date: 2008-06-18T06:38:56Z pdf:PDFVersion: 1.6 pdf:docinfo:title: How Multilevel Governance Affects the Clash of Capitalisms xmp:CreatorTool: Adobe InDesign CS3 (5.0) access_permission:can_print_degraded: true subject: This article challenges the methodological nationalism of the convergence debate by arguing that multilevel governance destabilizes the coalitions thought to underpin liberal and coordinated varieties of capitalism. Existing efforts to explain how coherent production regimes emerge and persist assume that some dominant social bloc ensures coherence by imposing its interests across all relevant regulatory subspheres. This assumption is not tenable in systems of multilevel governance. Three features of multilevel governance diminish the scope for a uniform social bloc to ensure a tight coupling of complementary regulations. First, the strategic opportunities for playing multilevel games vary across regulatory subspheres. Second, willingness to exploit these opportunities varies, because the transnational scope of legislation adds a ?constrain-competitor? dimension to actors? decision-making that may either strengthen or weaken interest group cohesion. Third, the institutional set-up at the supranational level of Europe?s multilevel polity multiplies alignment options. To illustrate these claims, the article draws on case studies of EU company law initiatives concerning takeovers and worker participation. dc:format: application/pdf; version=1.6 pdf:docinfo:creator_tool: Adobe InDesign CS3 (5.0) access_permission:fill_in_form: true pdf:encrypted: false dc:title: How Multilevel Governance Affects the Clash of Capitalisms modified: 2008-06-18T06:38:56Z cp:subject: This article challenges the methodological nationalism of the convergence debate by arguing that multilevel governance destabilizes the coalitions thought to underpin liberal and coordinated varieties of capitalism. Existing efforts to explain how coherent production regimes emerge and persist assume that some dominant social bloc ensures coherence by imposing its interests across all relevant regulatory subspheres. This assumption is not tenable in systems of multilevel governance. Three features of multilevel governance diminish the scope for a uniform social bloc to ensure a tight coupling of complementary regulations. First, the strategic opportunities for playing multilevel games vary across regulatory subspheres. Second, willingness to exploit these opportunities varies, because the transnational scope of legislation adds a ?constrain-competitor? dimension to actors? decision-making that may either strengthen or weaken interest group cohesion. Third, the institutional set-up at the supranational level of Europe?s multilevel polity multiplies alignment options. To illustrate these claims, the article draws on case studies of EU company law initiatives concerning takeovers and worker participation. pdf:docinfo:subject: This article challenges the methodological nationalism of the convergence debate by arguing that multilevel governance destabilizes the coalitions thought to underpin liberal and coordinated varieties of capitalism. Existing efforts to explain how coherent production regimes emerge and persist assume that some dominant social bloc ensures coherence by imposing its interests across all relevant regulatory subspheres. This assumption is not tenable in systems of multilevel governance. Three features of multilevel governance diminish the scope for a uniform social bloc to ensure a tight coupling of complementary regulations. First, the strategic opportunities for playing multilevel games vary across regulatory subspheres. Second, willingness to exploit these opportunities varies, because the transnational scope of legislation adds a ?constrain-competitor? dimension to actors? decision-making that may either strengthen or weaken interest group cohesion. Third, the institutional set-up at the supranational level of Europe?s multilevel polity multiplies alignment options. To illustrate these claims, the article draws on case studies of EU company law initiatives concerning takeovers and worker participation. pdf:docinfo:creator: Helen Callaghan meta:author: Helen Callaghan trapped: Unknown meta:creation-date: 2008-05-29T06:58:21Z created: 2008-05-29T06:58:21Z access_permission:extract_for_accessibility: true Creation-Date: 2008-05-29T06:58:21Z xmpMM:DerivedFrom:DocumentID: