmation of the information given in that turn. This requesting property is initial in nature, making a reconfirmation as a response relevant.

Example (121) shows a confirmation request where only a small inferential step is involved. Asunta is telling Elisa about a trip she made with me to the local boarding school. After she has explained that she wanted to make a radio call but could not, she says that there were many children who also wanted to call (lines 1-2), which is presented as the reason why she could not call. Elisa then uses a =*tiba*-marked confirmation request in line 3, which repeats the predicate of Asunta's preceding turn, adding the habitual marker *-jti* to it:

- (121) 1. A: *bēmū najj* (.)
bēmē=w naa=chi
many=PL DEM=DIR
‘They were many there.’
2. *jente itta [scwwü*
jente itta sewwe=w
people(SP) thing child=PL
‘The people, I mean, the children.’
3. ⇒ E: *[bēmējtiwtiba?=
bēmē-jti=w=tiba*
many-HAB=PL=INF
‘They are many there?’
4. ⇒ A: *=ija:shumash bēmējti:w*
ijashumash bēmē-jti=w
very_much many-HAB=PL
‘They are always very many.’
(290906.conv1)

The inferential step in the =*tiba*-marked utterance is quite small, from one particular event where there were many children to the general fact that there are always many children at the boarding school marked by the habitual marker *-jti*. Clearly, =*tiba* still marks an inference here, even though the inferential step is smaller than in the cases discussed in section 4.1.2 above. Examples

such as (121) constitute the first step on the cline from confirmation requests toward reconfirmation requests.

Asunta gives a confirming response in line 4, upgraded with the adverb *ijashumash* ‘very much’ and intonational lengthening at two points of the utterance. The upgrading supports the view that (121) is not a request for reconfirmation of some information already given by the addressee before, but rather a confirmation request introducing a new proposition.

Example (122) shows a similar use of =*tiba*. Asunta and Magdalena are talking about habits of the Chimane people. Magdalena explains that the Chimane, in contrast to the Yurakaré, drink viscous rather than runny *chicha*:

- (122) 1. M: *nülülü maenj nülül ñuj ñuj ñuj* (0.5) *tu mayaru maenj=*
nülülü ma-ense ñuj ñuj ñujta-w
 viscous 3PL.OBJ-drink IDEO IDEO shake=*PL*
ma-yarru=w ma-ense
 3PL.POSS-chicha=*PL* 3PL.OBJ-drink
 ‘[The Chimane] drinks his *chicha* viscous, he drinks *chicha*
 that shakes.’
2. ⇒ A: ((holding gaze to the addressee)) =*nij maensejtib chawchaw=*
*nij ma-ense-jti=**tiba** chawchaw*
 NEG 3PL.OBJ-drink-HAB=*INF* clear
 ‘He never drinks it runny!’
3. M: =*anu maensem kamankayam mimankaya*
anu ma-ense-m
 like_this 3PL.OBJ-drink-2SG
ka-ma-n-kaya-m
 3SG.OBJ-3PL.OBJ-BEN-give-2SG
mi-ma-n-kaya
 2SG.OBJ-3PL.OBJ-BEN-give
 ‘You drink it like that, you pass it on, somebody passes it on
 to you.’
 (270807_conv)

Asunta gives a confirmation request marked with =*tiba* in line 2. It is a paraphrase of Magdalena’s initial utterance in line 1, framed as a negative statement with an antonymous adjective. Furthermore, like in example (121), the habitual marker *-jti* is added. Again, there clearly is an inference involved here, from aspectually unspecified to habitual, and from positive to negative: from the fact that they drink viscous *chicha*, Asunta infers that they never drink runny *chicha*. The inferential step is however minimal.

In (123), we can observe a similar usage. Asunta and Magdalena are talking about how the Chimanes bury their dead. Magdalena states in line 1 that they do not bury their dead in a general burial place, but bury them wherever they are at that moment. There are two confirmation requests in (123), one without =*tiba* in line 2 and one with =*tiba* in line 4:

- (123) 1. M: *dyankala* (.) *mabusha atipsh tētu* (0.5)

- dyankala ma-busha ati-bëshëë*
 whatever 3PL.OBJ-lay_down DEM-entity
të-ta=w
 1SG.OBJ.COM-say=PL
 ‘He [the Chimane] puts them anywhere. I was told.’
2. ⇒ A: *nij mabusha lëtti?=*
nij ma-busha lëtta=y
 NEG 3PL.OBJ-lay_down one=LOC
 ‘He doesn’t put them together?’
3. M: *=nij mabushajti lëtti (0.9)*
nij ma-busha-jti lëtta=y
 NEG 3PL.OBJ-lay_down-HAB one=LOC
 ‘He doesn’t put them together.’
4. ⇒ A: *nij mapepejtiwtib lë[tti matuyshamu?*
*nij ma-pepe-jti=w=**tiba** lëtta=y*
 NEG 3PL.OBJ-put-HAB=PL=INF one=LOC
ma-tuwi-shama=w
 3PL.POSS-dead-DCSD=PL
 ‘So they don’t put their dead people together?’
5. M: *[achajtiw (.) matuyshamu*
acha-jti=w ma-tuwi-shama=w
 be.like.that-HAB=PL 3PL.OBJ-dead-DCSD=PL
 ‘That’s how they are, their dead.’
 (270807_conv)

The two confirmation requests can be considered an interactional minimal pair which allows us to compare confirmation requests with and without *=tiba*. Even though the unmarked confirmation request in line 2 presents a proposition that is technically inferred by the speaker on the basis of a source proposition provided by the addressee in her preceding utterance in line 1, *=tiba* is not used. This shows that the use of *=tiba* is optional.

The confirmation request with *=tiba* in line 4 is a paraphrase of the addressee’s confirming response in line 3, using a different verb with a similar meaning. The inferential step from source to target proposition is very small in this case, therefore the utterance can be considered a reconfirmation request indicating that the information is unexpected. If the information seemed normal to the speaker, she would not ask a reconfirmation request. By implicature of the utterance format as a reconfirmation request, the interpretation arises that the information given by the addressee is unexpected to the speaker. The context of the utterances supports this view. Asunta did not know before that the Chimanes do not bury their dead people in one place. This behavior is unexpected to her, since the Yurakaré in San Pablo do have a cemetery where they bury their dead.

A specific use of reconfirmation requests with *=tiba* is to question a presupposition of the previous turn by the addressee. Consider example (124), where the

speakers are talking about picture 12 of the frog story. In line 1, Magdalena notes that the dog is lying on top of a stone. In line 3, Asunta questions one of the presuppositions of the initial utterance by asking whether the object on the picture really is a stone. Magdalena gives a confirmation in line 4:

- (124) 1. ⇒ M: *atib chajm [bu:shu ësh]shë [dojoy*
a-tiba chajmu bushu ëshshë dojoy=y
 3SG.POSS-pet dog lie stone body=LOC
 ‘His dog is lying on top of the stone.’
2. A: *[m::] [bin::tu (itta)=*
mmum binta
 INTJ strong
 ‘It is in pain.’
3. ⇒ =*ëshshëtib na k[aytütü?*
*ëshshë=**tiba** naa ka-y-tütü*
 stone=INF DEM 3SG.OBJ-GOA-be
 ‘Is that a stone. that thing that is there?’
4. ⇒ M: *[ëshshë na kaytütü*
ëshshë naa ka-y-tütü
 stone DEM 3SG.OBJ-GOA-be
 ‘It’s a stone. that thing that is there.’
 (al.ce.frogstory)

Asunta’s reconfirmation request in line 3 is marked with =*tiba*, which is attached to the predicatively used noun. Her reconfirmation request questions one of the presuppositions of Magdalena’s initial utterance in line 1, namely that the object on which the dog is lying is a stone. The reconfirmation request carries an implicature of unexpected information, since if the speaker considered it obvious that the object is a stone she would not ask for reconfirmation.

Another example of a reconfirmation request with =*tiba* that questions a presupposition is (125), where Juan notes that the boy fell into the water in lines 1 and 2 (picture 15). Patricia’s response in line 3 is marked with =*tiba* and questions the presupposition that the object on the picture is really water:

- (125) 1. ⇒ J: *atantila yupa layj sammay=*
a-tanti=la yupa lacha samma=y
 3SG.POSS-face=INS enter too water=LOC
 ‘Face first he fell into the water, too.’
2. ⇒ =*sammay yupa (layj) (0.9)*
samma=y yupa lacha
 water=LOC enter too
 ‘He fell into the water, too.’
3. ⇒ P: *sammaytibala?=*
*samma=y=**tiba**=la*
 water=LOC=INF=COMM
 ‘Really, into the water?’

4. J: =a:j=
 aaʃ
 INTJ
 ‘Don’t know ...’
5. P: =atib chajmunñutina malanaʃ ati
 a-tiba chajmu-nñu=tina mala=naja ati=y
 3SG.POSS-pet dog-DIM=COM go.SG=NSIT DEM=LOC
 ‘Now he is there with his dog.’
 (pp-pf_frogstory)

Reconfirmation requests that question a presupposition of the previous utterance by the other speakers clearly express by implicature that the speaker doubts that the presupposition holds. i.e. the speaker expresses that the information carried by the presupposition is unexpected to her. If it were not unexpected, the speaker would not question the presupposition. This use of =tiba is another step in the direction of marking unexpected information. There is still a small inferential step involved, but the unexpected information interpretation of the utterance is clearly present.

Example (126) shows the use of =tiba in a reconfirmation request where no inferential step is involved at all. The example provides evidence for the unexpected status of the information: In line 1, Magdalena indicates that she thinks that the dog is not going to find its owner again. When this is corrected by Asunta in line 2, Magdalena gives a repeat of Asunta’s utterance marked with =tiba and =la. That the dog will find its owner is unexpected information to her, and she had expressed that she thinks the opposite in line 1.

- (126) 1. ⇒ M: ((laughing)) nij dechishtalannaʃ asono=
 nij deche-shta=laba=naja a-sonno
 NEG find-FUT=SUBJ=NSIT 3SG.POSS-owner
 ‘It [the dog] will not find its owner anymore?’
2. ⇒ A: =dechishta=
 deche-shta
 find-FUT
 ‘It will find him.’
3. ⇒ M: =dechishtatibala?=
 deche-shta=**tiba**=la?
 find-FUT=INF=COMM
 ‘Oh, he will find him?’
4. A: =mjn
 mjn
 INTJ
 ‘Mhm.’
 (al_cc_frogstory)

In example (126), *=tiba* does not mark inferential evidentiality, since there is no inferential step from the source to the target proposition. The reconfirmation request marked with *=tiba* in line 3 is a modified repeat of Asunta’s initial utterance in line 2. In this case where there is no inferential step, the interpretation of *=tiba* shifts to mirative. This happens within the interactional context of a reconfirmation request implicating that the information is unexpected to the speaker.

The reconfirmation requests where no inferential step is marked by *=tiba* are the last step in the expansion toward a mirative interpretation. The use of *=tiba* in mirative responses is presented in the next section (4.2.2). In this section, it has been shown that *=tiba* is used in reconfirmation requests where the inferential step from the source to the target proposition is only very small or not present at all. The source proposition in these cases is provided in a previous turn of the addressee. In such reconfirmation requests, an interpretation of unexpectedness of the information arises by implicature: If the speaker requests a reconfirmation, the information must be in some way unexpected to her. Otherwise a reconfirmation request would be unnecessary. In cases where there is no inferential step at all to be observed, the mirative interpretation becomes attached to *=tiba*. The reconfirmation request format offers a redundant context for semantic change.

4.2.2 Inferential *=tiba* as mirative

The mirative interpretation of *=tiba* only occurs in second position. Mirative responses with *=tiba* usually consist of an *achama* ‘be like that’ token in combination with *=tiba* and the commitment marker *=la*. This response format can be considered an interactional practice of marking a news receipt of unexpected information. The commitment marker *=la* in interrogative contexts is used to elicit strong commitment from the addressee. Mirative responses with *=tiba* can but do not have to get interrogative intonation. They are best considered news-receiving responses which treat the information given by the addressee as new with a mirative component indicating that the information is also in some way unexpected to the speaker.

There is no inferential step involved from the source proposition given in the previous turn by the addressee to the target proposition, since the verb *achama* does not have any meaning of its own but refers back to what has been previously said. An example for this use of *=tiba* is (127), where the speakers are talking about a woman both know. Asunta has expressed that she thinks that she is quite old, which has been disconfirmed by Magdalena. In line 1, Magdalena states that she only looks old because she wears wide dresses:

- (127) 1. M: *lëmmuy pëpëshama olo ibürü tejteshijti* (0.8)
lëmmuy pëpë-shama olo i-bürrii tejte-shi-jti
 just old-DCSD wide PV-dress grandmother-SML-HAB
 ‘Only because she wears old and wide dresses she looks old.’
2. A: *ë af:chuta*
ë achuta
 INTJ be_like_that

- Oh, that's what she does!
3. M: *[m ashoji (1.5)*
m ashoji
 INTJ young
 ·She's young.·
4. ⇒ *anu anashichi (0.7)*
anu ana-shi=chi
 like.that PROP-N-SML=FR
 ·Maybe like Ana.·
5. ⇒ A: *achamatibala=*
*achama=**tiba**=la*
 be_like_that=INF=COMM
 ·Really!·
6. M: *=jm*
ju
 INTJ
 ·Yeah.·
 (270807_conv)

In line 2, Asunta gives a news receiving response which is not evidentially marked. Then, in line 4, Magdalena estimates that the woman could be the same age as the sister of the two speakers, Ana. Asunta's response in line 5 is a mirative response marked with *=tiba* and *=la*. This news receiving response indicates that the information is unexpected to the speaker: Even though she was already informed that the woman was not old, she would not have expected her to be that young, i.e. as young as her sister Ana. Magdalena gives a reconfirmation in line 6 in form of an affirmative interjection. Such minimal reconfirmation tokens are quite common with mirative *=tiba*-marked news receiving responses.

Crucially, the confirmation requests presented in section 4.2.1 got a mirative component added by implicature that if a speaker asks for reconfirmation, she finds that this information is in some way unexpected or remarkable. In these cases, *=tiba* is used to mark inferential evidence, even though the inferential step is very small. In example (127), on the other hand, the mirative component is not added by implicature but by the use of *=tiba*. Without *=tiba*, the utterance would be interpreted as a usual news receipt token. There is no interrogative intonation to mark the utterance as a reconfirmation request to indicate that the information is unexpected.

Another example for the mirative use of *=tiba* is (128), where Asunta tells Magdalena that the bees are going to sting the dog (line 3):

- (128) 1. M: *majamar(ya) na atibatu=*
ma-karara=va naa a-tibata=w
 3PL.OBJ-spill_out(=REP) DEM 3SG.POSS-owner=PL
 ·It (the dog) made the beehive spill out!·
2. A: *=u:jma achu (.)*

- ujwa-ma achu*
look-IMP.SG like_that
'Look, like that...'
3. ⇒ *tishi chishtu* (0.2)
tishilë che-shta=w
now eat-FUT=PL
'Now they will sting (the dog).'
4. ⇒ M: *ashtutibala* (0.7)
achu-shta=w=tiba=la
like_that-FUT=PL=INF=COMM
'Really!'
5. A: *chi[:shtu:]*
che-shta=w
eat-FUT=PL
'They will sting.'
6. M: *[m:::]*
mmm
INTJ
'Hmmm.'
(al.ce.frogstory)

Magdalena's response in line 4 is a mirative news receipt marked with *=tiba* and *=la*. The *achama* token is adjusted in terms of TAM marking to mirror Asunta's initial utterance in line 3, which is common in Yurakaré: both initial utterance and response are marked for future. Asunta's reconfirmation in line 5 is a partial repeat of her initial utterance in line 3.

News-receiving responses of the format *achama* marked with *=tiba* and *=la* can express at least two kinds of unexpectedness. As we have seen in the preceding examples, it can be used to express that the information is unexpected to the speaker, i.e. that the speaker had expected something different to be the case. Another mirative notion is insight, where the speaker did not expect something else to be true, but rather has not been able to make sense of a situation. If the other speaker provides some information that helps the speaker to make sense of it, the speaker can use a news-receipt response marked with *=tiba* to express that she had not thought about what the other speaker just said before, thus that the information is unexpected. Such utterances can be translated as 'that's it!'. We can see this in example (129), a repetition of (104) on page 84. When Magdalena asks in line 1 whether the object to be seen on the picture (pictures 1 and 2) of the frog story is the moon, Asunta replies with an epistemically mitigated statement (line 2) that she thinks that it is the moon. After accounting for why she thinks it is the moon in line 4, Magdalena gives a *=tiba*-marked news-receiving response in line 5:

- (129) 1. M: *shuwi na (.) tēp(shë)chi=*

- shuwi naa tētē-bēshēē=chī*
 moon DEM which-entity=FR
 ‘Is that the moon, or what is it?’
2. A: =*shuwiya* (.) *n kuti=*
shuwi=ya ku-ta-y
 moon=REP 3SG.OBJ.COM-say-1SG
 ‘It could be the moon, I think.’
3. =*shuwi naa=*
shuwi naa
 moon DEM
 ‘It is the moon.’
4. ⇒ =*kusu na abentani kūtṭaya an shuwi*
kusu naa a-bentana=y kūtṭa=ya
 maybe DEM 3SG.POSS-window(SP)=LOC appear=REP
ana shuwi
 DEM moon
 ‘Maybe the moon appears in this window of his.’
5. ⇒ M: [*kūtṭa* (.) *a:cham/atibala* (.) *asibē a[bentani*
kūtṭa achama=tiba=la a-sibbē
 appear be_like_that=INF=COMM 3SG.POSS-house
a-bentana=y
 3SG.POSS-window(SP)=LOC
 ‘It appears, that’s it! In the window of his house.’
6. A: [*asibē abentani*
a-sibbē a-bentana=y
 3SG.POSS-house 3SG.POSS-window(SP)=LOC
 ‘From the window of his house.’
 (a_lce_frogstory)

The fact that Magdalena asks what the object is in line 1 shows that she is not really convinced that it is the moon, but that she considers it a possibility. She cannot make full sense of the picture. In lines 2-3, Asunta confirms that it is the moon and accounts for this view in line 4 by saying that maybe the moon can be seen from the boy’s window. She uses a =*ya*-marked utterance for that, to indicate that her utterance is meant as a suggestion rather than a fact. Magdalena’s response in line 4 contains a =*tiba*-marked news-receipt response, which is inserted in an otherwise evidentially unmarked repetition of Asunta’s preceding utterance in line 3. The news-receipt response does not seem to convey that the information was unexpected to the speaker, since she herself suggested in line 1 that the object could be the moon. Rather, it expresses that it provided an insight into an account which she did not have access to before. She could not clearly make out on the picture that the object was the moon, and probably she could also not make out clearly that a window was depicted around the moon. It is not unexpected to her that the moon can be seen from the boy’s window in the sense that she expected something else

to be the case, but rather in the sense that she has just not thought about it before.

Example (130) is another instance of the use of a =*tiba*-marked news-receipt response to mark insight (line 6). Again, the initial turn is marked with epistemic =*ya* in line 5:

- (130) 1. M: *ajampanaja daja* (0.8) *na ayoyoto doj=*
a-kampana=ja daja naa a-yoyoto dojo=y
 3SG.POSS-bell(SP)=TOP hang DEM 3SG.POSS-bed up=LOC
 ‘His bell is hanging there, above his bed.’
2. =*kus alus* /*alus*
kusu a-lus a-lus
 maybe 3SG.POSS-light(SP) 3SG.POSS-light(SP)
 ‘Or his light, his light!’
3. A: [*amashku kampanishtach(i) at(i)* ((laughs))=
amashku kampana-shta=chi ati
 how bell(SP)-FUT=FR DEM
 ‘How is that going to be a bell?’
4. M: =((laughs)) *alus*?=
a-lus
 3SG.POSS-light(SP)
 ‘It’s his light?’
5. ⇒ A: =*ati. aj kusu neonya* (0.5)
ati aj kusu neon=ya
 DEM INTJ maybe electric.light(SP)=REP
 ‘That’s it, well, maybe it’s an electric light.’
6. ⇒ M: *achamatibala=*
achama=tiba=la
 be_like_that=INF=COMM
 ‘Ah, really.’
7. A: =*mjm alus*
mjm a-lus
 INTJ 3SG.POSS-light(SP)
 ‘Mhm, it’s his light.’
 (aLce_frogstory)

In (130), Asunta and Magdalena are talking about the boy’s room (visible on pictures 1-4). Magdalena points out that a bell is hanging from his ceiling in line 1, then immediately corrects herself in line 2, proposing that it could also be a light. Asunta expresses that it seems funny to her that Magdalena could mistake the object for a bell in line 3. When Magdalena asks again whether it is a light in line 3, Asunta confirms this in line 4. She then adds an epistemic statement in line 5 containing *kusu* ‘maybe’ and epistemic =*ya*, suggesting that it might be an electric light. Magdalena responds with a =*tiba*-marked news-receipt

response in line 6. This response expresses insight rather than unexpected information, since Magdalena had already suggested that the object could be a light in line 2. However, she could not make sense of the appearance of the light. When Asunta suggests that it could be an electric light, it starts making sense to Magdalena, which she indicates with a =*tiba*-marked news receiving response. The news receipt response with =*tiba* is used here to indicate that the addressee provided some insight to the speaker, rather than marking that the given information is unexpected to the speaker in that she expected something else to be the case instead.

The mirative interpretation of =*tiba* only occurs in responses, i.e. it can only be used to refer to information given by the addressee in a previous turn, not to information provided by the general context, world knowledge, or a visual observation. This lends further support to the claim that the mirative interpretation arises through the use of =*tiba* in reconfirmation requests, which always refer to the previous utterance of the addressee. The reconfirmation requests can be considered a redundant context for semantic change, where the pragmatic context that leads to a semantic change is still present (Traugott 2004:553). The reconfirmation request format implicates that the information is unexpected to the speaker, while =*tiba* is taking over this mirative interpretation in contexts where it does not mark inferential evidence.

In this section, I have shown the use of =*tiba* in news receiving responses as expressing that the information given by the addressee is in some way unexpected to the speaker. Either the speaker had expected something else to be the case, or she had not considered the information before. Crucially, the mirative interpretation of =*tiba* arises exclusively in responsive utterances, and =*tiba* always refers to some information given previously by the addressee. It cannot be used to express that some event observed by the speaker is unexpected to her. This shows that this use of =*tiba* is determined by interactional function.

In the following section, the findings presented in this chapter are summarized and discussed. A cline of derivation of the different uses of =*tiba* will be proposed.

4.3 Discussion: The semantic expansion from inferential to mirative

In this chapter, I have shown that =*tiba* is an inferential evidential. It expresses that the speaker has inferred the target proposition on the basis of some different proposition, the source proposition. The source proposition can be provided in different ways, for example through visual perception or through the general conversational context. Furthermore, the source proposition is always accessible to both the speaker and the addressee.

Inferential =*tiba* is often used in confirmation requests, where the speaker expects the addressee to have superior access to the target proposition, and thus to be in a position to confirm or disconfirm whether the inference made by the speaker is correct.

Inferential =*tiba* has a second interpretation of mirative, marking unexpected information. Crucially, this can only refer to information given by the addressee in a previous turn, never to information observed by the speaker herself. In the following, it will be argued that the expansion from inferential to mirative can be traced through various interactional contexts, eventually leading to the mirative interpretation. This makes clear that interaction must have been the driving force behind this semantic expansion. This shows that a theory of meaning and semantic change should not ignore language use in social interaction.

The uses of =*tiba* are summarized in (131). The cline represents the likely direction of derivation of the different uses. We can see that the cline goes from uses in initial utterances to uses in responsive utterances:

- (131) *initial position*
 informing > request confirmation >
responsive position
 request reconfirmation > mirative news receipt

The frequency of the uses of =*tiba* are presented in Table 4.3. The initial uses are the most frequent, while the mirative use makes up 20% of the uses of =*tiba* in the corpus. Reconfirmation request account for 10% of the uses. This distribution of frequency supports the claim that the initial uses of =*tiba* in informing contexts and confirmation requests precede the second position uses. The initial uses of =*tiba* are more frequent. The fact that the use in reconfirmation requests is less frequent than the use as mirative shows that the mirative is becoming more established.

Table 4.3: The frequency of the uses of =*tiba*

Use	Frequency	Percent of total
Informing	29	28%
Confirmation request	29	28%
Reconfirmation request	10	10%
Mirative	21	20%
Other/unclear ¹	14	14%
Total	103	100%

¹ The category 'other' includes uses embedded under a quotative. For =*tiba*, there is one quotative use in the corpus.

Confirmation requests with =*tiba* are initial position uses and make confirmations as a response relevant. The addressee is expected to have superior access to the queried information. In confirmation requests, =*tiba* expresses its basic semantics of inferential evidence. Therefore, we can consider this use as a normal evidential use of =*tiba*. There are, however, also confirmation requests with =*tiba* which also have responsive properties, in that they ask the addressee to reconfirm something he has said in a preceding turn. In these cases, the inferential step from the source to the target proposition is usually

quite small and in some cases there is no inferential step involved at all. Such responsive confirmation requests have been called reconfirmation requests in this chapter. The use of *=tiba* in reconfirmation requests can be seen as a spread of the use in confirmation requests from initial to second position.

Conventionalization of pragmatic inferences is a common process of semantic change. If a linguistic item invites a certain pragmatic inference in a specific context, this inference can become associated with the linguistic item which leads to state of polysemy where the linguistic item has two interpretations, its original reading plus the newly associated one (e.g. Bybee et al. 1994, Hopper and Traugott 2003, Traugott and Dasher 2002). This process of conventionalization of pragmatic inference can also explain the expansion of *=tiba* from inferential to mirative. It has been argued in this chapter that the use of *=tiba* in reconfirmation requests has facilitated a re-interpretation of *=tiba* in responsive utterances in terms of marking unexpected information. This is due to the implicature carried by reconfirmation requests. If a speaker asks for reconfirmation of some information, she must find the information in some way unexpected, otherwise she would not ask for reconfirmation. This implicature of reconfirmation requests has become associated with *=tiba* in a specific interactional environment, namely in news-receiving responses. These responses are sometimes still framed as reconfirmation requests, often getting interrogative intonation and often reconfirmed by the addressee with an affirmative interjection or a short modified repeat. The interpretation of mirative for *=tiba* is not yet completely conventionalized, because it is still restricted to the specific context of responsive utterances.

One possibility to derive the implicature of unexpected information of reconfirmation requests is from the principle of generalized conversational implicature (Levinson 2000). Levinson proposes the heuristics “What’s said in an abnormal way isn’t normal” (M-heuristics) related to Grice’s first and fourth submaxim of manner (p. 38). This heuristics is exemplified in (132):

- (132) a. “Bill stopped the car”
+> ‘in the stereotypical manner with the foot pedal’
b. “Bill caused the car to stop”
+> (by the M-heuristics) ‘indirectly, not in the normal way, e.g., by use of the emergency brake’
(adapted from Levinson 2000:39)

If we extend Levinson’s M-heuristics to interaction in terms of preferred or most frequent (i.e. “normal”) responses, we can apply this extension to reconfirmation requests. With informing initial utterances in interaction, a “normal” response can be considered some kind of news-receiving response. We can expect that a person indicates that some information given by the other speaker is expressed to be understood and accepted as news. If a reconfirmation request is given instead, this implicates that the information is not normally understood and/or accepted as news, but treated as problematic in some way. Otherwise, the speaker would have given a normal news-receiving response. In this way, the implicature of ‘unexpected information’ arises with reconfirmation requests.

It has been argued that the pragmatic inference of unexpected information carried by the response format of reconfirmation requests has provided the context for the semantic change of *=tiba* in news-receiving responses. The semantic expansion of *=tiba* has thus been triggered by its use in interaction. This shows that interaction is an important factor in semantic change.

A connection between inferential and mirative has repeatedly been claimed in the literature and is attested for various languages (e.g. DeLancey 2001, Aksu-Koç and Slobin 1986). The argument usually is that the two concepts of inferential and mirative are cognitively connected. In the case of the Yurakaré inferential marker *=tiba*, we can see in addition which role interaction plays in the semantic expansion from inferential to mirative. The use of *=tiba* in confirmation requests has spread to second position reconfirmation requests, which implicate that information given by the addressee is unexpected or in some other way remarkable to the speaker. This implicature has become fixed in reconfirmation requests where no inferential step is involved anymore. These are news-receiving responses in which *=tiba* has come to express that the information given by the addressee is unexpected to the speaker. The shift from inferential to mirative in responsive contexts is clearly shaped by the interactional use in confirmation and reconfirmation requests. This shows that interaction was the driving force behind this semantic expansion.

The semantic expansion of *=tiba* from inferential to mirative in certain interactional contexts that has been described in this chapter could not have been detected without looking at interactional data. In fact, the mirative reading does not occur outside interaction (e.g. in monological narratives), since it is always responsive in nature. I have argued in this chapter that interaction was the driving force behind the shift from inferential to mirative. All this underlines the importance of including interaction in a theory of meaning and semantic change. It shows that there are cases where semantic change can be traced through interactional uses, which makes the study of semantic change in languages without diachronic data possible.

1

Chapter 5

The speaker's perspective in interaction: =*laba* 'subjective'

The verbal enclitic =*laba* expresses that the embedded proposition is accessed from the subjective perspective of the speaker. It explicitly excludes an assumption about the addressee's access to the information. Subjective =*laba* contrasts semantically with the intersubjective reading of =*ya* in terms of this dimension of (inter)subjectivity.

The use of =*laba* allows for the presence of various types of external evidence. In the presence of external evidence, three types of distribution of information access between speaker and addressee are possible. Both can have equal access to the external circumstances, the speaker can have superior access, or the addressee can have superior access. This variability of distribution of access correlates with the subjective meaning of =*laba*: It focuses on the speaker's perspective, while the addressee's perspective is not taken into account.

Subjective =*laba* can be used when the evidence for the proposition is completely internal, e.g. with information retrieved from memory or with evaluative assessments where a personal opinion is expressed. This variability of =*laba* suggests that it does not encode the presence of any particular type of external or internal evidence. Rather, it expresses the way in which information is cognitively accessed, namely through subjective interpretation of a situation by the speaker. This correlates with a cross-linguistic evidential type mentioned by some authors. Willett (1988:62) proposes a subtype of inferential evidence called "intuition", which can be realized as a separate category in languages. Chung and Timberlake (1985:244) have an evidential category which they call "the submode in which the event is a construct (thought, belief, fantasy) [...]:"

There are, however, at least two further possible analyses for =*laba*. The first would be to analyze =*laba* as an epistemic modal. It can be considered to express a subjective epistemic value with variable quantificational force. It indexes the embedded proposition to the speaker as a subjective expression of her epistemic state, which can be analyzed as an epistemic meaning. An argument against the

epistemic modal analysis can be found in Nuyts (2001), who argues on the basis of cross-linguistic data that subjectivity should be considered an evidential rather than an epistemic dimension because subjectivity is concerned with the evaluation of evidence. The fact that *=laba* does not encode a fixed degree of quantificational force is not a sufficient argument against an epistemic modal analysis, since it has been argued that it is not a defining feature of epistemic modals to encode a fixed degree of quantificational force (Matthewson et al. 2007).

The other possible analysis of *=laba* is as a marker of epistemic (inter)subjectivity, a category proposed by Bergqvist (*forthc.*) (cf. section 1.3.2). On this account, *=laba* would contrast with the epistemic reading of *=ya*, and these two markers could be considered to form a sub-system of grammatical marking of epistemic (inter)subjectivity. Epistemic *=ya* (cf. section 3.2) marks that the addressee is expected to arrive at the same conclusion or adopt the same view as the speaker, while *=laba* indicates that there is no assumption about the addressee's mental state. In section 5.4 below, this contrast between intersubjective *=ya* and subjective *=laba* will be discussed in more detail with a focus on the consequences for their use in interaction.

It should be noted here that this chapter will not focus on the discussion about which analysis of *=laba* is correct. Subjective *=laba* shows components of all three types of meanings. Rather, this chapter focuses on the uses of *=laba* in interaction, showing that the subjective semantics facilitates the use of *=laba* in a variety of interactional contexts.

In this chapter, it is shown that *=laba* expresses subjective access to the information presented in the proposition without a specific assumption about the addressee's expected access to that information. The marker *=laba* can be used in the presence of various types of external and internal evidence, which demonstrates that *=laba* does not encode a specific type of evidence. Rather, it encodes a type of cognitive access, expressing that the speaker is giving a subjective interpretation of a situation. The use of *=laba* does not include any reference to the expected mental state or cognitive access of the addressee. Evidence for this is provided by the fact that *=laba* can be used in any type of distribution of information access between the speaker and the addressee depending on the context and the conversational function.

Subjective *=laba* is used in a variety of interactional environments. In informing contexts, the speaker has superior access to the information marked with *=laba*. This use of *=laba* is discussed in section 5.1. *=Laba* can also be used when both speaker and addressee have symmetric access to the information, which is the case for example in assessments. This use is described in section 5.2. *=Laba* is also used in confirmation requests, where the addressee is expected to have superior access to the information. This use is the topic of section 5.3. All these uses of *=laba* have in common that the subjective interpretation of the speaker is presented without making a specific assumption about the addressee's interpretation of the situation.

5.1 The use of =*laba* in informing contexts

Subjective =*laba* is frequently used in informing interactional environments. In informing contexts, the speaker has superior or exclusive access to the information which allows her to inform the addressee who had inferior or no access to the information. It allows for various types of external evidence, both external and internal. Examples for external evidence are given in section 5.1.1. The use with internal evidence is discussed in section 5.1.2.

5.1.1 Subjective =*laba* and external evidence

The use of =*laba* does not require a specific distribution of information access. For example, it can be used when the speaker has superior or exclusive access to the circumstances that make her believe the proposition. Consider example (133), where Asunta calls out to a girl outside the house to check on the chickens:

- (133) *limawjama chika ittaw ish (.) eshaj muchamashlaba*
li-ma-ujwa-ma chika esha=ja
VLOC-3PL.OBJ-look-IMP.SG girl(SP) tiny_hawk=TOP
mu-chamashi=laba
3PL.OBJ.COM-be_busy=SUBJ
'Go and check on them (the chickens), girl. I think a tiny hawk is
bothering them!'
(al_cc_frogstory)

In (133), Asunta calls out from the house where she is chatting with Magdalena to a girl who is somewhere outside, probably Magdalena's daughter, telling her to check on the chickens. After a short pause, she adds an account for this command, explaining that she thinks that a tiny hawk is bothering the chickens. This account is marked with =*laba* to indicate that she does not know through direct experience that there is a tiny hawk, but that she for some reason thinks that this is the case. We can assume in this case that the girl has no access to the circumstances that lead Asunta to believe that a tiny hawk is bothering the chickens, since it is reasonable to assume that the girl would have chased the tiny hawk away if she had seen it already. We can therefore assume that the speaker does not expect the addressee to have access to the information marked with =*laba*, nor to the external circumstances that lead her to believe the information.

