A New Form of Governance? Comparing the Open Method of Co-ordination to 
Multilateral Surveillance by the IMF and the OECD

Schäfer, Armin

doi:10.1080/13501760500380742

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A New Form of Governance? Comparing the Open Method of Co-ordination to Multilateral Surveillance by the IMF and the OECD

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Schäfer, Armin
Institutioneller Wandel im gegenwärtigen Kapitalismus, MPI for the Study of Societies, Max Planck Society;

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Citation

Schäfer, A. (2006). A New Form of Governance? Comparing the Open Method of Co-ordination to Multilateral Surveillance by the IMF and the OECD. Journal of European Public Policy, 13(1), 70-88. doi:10.1080/13501760500380742.

Cite as: https://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0012-4B93-B

Abstract

The open method of co-ordination (OMC) has received much
attention in the recent EU literature. The predominant view claims that the OMC is not only a new but also an effective policy-making instrument. This paper raises
doubts about both claims by offering a comparison of soft law policy co-ordination in three international organizations. More specifically, this paper compares the
European Employment Strategy to the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines of the EU, the OECD Economic Surveys, and the IMF Article IV Consultations. Based on expert interviews, it seeks to demonstrate that these procedures are forms of multilateral surveillance that do not differ in kind. Such a comparative analysis of the OMC refutes claims to its novelty. Having compared the four procedures, a more general model of multilateral surveillance consisting of six elements is generated that facilitates further
comparisons. This paper concludes that governments select voluntarist procedures mainly to secure their own competencies rather than to realize common goals. Effective
problem-solving is therefore not necessarily the dominant objective of soft law.