adobe:docid:indd:552b5278-5a93-11da-897a-d9618a2e65c6 Author: Helen Callaghan producer: Adobe PDF Library 8.0 pdf:docinfo:producer: Adobe PDF Library 8.0 pdf:unmappedUnicodeCharsPerPage: 0 dc:description: This article challenges the methodological nationalism of the convergence debate by arguing that multilevel governance destabilizes the coalitions thought to underpin liberal and coordinated varieties of capitalism. Existing efforts to explain how coherent production regimes emerge and persist assume that some dominant social bloc ensures coherence by imposing its interests across all relevant regulatory subspheres. This assumption is not tenable in systems of multilevel governance. Three features of multilevel governance diminish the scope for a uniform social bloc to ensure a tight coupling of complementary regulations. First, the strategic opportunities for playing multilevel games vary across regulatory subspheres. Second, willingness to exploit these opportunities varies, because the transnational scope of legislation adds a ?constrain-competitor? dimension to actors? decision-making that may either strengthen or weaken interest group cohesion. Third, the institutional set-up at the supranational level of Europe?s multilevel polity multiplies alignment options. To illustrate these claims, the article draws on case studies of EU company law initiatives concerning takeovers and worker participation. Keywords: corporate governance; Europeanization; Europeanisation; multilevel governance; multi-level governance; positive integration; directives; Directives; harmonisation; harmonization; Germany; U.K.; political economy; lobbying access_permission:modify_annotations: true dc:creator: Helen Callaghan description: This article challenges the methodological nationalism of the convergence debate by arguing that multilevel governance destabilizes the coalitions thought to underpin liberal and coordinated varieties of capitalism. Existing efforts to explain how coherent production regimes emerge and persist assume that some dominant social bloc ensures coherence by imposing its interests across all relevant regulatory subspheres. This assumption is not tenable in systems of multilevel governance. Three features of multilevel governance diminish the scope for a uniform social bloc to ensure a tight coupling of complementary regulations. First, the strategic opportunities for playing multilevel games vary across regulatory subspheres. Second, willingness to exploit these opportunities varies, because the transnational scope of legislation adds a ?constrain-competitor? dimension to actors? decision-making that may either strengthen or weaken interest group cohesion. Third, the institutional set-up at the supranational level of Europe?s multilevel polity multiplies alignment options. To illustrate these claims, the article draws on case studies of EU company law initiatives concerning takeovers and worker participation. dcterms:created: 2008-05-29T06:58:21Z Last-Modified: 2008-06-18T06:38:56Z dcterms:modified: 2008-06-18T06:38:56Z title: How Multilevel Governance Affects the Clash of Capitalisms xmpMM:DocumentID: adobe:docid:indd:89cee74a-1a69-11dd-adad-fefa02bbbb0b Last-Save-Date: 2008-06-18T06:38:56Z pdf:docinfo:keywords: corporate governance; Europeanization; Europeanisation; multilevel governance; multi-level governance; positive integration; directives; Directives; harmonisation; harmonization; Germany; U.K.; political economy; lobbying pdf:docinfo:modified: 2008-06-18T06:38:56Z meta:save-date: 2008-06-18T06:38:56Z Content-Type: application/pdf X-Parsed-By: org.apache.tika.parser.DefaultParser creator: Helen Callaghan dc:subject: corporate governance; Europeanization; Europeanisation; multilevel governance; multi-level governance; positive integration; directives; Directives; harmonisation; harmonization; Germany; U.K.; political economy; lobbying access_permission:assemble_document: true xmpTPg:NPages: 22 pdf:charsPerPage: 102 access_permission:extract_content: true access_permission:can_print: true pdf:docinfo:trapped: Unknown meta:keyword: corporate governance; Europeanization; Europeanisation; multilevel governance; multi-level governance; positive integration; directives; Directives; harmonisation; harmonization; Germany; U.K.; political economy; lobbying xmpMM:DerivedFrom:InstanceID: 6c1368f6-12be-11dd-bfb1-a9096cc6f443 access_permission:can_modify: true pdf:docinfo:created: 2008-05-29T06:58:21Z