Example (133) illustrates the difference between the subjective marker =*laba* and the inferential evidential =*tiba* (see chapter 4). We can assume that Asunta in (133) could have used =*tiba* in place of =*laba*, since the proposition must be based on some kind of evidence (probably the chickens making noise), an access type usually encoded by inferential =*tiba*. However, as has been shown in chapter 4, the use of =*tiba* asserts the existence of some external evidence, i.e. a source proposition, on which the expressed proposition is based. Furthermore, it requires the source proposition to be mutually accessible by speaker and addressee. Neither of these features is true for =*laba*. Asunta in

(133) does not assert that there is external evidence for the proposition she is uttering. In contrast to =*tiba*, =*laba* allows for the presence of external evidence, but it does not assert it. Moreover, in (133) the speaker seems to have superior access to the external evidence. This shows that =*laba*, in contrast to =*tiba*, does not require a basis of mutually accessible evidence. We will see throughout this chapter that =*laba* can be used with various types of external and internal evidence. (133) was an example for =*laba* being used with some externally witnessed situation serving as evidence for the proposition.

=*Laba* can be used in answers to content questions to indicate that the speaker thinks the information to be correct without knowing for sure. This interactional environment is also informing in nature, since the speaker informs the addressee about the queried information. An example is (134). In line 1, an unidentified speaker who is passing by inquires about the whereabouts of a certain dog. In line 2, Paulina's answer is marked with =*laba*:

- (134) 1. ⇒ X: *chajmu petakkuda amatinaj (mija)* (0.8)
chajmu petakkuda amati=naja mija
 dog pregnant(SP) where=NSIT my_daughter(SP)
 'Where is the pregnant dog now, daughter?'
2. ⇒ A: *i:nñumlamnaj tiya=*
i-nñu-una=laba=naja tiya
 PV-child-DIST=SUBJ=NSIT aunt(SP)
 'I think it has given birth already, aunt.'
3. X: =*acham bëch(u) nij witala*
achama bëchu nij wita=la
 be_like_that like_this NEG arrive.SG=C'OMM
 'I see, so she didn't come here.'
 (040707_conv)

Before the sequence occurred, the four main participants of the conversation had been discussing about the possible whereabouts of a certain pregnant dog which normally stays close to the house where the conversation is taking place. The speakers discuss that the dog must have given birth already, since that day she has not shown up. The topic is dropped and the speakers talk about something else. At some point, a woman (speaker X) passes by, and after greeting the participants asks where the pregnant dog is (line 1). Asunta answers in line 2 with a =*laba*-marked utterance that the dog probably has already given birth.¹

Example (134) shows that =*laba* is very flexible as to what types of external evidence it allows. In this case, the evidence is provided by a consensus reached by the participants of the original conversation, namely that the dog must already have had her young. This consensus was reached on the basis of the external fact that the dog has not shown up on that day at the house. The

¹It seems that the question in line 1 was not so much meant to elicit where the dog is, but rather to ask why the dog is not at the house. The answer in line 2 can then be interpreted as an account for that. This interpretation is corroborated by the response of speaker X in line 3, where she indicates that she now understands why the dog did not show up.

information given in the =*laba*-marked utterance is thus based on both external evidence as well as a consensus reached with other people. What is crucial is that the addressee is excluded from the consensus, and therefore the proposition is a subjective interpretation of the situation with respect to the addressee.

=*Laba* is sometimes used with expressions of the cognitive or mental state of the speaker, when the speaker has only indirect evidence about the referent that is concerned by the mental state. In these cases, the speaker has exclusive access to the information in the proposition, since the addressee cannot access the mental state of the speaker. In example (135), =*laba* is used with the verb *buy(ta)* ‘to impress’. Magdalena and Asunta are talking about the Chimanes. Magdalena, who knows about their habits, explains that they can carry a lot of things in their carry baskets. In line 1, she says that they can carry five big spider monkeys. After going on for a while (data not represented here), she concludes her explanation in line 4. After a pause, Asunta gives a =*laba*-marked utterance expressing that she is impressed by the Chimanes’ abilities to carry a lot of heavy things:

- (135) 1. M: *sotu matatu sinkuttiw madayujtiwya atiw* (0.4)
 soto=w matata=w sinko-ti=w
 spider_monkey=PL big=PL five(SP)-NUM=PL
 ma-dayu-jti=w=va ati=w
 3PL.OBJ-carry-HAB=PL=REP DEM=PL
 ‘They can carry five spider monkeys.’
2. A: *u*
 u
 INTJ
 ‘Geez.’
3. ((11.7 seconds omitted))
4. M: *madayujtiw atipshēw* (0.8)
 ma-dayu-jti=w ati-bēshēē=w
 3PL.OBJ-carry_on_back-HAB=PL DEM-entity=PL
 ‘They carry them.’
5. ⇒ A: *timbuylab achu mada(...)*
 *ti-n-buyta=**laba** achu*
 1SG.OBJ-BEN-impress=SUBJ like_that
 ma-da[yu-jti=w]
 3PL.OBJ-carry_on_back-HAB=PL
 ‘It impresses me that they carry them like that.’
 (270807.conv)

Asunta’s explanation for this occurrence of =*laba* was that she had used it because she had not seen the Chimanes carry a lot of heavy things, but had only indirect evidence for it from what Magdalena had told her. This shows that =*laba* expresses in (135) that the speaker has no direct access to the circumstances which impresses her, but still thinks that it would impress her.

Note that even though the speaker has exclusive and thus superior access to her own mental state, the addressee has superior access to the *external* circumstances that lead to that mental state, which she has provided through her report about the carrying habits of the Chimanes. Example (135) shows as well that a report can serve as external evidence for a =*laba*-marked utterance.

5.1.2 Subjective =*laba* and internal evidence

We have seen that =*laba* can occur in the presence of various types of external evidence. However, =*laba* does not require nor assert the presence of external evidence. In (136), we can see a use of =*laba* where there is no external evidence for the embedded proposition. Rather, it is used to convey a personal opinion of the speaker, which can be considered a type of internal information access. This utterance was made when some of the people of the village and I were decorating the church for the celebration of the Saint San Pablo's day. A girl came to A and asked her where she should fix some piece of decoration. Asunta's response was the following:

- (136) *anilaba*
ani=y=laba
 DEM=LOC=SUBJ
 'I think here (you should put it).'
 (non-recorded naturally occurring example)

In (136), the target proposition represents a personal subjective opinion of the speaker, namely that a certain spot would be a good place to put the decoration. The speaker has superior access to the information given in the embedded proposition, since the addressee has asked her for the information, thereby indicating that she did not have access to it. It can also be observed that no specific response is made relevant by the =*laba*-marked utterance. It does not even make relevant as a response that the girl should hang up the decoration at the suggested place. The utterance is a suggestion rather than a command, which could be followed or objected.

Another type of internal information access that can be expressed by =*laba* is information retrieved from memory. With this evidence type, =*laba* indicates that the speaker is not totally sure whether the information is correct. Consider example (137), where Magdalena is trying to remember who the person was who experienced the events she has been describing:

- (137) 1. A: *i: shijshnamala* (.)
 ij shij~shinama=la
 INTJ INTS~long_ago=COMM
 'Geez, that was really a long time ago!'
 2. M: *kaniti an alberto* (1.0)
 kani=ti ana alberto
 not_yet=DS DEM PROPX
 'Alberto wasn't born yet.'

3. *a nij nuria* (0.6)
 a nij nuria
 INTJ NEG PROP
 ‘Oh, it wasn’t Nuria!’
4. *a:machi?* (.)
 ama=chi
 who=FR
 ‘Who was that?’
5. ⇒ *lindashamalaba?* (1.1)
 *linda-shama=**laba***
 PROP-DCSD=SUBJ
 ‘Was that Linda?’
6. A: *tütü ush atta abashtishama*
 tütü ushta atta a-bashti-shama
 be before other 3SG.POSS-wife-DCSD
 ‘He had another wife before?’
 (270807_conv)

Magdalena has told Asunta about some events that happened to her father-in-law and his wife, and now they are talking about how long ago that was. In line 1, Asunta concludes that it was indeed very long ago. Magdalena gives another clue as to how long ago it was in line 2, stating that her husband Alberto had not been born when these events occurred. After a pause of one second, Magdalena realizes that it was not Nuria who experienced these events. She notices this in line 3. The interjection *a* indicates that this is a sudden realization. Magdalena then wonders in line 4 who it was, using a rhetorical question marked with the frustrative marker *=chi*. In line 5 she finally suggests that it might have been another woman, Linda. She uses *=laba* in this utterance to express that the embedded proposition is retrieved from memory, and should not yet be taken as a fact by the addressee. The interrogative intonation of this utterance adds to the uncertainty. The use of *=laba* in (137) demonstrates that *=laba* can be used for epistemic downgrading, expressing that the information should not be considered a certain fact. The speaker has exclusive access to the information. This is underlined by the fact that Asunta did not even know that Magdalena’s father-in-law had another wife before, which we can see in her question in line 6.

A similar use of *=laba* can be observed in example (138). Magdalena has been trying to convince Asunta that the little animal that bites the boy in the nose (pictures 10 and 11 of the frog story) was a *samupopo*, a type of snake that can be found in the place where Magdalena lives with her husband. Asunta does not know this snake, because it does not exist in San Pablo, so Magdalena has exclusive access to the information. Asunta is not convinced, and lists some features of the animal on the picture that makes it appear to be an agouti in lines 1-3. In lines 6-7, Magdalena uses utterances marked with *=laba* to indicate that she is not entirely sure how the *samupopo* looks:

- (138) 1. A: *wow itta yopporesh itanti=*

- yoppore-sh* *i-tanti*
 agouti-ADV.MAN PV-face
 ‘Its face is like an agouti’s.’
2. *=yopporesh ishansha chamati ituu* (0.4)
yoppore-sh *i-shansha chama=ti* *i-tushshu*
 agouti-ADV.MAN PV-tooth like_that=DS PV-breast
 ‘Its teeth are like an agouti’s, like that it has its breast.’
3. *hh i[mey imeye] lacha*
i-meyye lacha
 PV-ear too
 ‘It has ears as well.’
4. M: [*lachuta*]
l-achuta
 REF-be_like_that
 ‘It is like that.’
 (0.5)
5. *ime:yejti=*
i-meyye-jti
 PV-ear-HAB
 ‘It has ears.’
6. ⇒ *=a:ːj* (0.3) *ē nij* (.) *nijtalaba=*
aaaj ēj *nijta=**laba***
 INTJ INTJ NEG=SUBJ
 Oh, I don’t think so, oh, no ...’
7. ⇒ *=koyoshoshkuta ipintalaba* (0.8)
koyosho-shku-ta *i-pinta=**laba***
 lizard-ADV.SML-MID PV-paint(SP)=SUBJ
 ‘I think it has a skin pattern like a lizard.’
8. A: (...{...})
9. ⇒ M: [*nij kuytejtiti kojkonsono*]
nij *ku-itc-jti-y=ti* *koj~konsono*
 NEG 3SG.OBJ.COM-ask-HAB-1SG=DS INTS~well
 ‘I haven’t asked in great detail.’
 (al.ce.frogstory)

In line 3, Asunta notes that the animal in the picture has ears. This makes it improbable that it is a snake, since snakes do not have ears. However, in line 5, Magdalena states that the *samupopo* snake does have ears, which implies that the animal could well be a *samupopo* snake. She immediately repairs herself in line 6, using interjections indicating insecurity, followed by a denial of her previous utterance in the form of a negator marked with *=laba*. *=Laba* in this utterance indicates that she is not entirely sure about this information which she is retrieving from her memory. She immediately adds another utterance again marked with *=laba* (line 7), indicating that she thinks that its skin

has the same pattern as a lizard's skin. This utterance refers back to a part of the conversation before the start of the transcript (not represented here), where Magdalena had mentioned that the *samupopo* snake had this type of skin pattern using an unmarked statement. The fact that she uses =*laba* now expresses that she is not as sure about it as she had first indicated. This is supported by the fact that Magdalena accounts for her uncertainty about this information in line 9, where she states that she has not asked in great detail about the *samupopo* snake.

In this section, the use of =*laba* in informing contexts has been presented. In these contexts, the speaker has superior access to the proposition embedded under =*laba*. This is possible both with external evidence as well as with internal evidence. Internal evidence includes personal opinions and information retrieved from memory. With internal evidence, information access is arguably always exclusive to the speaker. In the following section, the use of =*laba* in situations where both speakers have symmetrical access to the information will be presented.

5.2 =*Laba* in situations of symmetric access

=*Laba* is infrequently used in assessments, where the speaker expresses her evaluative stance toward a referent. Such assessments with =*laba* often do not receive agreements. We can see that in example (139), where Asunta gives an evaluation of the appearance of the boy of the frog story in line 1 directly before turning the page and changing the topic, without giving Magdalena any space to respond:

- (139) 1. ⇒ A: *shujshudylēn̄n̄ulab an sewwe=* ((turns the page))
shuj~shudyulē-n̄n̄=labā ana sewwe
 INTS~beautiful-DIM=SUBJ DEM boy
 'I think the boy is probably beautiful.'
2. ⇒ =*ujchampu tishi anchi=*
ujwa-cha-m=pu tishilē ana=chi
 look-JUS-2SG=PRES now DEM=DIR
 'You will see now, here...'
3. M: =*hhh amakka itējtēyjnaj na=*
ama-kka i-tējtē=chi=naja naa
 how-MEA PV-leg=FR=NSIT DEM
 'Geez, how long its (the frog's) legs are!'
4. =*achu yupishtanaja*
achu yupa-shita=naja
 like_that enter-FUT=NSIT
 'Like that it is going to enter.'
 (al.ce.frogstory)

Magdalena can also see the boy on the picture and thus has access to the assessed referent. Asunta uses =*laba* to indicate that she is conveying her subjective assessment. Directly after uttering the assessment, Asunta turns the page and goes on talking without waiting for a response from Magdalena. This shows that Asunta does not intend to mobilize a response with her utterance. Thus, even though access to the assessed referent is symmetrical, assessments marked with =*laba* do not seem to mobilize responses. This suggests that they express a subjective evaluation without including an assumption about the addressee's opinion.

In example (140), Miguel and Paulina are talking about the *surazo*² that just arrived. Miguel introduces this topic by assessing the *surazo* with a =*laba*-marked utterance in line 1:

- (140) 1. ⇒ M: *ənnətələb komadre sur* (.)
 ənnətə=labā komadre sur
 bad=SUBJ comadre(SP) surazo(SP)
 ‘The *surazo* is quite bad, comadre.’
2. *sur [itta*
 sur itta
 surazo(SP) thing
 ‘The *surazo*, well...’
3. P: *[te: (0.7)*
 tə
 INTJ
 ‘Yeah.’
4. *yo[kkoshe kom]padre bənu(la)*
 vokkoshe kompadre bənu=la
 truth compadre(SP) like_this=COMM
 ‘That is true compadre.’
5. M: *[dyumməla]*
 dyummə=la
 cold=COMM
 ‘The cold.’
 (160906_conv1)

In the assessment in line 1, =*laba* expresses that the speaker is talking about the particular *surazo* that is currently making life difficult in San Pablo, not about the *surazo* as a general phenomenon. After the assessment in line 1, Miguel holds his turn, apparently because he is trying to retrieve the Yurakaré word *dyummə*, with which he succeeds only in line 5. Paulina does not reply immediately because Miguel is continuing his turn, but then she volunteers a continuer in line 3, and after another pause an agreeing response. The response

²The *surazo* is a weather phenomenon common in the Amazonian part of Bolivia during the dry season. Cold air from Patagonia streams into Bolivia, and it can get quite cold. This phenomenon is commonly known as *sur* in the area. The Yurakaré call it *dyummə* ‘cold’, but sometimes they also use the Spanish term *sur*.

is a *yokkoshe* ‘truth’ token, conveying independent access to the assessed referent. This reflects the fact that she has access to the *surazo* as well, and can assess it from her own perspective. The agreement was not made relevant by Miguel’s initial assessment in line 1. Miguel is trying to hold his turn and the agreement is only volunteered after a pause of 0.7 seconds.

We can compare =*laba*-marked assessments to assessments without =*laba*. An example is (141), where Miguel and Paulina are talking about weeds that usually grow on the fields. In line 1 and 2, Miguel says that the *ilissi* weed is especially bad:

- (141) 1. M: *ilissiw=*
ilissi=w
ilissi.weed=PL
‘The *ilissi* weed.’
2. ⇒ =*atiw ënnëtëjtiw komadre=*
ati=w ënnëtë-jti=w komadre
DEM=PL bad-HAB=PL comadre(SP)
‘Those are the bad ones. comadre.’
3. ⇒ P: =*atiwj ënnëtë[jtiw kompa]drela*
ati=w=ja ënnëtë-jti=w kompadre=la
DEM=PL=TOP bad-HAB=PL compadre(SP)=COMM
‘Those are the bad ones indeed. compadre.’
4. M: [*të:*]
të
INTJ
‘Yeah.’
(160906_convI)

Miguel presents his assessment in line 2 as a generalized statement and an established fact. His evaluation is not spontaneous but rather has he held the opinion for some time already. Therefore, =*laba* is not used in this assessment. Paulina gives a confirming response, consisting of a repeat with the commitment marker =*la*, thus indicating that she does have independent access to the *ilissi*. and that her evaluation of it is the same as Miguel’s.

=*Laba* is also used outside assessments in situations of mutual accessibility of the external evidence that leads the speaker to believe the proposition. Example (142) shows such a usage. In line 4, Magdalena makes a joke about the dog barking at the beehive because it wants to get the honey. This utterance is marked with =*laba*:

- (142) 1. A: *ujcham tishi: chishtuti* (0.4)
ujwa-cha-m tishilë che-shta=w=ti
look-JUS-2SG now eat-FUT=PL=DS
‘You shall see. now they are going to sting it.’
2. M: *ashtutibal (mala)wojwobë[la::(sc)]*

- achu-stha=w=tiba=la*
 like_that-FUT=PL=INF=COMM
ma-la-wojwo=bëla=se
 3PL.OBJ-MAL-bark=CONT=PSUP
 ‘Are they? It is still barking at them.’
3. A: [(ëj) *malawojwo* (1.0)
ëj ma-la-wojwo
 INTJ 3PL.OBJ-MAL-bark
 ‘Wuff, it is barking at them.’
4. ⇒ M: *iuypintalaba an chajmu [hehe* ((laughs))
*i-uypi-nta=**laba** ana chajmu*
 PV-honey-DES=SUBJ DEM dog
 ‘Maybe that dog wants to get honey.’
5. A: ((laughs)) *[hehe bak: madelew (latiye)*
bak ma-dele=w l-ati=ye
 IDEO 3PL.OBJ-fall=PL REF-DEM=ADAP.F
 ‘Flat to the ground they fell down.’
 (al_ce_frogstory)

The speakers are talking about picture 11 of the frog story. They have noticed that the dog has made the beehive fall to the ground. In line 1, Asunta remarks that the bees are now going to sting the dog. This is met with a mirative news receiving response marked with =*tiba* by Magdalena in line 2, directly followed by an utterance where she notes that the dog is still barking at the bees. After Asunta expressed her confirmation in line 3, Magdalena gives a =*laba*-marked utterance in line 4, suggesting that the dog may be trying to get honey. In principle, both speakers can access the circumstances that led Magdalena to make that statement: the dog has barked at the beehive and made it fall by shaking the tree. Both speakers can see this on the picture. Access to the source proposition can therefore be considered symmetrical.

The =*laba*-marked utterance in (142) is meant as a joke. It does not express that the speaker really thinks that the dog wanted to get honey, but rather that this is her funny interpretation of the situation. Example (143) shows another use of =*laba* in a joke, where again both speaker and addressee have access to the circumstances that lead the speaker to make the =*laba*-marked suggestion:

- (143) 1. M: *dap* ((inclining upper body)) *ari ari tat anu katütülab ush*
na abashti (1.4)
*dap ari ari ta=ti anu ka-tütü=**laba** ushta*
 IDEO ouch ouch say=DS like_that 3SG.OBJ-be=SUBJ before
ana a-bashti
 DEM 3SG.POSS-wife
 ‘Maybe he had her close, his wife, when she was crying in pain.’
2. A: *a[:j*

aj

INTJ

‘Well...’

3. ⇒ M: *[asopto imñushtuj kankamalam ((laughing)) mesay kandu]la(ja)*

a-soboto i-nñu-shta=*ja*

3SG.POSS-belly PV-child-FUT=REA

ka-n-kama=laba mesay

3SG.OBJ-BEN-call=SUBJ message(SP)

ka-n-dula=ja

3SG.OBJ-BEN-make=REA

‘When she was going to give birth she probably called him, sending him a message.’

4. A: *[((laughs)) (.) a:mti diya bēbētēy(u)]*

amti diya bēbē=jtē=yu

how_many day(SP) search=ASSU=RES.F

‘How many days could he have searched?’

(al_ce_frogstory)

The sequence in (143) refers to picture 23 of the frog story. Magdalena suggests in line 1 that maybe the frog was close to his wife when she was crying in pain giving birth to the little frogs. By inclining her upper body, Magdalena imitates the posture of the female frog on the picture. She goes on in line 3 with another suggestion, which is now clearly a joke. She says that the female frog probably called her husband when she was going to give birth by sending him a radio message. During the last part of the utterance, she already starts laughing. Both suggestions are marked with *=laba*.

5.3 Requesting confirmation with *=laba*

Subjective *=laba* can also be used in situations where the addressee is expected to have superior access to the information given in the proposition. Usually, in these contexts utterances marked with *=laba* mobilize a confirming response. An example for the use of *=laba* in a confirmation request is (144), where Asunta tells Elisa in line 1 that she expects her to go to the neighboring village with a *=laba*-marked utterance:

- (144) 1. ⇒ A: *batamlab tishil na loma alta(chi)* ((gaze to addressee)) (.)

bata-m=laba tishilē naa loma alta=chi

go.FUT-2SG=SUBJ now DEM PROPN PROPN=DIR

‘You are going to Loma Alta today?’

2. ⇒ E: *nijtala* (0, I)

nijta=la

NEG=COMM

‘No.’

3. A: *lam batay tētaye an tammε =*

- l-achama bata=ya tō-ta=ye*
 REF-be_like_that go.FUT=REP 1SG.OBJ.COM-say=ADAP.F
ana ta-meme
 DEM 1PL.POSS-mother
- ‘Then how come our friend has said you were going to go?’
4. E: =*it* (.) *tibba wita shēwishta baytu kuti*
tī-ba wita shēwi-shta baytu
 1SG.POSS-husband arrive afternoon-FUT go.1PL.INT
ku-ta-y
 3SG.OBJ.COM-say-1SG
- ‘I said to her that we were going to go if my husband was arriving in the afternoon.’
 (290906_conv1)

Clearly, Elisa has superior access to her own plans, so in this situation the addressee has superior access to the information given in the proposition. Elisa gives a disconfirming response in line 2. Example (144) shows that utterances with =*laba* can be used to mobilize responses if they exhibit response-mobilizing *turn-design* features. The use of =*laba* alone does not seem to be used to mobilize responses. In the example, there are at least two of the response-mobilizing features identified by Stivers and Rossano (2010), namely the speaker’s gaze to the addressee at the end of the utterance, and the superior epistemic access of the addressee manifested in the use of the second person singular.³ These response-mobilizing features identify the =*laba*-marked utterance as a confirmation request inquiring about the addressee’s epistemic realm.

Example (144) underlines the great flexibility of which type of evidence is allowed with =*laba*. In line 3, Asunta accounts for why she thought that Elisa would go, namely because another woman had told her that Elisa had told her. Asunta thus has reported evidence for the proposition, which would in principle license the use of reported =*ya*. The fact that Asunta gives this account shows that the question in line 1 was not neutral in the sense that it was asking for information. Rather, Asunta already had a bias toward a confirming answer because she already had evidence for it. This supports the claim that the utterance marked with =*laba* in line 1 is a confirmation request.

The fact that Asunta does not use the reported marker =*ya* even though she has reported evidence shows that the evidential is chosen according to the interactional function the speaker intends to perform, not according to the evidence that exists in the external world. In (144), the speaker expresses that she believes in the proposition for some reason, and that she thus has a bias toward a confirming response. The reported marker =*ya* would have expressed that the speaker has been told that the addressee would go to Loma Alta. Since reported =*ya* is used in informing contexts, it would be pragmatically odd to use it in a situation where the addressee has superior access like in (144).

³The intonation of the utterance is slightly rising and could therefore be interrogative. This is another feature which is used to mobilize response (Stivers and Rossano 2010). However, the rise in intonation is not strong enough to clearly identify it as interrogative intonation. Therefore, this rise is not reproduced in the transcript.

Example (145) shows another use of =*laba* in a confirmation request. In line 3, Asunta calls out to Hugo asking whether it was him who got a radio message the day before:

- (145) 1. A: *ejte* (.) *tëpshënaj hugo?* (.)
este tëtë-bëshëë=naja hugo
 this(SP) which-entity=NSIT PROP
 ‘Hey, what’s his name? Hugo!’
2. H: *si*=
si
 yes(SP)
 ‘Yeah!’
3. ⇒ A: ((looking outside the window)) =*më mimbachewlab shëy*
mensaje (0.7)
mëë mi-n-bache=w=laba shëy
 2SG.PRON 2SG.OBJ-BEN-send=PL=SUBJ yesterday
mensaje
 message(SP)
 ‘Did they send you a message yesterday?’
4. *na [cha]shchashtaj nij ku nij kuj nij konsono*
naa chash~chash-ta=ja nij konsono
 DEM IDEO~IDEO-say=REA NEG well
 ‘There was a strong interference, it couldn’t be heard well.’
5. ⇒ H: [*no*]
no
 NEG(SP)
 ‘No.’
 (0.5)
6. (...) (2.6)
7. A: *ama kambachewse?* (.)
ama ka-n-bache=w=se
 who 3SG.OBJ-BEN-send=PL=PSUP
 ‘Who did they send it to, then?’
8. X: (...)
 (290906_convI)

In example (145), Asunta is calling out to Hugo who is passing by with some other people outside the house. In line 3, she asks him whether he was the person who got a radio message⁴ the day before using a =*laba*-marked utterance. The response is not immediately given, which could mean that it is not sufficiently mobilized by Asunta’s utterance. The utterance does not get interrogative

⁴Messages are delivered from town to the jungle communities by radio during a certain hour of the day. Many people in the community, especially women, spend that hour listening to the radio during the preparation of meals or other work. Usually, the radio signal is quite good in San Pablo, but sometimes there are disturbances.

intonation, and even though the speaker is looking out the window, probably at the addressee, maybe the addressee cannot clearly see this. It seems that the lack of immediate response motivates Asunta to add an account for her asking in line 4 that it could not be heard well because of the interference. This identifies the =*laba*-marked utterance as a confirmation request, excluding the possibility that it may be an informing utterance indicating that the speaker wants to inform the addressee that she thinks that he got a message the day before. This interpretation would be possible since even though the information concerns the addressee, still the speaker could have superior access to it, since the addressee could not have listened to the radio and thus not heard the message. The disconfirming response in line 5 is delayed with respect to the =*laba*-marked utterance that was probably meant to trigger it, but comes at the very beginning of Asunta's account.

Unfortunately, in (145) there is no clue for us to infer which kind of evidence Asunta has to believe that it was Hugo who got a message, like in example (144). However, the occurrence of =*laba* in (145) can be explained in terms of the speaker having reasons to believe that a confirming answer should be given. Support for this is provided by Asunta's next utterance in line 7, which is a content question asking who else could have been the addressee of the message in question.

It is not only with information concerning the addressee's epistemic domain that =*laba* can be used when the addressee is expected to have superior access to the information. An example is (146), an excerpt from example (126) on page 113. Magdalena produces a =*laba*-marked confirmation request about the following events of the frog story in line 5. Asunta has superior access to the information since she already knows the whole story while Magdalena does not, and is thus in the position to disconfirm in line 6:

- (146) 1. M: *amati na atibase* (1.8)
amati naa a-tiba=se
 where DEM 3SG.POSS-pet=PSUP
 'And where is his dog?'
2. A: *nij a:mchi ayattü maymanibē ana ittu[y(u)]*
nij aunchi ayaj-tütü ma-winani=bē ana
 NEG where IDEO-be 3PL.OBJ-walk=MOM DEM
itta=w=yü
 thing=PL.RES.F
 'Where could he be, running together with these things?'
3. M: ((laughs)) *[he]he tigtighe[hehehe]he=*
tīya=w=tī=yē
 cat=PL=DS=ADAP.F
 'Ah, they are stinging it!'
4. A: *[tyuti (0.4) uyprwe]*
tīya=w=tī uyipi=w=yē
 cat=PL=DS=ADAP.F bee=PL=ADAP.F

‘They are stinging it, the bees.’

5. ⇒ M: =*nij dechishtalamnaj asono*=

nij deche-shta=laba=naja a-sonno

NEG find-FUT=SUBJ=NSIT 3SG.POSS-owner

‘It [the dog] is not going to find its owner anymore?’

6. ⇒ A: =*dechishta*

deche-shta

find-FUT

‘It will find him.’

(*al_ce_frogstory*)

The speakers are talking about picture 11 of the frog story, where the boy is sitting on the branch of a tree, looking inside a hole in the tree. The dog is not on the picture.⁵ In line 1, Magdalena asks where the boy’s dog is. Asunta replies that it is running with the bees in line 2. Magdalena remarks that the dog is being stung by the bees (line 3), which is confirmed by Asunta in line 4. Then, in line 5 Magdalena states that she thinks that the dog is not going to find its owner again, which is disconfirmed by Asunta in line 6. Asunta has superior access to the information since she is the one who already knows the story, while Magdalena does not. Therefore, Magdalena is aware that Asunta knows whether the dog is going to find its owner, being the one who has superior access. Probably it is this feature of the utterance that invites a knowledge-related response. There is no gaze to the addressee, nor interrogative intonation. Another possibility is that the utterance was not meant to invite a knowledge-related response, but since it presents a false proposition it is corrected by the addressee in spite of not being invited to do so. If a speaker says something the other speaker knows to be false, it is probable that the second speaker will give a disconfirmation even though no response would have been made relevant by the initial utterance.

In this section, it has been argued that =*laba* marks subjective information access without making explicit reference to the addressee’s access to the information. It can be used with different distributions of information access: when both speaker and addressee have equal access, and when one of them has superior access.

It has also been shown in this section that the use of =*laba* can involve various types of external evidence and internal evidence, which suggests that =*laba* does not assert the presence of any particular type of evidence. Rather, =*laba* represents the evidential type of subjective information access, where the speaker offers her personal interpretation of a situation.

⁵In the frog story, this is a picture that goes over both sides of the page. The boy is on the right side, the dog on the left side. The two sides were presented as two pictures to the speakers.

5.4 Discussion

It has been shown in this chapter that *=laba* marks the speaker's subjective perspective on information. It has also been shown that the use of *=laba* does not convey a specific assumption of the speaker about the addressee's access to the information. Evidence for this is provided by the fact that *=laba* is used in three types of distribution of information access:

- i. The speaker has superior access: Informing contexts
- ii. Both speaker and addressee have equal access: e.g. assessments of mutually accessible referents
- iii. The addressee is expected to have superior access: confirmation requests

This variability of *=laba* shows that it does not convey a specific assumption about the addressee's access to the information. The subjective semantics of *=laba* accounts for its variability in use. Subjective *=laba* indicates the speaker's perspective on the information, which is not restricted to specific types of information access. However, a preference for symmetric access and superior access of the speaker can be observed as can be seen in Table 5.1 where the frequency of the three types of distribution found with *=laba* are summarized:

Table 5.1: The frequency of distribution of information access for subjective *=laba*

Access type	Frequency	Percent of total
S>A	22	20%
S=A	32	29%
S<A	14	13%
Other/unclear ¹	41	38%
Total	109	100%

¹ The category 'other' includes 15 uses where *=laba* is embedded in a quotative construction, which are not included in the distribution of access since they are not interactional uses. Furthermore, 10 uses where *=laba* is used in combination with the frustrative marker *=chi*. These uses will be discussed in section 8.2. In addition, the two uses in second position described in section 5.4.1 are included here.

Table 5.1 shows that symmetric distribution is most frequent when *=laba* is used, followed by superior access of the speaker. Superior access of the addressee is the less frequent type of distribution of information access. This can be explained with the subjective semantics of *=laba*. Since it marks the personal perspective of the speaker on information, it can be expected to be dispreferred in contexts where the addressee has superior access to the information.

5.4.1 Subjectivity and epistemic primacy

In interaction, speakers can claim to be the first to think of or hold a position on the information given in an utterance. This has been called epistemic primacy (Heritage 2002, Heritage and Raymond 2005). Initial utterances usually claim primacy by their mere firstness, while in second position a speaker can use certain upgrading strategies to convey that she was the one who thought about the information first and thereby resist the inherent claim of primacy of the initial utterance (Heritage and Raymond 2005). There is some evidence that =*laba* introduces a claim of epistemic primacy in second position utterances within the adjacency pair.

Since initial utterances by default carry a claim of epistemic primacy, they do not provide evidence for claiming that =*laba* conveys epistemic primacy. For this, we have to look at second position uses. There are only two such uses in the corpus, both of which provide some evidence for a claim of epistemic primacy carried by =*laba* in second position. These two examples will be discussed in the following.

