MAX-PLANCK-INSTITUT FÜR GESELLSCHAFTSFORSCHUNG
MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF SOCIETIES

National Vote Intention and European Voting Behavior, 1979–2004

Second Order Election Effects, Election Timing, Government Approval and the Europeanization of European Elections

Philip Manow

Philip Manow

**National Vote Intention and European Voting Behavior, 1979–2004:
Second Order Election Effects, Election Timing, Government Approval and
the Europeanization of European Elections**

MPIfG Discussion Papers are refereed scholarly papers of the kind that are publishable in a peer-reviewed disciplinary journal. Their objective is to contribute to the cumulative improvement of theoretical knowledge. The papers can be ordered from the institute for a small fee (hard copies) or downloaded free of charge (PDF).

Downloads
www.mpifg.de
Go to *Publications/Discussion Papers*

Abstract

Voting behavior in elections to the European Parliament seems to follow a regular pattern, as many EP-election studies have found: Parties in government at the national level tend to lose vote shares in EP-elections as compared to the last domestic electoral contest; small and ideologically more extreme parties tend to gain vote shares. These losses and gains seem to be more pronounced when the European election is held in the middle of the domestic legislative term (mid-term effect). In the many accounts that try to explain these regular deviations from domestic voting, one causal factor plays a central role: the popularity loss of parties in office at the national level. Since reliable and comparable popularity data for the EU-member states seems to be missing, the literature has attempted to measure popularity loss with two kinds of proxies: changes in economic performance (e.g. changes in the unemployment rate) and the timing of the EP-election within the domestic term. This paper proposes to use the bi-annually collected national vote intention question of the Eurobarometer surveys as a measurement for party popularity. The paper has three central findings: 1) changes in national vote intention are a strong and stable predictor for the actual vote share shifts between national and European elections, 2) neither the economic nor the election timing variables contribute substantially to the explanation of the vote share shifts; 3) changes in the impact of the national vote intention variable on European election outcomes over the six EP-elections held so far suggest that the European electorates have taken European issues more and more into consideration when participating in European elections (Europeanization of EP-elections). However, the data also suggests that voters have used these elections increasingly to voice their dissatisfaction with the European integration process (Anti-Europeanization of EP-elections).

Zusammenfassung

Das Stimmverhalten in den Direktwahlen zum europäischen Parlament folgt einem Muster, das in der Literatur bereits ausführlich beschrieben worden ist. Regierungsparteien verlieren Stimmenanteile im Vergleich zur vorangegangenen nationalen Wahl, kleine Parteien und ideologisch extremere Parteien gewinnen hingegen Stimmenanteile hinzu. Diese relativen Stimmenverlusten beziehungsweise -gewinne scheinen ausgeprägter, wenn die Europawahl in die Mitte der nationalen Wahlperiode fällt (*mid-term effect*). In vielen der bislang für dieses Muster angebotenen Erklärungen ist ein Faktor von zentraler kausaler Bedeutung – die (sinkende) Popularität der jeweiligen nationalen Regierungsparteien. Da es bislang für die EU-Mitgliedsländer keine verlässlichen und vergleichbaren Popularitätsdaten zu geben schien, half sich die Literatur damit, Popularität durch zwei „Proxies" zu messen: durch die Änderung zentraler ökonomischer Parameter (wie Arbeitslosigkeit) und durch die Datierung der Europawahl innerhalb der nationalen Legislaturperiode. Dieser Aufsatz schlägt vor, die halbjährlich erhobenen Wahlabsichts-Daten des Eurobarometers für die Ermittlung der Parteienpopularität zu verwenden. Ich zeige, dass 1) diese Variable sich in allen möglichen Modellspezifikationen als stabil erklärungskräftig für die tatsächlichen Stimmenverschiebungen in Europawahlen erweist, dass 2) die gängigen ökonomischen Variablen und die Zeitvariablen keinen stabilen Beitrag zur Erklärung der Stimmanteilsverschiebungen zwischen nationalen und europäischen Wahlen liefern, und dass 3) die über Zeit abnehmende Bedeutung der nationalen Wahlabsichts-Variable auf einen Prozess der Europäisierung der Europawahlen hinweist.

