Datensatz

Zusammenfassung

This article challenges the methodological nationalism of the convergence debate by arguing that multilevel governance destabilizes the coalitions thought to underpin liberal and co-ordinated varieties of capitalism. Many attempts to explain how coherent production regimes emerge and persist assume that some dominant social bloc ensures coherence by imposing its interests across all relevant regulatory subspheres. This assumption is not tenable in systems of multilevel governance. Three features of multilevel governance diminish the scope for a homogenous social bloc to ensure a tight coupling of complementary regulations. First, the incentives for interest groups to unite at the transnational level vary across regulatory subspheres, because the transnational scope of legislation adds a 'constrain-thy-neighbour' dimension to actors' decision-making that may either strengthen or weaken interest group cohesion. Second, the strategic opportunities for playing multilevel games vary across subspheres. Third, the institutional set-up at the supranational level of Europe's multilevel polity reduces the capacity of state actors to impose coherence from above. To illustrate these claims, the article draws on case studies of EU legislative initiatives concerning takeovers and worker participation.