In example (147), Virgilio and Santiago are talking about the hunting behavior of dogs. Virgilio says that some dogs follow the boars they are hunting into their burrows and then do not come out anymore (lines 1 and 2). This utterance can be understood in two ways - as an informing statement or a complaint. We know that such a thing already happened to at least one of Virgilio's dogs a year ago, from an earlier conversation his wife Paulina had with Miguel (160906.conv). Santiago's response in line 3 consists of a *yokkoshe* 'truth' token marked with =*laba*, the commitment marker =*la*, and the resignation marker =*ri* for male speakers which is interpreted as an epistemically independent statement:

- (147) 1. V: *peshu yupapaya yupaj:tiw* (0.7)
peshe=w yupa~pa=va yupa-jti=w
 other=PL enter~CAU=IRR enter-HAB=PL
 'Others make them (the boars) enter (their burrows) and then enter (themselves).'
2. *amaj ottomashiw* (0.6)
amaja otto-mashi=w
 how go_out-MINTS=PL
 'How could they get out again.'
3. ⇒ S: *yokkoshejtilablari=*
yokkoshe-jti=laba=la=ri
 truth-HAB=SUBJ=COMM=RES.M
 'That must be it.'
4. V: =*latija tiya lati tiya* (...)
l-ati=ja tiya l-ati tiya
 REF-DEM=TOP eat REF-DEM eat
 'Then the boar bites the dog, there it bites it.'
 (040707.conv)

An alternative response Santiago could have given in line 3 is a continuer, for example in the form of the interjection *tē* ‘yeah’. Another alternative would have been a news-receiving response like a form of *achama* ‘be like that’. However, Santiago’s response is not a news-receipt token, since *yokkoshe* ‘truth’ claims that the speaker knows the information to be true. If Virgilio’s utterance is interpreted as a complaint, Santiago’s response can be interpreted as a co-complaint. *Yokkoshe* indicates that Santiago knows that it is true that some dogs behave the way outlined by Virgilio. The commitment marker *=la* adds commitment, which is common in second position in Yurakaré. The resignation marker *=ri* adds that the information has to be considered a state of affairs which both speaker and addressee cannot influence, resisting a possible claim of the initial utterance that a new and previously unknown observation has been made. There is no true evidence to show what exactly *=laba* adds to the utterance. Since it occurs in a context where independent access to information is claimed, we can expect that it participates in some way in creating this claim. Possibly, Santiago’s own independent access to the information is added by *=laba*, which conveys that he came to believe that the information is true through his own reasoning. In (147), it can be seen that *=laba* occurs in environments where epistemic independence is claimed.

Evidence for the view that *=laba* conveys a claim of epistemic primacy in second position utterances is provided by example (148), where the claim of primacy carried by such an utterance is treated as problematic by the addressee (line 6). The sequence in (148) is about picture 24 of the frog story. The speakers are talking about the little frog that does not sit on the tree trunk with its family, but below on the ground. They think that maybe this frog was the one the boy had taken with him before⁶, and that it probably escaped from the boy. In sequence (148), they talk about which way it could have escaped:

- (148) 1. A: *mala layj* (.) *chajmunñula:m=*
mala lacha chajmu-nñu=laba
 go.SG too dog-DIM=SUBJ
 ‘I think the dog left as well.’
2. M: *=achamay layjla* (2.1)
achama=ya lacha=la
 be_like_that=REP too=COMM
 ‘It seems it did, as well.’
3. ⇒ A: *kusu a[nash kalamalalam na tumumu]*
kusu ana=jsha ka-la-mala=laba ana
 maybe DEM=ABL 3SG.OBJ-MAL-go.SG=SUBJ DEM
tumumu
 frog
 ‘I think maybe the frog escaped from him this way.’
4. M: *[kūwūj kūwūj kūwūj kūwūj] malaya* (0.7)

⁶Picture 21 is a picture that goes over two pages, on the left side the boy taking the little frog, on the other side the frogs looking after them. These two sides were presented as two separate pictures.

- küwüj küwüj küwüj küwüj mala=ya*
 IDEO IDEO IDEO IDEO go.SG=REP
 ‘It seems that it went swimming, swimming.’
5. ⇒ *atish kalayajtaj kalamallaba=*
ati=jsha ka-la-ayajta=ja
 DEM=ABL 3SG.OBJ-MAL-run=REA
ka-la-mala=laba
 3SG.OBJ-MAL-go.SG=SUBJ
 ‘I think it ran away and escaped from there.’
6. ⇒ A: *=a[cham mēti sē]*
achama mē-ta-y sēē
 be_like_that 2SG.OBJ.COM-say-1SG 1SG.PRON
 ‘That’s what I told you.’
7. M: *[naa kankana tü|tü (.)*
naa kankana tü|tü
 DEM further_down be
 ‘The one that’s further down there.’
8. A: *a:ti mindyujuy (.)*
ati mi-n-dyujuy
 DEM 2SG.OBJ-BEN-tell-1SG
 ‘That one, I told you.’
9. M: *(...)*
 (al.ce_frogstory)

After noticing that the dog has already left in line 1 and receiving an agreement in line 2, Asunta makes a claim marked with *=laba* in line 3, concerning the little frog, saying that it could have escaped from the boy from a certain direction. A large part of this utterance overlaps with an utterance of Magdalena (line 4) that still concerns the dog, where she says that it was probably swimming. After a pause, Magdalena makes a *=laba*-marked claim in line 5 with basically the same content as the claim made by Asunta in line 3. This results in a situation where both speakers have made the same claim marked with *=laba*. It is not clear whether Magdalena has missed Asunta’s first claim in line 3 due to the overlap with her own utterance, or whether she intends to claim epistemic primacy in second position with her *=laba*-marked utterance. Another possibility is that she means to indicate a different path of escape from the one indicated by Asunta, since she uses another demonstrative (*ati* ‘neutral’ instead of *ana* ‘proximal’). However, Magdalena’s intention is not of great importance to the point made here. What is crucial is how her *=laba*-marked utterance gets treated by Asunta, whose response in line 6 is to defend her epistemic primacy by saying that she had told Magdalena so in the first place. Since her utterance overlaps with an utterance of Magdalena which completes her *=laba*-marked claim in that it specifies the referent to which it refers (lines 7), Asunta again gives a defense of her epistemic primacy in line 8, this time more specifically referring to the referent. The fact that Asunta defends her epistemic primacy conveyed

by a =*laba*-marked utterance against a =*laba*-marked utterance by Magdalena suggests that she interprets Magdalena's =*laba*-marked utterance as conveying epistemic primacy rather than an epistemically subordinate agreement. This provides evidence for a claim of primacy conveyed by =*laba*-marked utterances in second position.

The claim of epistemic primacy carried by =*laba* correlates with its subjective semantics. Expressing the subjective perspective of the speaker, =*laba* conveys that the speaker was the first to think about the information. This contrasts with the uses of the intersubjective reading of =*ya*, which is used to mark equal epistemic access. The contrast between subjective =*laba* and intersubjective =*ya* will be discussed in more detail in the following section.

5.4.2 Subjectivity and intersubjectivity in interaction

Subjective =*laba* contrasts with the epistemic intersubjective reading of =*ya* (cf. section 3.2) in terms of epistemic intersubjectivity. While =*laba* presents a personal opinion of the speaker without including a specific assumption about the addressee's information access, epistemic =*ya* conveys the assumption that the addressee should be able to arrive at the same epistemic stance toward the proposition as the speaker. In this section, it will be shown that this contrast is manifested in the interactional uses of the two markers.

One point of contrast between intersubjective =*ya* and subjective =*laba* is that =*ya* often functions as a trigger for agreement in interaction, i.e. for a response which mirrors the speaker's epistemic stance toward the proposition. Subjective =*laba* does not show a preference for a specific type of response, as can be seen in Table 5.2⁷.

Table 5.2: Responses to utterances marked with =*laba*

Response	Frequency	Percent of Total
Agreement repeat with epistemic = <i>ya</i>	4	6%
Agreement <i>achama</i> with epistemic = <i>ya</i>	4	6%
Agreement other format ¹	6	9%
(Dis)confirmation	10	15%
No response	29	42%
Other/unclear ²	15	22%
Total	68	100%

¹ For example *nentava* 'maybe'.

² The category 'other' includes for example continuers or repair.

From Table 5.2 it becomes clear that =*laba* shows no preference toward a specific type of response. There are 14 agreements of various formats and 10 (dis)confirmations. In 29 cases, no response was given. The lack of preference for a specific type of response is due to the variability of =*laba* with respect to the types of distribution of information access with which it can occur. Since it does not express a specific type of distribution of knowledge, it does not show

⁷The table does not include the initial utterances for which the function was unclear. Neither does it include the uses of =*laba* in direct speech complements and in combination with frustrative =*chi*, since this combination is grammaticalized (cf. Table 5.1).

a preference for a specific type of response that correlates with any specific access type.

Initial utterances with =*ya* are frequently agreed with by the addressee, which is demonstrated in Table 3.2 on page 85. For mobilizing this agreement, utterances with =*ya* do usually not display any of the response-mobilizing features identified by Stivers and Rossano (2010) such as interrogative intonation or speaker gaze. The use of =*ya* alone can mobilize agreeing responses. It has been argued in section 3.3 that this interactional feature of =*ya* is due to its intersubjective semantics. Since =*ya* expresses an assumption of the speaker that the addressee should take the same epistemic stance toward the proposition, it puts some pressure on the addressee to demonstrate his epistemic stance. This observation correlates with the finding that talking about the addressee's epistemic realm is a turn-design feature for mobilizing responses (Stivers and Rossano 2010).

In contrast, utterances marked with =*laba* do not show a preference toward a certain type of response. For mobilizing responses with =*laba*, other response-mobilizing features are often present, such as interrogative intonation, speaker gaze, and talking about the addressee's epistemic realm (cf. Stivers and Rossano 2010). The distribution of responses to utterances with subjective =*laba* and intersubjective =*ya* is compared in Table 5.3.

Table 5.3: Responses to subjective =*laba* and intersubjective =*ya*

Response	= <i>laba</i>	= <i>ya</i>	Percent = <i>laba</i>	Percent = <i>ya</i>
Agree <i>achama</i> with = <i>ya</i>	4	46	6%	22%
Agree other format	10	20	15%	9%
(Dis)confirmation	10	27	15%	13%
No response	29	81	42%	39%
Other/unclear	15	36	22%	17%
Total	68	210	100%	100%

In Table 5.3, it can be seen that intersubjective =*ya* shows a preference for agreements of the format *achama* 'be like that' marked with =*ya* for epistemic dependence, while =*laba* does not show any preference. This demonstrates the distinct interactional properties of the two markers.

Example (149) is a sequence that demonstrates the contrast between intersubjective =*ya* and subjective =*laba* in interaction. Asunta and Magdalena are talking about the boy of the frog story. Asunta suggests twice that the boy could be a dwarf, once with an utterance marked with =*laba* (line 7), the second time with an utterance marked with =*ya* (line 17):

- (149) 1. A: *j̄m kalaw[sasa:]*:=
 ka-la-wasa~sa
 3SG.OBJ-MAL-caress~DIST
 'He is caressing his dog.'
2. M: [*l̄t̄ēm̄ēȳ bata(naj)*]
 l̄t̄ēm̄ē=chi bata=naja
 jungle=DIR go.FUT=NSIT

- ‘He’ll go to the jungle?’
3. A: =lētēmējy mala alla ibota (.)
 lētēmē=chi mala alla i-bota
 jungle=DIR go.SG therefore PV-boot(SP)
 ‘He’s going to the jungle. that’s why he’s wearing boots.’
4. M: chama [(naa)]
 achauua naa
 be_like_that DEM
 ‘That’s what he’s doing.’
5. A: [ujma] an sewwe [atijalēññu(tijsha achu)]
 ujwa-ma ana sewwe ati-kka-lō-nñu=ti=jsha
 look-IMP.SG DEM boy DEM-MEA-AUG-DIM=DS=ABL
 achu
 like_that
 ‘Look at that boy. even though he is only that small, like that...’
6. M: [(...) te:]=
 tē
 INTJ
 ‘Yeah.’
7. ⇒ A: =enanonñulaba? (0.5)
 enano-nñu=**laba**
 dwarf(SP)-DIM=SUBJ
 ‘Is he a dwarf?’
8. ⇒ M: enanonñuya (0.6)
 enano-nñu=**ya**
 dwarf(SP)-DIM=REP
 ‘He seems to be a dwarf.’
9. A: tē ēsh achu a:j bibushtachi (.)
 tē ēshē achu bibu-shta=chi
 INTJ why like_that energetic(SP)-FUT=FR
 ‘Yeah, being like that, how can he be so energetic?’
10. M: (tē:j)=
 tē
 INTJ
 ‘Yeah.’
11. A: =ujma (la) atewenñu (0.4)
 ujwa-ma lacha a-tewwe-nñu
 look-IMP.SG too 3SG.POSS-foot-DIM
 ‘Look, his feet as well.’
12. M: atewenñu nñunñjim ma::tatima na atewe (1.1)

- a-tewwe-n̄ñu ñuñuju-ina matata-ima naa a-tewwe
 3SG.POSS-foot-DIM small-COL big-COL DEM 3SG-foot
 ‘His feet are small, and they are big.’
13. A: j [abotu
 a-bota=w
 3SG.POSS-boot(SP)=PL
 ‘His boots.’
14. M: [pëpëññuychila (0.8)
 pëpë-n̄ñu=va=chi=la
 old-DIM=REP=FR=COMM
 ‘He seems to be a little old.’
15. A: pëpëññu mëti së=
 pëpë-n̄ñu më-ta-y sëë
 old-DIM 2SG.OBJ.COM-say-1SG 1SG.PRON
 ‘I told you, he is a little old.’
16. M: =mjm (1.1)
 mjm
 INTJ
 ‘Yeah.’
17. ⇒ A: enanuya (0.4)
 enano=**ya**
 dwarf(SP)=REP
 ‘He seems to be a dwarf.’
18. ⇒ M: achamayla (1.1)
 achama=**ya**=la
 be_like_that=REP=COMM
 ‘It seems to be like that.’
19. ujma atib chajmu nij konson chajmush itewe lacha
 ujwa-ma a-tiba chajmu nij kousono
 look-IMP.SG 3SG.POSS-pet dog NEG well
 chajmu-sh i-tewwe lacha
 dog-ADV.MAN PV-foot too
 ‘Look at the dog, its paws aren’t like those of a real dog
 either.’
 (al_ce_frogstory)

In (149), Asunta and Magdalena are talking about the boy of the frog story as depicted on picture 7. In line 1, Asunta notices that he is caressing his dog (the dog is in his arms). In line 2, Magdalena suggests that now he will go to the jungle; Asunta has already told her some time ago that the boy will go to the jungle, and Magdalena comments that now that he is outside the house he will probably go. Asunta confirms this in line 3, noting that this is the reason why he is wearing his boots. After a news receipt response by Magdalena in line 4, Asunta directs her attention to the looks of the boy, then giving an

utterance that seems unfinished, saying that the boy is like that even though he is only small. Probably, this utterance refers to him going to the jungle alone even though he is only small. Magdalena gives an affirmative token in line 6, and now Asunta produces a =*laba*-marked suggestion, saying that the boy could be a dwarf. She uses interrogative intonation here to mobilize an agreeing response. Both speakers have the same access to the boy, they can both see him in the picture, so they have the same basis for evaluating whether he is a dwarf or not. =*Laba* expresses that the embedded proposition is the subjective interpretation of the speaker of the aspect of the boy. The response that is produced is an agreement in the form of a repeat marked with intersubjective =*ya*. The use of =*ya* marks the response as epistemically dependent on the initial utterance.

After the agreement, Asunta gives a short affirmative token and goes on with a rhetorical question, asking how the boy can be so energetic (line 7). Magdalena gives an affirmative token of affiliation in line 8, and then she directs her attention to the boy's feet (line 9). In line 10, she notes that his feet look big even though they are small.⁸ Asunta's utterance in line 13 seems to add that his boots are big. It overlaps with Magdalena's next turn, where she notes that the boy might actually be older (line 14). Asunta says in line 15 that she has told Magdalena that he was older, which is acknowledged by Magdalena in line 16. Now, in line 17, Asunta repeats her suggestion that the boy could be a dwarf, this time using =*va* instead of =*laba*. The response given by Magdalena is a full agreement token consisting of the form *achama* 'be like that' marked with intersubjective =*ya* and the commitment marker =*la* (cf. section 3.2.2.2). We can observe that Asunta already knew that Magdalena would be able to agree here because she has already agreed in line 8 that the boy could be a dwarf. This demonstrates the difference in interactional function between subjective =*laba* and intersubjective =*ya*. While =*laba* is used in (149) to introduce a completely new idea, =*ya* is used after this idea is already agreed upon. When it is clear to the speaker that the addressee holds the same epistemic stance toward the proposition, she uses the intersubjective marker =*ya*.

Another contrast in interactional function between intersubjective =*ya* and subjective =*laba* concerns the second position uses of these markers. Intersubjective =*ya* is frequently used in agreeing responses (cf. section 3.2.2.1) while =*laba* is hardly ever used in second position. This can again be explained in terms of the semantics of the two markers. Agreeing responses are likely to express a symmetric epistemic stance toward the information expressed in the initial utterance. An intersubjective marker lends itself to expressing such a symmetric epistemic stance, since it includes an assumption about the addressee's epistemic state. A subjective marker which carries a claim of epistemic primacy (cf. section 5.1.1) does not lend itself to be used in epistemically agreeing responses.

⁸This interpretation of the utterance was given by Asunta when I transcribed the conversation with her.

In this section, it has been shown that subjective =*laba* and intersubjective =*ya* not only contrast in terms of their semantics, but also in terms of their interactional functions. These functions are summarized in Table 5.4:

Table 5.4: The interactional functions of subjective =*laba* and intersubjective =*ya*

	Subjective =<i>laba</i>	Intersubjective =<i>ya</i>
Semantics	Subjective	Intersubjective
Responses	No preference	Epistemically dependent agreements preferred
Epistemic (in)dependence	Epistemic independence and primacy	Epistemic dependence
Second position	Informing (answers to content questions); epistemic independence (infrequent use)	Epistemic dependence in agreements

The contrast between =*ya* and =*laba* in terms of intersubjectivity suggests that these two markers form a subsystem within the verbal enclitic set. This subsystem can be represented as follows:

(150) *Markers of epistemic (inter)subjectivity*

- =*ya* ‘intersubjective’
- =*laba* ‘subjective’

It has been argued in this chapter that the interactional functions of subjective =*laba* and intersubjective =*ya* can be derived directly from the semantics of the two markers. This means that semantics does not only express meaning, but also determines interactional uses.

Chapter 6

When no evidence is accessible: =jtë ‘assumption’

The evidential =jtë marks that no external evidence for the embedded proposition is accessible to the speaker. Frequently, information marked with =jtë seems to be accessed through general knowledge of the world or prior experiences. However, since this is not always the case, =jtë cannot be considered to encode information access through world knowledge. Typically, declaratives marked with =jtë are presented as impersonal through the lack of evidence and therefore the lack of interpretation of evidence by the speaker. They do not represent a personal opinion or suggestion of the speaker, but rather a state of affairs on which she has no influence.

Similar evidentials expressing a lack of external evidence are usually called ‘assumptive’ in the literature. Therefore, I call =jtë an assumptive evidential. ‘Assumptive’ has been established as a cross-linguistically valid evidential category. Aikhenvald (2004:63) defines the evidential notion she calls “Assumption” in the following way: “based on evidence other than visible results; this may include logical reasoning, assumption, or simply general knowledge.” This definition touches upon both the lack of direct accessible evidence as well as information access through other cognitive processes. Assumptive as an evidential category seems to occur predominantly in larger evidential systems with four or five choices (cf. Table in Aikhenvald 2004:65). An example for a language with an assumptive evidential that marks lack of direct evidence is Tupyca (Tucanoan, Colombia and Brazil): “Assumed evidentials are used only when no information about the state or event is being or has been received” (Barnes 1984:264).

Like the other evidentials of Yurakaré, =jtë includes an intersubjective component. It is used when the information is inaccessible to both the speaker and the addressee. This condition for the use of =jtë can be termed the ‘mutual inaccessibility condition’.

Assumptive $\text{=jt}\ddot{\text{e}}$ exhibits two properties that distinguish it from the other three evidentials of Yurakaré. The first is its distribution over sentence-types: $\text{=jt}\ddot{\text{e}}$ predominantly occurs in content questions, while the other three evidentials only scarcely (=ya ‘reported’) or never (=tiba ‘inferential’ and =laba ‘subjective’) occur in content questions. Only 25% of the occurrences of $\text{=jt}\ddot{\text{e}}$ in the corpus are in declaratives, while 71% are in content questions. The distribution of $\text{=jt}\ddot{\text{e}}$ across these utterance types is summarized in Table 6.1:

Table 6.1: The distribution of $\text{=jt}\ddot{\text{e}}$ over utterance types

Use	Frequency	Percent of total
Declarative	17	25%
Content question	49	71%
Direct speech complement ¹	3	4%
Total	69	100%

¹ The use of $\text{=jt}\ddot{\text{e}}$ within direct speech complements of quotative constructions is not an interactional use, and is therefore here not categorized as either a declarative or a content question use.

While in declaratives $\text{=jt}\ddot{\text{e}}$ marks the absence of evidence for the embedded proposition, its interpretation in content questions is that the information queried by the interrogative cannot be accessed at the time of speaking. Since this inaccessibility includes the addressee, content questions with $\text{=jt}\ddot{\text{e}}$ are not used in interaction to request information from the addressee. Rather, content questions with $\text{=jt}\ddot{\text{e}}$ usually seek alignment with the activity implemented by the utterance and also affiliation with the stance expressed by the utterance (cf. Stivers 2008). Thus, the interrogative format is exploited for actions other than requesting information.

The second feature that distinguishes $\text{=jt}\ddot{\text{e}}$ from the other evidentials is that it strongly collocates with the clausal enclitic =yu/ri ‘resignative f/m ’ (see section 2.7.1.6), so that there are only four out of 69 occurrences of $\text{=jt}\ddot{\text{e}}$ in the corpus without that enclitic. In three of these instances, =yu/ri is replaced by the clausal enclitic =se which expresses that the embedded proposition introduces a presupposition. The only case where $\text{=jt}\ddot{\text{e}}$ occurs without =yu/ri or any other clausal enclitic could either be a ‘mistake’, or it can be explained by an elliptical construction (see section 6.3.1 below for a discussion of the collocation). None of the other Yurakaré evidentials shows such a strong collocation with any other grammatical or lexical item.

The marker =yu/ri shows a split in usage according to the gender of the speaker. The form =yu is used by female speakers, while male speakers use =ri (cf. section 2.7.1.6). As a clausal enclitic, it is usually attached to the last element of a clause. Since $\text{=jt}\ddot{\text{e}}$ as a verbal enclitic attaches to the predicate, the combination of $\text{=jt}\ddot{\text{e}}$ and =yu/ri is often discontinuously marked in an utterance. It is probably reasonable to think of $\text{=j}\ddot{\text{e}}\text{=yu/ri}$ as developing into one discontinuous interactional marker. This is also supported by the semantics of the collocation. Even though a compositional analysis is still possible, this analysis seems somewhat forced. The compositional analysis yields an interpretation of the speaker resigning to the situation expressed

in the proposition (expressed by =*yu/ri*) even though no direct evidence is available (which is expressed by =*jtë*).¹

The use of =*jtë=yu/ri* in declaratives will be discussed in section 6.1. The use of =*jtë* in content questions is demonstrated in section 6.2. Section 6.3 discusses some of the features of =*jtë=yu/ri* in more detail. It includes a discussion of possible reasons for the preference of use in content questions (section 6.3.2), a tentative explanation for the strong collocation of =*jtë* and resignative =*yu/ri* (section 6.3.1). It will be argued that the semantics of marking lack of evidence of =*jtë* has facilitated its interactional use in content questions as well as the strong collocation with =*yu/ri*. This construction seems to be a conventionalized use with an interpretation that cannot be analyzed compositionally anymore.

6.1 Assumptive =*jtë* in declaratives

In this section, the uses of =*jtë* as an assumptive evidential in declarative sentence types are presented. (151) is an example of the use of =*jtë* in a monological narrative about a man who can transform into a jaguar. Another man notices him one day in the jungle and sees him transforming into a jaguar. After the jaguar man is gone, the other man thinks that probably the jaguar man will come back later (line 1), and that he himself should come back as well to wait for the jaguar man again (line 2). The direct speech clause in line 1 is marked with =*jtë* and =*ri* to represent this thought of the man as an assumption that is not accessed through direct evidence.

- (151) 1. ⇒ *atishamash wilishtajtë(ri)=*
 *ati-jsha-mashi wilita-shta=**jtë=ri***
 DEM-ABL-MINTS return-FUT=ASSU=RES.F
 ‘I assume he’ll return a little later.’
2. =*wilitaya (...) kantünise*
 wilita=ya ka-n-tütü-ni-y=se
 return=IRR 3SG.OBJ-BEN-be-INT-1SG=PSUP
 ‘I’ll come back here to wait for him.’
 (hombretigre)

The man has no external observable evidence that the jaguar man is going to come back. This lack of accessible evidence is marked by the combination of assumptive =*jtë* and the resignative marker for male speakers =*ri*.

In interaction, declaratives with =*jtë=yu/ri* are implemented for various actions. Since they are so scarce in the corpus, it is not clear if they constitute interactional practices. Utterances marked with =*jtë* can carry response-mobilizing turn design features such as interrogative intonation (cf. Stivers and Rossano 2010) to mobilize a response from the addressee. About half of

¹It is interesting to note that the definition of ‘assumption’ as given in the New Oxford Dictionary of English captures exactly the two meaning components expressed by =*jtë* and =*yu/ri*: “a thing that is accepted as true or as certain to happen, without proof”.

the declarative uses of =jtë=yu/ri receive a response in the corpus. The most common turn-design feature for mobilizing response with =jtë is talking about a topic by which the addressee is in some way affected. This is manifested in the co-occurrence of =jtë with second person subject marking as well as first person plural subject marking.

An example for a first person plural usage of =jtë=yu/ri that mobilizes agreement is (152). The utterance furthermore receives interrogative intonation as an additional response-mobilizing feature. Miguel's utterance marked with =jtë=ri in line 3 expresses the worry that the people in San Pablo, marked by first person plural², might die if the lagoon of San Pablo dries out. Paulina gives an agreeing response in line 4:

- (152) 1. P: *namashtay taju(dawa yosse*
nama-shta=va ta-kudawa yosse
 dry-FUT=REP 1PL.POSS-lagoon again
 'Our lagoon might dry out again.'
2. M: *[namashta komadrela (.)*
nama-shta komadre=la
 dry-FUT comadre(SP)=COMM
 'It will dry out I am convinced, comadre.'
3. ⇒ *lat namati shamashtatujtëri?=*
l-ati nama=ti shama-shta-tu=jtë=ri
 REF-DEM dry=DS die.PL-FUT-1PL=ASSU=RES.M
 'When that one dries out, I assume we are all going to die?'
4. ⇒ P: *=a:chishtatuy kompadre (latiji)*
achu-shta-tu=va kompadre latiji
 like_that-FUT-1PL=REP compadre(SP) then
 'We may, compadre, then.'
 (160906_convI)

In (152), Miguel and Paulina agree that the lagoon of San Pablo is probably going to dry out (lines 1-2). Miguel then expresses the assumption that the people in San Pablo might die in that case (line 3). The use of assumptive =jtë and resignative =ri indicates that there is no direct evidence accessible for whether the people are going to die, but that the speaker still assumes it to be probable. The use of rising interrogative intonation mobilizes a response. Another response-mobilizing feature is the use of the first person subject marker -tu, which includes the addressee and thus localizes the embedded proposition in the realm of information that concerns both the speaker and the addressee. This increases the pressure on the addressee to produce a response (Stivers and Rossano 2010). Paulina provides an agreeing response in line 4.

²The first person plural in line 3 has at least two possible interpretations. It could refer exclusively to the two speech act participants, or to all the people in San Pablo (including the two speech act participants). The latter interpretation seems more plausible, since probably everybody would be affected by a drying out of the lagoon. What is important is that the addressee is definitely concerned, which helps to mobilize a response by the addressee.

The use of $=jt\ddot{e}=yu/ri$ in combination with second person subjects occurs when the addressee is not expected to have superior access to the information, even though it directly concerns the addressee. This is due to the mutual inaccessibility of evidence condition for the use of $=jt\ddot{e}=yu/ri$. An example is (153), where Elisa suggests to some people who are leaving for a neighboring village that they will arrive the next day (line 1):

- (153) 1. \Rightarrow E: *namash wiwishtaptë(yu)* (0.6)
numajsha wiwi-shta-p=jtë=yu
 tomorrow arrive.PL-FUT=2PL=ASSU=RES.F
 ‘You’ll arrive tomorrow I assume.’
2. X: (*mj*)
mj
 INTJ
 ‘Hm.’
 (200906_convI)

Elisa and Asunta have been chatting with some men passing by the house who are on their way to another village. In line 1, Elisa expresses her assumption that they will arrive the following day, using a $=jt\ddot{e}$ -marked utterance. The collocation $=jt\ddot{e}=yu$ marks the lack of direct evidence for when the men will arrive at their destination. The speaker rather relies on her general knowledge, which tells her that the trip should take until the next day. It is important to note that even though we have a second person usage in this example the addressees do not have superior access to the information in question, since they cannot know any better than the speaker how long their trip will take. They must rely on the same kind of world knowledge as the speaker, using their experience of former trips to the place. The intersubjective value of mutual inaccessibility of evidence for $=jt\ddot{e}=yu/ri$ thus holds in this second person example. The usage of $=jt\ddot{e}=yu/ri$ with second persons to mark a statement about the addressee to which the addressee is not expected to have superior access could be an interactional practice. However, there are only two more instances of this usage, so the scarcity of the data does not allow to draw any conclusions.

Second person declaratives with $=jt\ddot{e}=yu/ri$ can be used in an ironic, joking fashion. Example (154) is such a use. Asunta and Elisa are talking about the boyfriend of one of Asunta’s daughters. Asunta has informed Elisa that he now works at the boarding school, no longer in the city of Trinidad (data not represented here). In line 1, Asunta says that he had told her that he would go to work there some time ago. In line 2, Elisa remarks that she assumes that Asunta is very unconcerned now, using a $=jt\ddot{e}=yu$ -marked declarative. It is not completely clear to what exactly this comment refers, whether to the fact that the boyfriend is working, living closer to Asunta, or further away from her daughter (who still lives in the city). What is clear is that it is meant as a joke, since both speaker and addressee laugh:

- (154) 1. A: *bati atchi wa sawanishti tēta (ana)* (0.6)

bata-y ati=chi sawata-ni-shta-y
 go.FUT-1SG DEM=DIR work-INT-FUT-1SG
të-ta ana
 1SG.OBJ.COM-say DEM

‘I will go there to work.’ he said to me.’

2. ⇒ E: *a yish trankil ti tütümtëyu* ((laughs)) *hehe* (0.4)

a yita-sh trankila
 INTJ good-ADV.MAN unconcerned(SP)
tütü-m=jtë=yu
 be-2SG=ASSU=RES.F

‘Ah, so you must be very unconcerned.’

3. ⇒ A: ((laughs)) *hehe* ((laughing)) *yish trankila tütüjti së*

yita-sh trankila tütü-jti-y sëc
 good-ADV.MAN unconcerned(SP) be-HAB-1SG 1SG.PRON

‘I am always quite unconcerned.’

(200906.conv1)

Semantically, we can assume that *=jtë* expresses its basic function of indicating lack of direct evidence. The speaker accesses the proposition through her knowledge of the world, that mothers are unconcerned when their daughter’s boyfriend does certain things.

The ironic reading probably comes from the intersubjective component of *=jtë=yu*, which indicates that the addressee is not expected to have access to the information given. However, Elisa’s statement concerns Asunta’s state of mind, to which she in fact has access. Therefore, the use of *=jtë=yu* is in the strict sense not licensed here. This situation seems to yield the non-literal, ironic interpretation. The intersubjectivity of *=jtë* is exploited for the interactional function of expressing irony. Asunta’s response in line 3 has confirmation format but is also meant ironically. It has an exaggerated intonation and is accompanied by laughter. Another possible explanation for the ironic reading of *=jtë=yu/ri* is that it expresses lack of evidence, which is also a typical feature of ironic statements. Since with ironic statements, the opposite of what is said is meant, there is no evidence for the information given in the proposition. This could account for the use of *=jtë=yu/ri* in ironic statements.

There is one more use in the corpus which is very similar to the one in (154). Strikingly, it is a use with exactly the same adjective *trankila* ‘unconcerned’ (Spanish). This suggests that this use could be an interactional practice. However, again the data are too scarce to make a firm statement.

In this section, some uses of the collocation *=jtë=yu/ri* in declaratives have been demonstrated. The uses seem quite diverse, and it seems that there is no specific practice connected to the declarative use of *=jtë=yu/ri*. An exception could be the uses with second persons, where two practices can possibly be identified. First, the use to indicate that the speaker is talking about information concerning the addressee to which the addressee is not expected to have superior access. Second, the use to indicate that the statement is meant ironically rather than literally by exploitation of the intersubjective

value of $=jt\ddot{e}=yu/ri$. However, these uses are too scarce to make a more informed claim.

The collocation $=jt\ddot{e}=yu/ri$ is much more commonly used in content questions than in declaratives. The interactional practices for which the combination of $=jt\ddot{e}$ and $=yu/ri$ is exploited can be much more easily identified in the context of content questions than declaratives, as we will see in the following section.

6.2 $=Jt\ddot{e}$ in content questions

The assumptive evidential $=jt\ddot{e}$ in combination with the resignative marker $=yu/ri$ most frequently occurs in content questions (cf. Table 6.1 above). The canonical function of content questions is to request a certain piece of information which is encoded by the question word, while the rest of the utterance is usually presupposed (Sadock and Zwicky 1985:185). With canonical questions, the speaker usually assumes the addressee to have access to the queried information and thus to know the answer to the question. Consequently, in its canonical use a content question should most frequently be followed by an answer given by the addressee.

However, content questions can be used for a variety of other interactional functions apart from requesting information (e.g. for making action requests in English), and must therefore be considered a sentence type rather than an action type. $=Jt\ddot{e}=yu/ri$ -marked content questions are not used to request information in interaction, but they are always used for other actions. There is only one case out of 27 content questions marked with $=jt\ddot{e}^3$ in initial position which receives a tentative answer as a response. This answer is introduced with the modal *kusu* ‘maybe’ to indicate that it is a suggestion rather than a fact known to the speaker. This shows that content questions with $=jt\ddot{e}$ in initial position do not make answers relevant. This can be explained with the intersubjective component of $=jt\ddot{e}$, which includes the addressee in the inaccessibility of information. For content questions, this means that the addressee is not expected to know the answer to the question.