Contents

Introduction

In one of the rarer cases of academic consensus, students of elections to the European Parliament have largely concurred that these are ruled by a set of empirical regularities. Ever since the early pioneering articles by Reif and Reif/Schmitt (Reif/Schmitt 1980; Reif 1984), three patterns in EP-elections have been highlighted and – by and large – confirmed in subsequent studies: Government parties tend to lose vote shares in European elections as compared to the last national contest; small parties as well as more extreme parties gain votes as compared to their prior domestic electoral performance. In addition, these regular vote share shifts seem more pronounced when the European election is held in the middle of the domestic legislative term – whereas EP-elections held shortly after or shortly before national elections produce less substantial deviations from the domestic electoral outcomes (Eijk/Franklin/Marsh 1996; Eijk/Franklin 1996; Reif 1997).

How is this pattern explained? The answer usually comes in two parts: First, although some voters use European elections to vote on European issues, most seem to want to send an electoral signal to the central political players within their national political arena. Secondly, since electoral rules, election dates, the set of parties that compete for votes, and – most importantly – what is at stake politically differ between national and European elections, voting behavior differs as well. Especially, whereas national general elections establish the national executive (first order elections), in EP-elections and other so-called second order elections less seems at stake.[1] Voters therefore just might care less (lower turnout) or they might vote differently because they do not need to worry about the consequences of their vote for (domestic) government formation, or about possibly 'wasting' it.

1   To this class of seemingly less important, second order elections belong regional, mid-term or by-elections. It is therefore no surprise that similar regularities can be observed between elections that decide over the composition of the national executive and those elections that do not, e.g. for British and Canadian by-elections (Mughan 1986, 1988; Pippa 1990; Hudson 1985), German regional or *Länder*-elections (Dinkel 1977, 1980, 1981, 1989; Lohmann/Brady/Rivers 1997; Jeffery/Hough 2001; Hough/Jeffery 2003; Burkhart 2005; Gaines/Crombez 2004), or US-American mid-term elections (cf. Miller/Mackie 1973; Kernell 1977, 1978; Stimson 1976; Tufte 1975, 1978; Jacobson 1990). In all of these elections, a significant number of voters cast a vote that is different from the vote they cast in the last domestic general elections. Vote switching seems to follow a quite regular pattern: governing parties lose and small and ideologically more extreme parties gain vote shares.

Whereas the existence of the described second order election effect in EP-elections is largely undisputed, the given explanation and the estimation of its strength have remained controversial (for recent overviews, see Hix/Marsh 2005; Kousser 2004; Koepke/Ringe 2006, forthcoming; Carrubba/Timpone 2005, among others). A major source of controversy is empirical. One central variable behind the so-called 'second order election'-thesis is government approval or party popularity at the time of the European election, as compared to voters' satisfaction with national parties at the time of the last domestic election. If EP-elections are used to send out signals of approval or disapproval to the national government and opposition parties, then election results should reflect the changes in political popularity that have occurred since the last national election. Yet, systematic and comparable time series on voters' approval of parties in EU-member state countries do not seem to be "widely available" (Kousser 2004: 7). Therefore, assuming that changes in approval follow a relatively regular, curvi-linear pattern over the legislative term, many students of EP-elections have proposed to use 'time', i.e. the time that has elapsed between first and second order elections, as a proxy. The loss of voters' support for government parties and the corresponding increase in the opposition's popularity is assumed to be at its maximum at mid-term, and least pronounced shortly after or shortly before national elections.[2] Since it is uncertain as to how well time really captures the changes in parties' political popularity, we remain doubtful as to how well we are able to measure and explain the second order effect in European elections.