In section 6.2.1 it will be demonstrated that content questions with $=jt\ddot{e}=yu/ri$ in first position are basically used for two actions, expressing interest in some information without being able to access it and complaining about oneself’s or others’ actions. Moreover, content questions with $=jt\ddot{e}=yu/ri$ often mobilize alignment with the activity the utterance conveys, and affiliation with the stance expressed by the utterance. The concepts of alignment and affiliation in interaction is discussed in Stivers (2008), where it is shown that there is a difference between alignment and affiliation as recipients’ actions during story telling. Alignment is structural in nature and attends to the activity implemented by the initial utterance, expressing that the speaker goes along with that activity. Affiliation is social in nature and attends to the expressed speaker’s stance toward the information. Stivers bases this distinction on her

³24 of which are co-occurrences with $=yu/ri$ and three with the presupposition marker $=se$.

finding that in story telling in English, continuers like *mm hm* express alignment with the activity of story telling, while head nods additionally express that the recipients can access the teller's stance toward the narrated event and indicate affiliation with this stance. To summarize, alignment is a second position action that orients toward the activity implemented by the initial utterance, while affiliation attends to the stance expressed by the initial utterance.

Stivers (p. 33) notes that the preferred response to a story telling is the expression of a stance toward the narrated event that "mirrors the stance that the teller conveys having [...] whether that is as funny, sad, fabulous, or strange." By providing continuers such as *mm hm*, the recipient of the story treats the turn of the teller as still ongoing and signals that he leaves the floor to the teller, rather than expressing a stance. The recipient is aligning with the activity of the teller telling a story (p. 34). Stivers's study shows that there are fine-grained distinctions as to which component of the initial utterance a response orients to. They can align or disalign with the activity that is initiated by the initial utterance, and they can affiliate with the speaker of the initial utterance through mirroring the stance expressed in the initial utterance.

Content questions with $=jt\ddot{e}=yn/ri$ can be considered an interactional practice. As a construction, such content questions should be considered pragmaticized constructions with a specific interpretation in interaction rather than a compositional construction.

The use of content questions with $=jt\ddot{e}$ in initial position is slightly more frequent than the use in responsive position, as is demonstrated in Table 6.2.

Table 6.2: The frequencies of content questions with $=jt\ddot{e}$ in initial and second position

Use	Frequency	Percent of total
Initial	27	55%
Responsive	22	45%
Total	49	100%

In second position, content questions with $=jt\ddot{e}$ are most frequently used in place of answers to content questions to indicate ignorance about the information requested by the initial utterance. This results in a response that is not the one made relevant by the initial utterance, but still aligns with the activity of the initial utterance of expressing interest in the information in question. We will see examples of this use in section 6.2.2.

6.2.1 Initial position content questions

The interpretation that arises with $=jt\ddot{e}$ -marked content questions is that the information queried by the question word is not known to the speaker and cannot be accessed by her at the moment of speech. This is not a unique feature of $=jt\ddot{e}$ -marked content questions, but is expected for all canonical content questions. The special feature of content questions with $=jt\ddot{e}$ is the intersubjective value carried by $=jt\ddot{e}$ which indicates that the addressee is not expected to know the answer either.

Most initial position content questions with $=jt\ddot{e}$ in the corpus are marked also with $=yu/ri$. Only three out of 27 instances are marked with the presupposition marker $=se$ instead. These uses will be discussed below in section 6.3.1.

Content questions with $=jt\ddot{e}=yu/ri$ in initial position are used to convey a certain stance toward the proposition. They can be used to indicate that it would be interesting to have information about a certain topic, which the speaker does however not expect to be able to get. Content questions in general seem to carry an expression of interest in the queried topic, otherwise the question would not be asked. The inaccessibility of the information is expressed by $=jt\ddot{e}=yu/ri$. An example of this usage is (155) where Virgilio wonders how many pups a certain dog has:

- (155) 1. V: *amtiwtĕ anñuri* (.)
amti=w=jtĕ *a-nñu=w=ri*
 how_many=PL=ASSU 3SG.POSS-child=PL.=RES.M
 ‘How many pups could they be?’
2. S: *a:mtiwtĕ piri*
amti=w=jtĕ *pii=ri*
 how_many=PL=ASSU older_brother.M=RES.M
 ‘How many could they be, brother?’
 (040707_conv)

Paulina, Asunta, Virgilio and Santiago have been talking about a dog that was pregnant, concluding that it has probably already got its litter. Virgilio now wonders in line 1 how many pups she could have, using a content question marked with $=jt\ddot{e}$ and resignative $=ri$ to express that nobody of them can know how many pups the dog has (they do not even know whether she has them already). By posing this content question, he expresses his curiosity to know how many pups the dog could have. Santiago responds with another $=jt\ddot{e}=ri$ -marked content question, expressing alignment to the activity of expressing interest in the information and to the activity of expressing mutual ignorance. Santiago furthermore affiliates with Virgilio by mirroring the stance expressed in the initial content question. The lengthening of the vowel of the question word strengthens the affiliative interpretation. The use of content questions with $=jt\ddot{e}=yu/ri$ in second position will be discussed in further detail in section 6.2.2 below.

In the initial content question in (155), $=jt\ddot{e}=yu/ri$ expresses an intersubjective evidential value in that the addressee is not expected to have access to the information. There are cases, however, where content questions with $=jt\ddot{e}=yu/ri$ are used when the addressee could have access to the information. In these cases, the intersubjective component of $=jt\ddot{e}=yu/ri$ is exploited for rhetorical effects. Such content questions express interest in the topic without asking for an answer to the question. This can be seen in (156) where we have a clear insight into the distribution of knowledge, since it is an example from a frog story retelling. In line 2, Patricia wonders where the frog could have gone using a $=jt\ddot{e}=yu/ri$ -marked content question. Juan does not answer this question but

rather produces a token indicating ignorance in line 3, even though he knows the answer:

- (156) 1. J: *malamala matumumuse* ((starts turning page)) (0.7)
ma-la-mala ma-tumumu=se
 3PL.OBJ-MAL-go.SG 3PL.POSS-frog=PSUP
 ‘Their frog left them.’
2. ⇒ P: *a:m: malajtē(yu)* (0.4)
amchi mala=jtē=yu
 where go.SG=ASSU=RES.F
 ‘Where could it have gone?’
3. ⇒ J: *a::* ((turns page fully, points on picture)) *ani=*
aaa ana=y
 INTJ DEM=LOC
 ‘I don’t know, here...’
4. P: *=kaynanibēla*
ka-winani=bēla
 3SG.OBJ-walk=CONT
 ‘He still has it.’
 (pp-pf_frogstory)

When Juan states that the frog has run away from the boy and the dog in line 1, Patricia wonders in line 2 where it could have gone, using a content question marked with $=jtē=yu/ri$. If we consider the speech situation of the frog story retelling, we can assume that Patricia should expect Juan to know where the frog has gone, since he already knows the whole story and is telling it to her. Whether or not this assumption is correct, it can be noted that Juan does not provide an answer to the question, but rather gives a response in the form of an interjection that expresses ignorance. This shows that the content question with $=jtē=yu$ indicates that the speaker does not intend to request information, even if the addressee could (and probably is expected to) have some kind of access to the information. In (156), $=jtē=yu/ri$ creates a situation of mutual ignorance rather than encoding it. In the situation of story telling, the teller pretends not to have knowledge about where the frog has gone, since otherwise the story would be spoiled.

Expressing interest is not the only action for which content questions with $=jtē$ can be used. Another action with which this utterance format is compatible is complaining. An example is (157), an extension of (140) on page 134. Miguel and Paulina are complaining about the *surazo*, the cold air from Patagonia that has hit the village. In line 6, Paulina wonders when the *surazo* is going to pass again, using a content question marked with $=jtē=yu$:

- (157) 1. M: *ēnnētēlab komadre sur* (.)
ēnnētē=laba komadre sur
 bad=SUBJ comadre(SP) surazo(SP)
 ‘The *surazo* is quite bad now, comadre.’

2. *sur [itta]*
 sur itta
 surazo(SP) thing
 ‘The surazo. well...’
3. P: [te:] (0.7)
 tē
 INTJ
 ‘Yeah.’
4. *yo[kkoshe kom]padre bēnu(la)*
 yokkoshe kompadre bēnu=la
 truth compadre(SP) like_this=COMM
 ‘That is true compadre.’
5. M: [dyummēla]
 dyummē=la
 cold=COMM
 ‘The cold.’
 (.)
6. [(...)]
7. ⇒ P: [a:]makki batajtēnaja^y (0.7)
 amakki bata=**jtē**=naja=**yu**
 when go.FUT=ASSU=NSIT=RES.F
 ‘When is it finally going to pass?’
8. ⇒ M: a: (.) [bē]chu ichish wita_j (0.6) [dyu]mmēse
 aaa bēchu ichish_a wita=_j dyummē=se
 INTJ like_that longer_time_ago arrive.SG=REA cold=PSUP
 ‘How could it be, having arrived like this quite some time ago, the dyummē.’
9. P: [(tē)] [(...)]
 tē
 INTJ
 ‘Yeah.’
 (160906.conv1)

Mignel states that the *surazo* is quite bad in line 1, thus starting a complaint sequence. Paulina first gives a minimal affirmative token (line 3) and then a longer agreement in line 4. In line 7, she poses a content question marked with =*jtē*=*yu*, asking when the *surazo* will finally pass. This information is not accessible, since nobody can know when the cold weather will pass again. Mignel’s response is accordingly not an answer to Paulina’s =*jtē*=*yu*-marked content question, but rather a response in the form of the interjection *aaa* indicating ignorance.

Probably Paulina’s content question in line 7 is meant as a complaint. Expressing ignorance as to when the bad weather will pass and lack of control over it conveys a certain helplessness of speaker and hearer, which can easily

be interpreted by pragmatic inference as a complaint. Moreover, Miguel's turn in line 1 can be considered an outright complaint, since he explicitly states that the *surazo* is bad. This facilitates the interpretation of Paulina's question as a complaint as well, with which she goes along with Miguel.

Another example for a complaint implemented by a =jtë=yu/ri-marked content question is (158). Asunta and Magdalena interrupt the telling of the frog story to leave Magdalena's little son outside with Asunta's daughter because he is constantly playing with the tripod of the camera. Asunta's daughter, however, went to the lagoon to wash her father's clothes. In line 4, Asunta complains about this:

- (158) 1. M: ((goes to the door, calls out for Asunta's daughter, gets no response, tells her child to go and look for her))
2. A: *ata:tu aropa kamala=*
a-tata a-ropa ka-mala
 3SG.POSS-father 3SG.POSS-clothes(SP) 3SG.OBJ-go.SG
 'She took her father's clothes.'
3. M: ((walks out the door))
4. ⇒ A: =*ësh atëptëjtë anu dyummëtiyu*
ëshë a-tëptë=jtë anu dyummë=ti=yu
 why PROG-wash=ASSU like.this cold=DS=RES.F
 'Why the hell is she washing while it is so cold?'
 (al_{ce}_frogstory)

When Magdalena calls out to Asunta's daughter in line 1, she does not respond. Asunta then remarks that her daughter has taken her father's clothes (line 2), which means that she has probably gone to the lagoon to wash them. During this utterance, Magdalena starts walking outside to look for Asunta's daughter (line 3). Asunta goes on immediately in line 4 with a content question marked with =jtë=yu, asking why her daughter is washing while it is so cold outside. This content question is not an information request, but rather a complaint about the behavior of the daughter. Semantically, =jtë=yu/ri expresses that the information queried by the question word cannot be accessed, neither by the speaker nor by the addressee, through direct evidence. This interpretation lends itself to be used for a complaint about the behavior of another person, since it expresses that there is no reasonable explanation for this person's behavior.

Asunta is complaining about her daughter for washing while it is cold. The reasons for the complaint are not very clear, since the Yurakaré normally also wash when it is cold, so it cannot be a complaint based on 'abnormal' behavior. However, it could have been the time of a *surazo*, which often includes rain. Maybe the complaint also just refers to the fact that it would be inconvenient for Asunta and Magdalena if her daughter was washing, since they want her to look after Magdalena's child. The reasons for the complaint could thus be merely practical.

In this section, it has been demonstrated that content questions with $=jt\ddot{e}=yu/ri$ in initial position are not used for requesting information, but are also compatible with at least two more actions, expressing interest in a topic without being able to access the information in question and complaining. In the following section, we will see that content questions with $=jt\ddot{e}$ in second position are used to express ignorance and to align with certain activities implemented by the initial utterance and affiliate with the stance expressed in the initial utterance.

6.2.2 Content questions with $=jt\ddot{e}$ in second position

Content questions with $=jt\ddot{e}=yu/ri$ can be used as responses to content questions.⁴ In these cases, the second position question is usually a modified repeat (cf. Stivers 2005) of the initial question. They express that the speaker does not know the answer to the question because she has no direct access to the information.

Apart from indicating ignorance about the information requested by the initial utterance, second position content questions with $=jt\ddot{e}=yu/ri$ express a particular form of alignment with the initial utterance, in that they express that the information would indeed be interesting to know. That the speaker of the initial question finds it interesting can be inferred from the fact that she asked the question. By doing this, she expresses some kind of interest in receiving the information. By using a $=jt\ddot{e}=yu/ri$ -marked content question, the second speaker aligns with the activity of finding the topic in question interesting. Thus, content questions with $=jt\ddot{e}=yu/ri$ in second position do not merely express ignorance about the requested information but also alignment with the activity of expressing interest in the topic. Moreover, in some cases they mirror the stance expressed in the initial utterance, thereby expressing affiliation with the addressee.

There is some evidence in the data that second position content questions with $=jt\ddot{e}=yu/ri$ express alignment with the initial content question by indicating interest in the queried topic. First, after uttering content questions with $=jt\ddot{e}=yu/ri$ in second position to content questions that request information speakers sometimes go on with their turn by speculating about possible answers. This shows that they do express further interest in the information. The second observation is of a more formal nature. In second position, $=jt\ddot{e}=yu/ri$ -marked content questions, the question word that is usually a repeat of the word used in the initial question is often significantly lengthened. This is a common strategy for expressing intensity in both first and second position. In second position it yields an interpretation of intensification, which basically seems to express affiliation with the addressee.

An example of a content question with $=jt\ddot{e}$ in second position is (159), where Patricia asks Juan about the bird on the picture which she cannot identify (line 1). After expressing his ignorance in line 2, Juan gives two suggestions for the identity of the bird, which demonstrates his interest in the topic:

⁴Out of 22 second position content question uses of $=jt\ddot{e}$, only one is without the resignative marker $=yu/ri$. This use could simply be a mistake or an unfinished utterance.

- (159) 1. J: ((points to the owl in the left corner of picture 15))
 2. ⇒ P: *tēpshēse=*
tētċ-bēshēē=se
 which-entity=PSUP
 ‘What is that, then?’
 3. ⇒ J: *=tēpshējtċ atiri* (0.7)
*tētċ-bēshēē=**jtċ** ati=**ri***
 which-entity=ASSU DEM=RES.M
 ‘What could that be?’
 4. ⇒ *agila* (0.5)
agila
 eagle(SP)
 ‘An eagle.’
 5. ⇒ *wēshoy(a) (.)*
wēsho=va
 harpy_eagle=REP
 ‘Or a harpy eagle.’
 6. P: *wēsho*
wēsho
 harpy_eagle
 ‘A harpy eagle.’
 (pp_pf.frogstory)

The speakers are talking about picture 15 of the frog story, on which the boy is caught between the deer’s antlers. Juan points to the bird in the upper left corner of the picture to direct Patricia’s attention to it (line 1). Patricia then asks what it is in line 2. In line 3, Juan indicates that he does not know what it is either, using a modified repeat of Patricia’s question marked with *=jtċ* and the resignation marker for male speakers *=ri*. After a short pause, he goes on to give two suggestions (lines 4-5).

By using the *=jtċ=ri*-marked question, Juan indicates that he does not have access to the information queried by the initial question. However, he still makes two suggestions about the identity of the bird. Through his use of the *=jtċ=ri*-marked question before that, it is clear that these suggestions are not confirmed knowledge but rather tentative assumptions. The fact that he makes these assumptions suggests that he would also like to know what kind of bird it is, and suggests that the *=jtċ*-marked question expresses his interest in the topic, thus aligning with the activity initiated by the addressee.

Another aligning usage of a *=jtċ*-marked content question in second position can be observed in (160). When Miguel asks Paulina about the condition of her plantation in line 1, she replies with a *=jtċ*-marked content question in line 2, which indicates that she has no direct evidence about the condition of her plantation:

- (160) 1. ⇒ M: *amashiuaja komadre mijukkulċ* (0.9)

- amashi=naja komadre mi-kukkulë*
 how=NSIT comadre(SP) 2SG.POSS-field
 ‘How is your field now comadre?’
2. ⇒ P: *a::mashijtëna ja kom[padreyu]*
amashi=jtë=naja kompadre=yu
 how=ASSU=NSIT compadre(SP)=RES.F
 ‘How can it be?’
3. M: [(...)] (.)
4. P: (*a[malniti]*) (0.5) *dandashtase*
amala-ni-y=ti danda-shita=se
 come-INT-1SG=DS go.up-FUT=PSUP
 ‘I still have to go there; there will be growing weeds.’
5. M: [(*kusuti*)]
kusuti
 maybe
 ‘Maybe.’
 (160906_convI)

Miguel expects Paulina to have knowledge about the condition of her plantation, which is indicated by his unmarked content question in line 1. By using an unmarked question, it is implicated that Miguel expects Paulina to know about the condition of her plantation. Against his expectations, she does not know the condition of her plantation, and indicates this using a =jtë-marked content question with modified repeat format in second position. The first vowel of the question word *amashi* ‘how’ is lengthened as an expression of intensification. However, the fact that she does not have direct evidence about her plantation does not keep Paulina from making an assumption. After accounting for her ignorance saying that she is still planning to go to her plantation, she states that weeds will be growing there (line 4). This assumption is obviously based on previous experience and world knowledge, which can be seen during the continuation of the conversation, where the speakers complain that certain weeds always keep on coming back (cf. example (141) on page 135).

In (160), it is clear that the speaker of the second position =jtë=yu-marked question shows interest in the topic raised by the addressee in the initial content question. First, she gives a suggestion for a possible answer, second, the question concerns her own plantation which must be a topic of interest for her, since that is the place where her crops grow and which thus sustains her. Example (160) therefore provides evidence for the interpretation of second position =jtë=yu/ri-marked questions as aligning with the activity of the initial question of expressing strong interest in the topic.

In (159) and (160), the speaker who asked the initial content question expected the addressee to know the answer to the question. Thus, by indicating that she does not know, this assumption is disconfirmed. By expressing a high interest in the topic, =jtë-marked content questions in second positions provide a way of expressing ignorance without disaligning with the activity initiated by the

addressee with the initial question, and also without disaffiliating with the addressee by for example challenging her for asking the question. Thus, using =*jtë*-marked content questions is an aligning and affiliative way of expressing ignorance as a response to a content question.

=*Jtë*=*yu*/*ri*-marked content questions can also be used as responses to content questions which are not outright information requests. In this case, they also express alignment with the activity carried by the initial question. This is the case in example (161), where the initial question is marked with frustrative =*chi*. The use of =*chi* here reduces the pressure on the addressee to provide an answer (see section 7.2.2.1):

- (161) 1. A: *küwü küwü mala fchajmu:*
küwü küwü mala chajmu
 IDEO IDEO go.SG dog
 ‘Swimming goes the dog.’
2. M: *{ma:la chajmu layjla (1.0)}*
mala chajmu lacha=la
 go.SG dog too=COMM
 ‘The dog’s going as well.’
3. ⇒ A: *am:chi {batajnjaja? amchi daji}shtachi?*
amchi bata=chi=naja amchi daja-shta=chi
 where go.FUT=FR=NSIT where hang-FUT=FR
 ‘Where will it go? Where will it come to shore?’
4. M: *{m:::}*
m
 INTJ
 ‘Mmh...’
 (.)
5. ⇒ a:m: (1.0) *chi batajtënjaja(yu)*
amchi bata=jtë=naja=yu
 where go.FUT=ASSU=NSIT=RES.F
 ‘Where could it be going?’
 (al.ce.frogstory)

In example (161), the speakers are talking about picture 24 of the frog story. In line 1, Asunta notes that the dog went away swimming, which is confirmed by Magdalena in line 2. Asunta then poses two content questions, asking where it might go and where it might come to shore (line 3). She uses =*chi* in these questions to indicate that she does not expect the addressee to have superior access to the information.⁵ Magdalena responds with a =*jtë*=*yu*-marked content question in line 5, thereby indicating that she aligns with the activity of finding this information interesting and indicating that she has no

⁵For a detailed discussion of this use, see section 7.2.2.1, where the use of =*chi* in this example is discussed in detail (example (185)).

access to the information. Furthermore, Magdalena expresses affiliation with Asunta, since her response takes the same stance as Asunta's initial utterance: the information cannot be accessed by either of the speakers. The lengthening of the repeated question word is extreme in this example, and it even includes a break of one second. This lengthening expresses intensification, which heightens the degree of affiliation with the stance expressed in the initial utterance.

Content questions with $=jt\ddot{e}=yu/ri$ in second position are also used for expressing alignment with initial $=jt\ddot{e}=yu/ri$ -marked content questions. In these cases, they clearly mirror the stance expressed in the initial utterance, thereby expressing affiliation with the addressee. This usage is demonstrated by example (162). After Miguel has finished telling the demon narrative, Paulina wonders in lines 1 and 3 how many days the boy could have spent with the demon using a content question marked with $=jt\ddot{e}=yu/ri$. Miguel's response is a modified repeat also marked with $=jt\ddot{e}=yu/ri$:

- (162) 1. \Rightarrow P: *amti* (0.7) *diya kutütüjtë* (na)=
amti diya ku-tütü=jtë naa
 how_many day(SP) 3SG.OBJ.COM-be=ASSU DEM
 'How many days could he have been with...'
2. M: *=ja=*
a
 INTJ
 'Well.'
3. \Rightarrow P: *=diablo ajyigu=*
diablo ati=yu
 demon DEM=RES.F
 '... the demon?'
4. \Rightarrow M: *=a:mti diya (.) kutütüjtëri=*
amti diya ku-tütü=jtë=ri
 how_many day(SP) 3SG.OBJ.COM-be=ASSU=RES.M
 'How many days could he have been with it?'
5. P: *m:*
uj
 INTJ
 'Hm.'
 (ma.pu.diablo)

By using a content question marked with $=jt\ddot{e}=yu/ri$, Paulina indicates that she is not asking Miguel to provide the information queried by the question word. Accordingly, Miguel does not answer the question, but gives a modified repeat of the initial question also marked with $=jt\ddot{e}=yu/ri$. Miguel thereby aligns with Paulina's expression of interest about the topic. By using the same construction in form of a content question marked with $=jt\ddot{e}=yu/ri$, the speaker mirrors the stance taken by the addressee in the initial utterance. Question-response pairs consisting of two questions marked with $=jt\ddot{e}=yu/ri$ therefore represent a high

degree of affiliation of the speaker who gives the response with the speaker of the initial utterance.

Alignment to =jtë=yu/ri-marked content questions can also concern the activity of complaining and expressing a lack of understanding about the behavior of a third party (cf. examples (157) and (158) above). Example (163) demonstrates such a usage. Magdalena is telling Asunta about her father-in-law who was attacked in another village. In line 1, she says that he was almost seized and tied. Asunta wonders in line 2 why the people of that village were against him, using a content question marked with =jtë=yu. In line 3, Magdalena responds to this using a modified repeat of the initial question also marked with =jtë=yu:

- (163) 1. M: *ñu:nku bannay set[aj lijanlasa*
ñũñũju bauna=yã seta=ja li-ka-n-lasa
 little lack=IBR scize=REA \LOC-3SG.OBJ-BEN-tie(SP)
 ‘He almost seized and tied him.’
2. ⇒ A: *[tëtëpshë ësh itumëtujtëyu=*
tëtë-bëshëë ëshë itumëtë=w=jtë=yu
 which-entity why be.against=PL=ASSU=RES.F
 ‘What, why on earth would they be against him?’
3. ⇒ M: *=ë::sh itumëtujtëyu*
ëshë itumëtë=w=jtë=yu
 why be.against=PL=ASSU=RES.F
 ‘Why on earth would they be against him?’
 (270807_conv)

The activity of Asunta’s initial content question is to express that she has no understanding for the behavior of the people who attacked Magdalena’s father-in-law. Magdalena’s response in line 3 is a repeat of Asunta’s initial question marked with =jtë and =yu, with a lengthening of the question word. With this, she expresses her alignment with the activity of complaining and expressing outrage, by confirming that she can see no reason why the attackers would have been against her father-in-law. The =jtë=yu-marked content questions in second position aligns with the activity of the initial =jtë=yu-marked content question and affiliates with the stance expressed in the initial utterance.

It has been demonstrated in this section how content questions with =jtë=yu/ri in second position are used to align with the activity of the initial utterance. This use reflects the intersubjective semantics of =jtë, since it expresses a mutual lack of access to information.

6.3 Discussion

It has been shown in this chapter that =jtë=yu/ri in declaratives is used in a variety of interactional environments, in all of which it expresses a lack of direct

access to the information including the addressee. However, we have also seen that the lack of evidence is usually not the important part of the interpretation of $\text{=jt}\ddot{\text{e}}\text{=yu/ri}$, but that it should rather be considered a pragmatic marker that is used for expressing mutual lack of knowledge.

Content questions marked with $\text{=jt}\ddot{\text{e}}\text{=yu/ri}$ have developed a specific pragmatic reading. They express that the queried information cannot be accessed by either the speaker or the hearer. Content questions with $\text{=jt}\ddot{\text{e}}\text{=yu/ri}$ in first position are used to express interest in a topic without being able to access the information and to express actions relating to complaints. They are never used to request information from the addressee as canonical content questions are, since they express that the addressee is not expected to have access to the information. In second position, content questions with $\text{=jt}\ddot{\text{e}}\text{=yu/ri}$ are used to express alignment with the activity initiated by the initial utterance.

In the present discussion, a tentative account for the collocation of $\text{=jt}\ddot{\text{e}}$ with the resignative marker =yu/ri will be given by discussing examples where $\text{=jt}\ddot{\text{e}}$ occurs without this marker (section 6.3.1). Moreover, a possible explanation for the preference of $\text{=jt}\ddot{\text{e}}\text{=yu/ri}$ to occur in content questions will be given (section 6.3.2). This explanation suggests that the intersubjective component of $\text{=jt}\ddot{\text{e}}$ has led to the interactional preference of occurring in content questions, which in turn has led to a specific pragmatic interpretation of such content questions.

6.3.1 The collocation of $\text{=jt}\ddot{\text{e}}$ with resignative =yu/ri

The collocation of $\text{=jt}\ddot{\text{e}}$ and =yu/ri is so strong that we must assume that it has grammaticalized to a large extent. This raises the question why these two markers developed such a strong collocation. A possible explanation is the high semantic affinity between lack of evidence and resignation. However, this explanation is rather intuitive and hard to corroborate with the data. Since we lack extensive historical data of Yurakaré, it is impossible to make an informed claim regarding the development of the collocation. The scarce examples where $\text{=jt}\ddot{\text{e}}$ occurs without =yu/ri do not get a different interpretation from those with =yu/ri , which suggests that the meaning of the collocation is not compositional anymore.

In the conversational corpus, there are four such instances of $\text{=jt}\ddot{\text{e}}$, three of which are co-occurrences with the presupposition marker =se . The interpretation, however, does not seem to differ from the instances where =yu/ri is present. At least, there is no difference of interpretation visible in the data. In elicitation, constructed examples with $\text{=jt}\ddot{\text{e}}$ and =se were rejected most of the time. This suggests that this use must be restricted to very specific contexts.

The fact that $\text{=jt}\ddot{\text{e}}$ can still be used without the marker =yu/ri shows that the combination has not fully developed yet into a single discontinuous marker. However, the data suggest that the combination of $\text{=jt}\ddot{\text{e}}$ and =yu/ri is not compositional because the interpretation in the examples without =yu/ri is the same as in the examples with =yu/ri . This in turn suggests a high degree of grammaticalization of the collocation. The combination of assumptive $\text{=jt}\ddot{\text{e}}$ and resignative =yu/ri therefore is best analyzed as a collocation that has almost become obligatory.

The use of =jtë without =yu/ri can probably be considered a mistake or interpreted as some kind of elliptical construction. In example (164), Asunta is wondering in line 1 what the boy of the frog story is doing using a =jtë=yu marked content question. Magdalena's response is a modified repeat of that question. However, she is leaving out the question word tē 'what' as well as the resignative marker =yu. The fact that the question word is also missing suggests that her turn is in some way elliptical with respect to the initial utterance. This could also explain why =yu is not used.

- (164) 1. A: tē:: *dulajtë an sewweyu* (0.7)
 të dula=jtë ana sewwe=yu
 which do=ASSU DEM boy=RES.F
 'What could that boy be doing?'
 2. M: *dulajtë an sewwe anuta*
 dula=jtë ana sewwe anuta
 do=ASSU DEM boy like.that
 'The boy doing like that.'
 (aLce_frogstory)

The three cases where =jtë co-occurs with =se instead of =yu/ri can be explained by blocking. The use of the presupposition marker =se in combination with =yu/ri cannot be used in a compositional way, since the combination of =se and =ri/yu is grammaticalized to express the repetition of regret (New Tribes Mission n.d.: lesson 32). This suggests that the use of =yu/ri could be blocked by the use of the presupposition marker =se, because the combination of the two would result in a different meaning.

An example of a use of =jtë in combination with the presupposition marker =se is (165), in which the =jtë-marked content question functions as a complaint. Asunta is telling Elisa about a trip she made with me to the local boarding school. Since the way is quite far and rough, we wanted to go part of the way back by canoe and found a family who were willing to give us a lift. However, the canoe became too heavy and went under the second it was pushed into the water. In line 1, Asunta tells Elisa that we capsized. In line 2, she explains that we got up and ended up walking over land. She then wonders why we did not go over land to begin with, using a =jtë-marked content question with =se instead of =yu/ri (line 3). This utterance functions to express a complaint about the speaker's and her companions' own behavior in that situation: there is no way in which this behavior can be reasonably accessed or explained.

- (165) 1. A: *latish ta ta tapërujati* (.)
 latijsha ta-përuk-ta=ti
 then 1PL.OBJ-IDEO-MID=DS
 'Then we capsized.'
 2. *itataja dyomojtotu amajlatu latiji adojoła=*
 itta-tu=ja dyomojto-tu amala-tu
 thing-1PL=REA get.up-1PL come-1PL
 a-doįjo=ła
 3SG.POSS-body=INS

‘When we did what’s-it-called, we got up and we went over land.’

3. ⇒ =*ējnij* *amalatutē ush adojolase* (0.6)

ējij amala-tu=jtē ushta
 why_not come-1PL=ASSU before
a-dojjo=la=se
 3SG.POSS-body=INS=PSUP

‘Why the hell did we not go over land straight away?’

4. *adojola amalatat nij litapëruktachila* (0.4)

a-dojjo=la amala-ta-tu nij
 3SG.POSS-body=INS come-HYP-1PL NEG
li-ta-përuk-ta=chi=la
 \LOC-1PL.OBJ-IDEO-MID=FR=COMM

‘Had we gone over land, we wouldn’t have capsized there.’

5. E: *a::chamapchila*

achama-p=chi=la
 be_like_that-2PL=FR=COMM
 ‘You wouldn’t.’
 (290906_convI)

Asunta adds in line 4 an account for her complaint in the form of a counterfactual conditional, saying that had we gone over land, we would not have capsized. Only here does Elisa give an agreeing response. She does not respond to the content question in line 3.

The content question marked with =*jtē* expresses a complaint of the speaker about her own behavior, carrying a self-deprecating action. We can again observe that the speaker has superior access to the circumstances than the addressee, because she is talking about an event in which she participated but the addressee did not. =*Jtē* expresses an intersubjective value in that the speaker does not expect the addressee to be able to make sense of her behavior either (i.e. to have access to possible reasons for why she did not go over land). The marker =*se* can be interpreted in this example as ‘instead’. The ‘instead’ refers to the event of trying to go in a canoe, so it refers back to another presupposed situation that is necessary to interpret the utterance.

Even though =*vu/ri* is missing in (165), the interpretation of the whole utterance does not differ from the interpretation of content questions with =*jtē* marked with =*vu/ri*. The utterance is interpreted as a complaint through expressing that there is no way in which the reasons for the behavior of the speaker can be accessed, i.e. that the behavior was unreasonable. The intersubjective interpretation also holds, since the addressee is not expected to be able to make sense of the behavior. The presupposition marker =*se* adds its own interpretation, introducing a presupposed event with which the event of the proposition is compared. In this case, the interpretation of ‘instead’ arises. It seems that the use of the resignative marker is blocked by the use of the presupposition marker =*se* because the combination of =*se* and =*vu/ri* is grammaticalized and would not be interpreted in a compositional way. Thus, the

uses of *jtë* in combination with *=se* can probably be explained by blocking, which supports the view that the combination of *=jtë* with *=yu/ri* is grammaticalized to a high degree.

To summarize, it is likely that the collocation of *=jtë* with the resignative marker *=yu/ri* has to a large extent grammaticalized. In the following section, it will be proposed that content questions with *=jtë=yu/ri* can be considered a conventionalized interactional practice.

6.3.2 Content questions with *=jtë* and *=yu/ri* as an interactional practice

It has been shown above that content questions with *=jtë=yu/ri* indicate that the question is not meant to make relevant an answer to the question as a response. This use is only possible because of the intersubjective component of *=jtë=yu/ri*. This intersubjective component makes the question express that the addressee is not expected to know the answer to the question. Therefore, the intersubjective reading must have preceded the use of *=jtë=yu/ri* in content questions. Since intersubjective meanings tend to be preceded by subjective meanings in grammaticalization and semantic change (Traugott 2004:551, Traugott and Dasher 2002:94), we can assume that *=jtë* had a subjective interpretation at the beginning, referring only to the speaker's information access. Possibly, the intersubjective interpretation only arose through the use of *=jtë* in combination with *=yu/ri*. The use of *=jtë=yu/ri* in content questions probably only arose after the intersubjective interpretation emerged.

The semantics of expressing lack of evidence of *=jtë* can be argued to have a semantic and pragmatic affinity to questions, which usually express that the speaker has no access to the queried information. This affinity could explain why *=jtë=yu/ri* is frequently used in content questions. Therefore, it seems plausible to assume that the semantics of *=jtë*, either alone or in combination with *=yu/ri*, has facilitated its use in content questions.

The use of *=jtë=yu/ri* is dispreferred in declaratives, which is probably also a result of its evidential semantics. It has been proposed that evidentials can be ordered with respect to each other, the ordering being pragmatically motivated in terms of speaker preference. These orderings are usually called evidential scales, or hierarchies. Evidential scales have been used to account for the implicatures that are claimed to arise with certain evidentials, namely that the use of an evidential lower on the scale implicates that the speaker could not have used one higher on the scale (cf. Faller 2002:66).

Faller (p. 61) points out that the concept of preference has been understood in different ways in the literature. She (p. 70) takes directness of evidence as the ordering principle, and proposes a two-dimensional scale, one that goes from Performative to Assumption, and one that goes from Direct to Hearsay:

(166) a. **The Personal Evidence Cline**

Performative > Visual > Auditory > Other sensory > Inference
from results > Reasoning > **Assumption**

b. **The Mediated Evidence Cline**

Direct > Secondhand > Thirdhand > Hearsay/Folklore
(Faller 2002:70. emphasis added)

The clines indicate that if a speaker has more than one type of evidence, she will prefer to use the evidential that is higher on the scale. In the Personal Evidence Cline proposed by Faller, it can be observed that Assumptive comes at the very end of the cline and should therefore be expected to be dispreferred if an evidential higher on the scale can be used. In individual languages, I expect this to result in a lower frequency in discourse and interaction of evidentials lower on the scale compared to evidentials higher on the scale. This can certainly be observed for the Yurakaré assumptive. In the conversational corpus studied for this dissertation, there are over 700 occurrences of =*va* (reported and epistemic counted together), 103 instances of inferential =*tiba*, and 109 occurrences of subjective =*laba*. Assumptive =*jtě* only occurs 69 times, of which only 22 occurrences are in declaratives. This shows that the assumptive marker is used less frequently than the other evidentials, which suggests that it is in some way dispreferred.

To summarize, assumptive =*jtě* in combination with resignative =*yu/ri* can be considered a pragmatic marker of mutual lack of information access. In content questions, a specific interpretation has developed indicating mutual lack of information access of speaker and addressee. It has been argued that the preference for content questions and the dispreference for declaratives is due to the semantics of =*jtě*=*yu/ri* as expressing lack of evidence. This means that the semantics of grammatical items such as evidentials can facilitate and also obstruct certain uses in interaction.

Chapter 7

From frustrative to politeness: =*chi* ‘frustrative’

Of the five verbal enclitics of Yurakaré, the frustrative marker =*chi* is the only one that does not encode an evidential value as its basic semantics. This chapter describes the basic semantics of =*chi* as frustrative, and shows that in interaction, =*chi* is used as a marker of politeness. Frustrative =*chi* can be combined with two of the evidentials, reported/intersubjective =*ya* and subjective =*laba*. These combinations are discussed in a separate chapter (8).

=*Chi* has an allomorphic variant =*vj*, which is frequently used in everyday speech. It is not entirely clear which factors condition the use of the two allomorphs, since no clear pattern can be observed in the data.

This chapter consists of three parts. Section 7.1 is concerned with the basic semantics of =*chi*. It demonstrates that =*chi* is a frustrative marker, indicating that the event described by the verb was not actualized. In section 7.2, the interactional uses of =*chi* are discussed. It is argued that =*chi* is used as a marker of politeness in interaction. Section 7.3 discusses how this politeness use can be pragmatically derived from the basic frustrative semantics of =*chi*.

7.1 =*Chi* as a frustrative marker

In declaratives, the most basic interpretation of =*chi* is the frustration of a planned, desired, or in another way expected event. The most frequent frustrative use of =*chi* is in combination with some of the irrealis TAM markers. This interpretation of =*chi* is discussed in section 7.1.1. Another frequent use of =*chi* is to mark counterfactuality in conditionals (section 7.1.2). Section 7.1.3 deals with the use of =*chi* in combination with quotative constructions, where it can be used to indicate that the event described in the direct speech complement is not true.

7.1.1 Frustrative with irrealis TAM markers

The most basic interpretation of =*chi* in declaratives is the frustration of a plan or intention of the clause's subject participant. One context for the frustrative interpretation to arise is when =*chi* is combined with an irrealis TAM marker (cf. section 2.6.3.1). The markers that occur with =*chi* in the conversational corpus are *-sh̄ta* 'future' (cf. section 2.5.4.1), *-nta* 'desiderative' (cf. section 2.5.4.3.2), *-ni* 'intentional' (cf. section 2.5.4.3.1), and *-jti* 'habitual' (cf. section 2.5.4.2.1). Furthermore, =*chi* occurs with the ability modal *iba* 'can', which is on its way of grammaticalization into an irrealis TAM marker. Since it behaves in the same way as the irrealis TAM markers in many respects, it is included in this section. The frequency of occurrence of these markers in combination with =*chi* is represented in Table 7.1.

Table 7.1: The frequencies of the irrealis TAM suffixes with =*chi* in frustrative declaratives

TAM marker	Frequency	Percent of total
Future <i>-sh̄ta</i>	12	52%
Desiderative <i>-nta</i>	5	22%
Intentional <i>-ni</i>	1	4.5%
Habitual <i>-jti</i>	1	4.5%
Ability modal <i>iba</i>	4	17%
Total	23	100%

Table 7.1 shows that of the irrealis TAM markers, the future marker *-sh̄ta* occurs most frequently with =*chi*. In combination with *-sh̄ta*, =*chi* expresses that the event that was going to occur as indicated by the future marker did not actually occur. Thus, =*chi* places the time of possible occurrence of the event and the time of the event being frustrated in the past. This means that in combination with =*chi*, the TAM markers that usually trigger future interpretation such as future *-sh̄ta* and desiderative *-nta* are interpreted as past. Consider example (167) from the *diablo* narrative. Miguel states that the demon was going to make the children fat and eat them. Frustrative =*chi* expresses here that the planned event of eating the children was frustrated, i.e. that the demon did not succeed in completing this action:

- (167) *na s̄j̄s̄j̄ mamb̄ya machishtaȳn̄ajase*
naa s̄j̄s̄j̄ ma-n-ib̄b̄b̄=ya
 DEM fat 3PL.OBJ-BEN-treat=IRR
ma-che-sh̄ta=chi=naja=se
 3PL.OBJ-cat-FUT=FR=NSIT=PSUP
 'She was going to make them grow fat and eat them.'
 (ma_pu_diablo)

An example of =*chi* in combination with the desiderative marker *-nta* is (168), where =*chi* expresses that the event desired by the subject participant of the clause was frustrated. Asunta and Magdalena are talking about the *w̄w̄ēt̄i*¹

¹ *W̄w̄ēt̄i* are the traditional mourning chants of the Yurakaré.

recordings to which Asunta has listened the day before. Magdalena has just asked whether their father has also listened to it on that day, which Asunta has disconfirmed. In line 1, she starts explaining what happened, saying that their father came to her house the day before. Then, in line 3 she uses a =*chi*-marked utterance containing the desiderative marker *-nta* to express that their father wanted to listen to it but did not.

- (168) 1. A: *shěys amalase* (0.5)
shěy=se amalase
 yesterday=PSUP come=PSUP
 ‘Yesterday again, he came here again.’
2. M: (...) (.)
3. ⇒ A: *kalwshěntayjse* (0.5)
ka-la-wěshě-nta=chi=sc
 3SG.OBJ-MAL-listen-DES=FR=PSUP
 ‘He wanted to listen to it again.’
4. ⇒ M: *nij kalawshě?* (.)
nij ka-la-wěshě
 NEG 3SG.OBJ-MAL-listen
 ‘He didn’t listen to it?’
5. A: *nij kalaushě*
nij ka-la-wěshě
 NEG 3SG.OBJ-MAL-listen
 ‘He didn’t listen to it.’
 (270807_conv)

The desiderative marker *-nta* indicates that the event was desired by the subject of the clause, the father of the two speakers, and =*chi* marks that the event was frustrated and did not occur.

A frustrative interpretation of =*chi* can also arise with the habitual marker *-jti*. Of the irrealis TAM markers, it is the only one which does not convey future reference. In this case, the interpretation is not as straightforward as with future *-shta* and desiderative *-nta*. The only example in the corpus is (169) from a conversation where Virgilio and Santiago are talking about dogs. Virgilio says that his new dog is not really good at hunting, because it only follows the animals a little while and then leaves them. The first verb *mala* ‘go.SG’ carries the comitative object marker *ku-*, which results in an interpretation of ‘following’. The habitual component is marked by *-jti*. The verb is additionally marked with frustrative =*chi*.

- (169) *kumalajtichi kumalanñuya* (.) *kalasajti an běshě* (ana)
ku-mala-jti=chi ku-mala-mñu=va
 3SG.OBJ.COM-go.SG-HAB=FR 3SG.OBJ.COM-go.SG-DIM=IRR
ka-la-saa-jti ana běshěc ana
 3SG.OBJ-MAL-finish-HAB DEM entity DEM

‘He follows it (but doesn’t fulfill the purpose of trapping it in its cave), following it a little it leaves the animal again.’
(040707_conv)

The effect of =*chi* in this example is to express frustration of the goal of following the animals, which is to trap them in their caves. Here we can see that =*chi* does not always mean that the action denoted by the verb is not actualized, but also that it is not taken to its end or does not fulfill its purpose. What is frustrated here is the telicity component of the action. This telicity is inferred from the context, since it is not the case that all instances of following should result in the trapping of a wild animal in its cave. The frustration is not associated with one single event, but with a series of events as indicated by the use of habitual -*jtí*.

The combination of =*chi* with the habitual marker -*jtí* only occurs once in the conversational corpus (cf. Table 7.1). Since in addition speakers show difficulties in interpreting examples with =*chi* in combination with habitual -*jtí* in elicitation, it seems that this use is not very common.

The ability modal verb *iba* ‘can’ is on its way of grammaticalizing into a verbal TAM suffix. While some speakers already use it as a suffix (van Gijn 2006:296), in San Pablo *iba* is still mostly used as a verb with its own lexical stress pattern. The modal *iba* forms a serial verb construction with the verb that precedes it, where *iba* carries the subject marking suffix and the first verb is unmarked. This is exactly the morphosyntactic condition for grammaticalization toward a TAM suffix, since the TAM suffixes occupy the slot between the verb and the subject marker.

Another clue for the probable grammaticalization of *iba* is that in combination with =*chi* it yields the same frustrative interpretation as the other irrealis TAM suffixes. Example (170) demonstrates the combination of *iba* with =*chi*. Asunta and Magdalena are talking inside the house, when Asunta suddenly notices that the children are destroying an orange tree outside and calls out to them (line 1). In line 4, Magdalena remarks that Asunta could have planted the tree in another place. =*Chi* in combination with *iba* yields a frustrative interpretation, indicating that the event denoted in the proposition cannot occur anymore: the tree cannot be planted in another place anymore.

- (170) 1. A: ((looking outside the window, standing)) *ěshě arumbap na naranja*
ěshě aramba-p ana naranja
 why break-2PL DEM orange(SP)
 ‘Why did you break that orange tree?’
2. ((6 seconds omitted, where the children outside say something that is inaudible))
3. M: ((looking outside)) (*anu*) *lulěw* (1.3)
anu lulě=w
 like_that pull_out=PL
 ‘They pulled it out like that!’

4. ⇒ ((pointing)) *naachi pëjta ibamchi* (0.7)
 naa=chi pëjta iba-m=chi
 DEM=DIR put can-2SG=FR
 ‘You could have planted it over there.’
5. A: *nijta latijse*
 nijta l-ati=y=se
 NEG REF-DEM=LOC=PSUP
 ‘No, that’s where it was.’
 (270807_conv)

Just like with the irrealis TAM suffixes, =*chi* in combination with the ability modal *iba* places the time when the event could have occurred in the past, thus expressing that the event cannot occur anymore at the time of speaking. Without =*chi*, *iba* indicates that the event described by the verb is still possible at the time of speaking. This can be seen in example (171), where Paulina suggests to Miguel that they should finish their conversation and go home:

- (171) *lani tajantoro ibab kompadrebë*
 l-ana=v ta-ka-u-toro iba=bë
 REF-DEM=LOC 1PL.OBJ-3SG.OBJ-BEN-finish can=MOM
 kompadre=bë
 compadre(SP)=MOM
 ‘We can finish now, compadre.’
 (220906_convII)

In (171), *iba* indicates that the two speakers should finish work now. The event is still possible, and is in fact going to occur. If *iba* was marked with =*chi*, the interpretation would be that the event cannot occur anymore, and that the time where the event was possible lies in the past (“We should have finished”).

In this section, it has been demonstrated that =*chi* in declaratives with irrealis TAM markers encodes the frustration of the event. As to scope, it has to be noted that =*chi* in this frustrative use scopes over the event, not over the proposition. It marks the frustration of the event described by the verb, not including the frustration of the TAM value indicated by the TAM marker. It is the event that is frustrated, while the event denoted by the TAM marker (e.g. planning, wanting, intending) is actualized.

Another frequent frustrative use of =*chi* is to mark counterfactuality in conditionals. This is the topic of the following section.

7.1.2 Counterfactual conditionals

Frustrative =*chi* is used in the apodosis of conditionals to mark counterfactuality. Its use seems to be obligatory in counterfactual conditionals. The whole construction seems to be grammaticalized to a large extent. Frustrative =*chi* is attached to the verb of the apodosis, while the verb of the protasis is marked with the ‘hypothetical’ marker *-ta* (see section 2.5.4.3.4). Consider example (172):

(172) *papel ana (.) anchimash tütatam yishtamchise*

papel ana ana=chi-mashi tüta-ta-m
paper(SP) DEM DEM=DIR-MINTS put-HYP-2SG
vita-shta-m=chi=se
good-FUT-2SG=FR=PSUP

‘This paper, if you had drawn it a little bit more to this side you would have been fine.’

(mapI)

During the drawing of the San Pablo map, Patricia tells Juan that if he had drawn the lagoon a bit more to the other side of the paper, he would be going to be fine, i.e. he would be going to have enough space for everything else. =*Chi* indicates that this cannot happen anymore, since the possible time for its occurrence lies in the past: Juan has already drawn the lagoon in the wrong place, and now he will not have enough space to draw everything else. In frustrative terms, =*chi* marks the frustration of the event of the apodosis.

Note that the future marker *-shta* retains its future semantics here. The event would occur in the future in relation to the speech situation. In this respect, conditionals differ from frustrative constructions, where the future is not interpreted in relation to the speech event, but rather as a relative future in relation to the events the speakers talk about.

In counterfactual conditionals, =*chi* frequently co-occurs with the reported/ intersubjective marker =*va*. This use is discussed in a separate section of the chapter on combinations within the set of verbal enclitics (section 8.1).

In the following section, the use of =*chi* with quotatives will be discussed. In this use, =*chi* is attached to the speech verb but scopes over the event described in the direct speech complement.

7.1.3 Frustrative =*chi* with quotatives

In combination with quotative constructions involving the speech act verb *ta* ‘say’ and a direct speech complement, =*chi* marks that the event described in the direct speech complement is false in the actual world, but was said or thought to be true at the time in the past to which the matrix verb *ta* refers. It is interesting to observe the scope of =*chi* in these constructions, since it does not take scope over the matrix clause, but only over the event described by the direct speech complement clause. This means that =*chi* in combination with quotatives does not take scope over the event denoted by the verb to which it is attached, the speech act verb *ta* ‘say’. The verb it is attached to is not under the scope of =*chi* in these constructions, since the event of saying or thinking did actually occur. Consider (173), where Paulina tells Miguel that her husband wrongfully thought at some time in the past that his dog got killed by a peccary:

(173) *alla boboyñaj titiba (.) kutaychi mijompadre*

alla bobo=ya=naja ti-tiba ku-ta=ya=chi
 therefore kill=REP=NSIT 1SG.POSS-pet 3SG.OBJ.COM-say=REP=FR
mi-kompadre
 2SG.POSS-compadre(SP)

‘Because of that your compadre thought: “It seems like it has already killed my dog.”’
 (160906_conv1)

Before uttering (173). Paulina has been telling Miguel how the dog of her husband entered a peccary’s burrow. Her husband did not get any sign of the dog for a while, so he thought that the dog had already been killed by the peccary. The verb *ta* ‘say’ is marked with =*chi* to indicate that the dog has not been killed in the real world, i.e. that the thought of the subject expressed in the direct speech complement was actually wrong in the real world. =*Chi* does not scope over the speech act verb it is attached to. The action of saying, in this case interpreted as thinking, did actually occur and was not frustrated, while the event denoted by the direct speech complement is under the scope of =*chi* and thus marked as false.

Quotatives with =*chi* can also be used to indicate that proposition of the speech complement is a lie uttered by the subject of the speech act verb, like in (174). The example is taken from a narrative about a man who thinks his wife is cheating on him, so he tells her that he will go to the jungle to make her feel safe to be able to meet her lover. He does not really go to the jungle, but just hides somewhere to wait for her lover to appear. This man is the subject of the speech verb in (174). The direct speech complement, in which the man says to his wife that he will go to the jungle, must be considered a lie. This is marked with =*chi* on the speech act verb *ta* to make clear for the addressee right away that the man is not really going away.

(174) *malani lētēmēyjbē tayj malaj (li)teshentalā*
mala-ni-y lētēmē=chi=bē ta=chi mala=ja
 go.SG-INT-1SG jungle=DIR=MOM say=FR go.SG=REA
li-teshe-nta=la
 VLOC-sleep-DES=INS
 ‘I’ll go to the jungle for a while.’ he said when he went to stay overnight.’
 (al_tradiciones)

As a last example for the use of =*chi* with quotatives, consider (175). Virgilio has just explained that he wanted to get a pup from a nearby farm, but then states in line 1 that he did not even go to look at it. In line 2, Santiago asks for reconfirmation, which he gets from Virgilio in line 3. Virgilio then adds that the owner of the pups had told him to go there to take one of the pups. He uses a quotative construction with a direct speech complement where the imperative uttered by the owner of the puppies is expressed through the use of the imperative TAM suffix *-ma*.

(175) 1. V: *amaj liwjanu(...)* (0.4)

- amaja li-ujwa-ni-y*
 how VLOC-look-INT-1SG
 ‘I didn’t even go to look at it.’
2. S: *nij liujnim pi latiji* (0.4)
nij li-ujwa-ni-m pii latiji
 NEG VLOC-look-INT-2SG older_brother.M then
 ‘You didn’t go to look at it?’
3. ⇒ V: *nijtala* (0.4) *kaymalama tētachi (ush)*
nijta=la ka-y-mala-ma
 NEG=COMM 3SG.OBJ-GOA-go.SG-IMP.SG
të-ta=chi ushta
 1SG.OBJ.COM-say=FR before
 ‘No. He had said to me: “Come to get one.” (but I didn’t).’
 (040707_conv)

Frustrative =*chi* is attached to the speech act verb *ta* ‘say’ and expresses that the command expressed in the direct speech complement was not fulfilled by the person to whom the command was addressed, in this case the speaker, i.e. that he did not take one of the pups.

The use of =*chi* is not obligatory to indicate that the event described by the speech complement of a quotative is false. The verb *ta* ‘say’ in its cognitive (‘think’) interpretation can get this reading in Yurakaré when used in a past context without being marked with =*chi*. This becomes clear in example (176). Asunta and Paulina have been talking about Asunta’s daughter who has given birth before the baby was actually due. In the utterance, Asunta states that she had thought at a certain time that there was still time until the birth:

- (176) *kanimashiya* (.) *kuti komadre lacha*
kani-mashi=ya kn-ta-y komadre lacha
 not_yet-MINTS=REP 3SG.OBJ.COM-say-1SG comadre(SP) too
 ‘I thought as well, comadre: “There is still time.”’
 (040707_conv)

Since both speakers already know what happened, it is clear to both that the direct speech complement has turned out to be false. This could explain why =*chi* is not used here to indicate the falseness. The example shows that it is not obligatory to use =*chi* to arrive at the interpretation of wrongfully thinking or saying something, since this can also arise through implicature.

This section has shown that =*chi* is used with quotatives to indicate that the event described in the direct speech complement has turned out to be false. In these constructions, =*chi* does not take scope over the speech act verb to which it is attached. This scope relation can be explained with the observation that =*chi* expresses a comment on the direct speech complement proposition, that was either not known to be false at the time of speaking or was pretended to be true (as in (174)). The direct speech complement is

supposed to represent a speech act that was uttered or thought. Attaching =*chi* directly to the verb of the direct speech complement would result in the interpretation that =*chi* had been present in that utterance (cf. also section 2.7.2.3). =*Chi* can therefore not be used within the direct speech complement to express that it was uttered wrongfully. An example is (177), where =*chi* is part of the direct speech complement. It is interpreted as being part of the quoted utterance:

- (177) *ējnij chittapchi muti sē*
ējnij chitta-p=chi mu-ta-y sēē
 why_not throw.away.SG-2PL=FR 3PL.OBJ.COM-say-1SG 1SG.PRON
 ‘“Why did you not throw it away?” I asked them.’
 (290906_conv1)

If =*chi* is part of the direct speech complement, it cannot be interpreted as marking the direct speech complement as false. This explains why =*chi* is attached to the speech act verb outside the direct speech clause to indicate that the direct speech complement is false.

To summarize, in this section it was demonstrated that =*chi* is a frustrative marker that encodes that the event denoted by the verb over which it scopes was frustrated, i.e. that it did not occur. There are three main frustrative uses of =*chi* in declaratives: the use with an irrealis TAM marker, in conditionals, and with quotatives. The frequencies of these three uses of =*chi* in declaratives are summarized in Table 7.2.

Table 7.2: The frequencies of the frustrative uses of =*chi*

Use	Frequency	Percent of total
Frustrative	23	41%
Conditional	21	38%
Quotative	8	14%
Agreement with = <i>ya</i> ¹	4	7%
Total	56	100%

¹ This use of =*chi* is discussed in section 8.1 of the chapter on combinations within the verbal enclitic set.

The following section deals with the interactional uses of =*chi*, where it is not used to express the frustration of an event, but rather to express a politeness value. This interpretation arises in commands and content questions. These uses are discussed in section 7.2.1 and 7.2.2, respectively.

7.2 =*Chi* as a politeness marker in interaction

Apart from declaratives, frustrative =*chi* occurs in commands and content questions. The two canonical actions for commands and content questions, action requests and information requests, can be considered potentially face-threatening actions in the sense of Brown and Levinson (1978). It will be argued

in this section that the use of =*chi* constitutes a strategy for diminishing the face threat of these actions, and that the use of =*chi* can therefore be considered to express a value of politeness.

The notion of politeness developed in Brown and Levinson (1978) is based on the concept of ‘face’ originally introduced by Goffman (1967). Face is considered a property of all members of a society. There are two types of face: the negative face being the wish to be unimpeded and undisturbed in the personal freedom of action, the positive face is the desire to be approved of by other members of the society (Brown and Levinson 1978:66). Some actions are inherently face-threatening because they encroach upon certain aspects of face. For example, action requests are used to try to get the addressee to perform a certain action, which potentially violates his desire to be unimpeded in his freedom of action, i.e. his negative face (pp. 70-1). When performing such face-threatening actions, speakers can use a range of strategies to reduce the potential face threat of that action. Such strategies can become conventionalized politeness strategies, like using question format for action requests in English and many other languages (‘Could you open the window?’) (pp. 74-5). These strategies can attend to different aspects of the addressee’s face.

In the following two sections, it is argued that the use of =*chi* in action and information requests is an instance of such a politeness strategy that mainly attends to the addressee’s negative face in that it expresses the speaker’s pessimism about the addressee’s willingness to perform the requested action or give the requested information. In this way, =*chi* reduces the pressure on the addressee to attend to the request, which in turn reduces the risk for the speaker of losing her face when the request is actually denied. It will be argued that the politeness interpretation can be derived from the basic frustrative semantics through pragmatic inference.

Table 7.3 summarizes the frequencies of the uses of =*chi* in declaratives, commands and content questions. It becomes clear that the use in content questions is the most frequent, while the use in commands is very scarce.

Table 7.3: The frequencies of the uses of =*chi*

Use	Frequency	Percent of total
Frustrative in declaratives	56	26%
Commands	6	3%
Content questions	93	44%
Other/unclear ¹	57	27%
Total	212	100%

¹ The category ‘other’ includes for example combinations with the subjective evidential =*laba* (cf. section 8.2) and uses of =*chi* within direct speech complements.

7.2.1 =*Chi* in commands

The term ‘command’ is used here to refer to utterances that convey that the speaker wants the addressee to perform a certain action. Commands in Yurakaré

Magdalena disconfirms this, stating that she does not know about it either. In line 4, Magdalena adds that she only has indirect knowledge through what other people have told her about the animals.

The imperative in line 1 conveys an action request: Asunta asks Magdalena to give her information about the eagles that live in Oromomo. This action request exhibits various turn design features that make it easier for Magdalena to resist the request. Magdalena responds in line 3 not to the command in line 1, but rather to the account for the command in line 2. She can do this precisely because the account was offered by Asunta. This leaves the option for Magdalena to choose to which utterance she attends. Obviously, it is easier for her to disconfirm Asunta's assumption that she knows about the harpy eagles of Oromomo, rather than denying the performance of the action of telling requested in line 1. Magdalena's response can be read as an account for denying to perform the action, which is facilitated through Asunta's account for making the command in line 2.

Another feature that makes the command formally easier to resist for Magdalena is the use of *=chi*. *=Chi* in commands can be considered a conventionalized politeness marker, which formally reduces the pressure on the addressee to perform the requested action and thus attends to the addressee's negative face. This politeness interpretation can be derived from the basic frustrative interpretation of *=chi* by pragmatic inference in the following way. The imperative marker *-ma* is one of the irrealis TAM markers (cf. section 2.6.3.1). Above in section 7.1.1, it has been shown that *=chi* in co-occurrence with certain irrealis TAM markers yields a frustrative interpretation. If we apply this interpretation to the imperative TAM marker *-ma*, it would yield an interpretation like 'I ordered you to do it but you did not do it', since *=chi* places the possible actualization of the event described in the proposition in the past, and expresses that the event has not actually occurred and cannot occur anymore. This literal interpretation of *=chi* with the imperative is however not the pragmatically correct one, since the speaker still wants the addressee to perform the action when uttering a command with *=chi*. Rather, the use of the frustrative construction with the imperative TAM marker is a conventionalized politeness strategy. Literally, it expresses that the addressee has already rejected or failed to perform the requested action. This formulation can be considered an instance of the 'be pessimistic' strategy proposed by Brown and Levinson (1978:177-81), a politeness strategy where the speaker expresses pessimism about the willingness or ability of the addressee to perform the requested action. An example for English would be negative usages like 'I don't suppose there'd be any chance of you. . . ' (p. 179). This example parallels the use of *=chi* with imperative in (178).

By formally reducing the pressure on the addressee to perform the requested action, *=chi* also attends to the speaker's negative face in case the request is declined, since *=chi* had already expressed that she did not really expect the addressee to grant it. It has to be noted that the reduction of pressure to perform the action seems to be only formally, not actually achieved by *=chi*. We can observe this in example (179), an extension of (172) above. Patricia tells Juan in line 1 that he should have drawn the lagoon of San Pablo at

another place to have more space for the rest of the map. Juan's response is a =*chi*-marked command, telling her that she should draw it (line 2):

- (179) 1. P: ((pointing to paper)) *papel ana* (0.3) *anchimash tütatam yishtamchi(se)* (0.9)
papel ana ana=chi-mashi tiita-ta-m
 paper(SP) DEM DEM=DIR-MINTS put-HYP-2SG
vita-shta-m=chi=se
 good-FUT=-2SG=FR=PSUP
 'This paper, if you had drawn it a little bit more to this side you would have been fine.'
2. ⇒ J: *dulamchinaj lacha* (0.6) (*ya*) ((starts handing an empty piece of paper to Patricia)) (2.4)
dula-ma=chi=naja lacha ya
 do-IMP.SG=FR=NSIT too now(SP)
 'Then do it as well now.'
3. P: *pereshatu papel* ((laughs)) *hehe* ((takes the empty piece of paper from Juan)) (0.6) (...)=
pere-shta-tu papel
 ruin(SP)-FUT-1PL paper(SP)
 'We're going to ruin the paper!'
4. J: =*an dulantu* ((drops the pen on her paper)) (0.4) *ami* (.) [*bush bushantu*] *ana* ((takes the used piece of paper and starts folding it)) (.) (...)=
ana=y dula-ni-tu ana=y busha-ni-tu ana
 DEM=LOC do-INT-1PL DEM=LOC lay_down-INT-1PL DEM
 'Let's do it here. Here, we'll put this one aside.'
5. P: (([picks up pen]))
 =(...) (0.5)
6. ⇒ J: ((folding his paper)) *dulamchi* (1.6) *ännëtë na* (1.2)
dula-ma=chi ännëtë naa
 do-IMP.SG=FR bad DEM
 'Do it. This one is bad.'
7. P: *lati dulambël* (...) *dejpues anchi kopiantu latiji* (...) (0.8)
 (...) ((offers him the pen))
l-ati=y dula-ma=bëla dejpues ana=chi
 REF-DEM=LOC do-IMP.SG=CONT then(SP) DEM=DIR
kopia-ni-tu latiji
 copy(SP)-INT-1PL then
 'Do it first on that one (the old one), then let's copy it to this one (the new one).'
8. J: ((takes the pen, unfolds the used paper, puts it on the table))
 (mapI)

Juan hands Patricia a new piece of paper (line 2) and she makes a comment on this in line 3, noting that they will ruin the paper if they go on like that. This can be read as her first indirect attempt to resist the command, since it refers to the fact that Juan has handed her a new piece of paper, which is a potential risk for ruining more sheets by drawing the map in the wrong way. However, she takes the paper, which shows that her resistance is not very strong. In line 4, Juan suggests that they should throw away the used piece of paper and make a new drawing on a fresh piece of paper. After dropping the pen on Patricia's piece of paper, he starts folding the old paper. Patricia takes the pen in line 5, but does not start drawing. In line 6, Juan repeats his =*chi*-marked command, adding that the old paper is no good, which seems to serve as an account for the command.

Throughout this sequence, we can observe that Patricia has a hard time resisting Juan's request that she should draw the map on a new piece of paper, even though it is clear from her actions that she is not very keen on doing so. She only reluctantly takes the paper and the pen, and does not start drawing. This seems to be because by denying the request, she admits that she is not able to do it better than Juan, even though she has implicated this by some of her preceding comments. Resisting the action request results in a loss of face (and actually helps restore Juan's positive face, since it indirectly approves of his performance), even though the command by which the action request was expressed was marked with =*chi*. This shows that marking of commands with =*chi* does not really but only formally reduce the pressure on the addressee of performing or at least rejecting to perform the action. This is corroborated by the observation that Juan performs additional actions to make the command even harder to resist, in that he hands Patricia the paper and the pen she needs to perform the action. Therefore, we have to consider the use of =*chi* to be a conventionalized politeness strategy with its literal meaning of frustrative being lost in all instances.

It seems that the reading of =*chi* in the two commands in (179) has another connotation that is more clearly related to its frustrative reading, namely that of questioning the ability of the addressee to perform the requested action. This can also be explained with the 'be pessimistic' strategy, but does not go one step further to express politeness. Rather, the literal interpretation of pessimism is retained in the uses in (179). In this way, =*chi* makes the commands sound like challenges rather than polite requests. It is interesting to observe that =*chi* can be used in both ways, to express real pessimism and to express polite, formal pessimism.

Commands are not very frequent in the conversational corpus (cf. Table 7.3), so it is hard to make a firm statement. An example from elicitation of a command with the intentional marker =*ni* is (180), where the command involves the addressee going somewhere else to look whether there is a jaguar there:

(180) *liujanimchi nentaya tütülab samu*

li-ujwa-ni-m=chi *nentaya tütü=laba samu*
 VLOC-look-INT-2SG=FR maybe be=SUBJ jaguar

‘Go and look, maybe there is a jaguar.’
(elicited example)

It seems that the use of =*chi* with the verb *ujwa* ‘look’ and the verbal locative marker *li-* is collocational. This probably comes from the interpretation yielded by the combination of the verbal locative with the verb *ujwa* ‘look’ that the addressee has to go to another place, which can be considered an action that requires a certain effort by the addressee. A naturally occurring example is (181), where Magdalena tells her child to walk over to the kitchen to tell Asunta’s daughter that Magdalena’s little boy will come to her so she can look after him.

- (181) 1. *liwjanimchi* (1.6)
li-ujwa-ni-m=chi
VLOC-look-INT-2SG=FR
‘Go and look.’
2. *bata niño kutama*
bata niño ku-ta-ma
go.FUT boy(SP) 3SG.OBJ.COM-say-IMP.SG
‘Tell her that the boy is coming.’
(290606_convI)

The first command in line 1 consists of a combination of the verbal locative *li-*, the verb *ujwa* ‘look’, and the intentional marker *-ni*. This command involves a change of place of the addressee and is marked with =*chi*. The second command in line 2, in contrast, is not marked with =*chi*. It is well possible that the use of =*chi* in combination with the verbal locative and the verb ‘look’ is conventionalized.

Examples for =*chi*-marked commands with imperative plural and jussive *-cha* can be found in van Gijn (2006). In (182), =*chi* co-occurs in a command with the imperative plural prefix *pi-*, while in (183), it co-occurs with the jussive marker *-cha* and a second person subject:

- (182) *li-pi-ujwa=chi*
VLOC-IMP.PL-look=FR
‘(Go and) look there!’
(van Gijn 2006:238, glosses modified)
- (183) *otto-cha-m=chi otto=va*
go_out-JUS-2SG=FR go_out=IRR
‘Go out.’
(van Gijn 2006:238, glosses modified)

The intentional marker *-ni*, the plural imperative prefix *pi-*, and the jussive marker *-cha* are all irrealis TAM markers. With these, we can expect a frustrative interpretation of =*chi*, from which we can derive the ‘be pessimistic’ strategy in the same fashion as we have done for imperative singular *-ma* above. What we can note is that commands with intentional *-ni* and jussive *-cha* can probably

be considered more polite than commands involving an imperative form, since they express the action request more indirectly.