Is it actually true that we lack comparable time series on government approval? Not quite. Since its inception and until very recently, Eurobarometer surveys asked bi-annually the classical vote intention question: "*If there were a general election tomorrow (say if contact under 18 years: and you had a vote), which party would you vote for?*"[3] Given that almost all the conventional party approval indexes use this classical vote intention question as their main measurement, I hold that the Eurobarometer surveys do, in fact, provide the kind of approval data that many claim is lacking. And if the central tenet of the 'second order election'-thesis holds true, namely that European elections are not primarily about European but about national issues, then national vote intention should be a fairly good predictor of voters' choice in elections to the European Parliament.

As of yet, however, to the best of my knowledge, the EB vote intention data has not been used to explain vote shifts in European elections. The many analyses of the elec-

---

2   Several contributions assume even a brief period of post-election euphoria (a political 'honeymoon'). Therefore, a 3rd order polynomial is used instead of a quadratic function to test for the midterm cycle effect (see for an extensive curve-fitting exercise Schmitt/Reif 2003).

3   Early Eurobarometer-surveys asked a bit less precise: "If there were a general election tomorrow (say if contact under 18 years: and you had a vote), which party would you support?" I do not think that this change in the wording affects in any systematic way the regression results reported below – the less precise first wording may only generate a larger error term.

tions to the European parliament have mainly relied on the excellent data provided by the European Election Studies (EES), a post-election extension of the regular Eurobarometer surveys included in the EB-survey that immediately follows after a European election (cf. Oppenhuis et al. 1996). However, when studying the second order effects in European elections, the vote intention question of the regular Eurobarometer surveys may, in fact, have some advantages over the post election studies. Even though the EES surveys – by asking how respondents have voted in the recent European and the last national elections – allow to trace declared *actual* vote switching, information on national voting behavior is given in retrospect only and the last national election may have already been held three or four years before. The Eurobarometer surveys, in contrast, allow to compare national vote *intention* and are conducted bi-annually, i.e. close to the actual national elections. Moreover, in the EES surveys the question for the past national vote is asked in the context of the respondent's current European voting behavior, which may influence the answers given. Finally, Eurobarometer's vote intention question was also posed in 1984, whereas the European Election Studies do not cover that year's election to the European parliament.

On a regular basis the vote intention question was included in the EB-survey until 1999. It then reappeared once in the EB 56.3 survey (January – February 2002; see Appendix). The Candidate Country Eurobarometer again asked the vote intention question in each survey. I have tried to have complete time series for all EU-member countries by closing the gaps for 2000, 2001 and 2003 with national opinion poll data (see Appendix). For the accession countries, the classical vote intention question was also included in the New Europe Barometer Studies conducted since 1991 by the Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde. I have used the responses to the 2004 New Europe Barometer survey to extend my data set to the 2004 EP-elections for 8 of the new member countries.[4]

In this paper, I will use the Eurobarometer national vote intention data in order to assess the second order effect in EP-elections more accurately. With a more precise estimate of the 'national content of the European vote' we can also better address the question of whether and how much recent European elections have become more European (less national) in character (see Hix/Marsh 2005; Ferrara/Weishaupt 2005), a point taken up in the last third of the paper. Why would a more precise estimate of the second order effect in European elections be of importance? It is crucial for a better understanding of EP-elections and therefore highly relevant for the debate of Europe's democratic deficit. Given that with the significantly increased role of the European Parliament in EU-legislation, the European Union has factually become a "classical two chamber legislature" (Hix 1999: 56; cf. 61) with a "bicameral legislative authority" of Parliament and Council (Corbett/Jacobs/Shackleton 2003: 183; Tsebelis/

---

4   I am grateful to the CSPP for granting me access to its data.

Garrett 2001: 359), a more precise estimate of the deviations between the national and the European elections is also a precondition for a better understanding of the dynamics of European interinstitutional politics – since national elections determine the party-political composition of the Council, whereas European elections determine the party-political composition of the Parliament. One relevant question then is: Is the second order effect so strong that we should expect systematic differences in the political partisan centers of gravity of the Council and the European Parliament, comparable to the frequent situations of divided government in other bicameral systems? While I can not take up this question in this paper (Manow et al. 2004), reaching a precise estimate of the second order effect in EP-elections is a precondition for systematically addressing this question.