An example of a first person plural hortative with =*chi* is (184). The hortative is embedded as a direct speech complement:

- (184) *baytuchi ellechi tēta*
baytu=chi *elle=chi* *tē-ta*
 go:1PL.INT=FR earth=DIR 1SG.OBJ.COM-say
 ‘“Let’s go downriver.” he said to me.’
 (ma_lifehistory)

Since the hortative is embedded as a direct speech complement under the speech act verb *ta* ‘say’, we again lack the conversational context to make any claims about its conversational use. A politeness interpretation is however feasible. The speaker is talking about his childhood, where he traveled a lot with his father from place to place. In (184), the speaker conveys that at one time, his father said to him that they should go downriver. By using =*chi*, the speaker seems to express that his father did not command him to go there without leaving him a choice, but rather asked him to go with him leaving him a choice to decline. Using a hortative instead of a command is also a politeness strategy (Brown and Levinson 1978:132-3). Thus, this embedded hortative command tells us something about how the speaker wants to present his relation to his father.

In this section, it has been argued that the use of =*chi* in commands is an instance of the politeness strategy ‘be pessimistic’ as proposed by Brown and Levinson (1978:177-81). By literally expressing that the addressee has already rejected or failed to perform the requested event, the speaker expresses pessimism toward the future willingness or ability of the addressee to perform the action. In this way, by using =*chi* the speaker is formally (but not actually) reducing the pressure on the addressee to perform the requested action. The advantage for the speaker is that she becomes in this way herself less likely to lose her face through a decline by the addressee, since a decline is formally anticipated. It has been shown that the reduction of pressure on the addressee is only formally but not actually achieved by the use of =*chi*, and argued that therefore we must consider =*chi* in commands a conventionalized politeness strategy. This is supported by the fact that a literal frustrative interpretation of =*chi* never occurs in commands.

It has been argued in this section that the ‘be pessimistic’ politeness interpretation of =*chi* can be derived pragmatically from a literal frustrative interpretation of =*chi* with irrealis TAM markers. It has also been demonstrated that in some cases, a more literal interpretation of this pessimism is possible, in which case =*chi* expresses that the speaker is actually pessimistic about the ability of the addressee to perform the requested action.²

²In elicitation, the Spanish translation of commands with =*chi* given by Yurakaré speakers is often ‘a ver’ (‘let’s see’). This translation captures the pessimism interpretation of =*chi*: ‘let’s see if you can do it’.

As there are not many occurrences of commands in the conversational corpus, the argument in this section is based on very few examples. The argument will be corroborated in the next section, where the use of =*chi* in content questions is discussed. We will see that there are contexts where =*chi* expresses pessimism concerning either mostly the ability of the addressee to answer the question, thereby really (not only formally) reducing the pressure on the addressee to produce an answer to the question.

7.2.2 =*Chi* in content questions

Content questions in Yurakaré are formed by the use of a question word in the first position of the sentence. The canonical action performed by content questions is to request information. Content questions marked with =*chi* can also be used for requesting information. I will argue in section 7.2.2.1 that in this contexts =*chi* adds a politeness value. In section 7.2.2.2, uses of content questions with =*chi* that are used for other actions will be discussed, where the interpretation of =*chi* is not so clear at first glance but can also be explained in terms of the ‘be pessimistic’ politeness strategy.

7.2.2.1 Information requests

Content questions with =*chi* can be used to perform information requests. It will be argued in the following that the interpretation of =*chi* in such cases is the addition of a politeness value. Just like in commands, the politeness strategy added by =*chi* is the ‘be pessimistic’ strategy as proposed by Brown and Levinson (1978:177-81). It seems that this politeness strategy is to some degree conventionalized. However, in this section it will be shown that there are cases where =*chi* actually reduces the pressure on the addressee to produce an answer to the question. These cases support an analysis of =*chi* as a politeness marker expressing that the speaker does not expect (i.e. is pessimistic) that the addressee should have superior access to the information and thus expresses that she does not expect the addressee to know the answer to the question. As a consequence, the pressure on the addressee to produce that answer as a response is actually, not only formally reduced. This happens usually in situations where the speaker and the addressee have equal access to the external evidence that provides access to the information in question and the speaker cannot make sense of the situation. By using a content question with =*chi* in these contexts, it is expressed that the speaker is not sure if the addressee can make better sense of the situation and will be able to provide an answer to the question.

Canonical content questions seem to be used when the speaker expects the addressee to have superior access to the information. Since the addressee is expected to know the answer, the information request is less face-threatening in that the risk of the addressee having to admit that he does not know the answer is expected to be small. =*Chi* is often used when this canonical situation of asymmetric distribution does not hold, but both speakers have equal access to the external circumstances. =*Chi* expresses that the speaker is pessimistic about the addressee being able to give the answer to the question, thus reducing the pressure on the addressee to provide the answer.

Evidence for this interpretation comes from examples where the addressee does not give the answer to a content question marked with =*chi*, like in example (185), a repetition of (161) on page 168. Instead of an answer to the =*chi*-marked questions in line 3, Magdalena produces a question marked with =*jtë=ɣn* (cf. section 6.2.2) to express that she does not know the answer in line 5:

- (185) 1. A: *küwü küwü mala [chajmu:*
küwü küwü mala chajmu
 IDEO IDEO go.SG dog
 ‘Swimming goes the dog.’
2. M: [*ma:la chajmu layjla* (1.0)
mala chajmu lacha=la
 go.SG dog too=COMM
 ‘The dog’s going as well.’
3. ⇒ A: *am:chi [bataynaja? amchi daji]shtachi?*
*amchi bata=**chi**=naja amchi daja-shta=**chi***
 where go.FUT=FR=NSIT where hang-FUT=FR
 ‘Where will it go? Where will it come to shore?’
4. M: [*m:::*]
m
 INTJ
 ‘Mmh...’
 (.)
5. ⇒ *a:m:* (1.0) *chi batajtënaja(yu)*
amchi bata=jtë=ujaja=yu
 where go.FUT=ASSU=NSIT=RES.F
 ‘Where could it be going?’
 (al_cc_frogstory)

Asunta notes in line 1 that the dog went away swimming (picture 24). After Magdalena confirms in line 2, Asunta wonders where it might go and where it might come to shore. She does this using two content questions marked with =*chi*.³ By posing these questions, Asunta expresses that she does not know herself where the dog will go. She also knows that Magdalena does not know, since she does not know the story better than Asunta who is telling it to her. Thus, both participants rely on the same evidence which is accessible in the same way to both of them, namely what can be seen on the pictures. Asunta uses =*chi* in the content questions in line 3 to indicate that she does not expect Magdalena to have superior access to the information and thus know the answer to the question, in this way reducing pressure on her to produce an answer. Magdalena’s response in line 5 is a modified repeat of Asunta’s first question. Magdalena’s response is a typical second position content question

³Note that even though the future marker *-shta* appears in both questions, the interpretation is not frustrative; rather, the future interpretation is retained, since these questions refer to future events.

used to confirm ignorance about a certain topic: it is marked with assumptive =*jtë* in combination with resignative =*vu*, and the repeated question word is lengthened⁴. This response indicates that in concord with the implicatures of the initial question, the speaker confirms that she does not know the information in question. Such questions in second position are one typical way to deal with initial =*chi*-marked content questions. The response is not treated as problematic by Asunta, who does not give any kind of verbal response. This shows that Magdalena's response does not violate any of Asunta's expectations she expresses when making the initial utterance.

In (186), the situation is similar to that in (185), with a different outcome. In (186), the =*chi*-marked content question is added to a suggestion to indicate that the speaker is not sure whether the suggestion is correct (line 1). The addressee disconfirms the suggestion in line 2, and answers the =*chi*-marked content question in line 4:

- (186) 1. ⇒ A: *ujma atib tumumu tēpshēchi [(ati)*
ujwa-ma a-tiba tumumu tētē-bēshēē=chi
 look-IMP.SG 3SG.POSS-pet frog which-entity=FR
 'Look that's his frog, or what is it?'
2. M: [*ajamma nijta* (0.4)
a-kamma nijta
 PROG-call NEG
 'He is calling. No!'
3. ⇒ A: [*nijta?*
nijta
 NEG
 'No?'
4. ⇒ M: [*polornū* (0.5)
polor-nū
 flower(SP)-DIM
 'It's a flower.'
5. A: *polornū*
polor-nū
 flower(SP)-DIM
 'It's a flower?'
 (al.ce_frogstory)

Asunta tells Magdalena to look at an object in the picture, suggesting that it could be the boy's frog. She then immediately adds a =*chi*-marked content question to indicate that she is not sure whether her suggestion is correct and that she does not expect Magdalena to have superior knowledge of what the entity on the picture might be, since both speakers have the same visual access to the drawing (line 1). The speaker thereby reduces the pressure on the addressee of providing an answer to the question. In line 2, Magdalena first

⁴Lengthening is quite extreme, since it even includes a pause of one second.

produces a disconfirming response to the suggestion that the entity is a frog, and then in line 4 provides an answer to the =*chi*-marked question, stating that the object is a flower. Asunta's response is a news receipt in repeat format, demonstrating that she accepts Magdalena's answer.

Examples (185) and (186) show that =*chi*-marked questions in situations where both speakers have equal access to some externally available information can be responded to in at least two ways. First, the addressee can express her ignorance about the information in question. Second, the addressee can produce an answer. Both ways of attending to a =*chi*-marked content question performing an information request are in concord with the terms of the initial question. This shows that content questions marked with =*chi* in a situation where information access is symmetrical =*chi* can be used to reduce the pressure for providing an answer, leaving a space for an answer if the addressee is able to make better sense of the external evidence than the speaker.

With these insights, a brief remark on the difference between content questions with =*chi* and those with =*jtë=yu/vi* (cf. section 6.2.1) in initial position can be made. The difference between the two is that content questions with =*jtë* in initial position indicate that there is no evidence at all for the information in question, and that the addressee is expected to have no access to the information either. With =*chi*, there always seems to be some kind of external evidence, of which the speaker cannot make perfect sense. =*Chi* expresses that the addressee is not expected to have superior access, but that the speaker sees a chance that the addressee might be able to make better sense of the external evidence and might thus be able to provide an answer. Furthermore, content questions with =*chi* are not used in second position to express ignorance with respect to the information requested in the initial utterance. This suggests that content questions with =*chi* express a different set of expectations about the addressee's access, and are also used in different situation than content questions with =*jtë*.

In the examples presented in this section so far, we have seen the use of content questions marked with =*chi* in situations where both speaker and addressee had equal access to the external evidence through which the information was accessed. In these cases, =*chi* is used to indicate that the speaker did not expect the addressee to have superior access to the information in question, thereby reducing the pressure on the addressee to provide an answer. However, this is not the only situation where content questions can be marked with =*chi* for adding a politeness value to an information request. This can also be the case when the question concerns the addressee's epistemic realm, and thus the addressee is known to have superior access and rights to the information. An example is (187), where Asunta asks Elisa in line 1 how it went the day before when she took me for a fishing trip, using a =*chi*-marked content question:

- (187) 1. ⇒ A: *amashipechi shčy ajujanipja* (0.4)
amashi-p=chi shčy a-kuyja-ui-p=ja
 how-2PL=FR yesterday PROG-fish-INT-2PL=REA
 'How was it yesterday when you went fishing?'

2. E: *yij kamali tammela* (1.1)
yij ka-mala-y ta-meme=la
 good 3SG.OBJ-go.SG-1SG 1PL.POSS-mother=COMM
 ‘Good. I took the woman with me.’
3. *ka/ynani ka/malija*
ka-winani-y ka-mala-y=ja
 3SG.OBJ-walk-1SG 3SG.OBJ-go.SG-1SG=REA
 ‘I went with her when I took her with me.’
4. A: *[m:]*
m
 INTJ
 ‘Hm.’
 (0.7)
5. E: *pojorey balitu* (1.1)
pojore=y bali-tu
 canoe=LOC go.PL-1PL
 ‘We went in a canoe.’
6. A: *ë pojori?*
ë pojore=y
 INTJ canoe=LOC
 ‘Ah. in a canoe?’
7. E: *[ëjë ashkuti kamalij ashkuti* (0.9)
ëjë achu-ku-ta-y
 INTJ like_this-3SG.OBJ.COM-say-1SG
ka-mala-y=ja achu-ku-ta-y
 3SG.OBJ-go.SG-1SG=REA like_this-3SG.OBJ.COM-say-1SG
 ‘Mhm. I told her this when I took her. I told her this.’
8. *tintuyucham kuti*
tí-n-tuyu-cha-m ku-ta-y
 1SG.OBJ-BEN-steer-1US-2SG 3SG.OBJ.COM-say-1SG
 ‘“You will steer for me.” I said to her.’
 (290906_conv1)

The use of =*chi* in the content question in line 1 cannot be explained in terms of the ‘be pessimistic’ strategy regarding the non-ability of the addressee to provide an answer to the question, since the addressee clearly has access to the queried information. An interpretation in terms of pessimism concerning the willingness of the addressee to provide an answer seems more promising.

Probably, the value of pessimism is added because the question in line 1 implicates a higher imposition. Formally, it asks how the trip was, which could be answered with a very short assessment of the trip, as is done by Elisa in line 2. However, the question in line 1 does more than requesting a short assessment: rather, it tries to animate the addressee in an indirect way by asking for an assessment of the trip, which is quite an imposition since the addressee

- müta*
pull_out
'He pulled it out?'
5. P: =*mütaya*
 müta=ya
 pull_out=REP
 'He pulled it out.'
 (160906_convI)

The content question in line 2 of (188) concerns the epistemic realm of the addressee, since she is the one who knows the story. In this sense, the situation is similar to that in (187). There is, however, a crucial difference between the two situations. In (188), Paulina is already engaged in the telling of the story, and Miguel's content question in line 2 queries only a little part of the story, not imposing too much effort on the addressee. Furthermore, the question concerns a crucial part of the story, and it is likely that Paulina would have touched upon that topic herself at some point during the story. In contrast, in the content question in (187), the speaker was indirectly asking the addressee to start a telling about a topic in which she was not yet engaged, and therefore the question can be considered more imposing than that in (188). This explains why =*chi* is used in (187) but not in (188).

In this section, we have seen the use of =*chi* in content questions that were used for the action of requesting information. It has been argued that =*chi* adds a value of politeness by representing the 'be pessimistic' politeness strategy. However, we have not seen so far how this interpretation could have arisen diachronically. For commands, we can derive the politeness interpretation directly from the frustrative interpretation since commands are always formed with one of the irrealis TAM suffixes, but this is not the case for content questions. The following section discusses uses of content questions with =*chi* for actions other than requesting information. It will be shown that there are uses that can be understood as a diachronic link between the frustrative and the politeness interpretation in content questions, by which we can explain how this use might have developed.

7.2.2.2 Expressing stance

When content questions with =*chi* are not used to request information, they usually convey the speaker's stance toward the proposition expressed. Content questions with =*chi* are used for two types of stance, expressing surprise about an observed state of affairs, and expressing some kind of negative stance toward the proposition.

The expression of surprise is frequently done with a specific kind of content questions formed with the word *tonto*, which expresses 'how can it be that... ', and is therefore translated as 'how' in the transcripts. *Tonto* inherently expresses that the proposition that follows seems in some way astonishing to the speaker. *Tonto* is analyzed as a question word for mainly two reasons. First, syntactically, it functions like a question word, occupying the first position of a sentence and

expressing that the following proposition is presupposed. Second, in some cases utterances with *tonto* are treated as content questions by the addressee.

Content questions with *tonto* can be marked with =*chi* like in example (189), where Asunta expresses surprise about the fact that the boy does not get tired of looking for the frog (line 1):

- (189) 1. A: *ton:to nij lijushuchi an sewwe* (.)
 tonto *nij lijushu=**chi** ana sewwe*
 how NEG fear=FR DEM boy
 ‘How is it possible the boy doesn’t get fed up with this?’
2. M: ((laughing)) *tēhēhēhē*
 tē
 INTJ
 ‘Right.’
 (al.ce.frogstory)

Magdalena’s response in line 2 consists of laughter and an affirmation token, expressing alignment and affiliation rather than providing any kind of answer. The response expresses that Magdalena just like Asunta finds it surprising that the boy did not hurt himself. This shows that utterances with *tonto* and =*chi* convey no pressure of producing an answer on the addressee, and that affiliation is an accepted response.

Example (190), a repetition of (111) on page 92, shows a similar usage, with a different type of response. Magdalena wonders in line 1 why the boy did not drown when he fell into the water because his boots are so big and they should have filled with water and drowned him (talking about picture 21 where his boots are visible again). To express this, she uses a content question with *tonto* and =*chi*:

- (190) 1. ⇒ M: *tonto nij kabliwchi abotu sammay* (.)
 tonto *nij ka-bali=w=**chi***
 how NEG 3SG.OBJ-go.PL=PL=FR
 a-bota=w *samma=y*
 3SG.POSS-boot(SP)=PL water=LOC
 ‘How come his boots didn’t drown him!’
2. A: *a:j kusu pupupuya* (.)
 aj kusu pupupu=ya
 INTJ maybe shallow=REP
 ‘Well, maybe it’s shallow.’
3. M: *achamayla*
 achama=ya=la
 be_like_that=REP=C’OMM
 ‘It seems to be like that indeed.’
 (al.ce.frogstory)

The response given by Asunta in line 2 is different from that given in (189). Asunta gives a possible explanation for why the boy is not drowned by his

boots, namely that the water could be shallow. In this utterance, she uses the intersubjective possibility evidential =*ya* to indicate that she thinks that this explanation should seem reasonable to the addressee as well. In line 3, Magdalena gives her agreement marked with =*ya*, which is the preferred agreement format to such =*ya*-marked initial utterances (cf. section 3.2.2.1).

In examples (189) and (190), we have seen that utterances with *tonto* and =*chi* accept both alignment and affiliation with the stance of surprise expressed, as well as proposals as to possible explanations for the surprising situations. That is, they accept non-answers as well as answers, just like the information requests done with =*chi*-marked content questions discussed above. This suggests that the value added by =*chi* when combined with *tonto* is that the speaker does not expect the addressee to be able to make better sense of the situation, but that she does not think that it is impossible either. This interpretation is the same as in the information request examples above. In both cases, =*chi* adds the ‘be pessimistic’ politeness strategy.

If the addressee has superior access to the information that is marked as surprising by the speaker with *tonto*, =*chi* does not seem to be used. Consider (191), an extract from example (95) on page 71. Miguel is engaged in a telling to Paulina about an event that Paulina’s brother has told Miguel but not Paulina. Paulina’s brother has accidentally shot the dog of their sister while hunting a wild boar because he mistook it for a boar. In line 6, Paulina makes a confirmation request about whether these events occurred during the day, which is confirmed by Miguel in line 7 and line 9. After giving an interjection expressing surprise in line 8, in line 10 Paulina produces a content question with *tonto* not marked with =*chi*, asking how it can be that her brother did not recognize the dog. The information that the events occurred during the day is important here, since during the night it could easily be the case that an animal is not recognized. This is far less probable in plain daylight.

- (191) 1. M: *achu eleyj wejshē kujaynaniw(y) (.)*
achu elle=chi wējshē
 like_that earth=DIR wild_boar
ku-ja-winani=w=ya
 3SG.OBJ.COM-3SG.OBJ-walk=PL=REP
 ‘Like that they followed a wild boar downriver.’
2. *kayashiw(y) wejshē (1.4)*
kayashi=w=ya wejshē
 shoot=PL=REP wild_boar
 ‘They shot the wild boar.’
3. *wejsheshkuta amalashiya layj chajmu (1.1)*
wējshē-shku-ta amala-shi=ya lacha chajmu
 wild_boar-ADV.SML-MID come-SML=REP too dog
 ‘The dog seemed to come like a wild boar, too.’
4. P: *i:/:*
ij
 INTJ

- ‘Geez.’
5. M: [*achamaj netaj kayashiya a(. . .) (.) ayta acharbi=*
achama=ja neta=ja kayashi=ya
like_this=REA fire=REA shoot=REP
a-charaba=y
3SG.POSS-shoulder=LOC
 ‘So he fired and shot it in the shoulder.’
6. P: =*lējli kompadre (.)*
lējilē=y kompadre
day=LOC compadre(SP)
 ‘In the day, compadre?’
7. M: *lējli (1.0)*
lējilē=y
day=LOC
 ‘In the day!’
8. P: *i:/*
ij
 INTJ
 ‘Geez.’
9. M: [*lējli komadre=*
lējilē=y komadre
day=LOC comadre(SP)
 ‘In the day, comadre.’
10. ⇒ P: =*ton nij iyepe (0.7)*
tonto nij iyepe
how NEG know
 ‘How come he didn’t recognize it?’
11. M: *nij wejsheshish ((gaze to Paulina)) tēta (.)*
nij wejshe-shi-sh tē-ta
NEG wild_boar-SML-ADV.MAN 1SG.OBJ.COM-say
 ‘Just like a wild boar, he told me. . .’
12. P: [*utte*
otte
 INTJ
 ‘I see.’
13. M: [*lēmuy (pe)tes petes amalashiya*
lēmuy petes petes amala-shi=y
just IDEO IDEO come-SML=REP
 ‘It came just like that, petes petes.’
 (160906_conv1)

Paulina’s question with *tonto* receives an answer in line 11 and 13, which is an account for why Paulina’s brother did not recognize the dog: it looked like a

wild boar, and came running like one. In this situation, Miguel has superior access to the information, since he is the one who knows the story through the report of Paulina's brother. This is reflected by the lack of =*chi* in the *tonto* question. By not using =*chi*, the accountability of producing an answer is not reduced, and an answer is made relevant. Paulina can expect Miguel to know how the story goes, including why her brother did not recognize the dog. When =*chi* is added to such utterances, the pressure of producing an answer is reduced, since the speaker does not expect the addressee to be able to produce an answer, or rather, is not sure whether the addressee will be able to do so.

Surprise can also be expressed with content questions containing question words other than *tonto* 'how', like in (192). Here, the question word *amakka* 'how big' is used to express surprise about how long the legs of the frog are (line 1). The content question is furthermore marked with =*chi*:

- (192) 1. ⇒ M: *hhh amakka itējtējnjaj na a:chu yupishtanaja* (0.6) *ot/to*
 ((laughs))
ama-kka i-tējtē=chi=naja naa achu
 how-MEA PV-leg=FR=NSIT DEM like_that
yupa-shta=naaja otto
 enter-FUT=NSIT go_out
 'Geez, how long his legs are! Like that he's going in. He's going out!'
2. A: *ottoshta* ((laughs))
otto-shta
 go_out-FUT
 'He's going to get out!
 (al.ce.frogstory)

Since both speakers have access to the length of the frog's legs by looking at the picture, it is clear that the question is not intended as an information request. Rather, it is interpreted as an expression of surprise regarding the length of its legs. We can infer this from the fact that Magdalena does not end her turn after the question, but rather adds another utterance. It is also corroborated by the fact that the question is not attended to by Asunta in line 2. Rather, she attends to the second part of Magdalena's turn in line 1, in which she notes that the frog is going in and then repairs herself to say that it is going out.

Another action for which content questions with =*chi* are used is expressing a negative stance toward the proposition expressed. An example is (193), where Magdalena's little son is bothering Magdalena and Asunta while they are talking. Magdalena stands up from the table where she is chatting with Asunta to keep her son from playing with the tripod of the camera. In line 2, Asunta gives a =*chi*-marked content question with the question word *ēnij* 'why not', asking why Magdalena does not leave her son with his cousin. This question is not intended to request the information it formally queries, but rather to express a negative stance. Asunta can see no reason why the addressee should not do so. This

conveys a negative stance of the speaker to the fact that the addressee does not perform the action.

- (193) 1. M: ((hurries to her son who is playing with the tripod of the camera))
 2. ⇒ A: *ēnij kajammalamchi ayee m=*
ēnij *ka-ka-n-mala-m=chi*
 why_{not} 3SG.OBJ-3SG.OBJ-BEN-go.SG-2SG=FR
a-yeē
 3SG.POSS-woman
 ‘Why don’t you bring him to his cousin?’
 3. =*pēj̄pēni kajamalacham aj kosina(y) ayee* (1.7)
pēj̄~pēni ka-ka-mala-cha-m
 INTS~difficult 3SG.OBJ-3SG.OBJ-go.SG-JUS-2SG
kosina=y a-yeē
 kitchen(SP)=LOC 3SG.POSS-woman
 ‘He is difficult, you should take him into the kitchen to his cousin.’
 4. *kanchitanicham*
ka-n-chitta-ni-cha-m
 3SG.OBJ-BEN-throw.SG-INT-JUS-2SG
 ‘You should leave him with her.’
 5. M: ((comes back and sits down on her chair next to Asunta))
 (al.ce.frogstory)

The content question with =*chi* in line 2 can already be understood as initiating an action request. Asunta does not end her turn here, but immediately goes on to actually give a command in line 3, where she tells Magdalena more directly to leave her son with his cousin if he keeps on disturbing them. She repeats her command in a different form in line 4. The content question indicating the speaker’s negative stance is thus used here to initiate an action request.

Another example of a negative stance expressed is (194). Juan indicates to Patricia in line 1 the place where he is going to draw Pedro’s house. In line 2, Patricia produces a clarification question, asking where the house of Pedro is. When Juan tells her that it is where the teacher lives she laughs and produces a reconfirmation request. Juan confirms in line 5, and then asks whether he should draw Pedro’s place at all. It seems that he does this because he interprets her laughter and reconfirmation request as treating the drawing of Pedro’s house as problematic. In line 6, Patricia confirms that he should do it, using an imperative in combination with the commitment marker =*la*. In line 7, she adds a content question marked with =*chi*, asking why Pedro should be the only one who escapes, i.e. why he should be the only one whose house is not drawn on the map. This content question expresses a negative stance toward the embedded proposition, thus indicating that Pedro should not escape.

- (194) 1. J: *latisha ani* (0.5) *pedronnu* (1.3)

- latijsha ana=y pedro-nñu*
 then DEM=LOC Pedro-DIM
 ‘Then here. Pedro.’
2. P: *am pedron(ñu) (.)*
amchi pedro-nñu
 where Pedro-DIM
 ‘Where’s Pedro?’
3. J: *profesor litütüti=*
profesor li-tütü=ti
 teacher(SP) VLOC-be=DS
 ‘Where the teacher lives.’
4. P:=((laughs)) *hehehe ((inbreath)) pedro(nñu)? (0.5)*
pedro-nñu
 Pedro
 ‘Pedro?’
5. J: *pedro (.) dulanı layj ati (.)*
pedro dula-nı-y lacha ati
 Pedro do-INT-1SG too DEM
 ‘Pedro. Should I do that one. too?’
6. P: *dulamala (2.3)*
dula-ma=la
 do-IMP.SG=COMM
 ‘Sure. do him!’
7. ⇒ *ësh latijti puchishtachi*
ëshë *l-ati-jti puchu-shta=chi*
 why REF-DEM-NLIM escape-FUT=FR
 ‘Why should he be the only one who escapes?’
8. J: ((keeps drawing))
 (mapI)

The =*chi*-marked content question in line 7 is not treated as an information request by Juan, since he does not give an answer but rather keeps drawing on the paper. Rather than requesting information, Patricia’s content question expresses that she cannot see a reason why Pedro’s house should not be drawn.

The content question in line 7 of (194) contains the future marker *-shta*. Here, the future interpretation is retained, since the possible event of Pedro escaping (i.e. being not drawn) lies in the future. In the following, a use of content questions with =*chi* in combination with the future marker will be presented where the future interpretation is canceled by the use of =*chi*, just like in the frustrative reading. It will be argued that this use provides the link between the frustrative semantics of =*chi* and its politeness use in content

Content questions with =*chi* that express a negative stance toward the proposition also occur in second position, where they express either a strong agreement or a strong contradiction. In these contexts, the content question always contains the future marker -*shta*. An example where a content question with =*chi* is used for agreement is (195). Paulina and Miguel have been talking about my field equipment. Miguel has been wondering how long the tapes of the video camera last. In line 1, he produces a confirmation request containing the inferential evidential =*tiba* (cf. section 4.1.2), asking whether we, the researchers, bring a lot of tapes with us. Paulina responds with a =*chi*-marked content question in line 2:

- (195) 1. ⇒ M: *běj*:*j* (0.8) *bēm mamalajtiwtib anu?* (.)
běj-bēmē ma-mala-jti=w=tiba ana=w
 INTS-much 3PL.OBJ-go.SG-HAB=PL=INF DEM=PL
 ‘They must bring a lot of those?’
2. ⇒ P: *amashku nij achushtuyj komp=*
amashku nij achu-shta=w=chi kompadre
 how NEG like_that-FUT=PL=FR compadre(SP)
 ‘Of course that’s what they do.’
3. M: =*těj*/::
těj
 INTJ
 ‘Yeah.’
4. P: [*por pakete mamalajtiwya*
por pakete ma-mala-jti=w=ya
 by(SP) box(SP) 3PL.OBJ-go.SG-HAB=PL=REP
 ‘They probably bring them in boxes.’
 (220906_convII)

The content question marked with =*chi* in line 2 indicates a strong agreement, expressing that the speaker thinks that indeed the researchers bring a lot of tapes. Literally, it expresses that there is no way in which one could think that this is not the case. This negative reading is derived here from the use of =*chi* in combination with the future marker -*shta*. Like with the frustrative reading in combination with irrealis TAM markers in declaratives (cf. section 7.1.1), in content questions the combination with -*shta* can result in an interpretation of thinking that there is no way in which the proposition could be true.

Example (196) shows a use where a content question with =*chi* indicates a strong disagreement in second position. When Magdalena sees the dog of the frog story on picture 1, she thinks that it is covered with something and notices it in line 1. Asunta responds in line 2 with a content question marked with =*chi*. This content question in second position expresses that the speaker sees no way how somebody could possibly think that the dog is covered. Asunta then adds as an account that the object on the dog’s head is the dog’s ear (line 4).

- (196) 1. M: *urupta na atib chajmu* (0.5)

- urupta naa a-tiba chajmu*
 cover_oneself DEM 3SG.POSS-pet dog
 ‘His dog is covering itself.’
2. ⇒ A: *amashku uruptishtayjbě=*
amashku urupta-shta=chi=bě
 how cover_oneself-FUT=FR=MOM
 ‘How is it going to be covering itself!’
3. M: ((laughs)) *=he/he*
4. A: ((pointing to picture)) *[ameye*
a-meyye
 3SG.POSS-ear
 ‘Those are its ears!’
5. M: ((laughing)) *ameye (0.6) ameye?=*
a-meyye a-meyye
 3SG.POSS-ear 3SG.POSS-ear
 ‘Its ears! Its ears?’
6. A: *=ameye*
a-meyye
 3SG.POSS-ear
 ‘Its ears.’
 (al_cc_frogstory)

The verb in the content question in line 2 is marked with the future marker *-shta*. In this case, the future interpretation is not retained, since the event of the dog not covering itself does not lie in the future. Rather it is frustrated by the fact that something else is the case, namely that what Magdalena thinks covers the dog are its ears. The event that it is covered is not true at the time of speaking, and was never true in the past. This is clearly a connection to the literal frustrative interpretation of *=chi* in declaratives, even though the frustrative interpretation includes a time in the past where the event was actually possible. This use of *=chi* shows that the interpretation of *=chi* in (196) is can be derived from the frustrative interpretation in declaratives.

In terms of action, the content question is not meant as an information request, since Asunta immediately adds that the objects on the picture are the ears of the dog. Magdalena does not treat the content question as an information request, since she does not give an answer to the question (i.e. an explanation how the dog covered its ears). This shows that in (196), the content question format is used for another type of action than requesting information. The action performed is a strong disconfirmation, in that it expresses that there is no way in which the proposition of the initial utterance could be or could have been true at any time. It thus expresses a strong negative stance toward the proposition, indicating that the speaker wishes that the expressed situation should not be or is not actually happening.

A similar example is (197), where Magdalena thinks that the lamp hanging in the boy's room is a bell (line 1). She immediately repairs herself in line

2. suggesting that it could be a light. However, Asunta also jumps in quickly with a =*chi*-marked content question, conveying that the object on the picture cannot possibly be taken to be a bell (line 3). Like in (196), the content question contains the question word *amashku* and the future marker *-shita*. In combination with =*chi* and in responsive position this utterance conveys a strong disconfirmation of the initial utterance.

- (197) 1. M: *ajampanaja daja* (0.9) *na ayoyoto doj=*
a-kampana=ja daja naa a-yoyoto
 3SG.POSS-bell(SP)=TOP hang DEM 3SG.POSS-bed
dojjo=v
 body=LOC
 ‘That’s his bell hanging there above his bed.’
2. =*kus alus [alus]*
kusu a-lus a-lus
 maybe 3SG.POSS-light(SP) 3SG.POSS-light(SP)
 ‘Or it’s his light, his light!’
3. ⇒ A: [*amashku* ((laughing)) *kampanishtachi at=*
amashku kampana-shita=chi *ati*
 how bell(SP)-FUT=FR DEM
 ‘How is that going to be a bell?’
4. M: ((laughs)) =*hehe alu/s?*
a-lus
 3SG.POSS-light(SP)
 ‘It’s his light?’
5. A: [*a:ti aj kusu neonya*
ati aj kusu neon=ya
 DEM INTJ maybe light_bulb(SP)=REP
 ‘That, well, maybe it’s a light bulb.’
 (al_{Lee}-frogstory)

We have seen in this section that content questions with =*chi* can be used in second position to express some kind of contradiction toward the initial utterance of the addressee. In these cases, the verb was always marked for future tense with *-shita*, which can be explained with the connection to the basic frustrative reading of =*chi* in declaratives: here, it marks that the event cannot be true, for all the speaker knows.

Using this interactional practice seems rather competitive or even disaffiliative, since it openly challenges the suggestion made by the addressee in the initial utterance. It even seems to challenge the ‘sayability’ of that suggestion, expressing that nobody can possibly think that this proposition is true. How can we reconcile this competitive use of =*chi* with the politeness use described above? At first glance, these uses seem to be opposed to each other in terms of the actions in which they occur. In the following section, a possible connection of these two uses will be discussed, and it will be argued that the politeness use could have developed out of the negative stance use in content questions through pragmatic inferencing.

7.3 Discussion: from frustrative to politeness

It has been shown in this chapter that the most basic interpretation of *=chi* in declaratives is frustrative. In commands, *=chi* adds an interpretation of politeness, in that it formally reduces the pressure on the addressee to produce the requested action. Furthermore, *=chi* can be used in content questions. In content questions that convey information requests, *=chi* adds a politeness value in that it reduces the pressure on the addressee to provide an answer. Another use of *=chi* in content questions is to indicate that the question should not be interpreted as an information request but rather some other kind of action expressing the speaker's stance. In this section, it is discussed how the interactional uses can be derived from the basic frustrative semantics of *=chi*.

The notion of 'face' as developed in Goffman (1967) and Brown and Levinson (1978) is crucial in accounting for the politeness use of *=chi* in commands and content questions. Face is an interactive notion, since it can only be satisfied, kept, threatened or lost through the actions of others. In interaction, speaker and addressee cooperate to maintain the other's and thereby their own face, since a threat to the other's face could lead him to threaten the speaker's face in turn. It is thus in the interest of all participants to maintain each other's face (Brown and Levinson 1978:65).

People constantly perform actions that constitute a potential face threat for the addressee. There are various strategies to reduce the potential face threat, which are considered politeness strategies in Brown and Levinson (1978). The higher the risk of face loss, the more probable it is that the speaker will choose a strategy high on the politeness scale (p. 65).

As discussed above in section 7.2.1, the use of *=chi* in commands formally expresses that the speaker does not expect the addressee to perform the requested action, thus representing the 'be pessimistic' politeness strategy (Brown and Levinson pp. 177-81). This strategy aims at satisfying the negative face of the addressee, his desire to be unimpeded in his freedom of action. An action request is a potential threat of his negative face because it exerts a certain pressure on him to perform the action, which might violate his freedom of action (p. 71). It has been argued that through the literal frustrative interpretation of the combination of *=chi* with the irrealis TAM suffixes, to which all suffixes used in commands belong, such a command implicates that the addressee is not expected to really perform the requested action, which reduces the pressure on the addressee to perform the action. Furthermore, a potential denial of the addressee is less likely to threaten the speaker's face, since she has already expressed that she is not sure whether the addressee will be willing to perform the requested action. However, we have also seen that the reduction of pressure is only formally given, since speakers cannot always easily resist such action requests. The second possible interpretation of *=chi* in commands is more directly linked to the 'be pessimistic' strategy, in that it expresses that the speaker factually, not only formally, expects the addressee to be unable to perform the requested action.

The use of *=chi* in content questions that perform information requests is a politeness strategy aiming at maintaining the addressee's negative face.

his desire to be unimpeded⁵. We have seen in section 7.2.2.1 that =*chi* factually, not only formally, reduces the pressure on the addressee to provide an answer. This strategy of information request formulation saves the addressee from a potential loss of face if he should fail to produce the answer that would have been made relevant by a question without =*chi*. =*Chi* is often used in situations where the speaker does not expect the addressee to have superior access to the information, but still sees a chance that he might be able to make better sense of the situation than herself. Such a question therefore allows for various kinds of responses, from expressing ignorance to a straightforward answer.

Content questions with =*chi* can also express the speaker's stance toward the proposition. They can be used to indicate surprise about an observed state of affairs, or to express a negative stance toward the proposition, expressing that there is no way in which the proposition could be true. The latter can also occur in second position, where it indicates a strong agreement or disconfirmation.

As argued above, the politeness value of =*chi* in commands also arises because of its use in combination with the irrealis TAM markers. The frustrative basic semantics yields a politeness value of the 'be pessimistic' strategy. For content questions, there is one step in between the frustrative interpretation and the politeness reading. From the frustrative reading with irrealis TAM markers in declaratives, the use of =*chi* in content questions in combination with the future marker *-shita* could have developed, expressing a negative stance toward the proposition and thus retaining the literal frustrative semantics of =*chi*. Then, =*chi* probably developed a more general use in content questions as a politeness marker. Like in commands, in information requests =*chi* represents the 'be pessimistic' politeness strategy as proposed by Brown and Levinson (1978). The two paths of development for =*chi* are represented in (198):

(198) **Commands**

Frustrative in declaratives with irrealis TAM markers > Politeness marker with irrealis TAM markers in commands

Content questions

Frustrative in declaratives with irrealis TAM markers > Content questions with irrealis future marker *-shita* expressing negative stance > Politeness marker in content questions without irrealis TAM markers

It has been argued in this chapter that the politeness interpretation of =*chi* in commands and content questions is derived from its frustrative interpretation in combination with irrealis TAM markers. This development can be considered a conventionalized interactional exploitation of the frustrative semantics of =*chi*.

⁵The use of =*chi* in commands and content questions seems to concentrate on the negative face of the addressee, while the positive face, the desire to be approved of, is not addressed by such uses of =*chi*. The maintenance of positive face is achieved by other strategies in Yurakaré, for example the frequent use of address terms in Yurakaré, which specify and thus strengthen the relationship between the speakers. For example, Miguel and Paulina address each other very often using the terms *komadre* and *kompadre*, which attends to the positive face of both speakers by reaffirming and thereby strengthening their social relationship. Such a use of in-group identity markers is a common strategy for paying attention to the positive face of the addressee (Brown and Levinson pp. 112-5).

Like the mirative use of =*tiba* (see section 4.2.2), the change from the frustrative to the politeness use of =*chi* can be traced through the interactional uses of that marker. Without the use of diachronic data, the study of interactional data allows to infer the path of change from frustrative to politeness of =*chi*. This demonstrates the usefulness of studying interactional data for the investigation of semantic change.

Chapter 8

Combinations within the verbal enclitic set

In the corpus, two combinations within the verbal enclitic set are attested, both of which involve the frustrative marker *=chi*. The four evidential-intersubjective enclitics of Yurakaré, *=ya* ‘reported’, *=tiba* ‘inferential’, *=laba* ‘subjective’, and *=jtë* ‘assumptive’ cannot be combined to attach to one asserted proposition in San Pablo language use. Evidence for this comes from the corpus data, where there are no occurrences of any combination of evidentials. More evidence is provided by the results of semantic elicitation, where all combinations were unanimously rejected by the speakers, and no context could be provided by any speaker where any of the combinations in any order could be used.

It is possible that other Yurakaré communities show other practices. Van Gijn (2006:261) found *=ya=laba* as a possible combination of evidentials, with a grammaticalized interpretation of doing something in vain, without success.¹ There are no examples of this usage in the San Pablo corpus. Only two instances of this combination are attested in total, both from the same speaker who is from the village Loma del Amor, which makes it hard to say whether this use is a common practice in that community, or whether they are rather idiosyncratic usages which do not occur in common linguistic practice.

The evidential-intersubjective markers that combine with *=chi* are reported/intersubjective *=ya* and subjective *=laba*. These were also the only combinations that were accepted in semantic elicitation. Combinations of *=chi* with inferential *=tiba* and assumptive *=jtë* were rejected in both possible orders.

In this chapter, examples for the two possible combinations *=ya=chi* (section 8.1) and *=chi=laba* (section 8.2) are presented. It will be argued that the interpretation of the combination of *=ya* and *=chi* is compositional, while the combination of *=chi* with *=laba* has grammaticalized and developed a new meaning that cannot be analyzed in a compositional way anymore. In section

¹This interpretation is yielded in San Pablo by the combination of *=chi* with *=laba* (cf. section 8.2 below). This combination is frequently pronounced as /yjlaba/. The two instances of the combination of *=ya* and *=laba* are pronounced as /yjlaba/. This could be a shortening of /yjlaba/

8.3. possible reasons for the impossibility of all the other combinations are discussed.

8.1 The combination of =*ya* and =*chi*

The combination of =*ya* and =*chi* only occurs in declaratives, whereas the other two contexts where =*chi* can occur (content questions and commands) are never additionally marked with =*ya* in the conversational corpus. It will be argued in the following that the reading of the combination is compositional. Both readings of =*ya* occur in combination with =*chi*, the reported as well as the intersubjective reading.

There are four different uses of the combination of =*ya* with frustrative =*chi* in the conversational corpus. Three of these are typical uses of =*chi*: the use in frustrative constructions with irrealis TAM markers (cf. section 7.1.1), in counterfactual conditionals (cf. section 7.1.2), and the use with quotatives to indicate that the embedded speech complement is false (cf. section 7.1.3). The fourth use of the combination of =*ya* and =*chi* is a typical use of =*ya* in its intersubjective reading, the use in epistemically dependent agreeing responses (cf. section 3.2.2.2). The frequencies of these uses of the combination are summarized in Table 8.1.

Table 8.1: The uses of reported/intersubjective =*ya* with frustrative =*chi*

Use	Frequency	Percent of total
Frustrative ¹	10	40%
Conditional	8	32%
Agreements	4	16%
Quotative	2	8%
Unclear	1	4%
Total	25	100%

¹ Includes uses with the irrealis TAM suffixes and with the ability modal *iba*.

Table 8.1 shows that the frustrative use of =*chi* is the most frequent for the combination of =*ya* and =*chi*. In this reading, =*ya* can occur both in its reported and in its epistemic intersubjective reading. An example for the reported reading is (199), where the combination of reported =*ya* with frustrative =*chi* co-occurs with the desiderative irrealis TAM suffix *-nta*. Magdalena is telling Asunta about some events that were reported to her. A man died and was brought to his village by his son-in-law. This is indicated in line 1, where the reported marker =*ya* is used to express that the information is based on a report by another person. In line 2, Magdalena states that the son-in-law was going to sleep next to the body on the way, using the desiderative marker *-nta*.

- (199) 1. *libushu kawitaya* (1.2)
 li-bushu ka-wita=ya
 VLOC-lic 3SG.OBJ-arrive.SG=REP
 ‘He brought him lying.’

2. ⇒ *kashe kateshentaychi latiji püy*
ka-teshe-nta=ya=chi latiji püü=y
 3SG.OBJ-sleep-DES-REP=FR then path=LOC
 ‘He wanted to sleep next to him on the way (but didn’t).’
 (270807_conv)

In line 2, the reported marker =*ya* is used to indicate that this was reported to her, while the frustrative marker =*chi* is used to express that the son-in-law did not have to sleep next to the dead body in the end. The combination of =*ya* and =*chi* is interpreted in a compositional way, =*ya* indicating reported evidence and =*chi* indicating frustrative in combination with the irrealis TAM marker -*nta* ‘desiderative’.

In the frustrative use, =*ya* can also occur in its intersubjective epistemic reading. An example with the ability modal *iba* is (200). Talking about picture 24 of the frog story where the boy is carrying one of the little frogs, Asunta and Magdalena are wondering how the boy could succeed in taking one of the little frogs, since usually frogs run away when one tries to grab them. Magdalena wonders how he could have managed to grab one in line 1. Asunta then says that this information should be shown on the pictures (line 4). Her utterance contains the ability modal *iba* marked with =*ya* for epistemic intersubjectivity, indicating that Asunta expects Magdalena to take the same stance. Moreover, the utterance is marked with =*chi*, yielding a frustrative interpretation: the information could be on the pictures but it is not. Magdalena agrees in line 5 with a repeat of Asunta’s initial utterance, again using an utterance containing *iba* marked with =*ya* and =*chi*.

- (200) 1. M: *amashku muchamashibë ush mishtaj (lacha)* (1.3)
amashku nu-chamashi=bë ushta
 how 3PL.OBJ.COM-be_busy=MOM before
mii-shta=ja lacha
 take.SG-FUT=REA too
 ‘How could he have done so he could grab it?’
2. A: *a:ti ujay it=*
ati ujwa-y itta
 DEM look-1SG thing
 ‘I looked at this...’
3. M: =*[të::]*
të
 INTJ
 ‘Yeah.’
4. ⇒ A: =*[ujay ati mii] ibu[yehi ani]*
ujwa-y ati mii iba=w=ya=chi ana=y
 look-1SG DEM take.SG can=PL=REP=FR DEM=LOC
 ‘I looked, they could have put that here [they should have put that on the picture].’
5. ⇒ M: *[ati mi]i ibuychi ati*

ati mii iba=w=ya=chi ati=y
 DEM take can=PL=REP=FR DEM=LOC
 ‘They could have put that there.’
 (al.ce.frogstory)

The interpretation of the combination of =*ya* and =*chi* is again compositional in (200). here with the epistemic intersubjective reading of =*ya*.

Another frequent use of the combination of =*ya* and =*chi* is in counterfactual conditionals where frustrative =*chi* marks that the event described by the apodosis has not occurred and cannot occur anymore. An example of this use is (201). Patricia is telling Juan that if he had drawn the lagoon more in the center of the paper, they could stick it to another paper and then it would be fine:

(201) *běshēmujuta anu popoya (.) anu dulatuychi emejnesh küttaychi*
běshěë-mujju-ta anu popo=ya anu dula-tu=ya=chi
 entity-center-HYP like_that glue=IRR like_that do-1PL=REP=FR
emejmesh kütta=ya=chi
 well appear=REP=FR
 ‘If it was more in the center, sticking it together like this we would do it like that and one could see it fine.’
 (mapII)

In this example, the combination =*ya=chi* is used once with a first and once with a third person. The interpretation of the combination is compositional: =*ya* in its intersubjective epistemic reading marks that the speaker thinks that the proposition could be possibly true under the condition of the protasis and expects the addressee to take the same stance. Frustrative =*chi* indicates that the event described by the proposition has not occurred.

The counterfactual conditional use of the combination =*ya=chi* usually occurs with the epistemic reading of =*ya*. However, the reported interpretation for =*ya* in counterfactual conditionals is also possible, like in (202). Asunta and Magdalena are talking about the *wëwëti* recording I brought for them to listen to. Asunta says in line 1 that if there was enough energy for the laptop, they would be listening to it at that moment. The conditional marked with =*ya=chi* can be interpreted as both reported or epistemic. In the case of a reported interpretation, it would express that I told Asunta that there was no energy, and that if there was some, they could listen to the *wëwëti*. The epistemic reading would yield an interpretation of ‘maybe we would listen to it’, a judgment of epistemic possibility.

(202) 1. ⇒ A: *itta tütta kalawshëtuychi tishilë* (0.7)
itta tütü-ta ka-la-wëshë-tu=ya=chi tishilë
 thing be-HYP 3SG.OBJ-MAL-listen-1PL=REP=FR now
 ‘If there was what’s it called [energy for the laptop], we would listen to it [the *wëwëti*] now.’
 2. (*itta*) [*mjta*]

- itta nijta*
thing NEG
‘There is no ...’
3. M: *[bateria] nijta?*=
bateria nijta
battery(SP) NEG
‘There is no battery [energy left in the battery]?’
4. A: *=bateria nijta dajta*
bateria nijta ?
battery(SP) NEG ?
‘There is no battery.’
(270807_conv)

The fact that the conditional can occur with both readings supports a compositional analysis of the combination of =*ya* and =*chi* in the context of counterfactual conditionals. The compositional analysis is also supported by the fact that =*ya* is not obligatory in counterfactual conditionals. In the corpus, there are 8 uses of =*chi* in conditionals in combination with =*ya* and 13 without =*ya*. An example is (203), where the speaker is telling the addressee about when we capsized with a canoe. In (203), she states that had we gone over land, we would not have capsized. She does not use =*ya* here since she knows for sure that this is true. It is impossible to capsize outside the water.

- (203) *adojola amalatat nij litapëruktachila*
a-dojjo=la amala-ta-tu nij
3SG.POSS-body=INS come-HYP-1PL NEG
li-ta-përuk-ta=chi=la
VLOC-1PL.OBJ-IDEO-MID=FR=COMM
‘Had we gone over land, we wouldn’t have capsized there.’
(290906_convI)

Example (203) shows that =*ya* in counterfactual conditionals is not used when the speaker knows for sure that the event described in the apodosis would be true in case the event of the protasis had been true. This supports a compositional analysis of the combination of =*ya* with =*chi* in counterfactual conditionals.

There are two uses of the combination =*ya*=*chi* with quotatives. Again, the interpretation is compositional. In the two examples in the conversational corpus, =*ya* is used to indicate reported evidence, while =*chi* is used to express that the proposition of the direct speech complement is false. An example is (204), an extension of (173) on page 182. Paulina is telling Miguel about some events that happened to her husband for which she has reported evidence. The whole telling is marked with =*ya* for reported evidence, which we can also see in the utterance in line 3. Paulina’s husband’s dog entered a peccary’s burrow. In line 1, she states that her husband thought at a certain moment that his dog had already been killed by the peccary. This utterance is marked with

=*ya* for reported evidence: her husband has told her about this thought. The utterance in line 1 is also marked with =*chi* for frustrative, which in this case co-occurs with a quotative, thus expressing that the proposition of the direct speech clause has turned out to be false: the dog was not really dead.

- (204) 1. ⇒ P: *alla boboynaj titiba (.) kutaychi mijompadre=*
alla bobo=va=naja ku-ta=ya=chi
 therefore kill=REP=NSIT 3SG.OBJ.COM-say=REP=FR
mi-jompadre
 2SG.POSS-compadre(SP)
 ‘Because of that your compadre thought that it [the peccary]
 had already killed his dog.’
2. M: =(. . .) (0.5)
3. P: *ine:li ashonkoy lijutütüy kompadre*
inele=y a-shonko=y
 inside=LOC 3SG.POSS-hole=LOC
li-ku-tütü=ya kompadre
 VLOC-3SG.OBJ.COM-sit=REP compadre(SP)
 ‘It [the dog] was inside its [the peccary’s] burrow together
 with it [the peccary]. compadre.’
 (160906_convI)

The combination of =*ya* and =*chi* in line 1 is compositional, in that =*ya* expresses reported evidence and =*chi* the notion of frustrative.

The fourth use of the combination of =*ya* with =*chi* is in agreeing responses. Agreements are a typical context for the intersubjective reading of =*ya* (cf. section 3.2.2.2). If the initial utterance is marked with =*chi*, the agreeing response is usually also marked with =*chi*. An example is (205). On picture 18 of the frog story, the deer has dropped the boy into the water and is itself standing on the shore. Asunta states in line 2 that the deer could have fallen into the water as well after dropping the boy. This utterance contains the ability modal *iba* and the combination of =*ya* and =*chi*, which constitutes a frustrative use of =*chi* (see section 7.1.1). Magdalena gives an agreeing response in line 3, also marked with =*ya* and =*chi*. The reading is compositional, =*ya* marks the utterance as an epistemically dependent agreement, while =*chi* repeats the frustrative of the initial utterance.

- (205) 1. M: *mororoy tēsē na sierbu* (2.0)
mororo=y tēsē naa sierbo
 hill=LOC stand DEM deer(SP)
 ‘That deer is standing on the hill.’
2. ⇒ A: *rüj lidele ibaychi la(y)la*
rüj li-dele iba=ya=chi lacha=la
 IDEO VLOC-fall can=REP=FR too=COMM
 ‘It should have fallen in, too.’

3. ⇒ M: =a::chutaychi
 achuta=**ya=chi**
 be_like_that=REP=FR
 'It should have.'
 (al.ce.frogstory)

It can be concluded that the interpretation of the combination of =ya and =chi is interpreted in a compositional way in all cases. This is not the case for the combination of frustrative =chi with subjective =laba, as will be shown in the following section.

8.2 The combination of =chi and =laba

The interpretation of the combination of frustrative =chi with subjective =laba does not seem to be compositional in most of the uses. Rather, it has developed a new range of meanings and must thus be considered grammaticalized. It has to be noted that there are only ten occurrences of =chi=laba in the conversational corpus, which shows that its use is not very common.

The most frequent interpretation of =chi=laba in interaction is to express that the information given by the addressee is in some way unexpected to the speaker (see Table 8.2). This interpretation is mirative in nature (cf. DeLancey 1997, 2001, and section 4.2.2 for an account of the mirative use of inferential =tiba). The use of =chi=laba seems to contain a certain degree of doubt, as is suggested by the results of semantic elicitation. However, the interactional data do not support this, which may however be due to the scarceness of occurrences of this combination in the conversational corpus.

There are two more uses of =chi=laba in the conversational corpus, which can both be considered marginal since each of them occurs only once. These are an apparently compositional use with a quotative, and a use to express that an action is carried out in vain. For the latter interpretation, there are some more examples from monologues, while the compositional use seems to be an exceptional case. The frequencies of the uses of =chi=laba are given in Table 8.2.

Table 8.2: The frequencies of the uses of =chi=laba

Use	Frequency	Percent of total
Mirative	6	60%
Compositional with quotative	1	10%
In vain	1	10%
Other/unclear ¹	2	20%
Total	10	100%

¹ The category 'other' contains one use embedded within a direct speech complement.

The mirative use of =chi=laba is the most frequent in the conversational corpus with six occurrences. It has been shown in section 4.2.2 that the inferential evidential =tiba can be used to express the notion of mirative. Its use is

restricted to responsive utterances, where it expresses that the information given by the addressee in the preceding utterance is unexpected to the speaker. This restriction does not hold for *=chi=laba*. Another difference between the two mirative strategies is that *=tiba* does not express doubt, while *=chi=laba* seems to express a certain degree of doubt. What the use of *=tiba* and *=chi=laba* to express mirative have in common is that they both refer to information given by the addressee.

=Chi=laba can be used in reconfirmation requests that are not immediately adjacent to the utterance to which they relate. This use can be observed in (206), where the information in question is given by Magdalena in line 1, and the mirative utterance containing *=chi=laba* relating to it only occurs in line 10. Magdalena has been telling Asunta about an event witnessed by friends of hers, where they observed that some Chimane people buried a dead person on the beach. In line 1, Magdalena reports that the people put a little cross on the grave and went away. This utterance is marked with *=ya* for reported evidence, since these events were observed by the friends of the speaker and then reported to the speaker. Asunta produces a news receipt response in line 2, which receives a reconfirmation token in line 3. From this we can infer that this information is integrated in some way into Asunta's knowledge. In line 4, Asunta asks whether the dead person belonged to the family of the people who buried them, which Magdalena confirms in line 5, again using the reported marker *=ya*. Asunta continues asking in line 6, listing some possible family relations. In line 7, Magdalena states that the dead person was the father of those who buried him. After another news receipt response by Asunta in line 8, Magdalena produces a summarizing utterance, saying that they buried him like this (line 9). In line 10, Asunta gives an utterance marked with *=chi=laba* that refers back to the cross mentioned by Magdalena in line 1. This utterance is introduced by the Spanish loan conjunction *pero* 'but', indicating that there is some contrast between the proposition and some other part of the discourse. In this case, the contrast seems to be between burying the man on the beach, but still going through the effort of putting a cross on his grave.

- (206) 1. ⇒ M: *anu kurushanñu bak kampĕjtaj baliwya* (0.8)
anu kurush-a-nñu bak ka-m-pĕjta=ja
 like_that cross(SP)-LINK-DIM IDEO 3SG.OBJ-BEN-put=REA
bali=w=ya
 go.PL=PL=REP
 'A little cross they put for him and then they went.'
2. A: *achuta=*
achuta
 be_like_that
 'Really.'
3. M: *=achu kampĕjtaj baliwya=*
achu ka-m-pĕjta=ja bali=w=ya
 like_that 3SG.OBJ-BEN-put=TOP go.PL=PL=RLP
 'Like that they put it for him and go.'

4. A: =*mapta ushta ati*=
ma-apta ushta ati
 3PL.POSS-kin before DEM
 ‘Was he their kin?’
5. M: =*maptaya* (1.2)
ma-apta=va
 3PL.POSS-kin=REP
 ‘Their kin.’
6. A: *mabisi mabonto* (.) [*mashoja*]
ma-bisi ma-bonto ma-shoja
 3PL.POSS-sibling 3PL.POSS-son 3PL.POSS-daughter
 ‘Their sibling, their son, their daughter.’
7. M: [*m ma matatay m matata* (0.8)]
ma-tata=va ma-tata
 3PL.POSS-father=REP 3PL.POSS-father
 ‘Their father (they said), their father.’
8. A: *matata*=
ma-tata
 3PL.POSS-father
 ‘Their father.’
9. M: =*mj achu pëjtaya* (0.5)
mj achu pëjta=w=ya
 INTJ like_that put=PL=REP
 ‘Yeah, like that they put him.’
10. ⇒ A: *aj* (.) *pero kampëjtayilab kurush* (.)
*aj pero ka-n-pëjta=**chi=laba** kurush*
 INTJ but(SP) 3SG.OBJ-BEN-put=FR=SUBJ cross(SP)
 ‘Oh, but they erected a cross for him.’
11. M: *achu kampë(jtaw)*
achu ka-n-pëjta=w
 like_that 3SG.OBJ-BEN-put=PL
 ‘Like that that they put it for him.’
 (270807_conv)

The interpretation of the combination of =*chi* and =*laba* in (206) is not compositional. Since the utterance refers to common ground between the speakers, which has been introduced by Magdalena in line 1, =*laba* does probably not mark subjective information access. If this was the case, the utterance would convey a claim of epistemic primacy (cf. section 5.1.1), which it clearly does not here. Moreover, =*chi* is not interpreted as frustrative or in this example, since the event of the people putting a cross on the grave is known to have occurred. This shows that the interpretation of =*chi=laba* is not compositional in terms of frustrative and subjective information access.

Instead, the combination of *=chi=laba* expresses that the information is unexpected to the speaker, including a certain degree of doubt. The use of the conjunction *pero* ‘but’ supports the analysis of the utterance in line 10 as indicating unexpected information. Furthermore, the reconfirmation request format implicates that the information is unexpected to the speaker, since otherwise she would not have asked for reconfirmation. Just like with *=tiba* (cf. section 4.2.1), the use in reconfirmation request seems to offer the context for a shift in interpretation toward mirative. Magdalena treats Asunta’s utterance as a reconfirmation request, giving a confirming response in line 11.

In example (207), *=chi=laba* is used in a reconfirmation request that occurs closer to the utterance to which it refers back than in (206). Magdalena has been telling Asunta that her father-in-law was attacked by some people. In line 1, she tells Asunta that these people wanted to kill her father-in-law and that he escaped from them. She uses the reported marker *=ya* to indicate that this has been reported to her by her father-in-law. After another utterance which is probably a slip of the tongue (see footnote to the example), Asunta produces a reconfirmation request marked with *=chi* and *=laba* in line 3, asking whether they were going to kill Magdalena’s father-in-law. This reconfirmation request does not immediately follow the initial utterance, but is much closer to it than in example (206). No news receipt token has been given so far, so the speaker has not demonstrated that she has integrated the information into her knowledge base. This shows that reconfirmation requests with *=chi=laba* are not restricted to contexts where the speaker refers back to information that has been introduced some turns before, but that they can also refer to information given in the immediately preceding turn.

- (207) 1. ⇒ M: *achu boboututi puchuy shinam tiwëshunñe* (0.9)
achu bobo-nta=w=ti puchu=ya shinama
 like_that kill-DES=PL=DS save_oneself=REP lon_ago
ti-wëshunñe
 1SG.POSS-father_in_law
 ‘When they wanted to kill him in that fashion, my father-in-law saved himself.’
2. *puchachuya* (1.1)
puchacha=w=ya²
 rescue=PL=REP
 ‘They rescued him.’
3. ⇒ A: *miwëshunñe boboshtuyflam* (0.4)
*mi-wëshunñe bobo-shta=w=**chi=laba***
 SG.POSS-father_in_law kill-FUT=PL=FR=SUBJ
 ‘They were going to kill your father in law.’
4. M: *tiwëshunñe boboshtuychila*
ti-wëshunñe bobo-shta=w=ya=chi=la
 1SG.POSS-father_in_law kill-FUT=PL=REP=FR=COMM
 ‘They were going to kill him indeed.’
 (270807_conv)

Magdalena treats Asunta's utterance as a reconfirmation request, giving a confirmation in line 4. The confirmation is marked with =*ya* for reported evidence, with =*chi* for frustrative³ (since the people did not succeed at killing the father-in-law), and with =*la* for adding commitment in second position. The combination of =*chi* and =*laba* in line 3 cannot be interpreted as compositional, since the speaker has received the information from the addressee, which means that a subjective interpretation of =*laba* is not possible. =*Chi*, in contrast, could get a frustrative interpretation here, since it co-occurs with the future marker -*shta* which usually yields a frustrative interpretation. The fact that =*chi* could have its literal interpretation here could be a clue for how the non-compositional interpretation developed, since it shows that we can still find traces of the basic meaning of =*chi*. A proposal will be discussed below in section 8.3.1.

The use of the combination of =*chi*=*laba* to express mirative is not restricted to the reconfirmation request format. In example (208), it is used in a second position utterance that is not a reconfirmation request, but rather a second position noticing in which the speaker expresses that she can also access the information in question. When Magdalena starts examining her baby (line 1), Asunta asks her why she does not make him urinate⁴ in line 2, using a =*chi* marked question to indicate that this is not an information request but rather expressing a complaint about not having made him urinate (cf. section 7.2.2.2). In line 3, Magdalena notices that the boy has already urinated. Asunta's response in line 4 is a modified repeat marked with =*chi*=*laba* and the female resignation marker =*yu*.

- (208) 1. M: ((examines her baby child on her lap))
 2. A: *ĕnij shuppĕpĕmchi?* (1.3)
 ĕnij shuppĕ~pĕ-m=chi
 why_not urine~CAU-2SG=FR
 'Why don't you make him pee?'
 3. ⇒ M: *ish[upĕnaj buyta]*
 i-shuppĕ=naja buyta
 PV-urine=NSIT chief
 'The boss has peed already.'
 4. ⇒ A: *[ishu:]::pĕyylabayu=*
 *i-shuppĕ=**chi=laba**=yu*
 PV-urine=FR=SUBJ=RES.F
 'Really, he has peed!'
 5. =*ĕnij shuppĕpĕmchi (mĕ)*
 ĕnij shuppĕ~pĕ-u=chi mĕĕ
 why_not urine~CAU'S-2SG=FR 2SG.PRON

²According to the consultant with whom I transcribed this recording, this is not the correct verb that should be used here, since the Chimane did not save Magdalena's father-in-law, but rather let him escape involuntarily.

³This is another compositional use of the combination of =*ya* and =*chi*.

⁴Babies frequently do not wear diapers, but are taken out to urinate.

‘Why didn’t you make him pee?’
(270807_conv)

=*Chi=laba* expresses here that the fact that the boy already urinated was unexpected to the speaker. That is was indeed unexpected to her can be inferred from her utterance in line 1, where she asks Magdalena why she does not make him urinate, which implicates that she thinks that he has not yet urinated.

The combination =*chi=laba* can be used to indicate that an action is carried out for a long time, and as an extension of that interpretation, it can indicate that an action is carried out in vain.⁵ Since this use is marginal in the conversational corpus with only one instance (cf. Table 8.2), examples from monological data are used here. An example is (209). The example is from the monologue about the old traditions of the Yurakaré. The sequence is about how the ancestors of the Yurakaré mourned their dead. In line 1, Asunta states that they were sad when somebody died. The combination of =*chi=laba* occurs in line 2 in a declarative expressing that the ancestors cried about their dead. When translating this extract, Asunta gave the interpretation of ‘he cried and cried’ for this utterance.

- (209) 1. *adyindyi* (0.9)
 adyindyi
 sad
 ‘He was sad.’
2. ⇒ *awëwëylaba* (1.1)
 a-wëwë=chi=laba
 PROG-cry=FR=SUBJ
 ‘He cried and cried.’
3. *tupti litütüy lëjlishitati* (0.4)
 tuputa=y *li-tütü=y* *lëjlc-shta=ti*
 mosquito_net=LOC VLOC-be=IRR day-FUT=DS
 ‘When they were in their mosquito net at the break of dawn.’
4. *chajtiw shinam tappëshamu*
 chajti=w *shinama*
 be_like_that:HAB=PL long_ago
 ta-pëpë-shama=w
 1PL.POSS-grandfather-DCSD=PL
 ‘Like that our ancestors used to be before.’
 (al_tradiciones)

It is not clear how the interpretation of doing something over a long time arises from the combination of =*chi* and =*laba*. It is interesting to note that, when presented with this sentence in semantic elicitation out of context, six out of seven speakers gave the interpretation of the speaker not knowing whether

⁵Note that this function is described by van Gijn (2006) for the two instances of the combination of =*ya* and =*laba*: see above.

the event happened or not. This interpretation relates more to the second interpretation of *=chi=laba*, the expression of unexpected information with some degree of doubt.

In (210), we find a similar example. This usage of *=chi=laba* with the verb *mala* ‘go.SG’ occurs in mythological narratives. The sequence in (210) is taken from the narrative of Tiri. The husband of Tiri’s mother did not come home again one day because he got eaten by jaguars. His wife is sad when he does not come back, and goes to search for him. This is expressed in line 1. In line 2, we find an instance of the verb *mala* ‘go.SG’ marked with *=chi* and *=laba*, indicating that she walked for a very long time. This effect is strengthened by the repetition of the verb *mala* in both lines 1 and 2, which in Yurakaré is used to indicate ongoing or repeated actions. Additionally, an interpretation of carrying out the action in vain arises, since the woman walks looking for her husband but does not find him.

- (210) 1. *libëbëni* (0.5) *mala adyindyi tütü mala* (1.0)
 li-bëbë-mi *mala adyindyi tütü mala*
 VLOC-search-INT go.SG sad be go.SG
 ‘She went to look for him, she went, being sad she went.’
2. ⇒ *malayjlaba* (0.5) *malaja* (0.5) *malaja*
 mala=chi=laba mala=ja mala=ja
 go.SG=FR=SUBJ go.SG=REA go.SG=REA
 ‘She went without stopping, going, going.’
 (al_tiri)

The ‘in vain’ interpretation could arise through pragmatic inference, based on the inference that if an action is carried out for a very long time, a possible reason is that it has not yielded a result. Of course, it could also be the other way around, with the ‘in vain’ interpretation being prior and giving rise to the interpretation of doing something for a long time as a pragmatic inference. The latter scenario could even be more compatible with the frustrative semantics of *=chi*. Which of the two scenarios is true cannot be decided since there is no evidence in the data.

To summarize, the combination of *=chi=laba* must be considered grammaticalized to a large extent, because it has developed an interpretation that cannot be analyzed in a compositional way anymore. In interaction, it is used to mark information as unexpected. A second, more marginal use is to indicate that an action is carried out over a long time and, as an extension, in vain.