To anticipate the results presented in more detail below: Changes in declared national vote intention between the last national and the subsequent European election prove to be a strong and stable predictor for actual vote shifts in EP-elections. The national vote intention variable clearly improves the standard models in the EU-election literature and its integration into the regression equation renders many variables that previous studies found of explanatory importance, among them economic variables and variables capturing differences in electoral rules, insignificant. The effect of election timing on EP-election outcomes remains unclear. While there is some prima facie evidence that a popularity cycle exists, closer inspection shows that the data does not allow rejecting the null-hypothesis, i.e. that the effect of election timing is significantly different from zero cannot be established. Finally, with respect to the varying importance of national vote intention for the different European election outcomes, a creeping Europeanization of European elections can indeed be observed. However, this trend seems to be caused rather by a growing anti-European sentiment among the many national electorates, than by the emergence of one truly European electorate.

The paper proceeds as follows: In the next section, I will briefly discuss the literature's most prominent explanations of the second order effect in EP-elections and the methodological as well as conceptual problems caused by approximating governmental approval via election timing data (Section 2). In Section 3, I describe my data set and present my empirical results. To conclude, I will highlight my paper's contribution to the literature (Section 4).

What explains the second order effect in EP elections?

The second order effect in European Elections is often said to reflect the fact that voters use these elections less to vote on European issues, but to express their opinion about the policy performance of their current national government. European elections have been called protest or barometer elections (Anderson/Ward 1996), "mark-

ers" with which voters can express dissatisfaction with their current government (Oppenhuis et al. 1996). If voters' dissatisfaction reflects a deterioration of central economic parameters like unemployment, inflation, or GDP, this argument is in line with the retrospective- or economic voting-literature (Lewis-Beck/Stegmaier 2000). The regularity with which government parties lose electoral support over the legislative term may then find a 'political business cycle' explanation (Franzese 2002). Skillful politicians tend to enact painstaking reforms at the very start of the legislative term speculating that first reform payoffs will materialize before the next election is due. Politicians also tend to weight the inflation/unemployment trade-off differently depending on whether a national election is pending or not. This, according to the political business cycle thesis, causes shifts in government approval and may explain why voting patterns in second order elections systematically deviate from first order elections depending on when in the electoral term the second order election is held.

Others explain vote shifts between first order and second order elections simply as the effect of differences in electoral turnout. Since less seems at stake politically, voters may simply abstain from voting (Franklin et al. 1996). But vote abstention is not uniformly distributed among all parties. In particular, disappointed supporters of government parties are more likely to abstain from voting while supporters of the opposition parties want to voice their dissatisfaction ('differential mobilization'; see Schmitt 2005: 670, Endnote 2). Also large, ideologically less coherent parties may have more problems to mobilize their supporters than small single issue parties. But it may as well be the case that a simple 'regression to the mean' tendency is behind the observable voting patterns. Government parties are more likely to be among those parties that have been exceptionally successful in the last election. This would make it more likely that they shrink to 'normal size' in subsequent elections.