8.3 Discussion

In this chapter, examples for the two possible combinations within the verbal enclitic set of Yurakaré have been presented. It has been argued that the combination of reported/intersubjective *=ya* with *=chi* is compositional, and that the combination of *=chi* with subjective *=laba* is not compositional but has developed a new interpretation which is different from the sum of its

parts. In the following, it will be proposed that the mirative interpretation of =*chi=laba* could have arisen from uses where the combination was used in a compositional way (section 8.3.1). Furthermore, possible reasons will be discussed why the two attested combinations described in this chapter are the only possible combinations, while the others are ungrammatical (section 8.3.2).

8.3.1 The grammaticalization of =*chi=laba*

It will be argued in the following that the mirative interpretation of =*chi=laba* could have arisen through compositional uses of the combination, where =*chi* is interpreted as frustrative and =*laba* as subjective. There is one case in the conversational corpus of =*chi=laba* where both morphemes retain their semantics, yielding such a compositional interpretation. This example helps us infer how the new grammaticalized meaning of this marker could have developed. In (211), the speakers are talking about possible reasons for the boy to grab the deer's antlers (pictures 13 and 14). In line 1, *Asunta* suggests that the boy might not have seen it before, and wonders how else it could have happened. After *Magdalena* indicates her ignorance in line 2, *Asunta* suggests that the boy could have thought that it was a tree in line 3, using an utterance marked with =*chi=laba*.

- (211) 1. A: *kusu nij bëjta ush an sewwe amashku [imbëtëchi]* ((turns page))
kusu nij bëjta ushta ana sewwe amashku imbëtë=chi
 maybe NEG see before DEM boy how behave=FR
 'Maybe the boy didn't see it before, or how could he have done?'
2. M: [*a*::: (.)]
aaa
 INTJ
 'Don't know.'
3. ⇒ A: *kummë kutayjlaba=*
kummë ku-ta=chi=laba
 tree 3SG.OBJ.COM-say=FR=SUBJ
 'He might have thought it was a tree.'
4. M: =*m bë* ((laughing)) *u[jorejtuuj] sak*
bë a-korejto=y sak
 ATT 3.POSS-neck=LOC IDEO
 'Look, he is on its neck!'
5. A: [*...*]
 (al_ce_frogstory)

A compositional interpretation of the utterance marked with =*chi=laba* in line 3 is plausible. Frustrative =*chi* indicates that the boy wrongfully thought that the deer's antlers were a tree. Subjective =*laba* expresses that this is the personal interpretation of the speaker. The translation yielded by this

compositional analysis of *=chi=laba* is ‘I think he wrongfully thought it was a tree’.

This compositional example can possibly provide a link between the compositional and the non-compositional, grammaticalized interpretation of *=chi=laba*. Expressing that one holds the subjective opinion that somebody thought something wrongfully can conversationally implicate that one finds it unexpected that this person thought such a thing. From such a conversational implicature, the unexpected information reading of *=chi=laba* could have developed and grammaticalized. Then it could have spread to uses where *=chi* normally does not occur. However, this does not explain why *=chi=laba* as mirative is used to mark information as unexpected that was given by the other speaker.

Another link between the two interpretations is example (207) above, where *=chi=laba* occurs with the future marker *-shta*. In that example, the frustrative marker *=chi* seems to retain its frustrative semantics, and at the same time express a mirative interpretation in combination with *=laba*. This example demonstrates what the stage in between the compositional and the non-compositional reading could have looked like.

An example which might provide a link between the subjective interpretation of *=laba* and the mirative interpretation of its combination with frustrative *=chi* is (212). Here, *=laba* occurs in a second position context with information that has already been part of the discourse. The interpretation seems to be one of unexpected information rather than subjective information access. Asunta and Magdalena have been talking about picture 1 of the frog story for a while, where the boy and the dog are looking at the frog inside its glass bowl. The sequence in (212) refers back to a short sequence that occurred roughly 1.5 minutes before, where Magdalena noticed that the dog had covered itself, which was disconfirmed by Asunta who then explained that what Magdalena thought was a cover were its ears.⁶ In (212), Magdalena points back to that prior sequence in line 1, where she laughingly makes fun of her own suggestion that the dog would be covering itself. Asunta also starts laughing, giving a partial repetition of Magdalena’s utterance in line 2. This repeat is marked with *=laba*. This utterance refers to common ground between the two speakers, as well as to the initial utterance immediately preceding it. A similar sequence is repeated in lines 3-4.

- (212) 1. M: ((laughing)) *na urupta* ((laughs)) *idalatebenñu ti* (0.8)
naa urupta i-dala-tebe-nñu ta=v
 DEM cover_oneself PV-head-PURP-DIM say-1SG
 ‘And I thought that it covered itself, that it had a head cover!’
2. ⇒ A: ((laughs)) *heem uru urupta kutamlam mē=*
urupta ku-ta-m=laba mēē
 cover_oneself 3SG.OBJ.COM-say-2SG=SUBJ 2SG.PRON
 ‘You really thought it covered itself!’
3. M: *=urupta [kuti sē* ((laughs))
urupta ku-ta-y sēē
 cover_oneself 3SG.OBJ.COM-say-1SG 1SG.PRON

⁶This sequence is represented in (196) on page 206.

- ‘I thought it covered itself.’
4. ⇒A: *[lëmmuy urupta chamashibē kutamlam=*
lëmmuy urupta chamashi=bë
 just_like_that cover_oneself be_busy=MOM
ku-ta-m=laba
 3SG.OBJ.COM-say-2SG=SUBJ
 ‘You thought it was just like that being busy with covering
 itself.’
5. M: *=shuwi na? tēp(shēchi)*
shuwi naa tētō-bēshēē=chi
 moon DEM which-entity=FR
 ‘Is that the moon, or what is it?’
 (al_cc_frogstory)

=Laba cannot mark subjective information access in the two uses in lines 2 and 4, since the information is clearly directly accessible to the speaker. She has heard Magdalena say that she thought that the dog was wearing a cover. Neither can it indicate a claim of independent epistemic access in second position, since there is no way Asunta could have independent access to Magdalena’s thoughts. Rather, it seems that the interpretation is here that Asunta finds it unexpected that Magdalena could think that the dog was covering itself. It is not clear how this interpretation is derived from the subjective semantics of *=laba*, but a connection to the combination with *=chi* seems likely. The interpretation in (212) could also be a specific interpretation of *=laba* with second persons. Since there are no other examples of this kind in the corpus, it is hard to say whether or not this use constitutes a conversational practice.

In elicitation, utterances with *=laba* and a second person singular are almost always interpreted as confirmation requests in which the speaker has some reason to think that the requested information should be true. In the case of (212), the speaker even knows the proposition to be true, so the interpretation of the question is to express that the information is unexpected to the speaker. Magdalena’s response in line 3 allows for a confirmation request interpretation of line 2 because she gives a confirmation in form of a repeat. Asunta gives another repeat in line 4 with some additional material, again marked with *=laba*. The mirative interpretation seems again the most likely here. Magdalena does not respond to this utterance but rather abruptly changes topic in line 5.

It has been argued in this section that the mirative interpretation of *=chi=laba* could have developed out of uses where a compositional reading is still possible. The following section discusses possible reasons for why *=ya=chi* and *=chi=laba* are the only possible combinations within the verbal enclitic set.

8.3.2 Possible and impossible combinations

It has been stated above that *=ya=chi* and *=chi=laba* are the only possible combinations within the verbal enclitic set. All other combinations do not occur in the corpus and are rejected by speakers in elicitation. It will be argued that

the impossibility of combining the evidentials is due to semantic incompatibility in some cases, and to incompatibility of conditions of use in other cases.

Underlying these explanations is the fact that all evidentials take scope over the whole proposition, which would lead to an interpretation of two or more different types of access to the information given in the proposition in case of a combination of two or more evidentials. An interpretation where one evidential scopes over the evidential type expressed by the other evidential is not possible in Yurakaré. On a purely semantic basis, it would be possible for one evidential to take scope over another in a combination. We can imagine that the combination of reported $=ya$ and inferential $=tiba$ would result in the interpretation ‘I must have been told p’. Here, $=tiba$ would scope over $=ya$, which would be indicated by its position following $=ya$. However, such combinations of evidentials are not possible in Yurakaré. The evidentials always take scope over the proposition and they cannot be combined to take scope over each other.

Another aspect that blocks the combination of evidentials is the deictic shift that some combinations would involve. This can be illustrated by a sentence like ‘I heard that p must be the case’, which could be represented by the combination of $=tiba=yá$. In this case, reported $=ya$ would scope over inferential $=tiba$. Note that here a shift of deictic center would be required for the inference marker, which would express that the proposition p was inferred by the person who reported it to the speaker rather than by the speaker herself. This is not possible with Yurakaré evidentials. The only way in which they can shift from the speaker to another deictic center is when they are embedded within a direct speech complement under a speech act verb in quotative constructions (cf. section 2.7.2.3).

The Yurakaré evidentials could be expected to yield the interpretation that the speaker has two or more types of access to the information when combined,⁷ for example access through a report as well as inferential access through some kind of observable evidence, which would be expressed by a combination of reported $=ya$ and inferential $=tiba$. The interpretation would be ‘I heard and I also infer on the basis of external evidence that p’. On semantic grounds, such a combination is imaginable; however, it does not occur with any of the evidentials in Yurakaré.

Having established that the evidentials always take scope over the proposition, we can explain the impossibility of some combinations of evidentials in San Pablo Yurakaré on semantic grounds. Some combinations are semantically incompatible, since they would indicate contradicting types of evidence. The assumptive marker $=jtë$ could not possibly combine with any of the other evidentials, since it marks the lack of observable evidence, while the other three evidentials all indicate the presence of some kind of evidence. $=Jtë$ is thus incompatible with the other three evidentials on semantic grounds.

As for the combination of inferential $=tiba$ with subjective $=laba$, what makes them incompatible with each other is their different conditions of use in terms of intersubjectivity. While $=tiba$ requires the addressee to have access to

⁷Another possibility would be a combination that is not compositional anymore but rather developed a new meaning.

the external evidence as well. *=laba* does not come with any kind of assumption about the addressee's access, and can also be used when the addressee clearly has no access to the external evidence through which the speaker is accessing the information given in the target proposition. This makes the combination of *=laba* and *=tiba* impossible.

Differences in conditions of use also explain the incompatibility of *=ya* in both its reported and epistemic readings with *=tiba* and *=laba*. Reported *=ya* is used in informing interactional contexts, where the speaker informs the addressee of something to which he has had no access before. This makes the reported use of *=ya* incompatible with both *=tiba* and *=laba*. *=Tiba* is never used in informing contexts, and it requires at least equal access to the external information. As for *=laba*, it seems incompatible with reported *=ya* since it is used when the speaker presents her subjective interpretation of a situation without claiming anything about the addressee's access. Since the use of reported *=ya* does convey such a claim, *=ya* and *=laba* are incompatible in terms of their conditions of use.

The epistemic use of *=ya* is also incompatible with *=tiba* and *=laba* in terms of its conditions of use. While *=tiba* emphasizes the presence of external evidence, *=ya* de-emphasizes the presence of external evidence. As for epistemic *=ya* and subjective *=laba*, they contrast in terms of their intersubjective conditions of use. While *=ya* is used when the speaker expects the addressee to also find the proposition a reasonable possibility, *=laba* makes no such claim. This explains the incompatibility of these two markers.

We can explain the fact that combinations of evidentials with frustrative *=chi* are possible through the scope relations of these markers. While *=chi* takes scope over the event in its declarative frustrative use, the evidentials take scope over the proposition. This makes their use in combination in principle compatible, since they do not compete with each other as propositional operators. While *=chi* operates on the event level indicating that the event did not occur, the evidentials operate on the propositional level. The question remains what makes it possible for *=chi* to combine with *=ya* and *=laba*, but not with the other two evidentials.

The fact that *=ya* and *=laba* are the only evidentials that can co-occur with the frustrative marker *=chi* supports the view that they share some underlying features. What they have in common is that they de-emphasize the presence of external evidence (a source proposition) that is used as an access point for the embedded proposition (the target proposition). The reported reading of *=ya* is not used when the speaker infers a target proposition from a source proposition. Rather, it is used when the speaker relies on a report of the target proposition made by somebody else, and thus the source proposition is the same as the target proposition. The intersubjective epistemic reading of *=ya* emphasizes that the speaker considers the proposition a possible truth, without requiring the presence of a source proposition. Thus, both uses of *=ya* are not concerned with expressing the presence of a source proposition from which the target proposition is inferred. Subjective *=laba* expresses that the speaker interprets a situation in a subjective way. Its use de-emphasizes the presence of a source proposition and emphasizes the subjective interpretation of a situation.

Inferential =*tiba* and assumptive =*jtë*, in contrast, are concerned with asserting the presence and absence of a source proposition, respectively. =*Tiba* asserts that the speaker accesses the target proposition through inference from some kind of source proposition, while =*jtë* expresses that the speaker cannot access any source proposition for inferring the target proposition. =*Tiba* and =*jtë* contrast in this respect with =*ya* and =*laba*, which do not assert the presence or absence of a source proposition.

It can merely be speculated that it could be this difference that makes the combination of =*chi* with =*ya* and =*laba* possible, while combinations with =*tiba* and =*jtë* are impossible. An explanation could be that the presence or absence of a source proposition from which the target proposition can be inferred does not allow for the target proposition to be in fact known to be non-actualized. However, it is also possible that there is no functional explanation why these combinations are impossible.

To summarize, it has been shown in this chapter that there are only two possible combinations within the verbal enclitic set, reported/intersubjective =*ya* with frustrative =*chi*, and frustrative =*chi* with subjective =*laba*. While the combination =*ya=chi* has a compositional interpretation, this is not the case for =*chi=laba*, which has developed a new interpretation. Most frequently, its interpretation is mirative, indicating that some information given by the addressee is unexpected to the speaker. Unlike =*tiba* in its mirative use, =*chi=laba* can be used to refer back to information given in a turn that does not immediately precede it, and with information the speaker is able to observe.



Chapter 9

Summary and conclusion

In the present study, I have analyzed the use of the Yurakaré evidentials in interaction using conversational data. The data have shown that the evidentials are used for a variety of interactional functions. This dissertation contributes to the field of language description in that it offers a comprehensive account of the evidential system of Yurakaré, which has not been described in detail before. Thereby, it enhances our knowledge about the grammatical category of evidentiality. In the following, the most important findings are summarized. Section 9.2 presents the conclusions of this study.

9.1 Summary

In chapter 3, it is shown that the verbal enclitic =*ya* has two readings, reported evidentiality and epistemic intersubjectivity. The reported reading is used in informing interactional contexts, when the speaker informs the addressee of something that she does not expect him to know. In contrast, the intersubjective reading is used when situations are jointly accessed and interpreted by speaker and addressee. This shows that the interpretation of =*ya* depends on the interactional context of use.

Utterances with =*ya* in its epistemic intersubjective reading show a preference for agreeing responses. I have argued that this is due to the intersubjective semantics of =*ya*. Since the intersubjective component expresses that the speaker expects the addressee to take the same stance on the information, an agreeing response is mobilized or at least facilitated. The epistemic reading of =*ya* is also used in second position utterances to mark them as epistemically dependent agreements. This use is again facilitated by the intersubjective semantics of =*ya*. Since it expresses that the addressee is expected to take the same stance, it lends itself to be used in agreements which mirror the stance expressed by the initial utterance. This demonstrates that the semantics of =*ya* influences the ways in which it is used in interaction.

Chapter 4 demonstrates that the inferential evidential =*tiba* is used to indicate that the speaker accesses the information through inference from some kind of external evidence. =*Tiba* is often used in confirmation requests where

the addressee is expected to have superior access to the information. I have suggested that the use of =*tiba* increases the pressure on the addressee to produce a response in such contexts.

Inferential =*tiba* has a use that is restricted to responsive utterances where it expresses the notion of mirative, i.e. it indicates that the information is unexpected to the speaker. It can only refer to information given by the addressee in the previous turn. I have argued that this use has arisen through the spread from confirmation requests to second position reconfirmation requests. Since reconfirmation requests implicate that the information given by the addressee is unexpected to the speaker, this interactional context facilitated a shift in interpretation of =*tiba* from inferential to mirative in responsive utterances. This shows that interaction can be the driving force behind a shift in interpretation, and that this can be demonstrated by the use of interactional data. Such an approach is important for languages for which no diachronic data exist.

The subjective evidential =*laba* was discussed in chapter 5. It indicates that the speaker interprets a situation from her subjective perspective without taking the perspective of the addressee into account. I have argued that this can be inferred from the fact that =*laba* can occur with various types of distribution of information access.

Subjective =*laba* does not show a preference for any specific kind of response. I have suggested that this is due to the subjective semantics of =*laba*. Since =*laba* does not express an assumption about the addressee's information access or stance, it does not lend itself to facilitating a specific type of response. This demonstrates that the meaning of =*laba* "blocks" certain uses in interaction.

In chapter 6, it was shown that the marker =*jtë* collocates with the resignative marker =*yu/ri* to yield an assumptive interpretation. It is mainly used in content questions to indicate that the queried information is not accessible to either speaker or addressee. Content questions with =*jtë=yu/ri* are not used to request information but rather to express some kind of stance. Responses to content questions with =*jtë=yu/ri* often show affiliation with that stance. In second position, content questions with =*jtë=yu/ri* can be used to express alignment with the activity implemented by the initial utterance and affiliation with the stance expressed by it.

I have argued that the dispreference of the use of =*jtë=yu/ri* in declaratives could be due to the tendency toward basing information on the strongest possible evidence (Faller 2002). Since =*jtë=yu/ri* expresses lack of evidence, it could have become dispreferred in declaratives, while the use in content questions came to be the preferred use. The interpretation of lack of evidence is better suited for use in content questions, since these inherently express lack of knowledge. The intersubjective component of =*jtë=yu/ri*, expressing that the addressee is not expected to be able to access the information, leads to the use in content questions that do not request information but rather perform other actions in interaction. This demonstrates the close connection between the semantics of =*jtë=yu/ri* and its use in interaction.

Chapter 7 deals with the frustrative marker =*chi*. This verbal enclitic is not an evidential, but it has been included in this study because it occupies the same morphosyntactic slot, and because it has an intersubjective component

in interaction, like the four evidentials of Yurakaré. The basic semantics of =*chi* in declaratives is to indicate that an event is frustrated, i.e. that the event is not actualized. Furthermore, =*chi* is used in commands and in content questions to reduce the pressure on the addressee of performing the requested action or providing the requested information. This was analyzed as an instance of the ‘be pessimistic’ politeness strategy proposed by Brown and Levinson (1978:177-81). It has been argued that the use of =*chi* as a politeness marker arose from its basic frustrative interpretation in combination with irrealis TAM markers. This shows that the context of use of =*chi* has led to a shift from frustrative toward a politeness marker in certain contexts.

As demonstrated in chapter 8, the only possible combinations within the verbal enclitic set are =*ya=chi* and =*chi=laba*. I have shown that the interpretation of the combination of reported/intersubjective =*ya* with frustrative =*chi* is compositional because both markers retain their basic semantics. In contrast, the combination of =*chi* with =*laba* has developed a new meaning of indicating unexpected information that cannot be analyzed in a compositional way. I have argued that the impossibility of other combinations could be due to semantic incompatibility.

9.2 Conclusion

The findings of this study show that the use of the Yurakaré evidentials is to a large extent grounded in interaction. This is in line with findings from other interactional studies of evidentials and evidential expressions, such as Donabédian for Modern Western Armenian (2001), Fox for English (2001), and Michael for Nanti (2008), who argue that evidentiality is an interactional category that should be studied from an interactional perspective.

The present study advocates an interactional perspective on evidentials and on language in general. It demonstrates that methods from Conversation Analysis can be used for analyzing the semantics and pragmatics of grammatical items like evidentials. The Yurakaré evidentials were studied using a sequential analysis, with special attention to how the participants treat each others’ utterances in interaction. This method comes from the Conversation Analysis tradition and is not standard in descriptive linguistics. In the present study, this method has proven to be very useful for the study of the Yurakaré evidentials. It therefore seems desirable to further implement the method of sequential analysis in the field of descriptive linguistics, since it can offer results that cannot easily be obtained with other methods.

An important argument for the use of interactional data in linguistic investigation is that certain meaning components are hard to notice outside interaction. In this dissertation, I have shown that the Yurakaré evidentials all express an assumption of the speaker about the addressee’s information access. All evidence for these intersubjective components of the evidentials comes from the interactional data used in this study. The intersubjective component of the evidentials could not have been detected outside interactional data. Intersubjective values of grammatical items can best be studied in conversations where speakers share perspectives on information, and we can

observe how they treat each others' utterances. Such an analysis is not possible in monological data. This underlines the significance of the study of interaction for the field of linguistics. The main contributions of this dissertation to the field of interactional linguistics are summarized in the following:

- Methods from Conversation Analysis are useful for the analysis of grammatical items
 - An interactional perspective broadens our understanding of the semantics and pragmatics of grammatical categories
 - Some semantic components like intersubjectivity can only be discovered in interaction
- ⇒ **An interactional perspective is crucial for the study of evidentiality and other grammatical categories**

By offering an analysis of the relationship between the semantics of the Yurakaré evidentials and their uses in interaction, this dissertation contributes to the study of meaning and semantic change. I have argued that the evidential and intersubjective semantics of the Yurakaré evidentials facilitate specific uses in interaction, which shows that meaning has a bearing on use in interaction. Moreover, I have demonstrated that in some cases a semantic change can be traced through interactional contexts. These cases provide synchronic evidence for semantic change, which is especially helpful in the case of languages for which no diachronic data are available.

It is well documented that one process of semantic change and grammaticalization is the conventionalization of pragmatic inferences (e.g. Bybee et al. 1994, Hopper and Traugott 2003, Traugott and Dasher 2002). This happens when a word or grammatical item invites a certain pragmatic inference in some context or environment. This inference can become associated with the word or grammatical item itself, a process through which a stage of polysemy arises. Usually, such mechanisms of semantic change are studied with the use of historical written texts. The present study shows that we can also study processes of semantic change in synchronic interactional data, at least to some extent. Interactional data can provide evidence for the pragmatic processes that lead to semantic change, since they provide an insight into the various uses of the words or grammatical items we study. For example, we have seen that the inferential marker =*tiba* has developed a mirative reading in a certain interactional context, namely in second position utterances within the adjacency pair. This semantic expansion was argued to have arisen through pragmatic inference provided by the interactional context of reconfirmation requests. To summarize:

- Interactional use can lead to semantic change
 - Some semantic changes can be traced through synchronic interactional data
- ⇒ **Interactional data can provide evidence for semantic change, which is especially useful when no diachronic data are available**

The present study shows that the Yurakaré evidentials are used for certain functions in interaction which can be related to their basic semantics. This supports the idea that semantics and pragmatics are distinct, a point which is continuously debated in the literature. In the future, it will be interesting to investigate whether evidentials in other languages are used for the same functions in interaction. If this can be shown to be the case, this would enable us to establish an interactional typology of evidentiality, where the semantics of evidentials are cross-linguistically correlated with certain uses in interaction.



Samenvatting

Yurakaré is een ongeclassificeerde taal, gesproken in centraal Bolivia. Het heeft een set van vijf verbale enclitische markeerders, waarvan er vier evidentialiteitsmarkeerders zijn. Deze studie onderzoekt het gebruik in interactie van deze enclitische elementen, gebruikmakend van conversationele data. De studie toont aan dat het gebruik en de interpretatie van de verbale enclitische markeerders voor een groot deel bepaald wordt door de interactionele context.

In hoofdstuk 3 wordt getoond dat de markeerder =*ya* twee interpretaties heeft: reportatieve evidentialiteit en epistemische intersubjectiviteit. De reportatieve lezing ontstaat in informerende contexten, als de spreker de hoorder informeert over iets waarvan zij verwacht dat hij dit niet weet. De intersubjectieve interpretatie, daarentegen, ontstaat wanneer een situatie voor zowel de spreker als hoorder toegankelijk is, en gezamenlijk wordt geïnterpreteerd.

Uitingen met =*ya* in de epistemisch-intersubjectieve lezing hebben een voorkeur voor instemmende reacties. Dit is gerelateerd aan de intersubjectieve semantiek van =*ya*. Aangezien de intersubjectieve component uitdrukt dat de spreker verwacht dat de hoorder dezelfde houding als de spreker aanneemt ten opzichte van de informatie, wordt een instemmende reactie gemobiliseerd of op zijn minst gefaciliteerd. De epistemische lezing van =*ya* wordt ook gebruikt in reagerende uitingen, waarmee ze als epistemisch afhankelijke instemmingen worden gemarkeerd. Dit gebruik wordt eveneens gefaciliteerd door de intersubjectieve semantiek van =*ya*. Omdat =*ya* uitdrukt dat van de hoorder wordt verwacht dat hij dezelfde houding aanneemt, is het geschikt om gebruikt te worden in overeenstemmingen die de houding van de spreker, uitgedrukt in de initiële uiting, reflecteren. Deze observaties tonen aan dat de interpretatie van =*ya* afhankelijk is van de interactionele context waarin het wordt gebruikt.

Hoofdstuk 4 laat zien dat de inferentiële evidentialiteitsmarkeerder =*tiba* gebruikt wordt om aan te geven dat de spreker toegang heeft tot de informatie via inferentie op basis van externe evidentie. =*Tiba* wordt vaak gebruikt in verzoeken tot bevestiging, waarbij verwacht wordt dat de hoorder betere toegang tot de informatie heeft dan de spreker. Ik stel voor dat het gebruik van =*tiba* de druk op de hoorder verhoogt om in zulke contexten met een antwoord te komen.

De inferentie-markeerder =*tiba* heeft een interpretatie die beperkt is tot reagerende uitingen, waar het een miratieve lezing krijgt, dat wil zeggen dat het aangeeft dat de informatie onverwacht is voor de spreker. Het kan alleen refereren naar informatie die door de hoorder in de vorige beurt gegeven

is. Ik beargumenteer dat dit gebruik is ontstaan door een uitbreiding van gebruikscontexten van =*tiba*, van initiërende bevestigingsverzoeken naar reagerende herbevestigingsverzoeken. Aangezien verzoeken tot herbevestiging impliceren dat de door de hoorder gegeven informatie onverwacht is voor de spreker, heeft het gebruik van =*tiba* in deze interactionele context een verschuiving in de interpretatie van =*tiba* teweeggebracht van inferentiëel naar miratief in reagerende uitingen. Dit laat zien dat interactie een drijvende kracht kan zijn achter een verschuiving in interpretatie, en dat dit kan worden aangetoond door het gebruik van interactionele data.

De subjectieve evidentialiteitsmarkeerder =*laba* wordt besproken in hoofdstuk 5. De markeerder geeft aan dat de spreker een situatie interpreteert vanuit haar subjectieve perspectief zonder het perspectief van de hoorder daarbij te betrekken. Dit blijkt mede uit het feit dat =*laba* gebruikt kan worden in situaties met verschillende verdelingen van informatietoegang. De markeerder =*laba* lokt geen specifieke reagerende uitingen uit. Ik beargumenteer dat dit volgt uit de subjectieve semantiek van =*laba*. Omdat =*laba* geen aanname over de informatietoegang of houding van de hoorder uitdrukt, is er geen preferentie voor één specifiek type reagerende uitingen. Dit laat zien dat de betekenis van =*laba* het gebruik in bepaalde interactionele contexten blokkeert.

In hoofdstuk 6 beschrijf ik hoe de combinatie van de markeerder =*jtë* met de resignatieve markeerder =*yu/ri* leidt tot een assumptieve interpretatie. Dit gebruik komt het meeste voor in inhoudsvragen om aan te geven dat de informatie waarnaar wordt gevraagd onbereikbaar is voor zowel spreker als hoorder. Inhoudsvragen met =*jtë* en =*yu/ri* worden dan ook niet gebruikt voor verzoeken om informatie, maar om een bepaalde houding uit te drukken. Antwoorden op inhoudsvragen die gemarkeerd zijn met =*jtë* en =*yu/ri* drukken vaak een aansluiting op die houding uit. In reagerende positie kunnen inhoudsvragen met =*jtë* en =*yu/ri* ook aansluiting of verbinding uitdrukken met de actie en de houding die in de initiële uiting wordt gegeven.

Het feit dat =*jtë* en =*yu/ri* gebrek aan bewijs uitdrukt, kan ertoe hebben geleid dat het gebruik ervan in mededelingen werd vermeden, terwijl het gebruik in inhoudsvragen het geprefereerde gebruik werd. De gebrek-aan-bewijs interpretatie past beter bij inhoudsvragen die immers inherent gebrek aan bewijs uitdrukken. De intersubjectieve component van =*jtë* en =*yu/ri*, die uitdrukt dat niet van de hoorder verwacht wordt dat hij toegang heeft tot de informatie, leidt tot het gebruik in inhoudsvragen waarin niet om informatie wordt verzocht, maar waarin andere interactieve acties worden uitgedrukt. Dit drukt de nauwe samenhang uit tussen de semantiek van =*jtë* met =*yu/ri* en de interactionele context waarin het wordt gebruikt.

Hoofdstuk 7 behandelt de frustratiefmarkeerder =*chi*. De basisfunctie van =*chi* is om aan te geven dat een gebeurtenis is gedwarsboord (gefrustreerd), d.w.z. dat een gebeurtenis niet heeft plaatsgevonden. Daarnaast wordt =*chi* gebruikt in bevelen en in inhoudsvragen om de druk op de hoorder om de verzochte actie uit te voeren of de gevraagde informatie te geven, te verminderen. Dit gebruik analyseer ik als een uiting van de 'wees pessimistisch'-beleefdheidsstrategie voorgesteld door Brown en Levinson (1978: 177-81). Ik beargumenteer dat het gebruik van =*chi* als een beleefdheidsmarkeerder ontstaan is uit de basisfunctie van =*chi* (frustratie van een gebeurtenis) in

combinatie met irrealis TAM (tijd-aspect-modaliteit)- markeerders. Ik laat hiermee zien dat de gebruikscontexten van =*chi* een rol hebben gespeeld in een uitbreiding van de functies van =*chi*.

Zoals wordt beschreven in hoofdstuk 8, zijn de enig mogelijke combinaties van =*chi* met evidentialiteitsmarkeerders =*ya=chi* en =*chi=laba*. Ik beargumenteer dat de interpretatie van de combinatie van de reportatieve/ intersubjectieve markeerder =*ya* met de frustratieve =*chi* compositioneel is, omdat beide markeerders hun basisbetekenis behouden. De combinatie van =*chi* met =*laba*, daarentegen, heeft geleid tot een nieuwe betekenis (onverwachte informatie) die niet kan worden samengesteld uit de som der delen. Ik beargumenteer dat de andere logisch mogelijke combinaties niet voorkomen vanwege semantische incompatibiliteit.

Dit proefschrift draagt bij aan de descriptieve linguïstiek door een uitgebreide beschouwing te geven van het evidentiële systeem van het Yurakaré, wat nog niet eerder tot in dergelijk detail was beschreven. Het draagt op deze manier ook bij aan ons begrip van evidentialiteit als grammaticale categorie in het algemeen.

Deze studie bepleit een interactioneel perspectief op evidentialiteit en op taal in het algemeen. Het draagt bij aan de interactionele linguïstiek door te laten zien dat methodes uit de Conversatie Analyse gebruikt kunnen worden voor de analyse van grammaticale elementen zoals evidentialiteitsmarkeerders. De resultaten van de studie laten zien dat de interpretatie van de evidentialiteitsmarkeerders in het Yurakaré sterk afhangt van het gebruik in interactie. Ze worden niet altijd gebruikt om de hoorder te informeren over de informatiebron van de spreker, maar ook voor interactionele functies. Dit onderstreept het belang van het bestuderen van het gebruik van evidentialiteitsmarkeerders in interactionele contexten bij de studie naar evidentialiteit als een linguïstische categorie. Meer in algemene zin toont dit het belang aan van interactionele data voor de linguïstiek.

Een ander belangrijk argument voor het gebruik van interactionele data in de linguïstiek is dat bepaalde betekeniscomponenten moeilijk waarneembaar zijn buiten interactie. In dit proefschrift laat ik zien dat alle evidentialiteitsmarkeerders van het Yurakaré een aanname uitdrukken over de toegang van de hoorder tot informatie (waarbij =*laba* expliciet uitdrukt dat de spreker niet een dergelijke aanname maakt). Alle evidentie voor deze intersubjectieve componenten van de evidentialiteitsmarkeerders komt van de studie van interacties. De intersubjectieve component zou niet zijn gevonden zonder het gebruik van interactionele data.

Intersubjectieve waarden van grammaticale items kunnen het best worden bestudeerd in conversaties waarbij sprekers perspectieven op informatie delen, en waarbij we kunnen observeren hoe ze op elkaars uitingen reageren. Een dergelijke analyse is niet mogelijk met monologische data. Dit is verdere ondersteuning voor het belang van het bestuderen van interactionele data in de beschrijvende linguïstiek.

Deze studie laat zien dat de evidentialiteitsmarkeerders gebruikt worden voor bepaalde interactionele functies, die kunnen worden gerelateerd aan hun kernbetekenis. Dit ondersteunt het idee dat er een onderscheid is tussen

semantiek en pragmatiek, een punt dat in de literatuur vaak in twijfel wordt getrokken. Door een analyse te geven van de relatie tussen de semantiek en het gebruik in interactie van de evidentialiteitsmarkeerders van het Yurakaré draagt deze studie bij aan de studie van betekenis en betekenisverandering.

Ik laat zien dat de evidentieële en intersubjectieve semantiek van de evidentialiteitsmarkeerders van het Yurakaré specifieke gebruiken in interactionele contexten mogelijk maken, hetgeen laat zien dat betekenis invloed heeft op het gebruik in interactie. Bovendien toon ik aan dat in sommige gevallen een semantische verandering teruggetraceerd kan worden via interactionele contexten. Interactionele data onthullen belangrijke details over de pragmatische processen die van belang zijn voor taalverandering. De methode om een betekenisverandering via interactionele contexten te traceren is nuttig voor talen waarvoor geen diachrone informatie voorhanden is.

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Curriculum Vitae

Sonja Gipper was born on June 23, 1977 in Meschede, Germany. She studied Latin American Anthropology, Spanish and English at the University of Bonn and received her Masters degree in July 2005. From June 2006 to February 2011 she was a PhD student in the project "The Documentation of Yurakaré" at the Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics, Nijmegen. She is currently employed as a lecturer at the Linguistics Department of the University of Cologne.

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