It is also plausible to assume that differences in election outcomes reflect different incentive structures that voters face in domestic and European (or other second order) elections. Since in EP-elections government formation is not at stake, voters may feel freer to express their sincere preference ('vote with their heart'; Oppenhuis et al. 1996), in particular the fear of a possibly 'wasted vote' should play less of a role in their considerations. Differences in electoral rules may explain why voters deviate from their national voting behavior in European elections (Kousser 2004). For instance, in the 2004 EP election, British Members of the European Parliament were elected not according to the majoritarian first-past-the-post system, but under list-PR. That small member states can only send a few delegates to Brussels or Strassbourg means that the electoral threshold for smaller parties is much higher compared to national elections in these countries. A different vote may also simply reflect voters' different choice set, since the parties that run for national office and those that compete for seats in the European Parliament are not necessarily the same (Hix/Marsh 2005), not the least because in some countries large anti-European movements have taken part in EP elections (like in Denmark in 1989 and 1994; cf. Hix 1999: 183). Dif-

ferences in electoral rules may again play a role here, since sometimes participation in European elections is handled less strictly than that in national elections.[5]

Recently, voting behavior in EP-elections has also been explained with the 'multi-level' character of the European Union (Carrubba/Timpone 2005). In a federal polity, voters may vote differently in elections to different layers of government because they prefer different sets of policies at each level. As a voter may prefer a Democrat as her representative but a Republican as her president (cf. Fiorina [1992] 2003: 65), she might also prefer – for example – strict environmental policies or high social standards at the EU-level but is – with the potentially adverse effects on national competitiveness in mind – against implementing progressive regulation single-handedly at the national level (Carrubba/Timpone 2005). This may be one of the reasons why Green parties have fared so much better in European elections than in the domestic electoral arena.

With this high number of potential explanations for the second order effect in European elections, a judgment about the relative relevance of any of them must be delegated to a multivariate analysis. Yet, this is no easy task since we apparently lack good measures for some variables of central theoretical importance. Most importantly, previous EP-election studies claimed that we lack reliable and comparable opinion poll data on party popularity (see above). But in one way or the other, popularity or electoral support is a crucial variable in most of the explanatory accounts sketched out above. Party approval plays a role in the retrospective voting and popularity cycle thesis, in the protest or barometer election argument as well as in the turnout and 'regression to the mean' explanations. As a second best solution, many studies have used time as a proxy, which remains to be a highly controversial substitute. To put it bluntly: time measures nothing but time (Kernell 1978: 509), and even scholars who used time as a party-popularity proxy admit that "time by itself [is] never a satisfying variable" (Kousser 2004: 14). To what extent the timing of EP-elections within the national electoral cycle actually captures systematic shifts in government approval remains an open question.

Already at the theoretical level we may harbor some doubts. Let's assume for a moment that government approval indeed follows in all parliamentary democracies the same law-like quadratic (or 3rd order polynomial) pattern (see Schmitt/Reif 2003). In some countries this loss of approval is then likely to lead to political crisis, early government resignation and to the scheduling of new elections.[6] The upshot would be a

---

5   For instance, in Germany joint party lists are allowed in EP-elections, whereas they are prohibited in national elections.

6   The recent German experience in which the Schröder government decided to call new national elections after a devastating defeat in the Land-elections in North Rhine-Westphalia would be a case in point.

pattern at odds with the 'popularity cycle prediction.' In this case, government approval would be lowest directly before the next national elections, i.e. at the very end of the electoral term. Given that some types of governments are systematically less stable than others (Warwick 1994), assuming a uniform 'approval cycle' among the EU-member state countries is likely to lead to biased results, in particular to a potential underestimation of the popularity impact on European elections.[7]

We have also reasons to be skeptical on more empirical grounds. Take the example of German second order, i.e. state-elections. As has been shown in recent studies (Jeffery/ Hough 2001; Hough/Jeffery 2003; Burkhart 2005), the cycle-effect in German *Länder* elections largely vanished over the course of the 1990s. This led scholars to infer that the nexus between federal and state elections weakened. Yet, when *directly* measuring the impact of government popularity on voting in German state elections, the approval effect has even increased in strength since the 1970s (Burkhart 2005). With heightened voter volatility, government approval has ceased to follow the regular, quadratic pattern that previous studies had found for German state elections in the 1970s and 1980s (Dinkel 1977, 1981, 1989), while government approval has not ceased to strongly influence individual voting behavior in state elections. The consequences of using time as a popularity proxy are evident: Even where EP-election studies find a significant impact of election timing on vote shifts in second order elections, we are left with a substantial degree of uncertainty about the strength of the coefficient of real theoretical interest, namely that of the popularity of national parties. It therefore seems worthwhile to investigate with party popularity data, first, whether these allow us to better estimate the second order election effect in EP-elections, and second, whether we still find an effect of election timing in European elections once we have included popularity data into our regression.

In the next section, I will use the national vote intention variable from the Eurobarometer surveys in various model specifications. I will show it to be a strong and stable estimator of vote choice in EP-elections. This variable can also be used to analyze the varying impact of the national political agenda on European elections since 1979.

---

7   In other words, 'approval decline' and 'actual end of term' are unlikely to be wholly independent of each other. One way around this problem would be to calculate 'hypothetical' instead of actual 'mid-terms' based on the full legal legislative term. However, 'hypothetical terms' have the problem that the approval data identified as 'end of the term' data might in fact be 'start of the next term' data potentially generated by a new and different (and more popular) government. In my regressions, I used both actual as well as hypothetical mid-terms but could not find strong evidence for midterm effects in either of the specifications.

Data and results

The following analysis is based on a data set that includes information on both national and European vote shares for every party that participated in any of the six European elections between 1979 and 2004. The total number of party-pairs is N= 654,[8] while the overall number of observations in the various regression analyses presented below varies with the number of control variables included in the specification. From the Eurobarometer and the New Europe Barometer surveys, I generated 483 party pairs for my independent variable of central theoretical interest, namely national vote intention. This means that for 483 parties, I have information pairs reporting their (hypothetical or 'intended') vote share at the moment of the last national first order election and at the moment of the subsequent second order European election.[9] My central question is whether and to what extent the vote shifts between national and European elections can be explained with the shifts *in national vote intention* that occurred between both elections. I am particularly interested in assessing the explanatory value of this variable against a set of alternative measures which have been proposed in the literature.

First, I would like to address the question of whether the national vote intention variable helps explain EP-election outcomes better than variables capturing the relative location of the European election within the legislative term. I compare four models. In the first and most simple one, I test only the two central predictions of the second order election thesis, namely that parties in government tend to lose whereas small parties tend to gain vote shares in EP-elections. Therefore, in Model 1, I regress vote share shifts on a party size variable (vote shares in the last national election) and on a government status dummy. Model 2 adds the TIME and TIME^2 variables, with TIME running from 0 to 1 and capturing when in the domestic legislative term the European election was held.[10] TIME is integrated as a quadratic function in order to capture the 'mid term' effect hypothesized in the literature.[11] Since it is government parties

---

8   I assigned parties that had not previously run for domestic office but participated in an EP-election a domestic vote share of 0. An important part of the differences between national and European election outcomes is due to the fact that the pool of parties competing for seats is not identical across these elections (see Hix/Marsh 2005). In my multivariate analysis, I control for this variable via a 'new-party' dummy (see below). Excluding parties that have not taken part in the preceding national elections does not alter the following results substantially, but renders some of the coefficient less strong.

9   Eurobarometer surveys are conducted twice a year, in April and October. I used the last Eurobarometer that was conducted prior to an EP- or national election. The maximal time period between survey and election therefore is six months. I controlled for differences in 'closeness' of surveys and actual elections but could find no systematic effect.

10   (1) ELECTDIFF $= a + \beta_1$ PARTY SIZE (vote share in last national election) $+ \beta_2$ IN GOVERNMENT $+ \varepsilon$; (2) ELECTDIFF $= a + \beta_1$ PARTY SIZE $+ \beta_2$ IN GOVERNMENT $+ \beta_3$ IN GOVERNMENT $\star$ TIME $+ \beta_4$ IN GOVERNMENT $\star$ TIME$^2 + \varepsilon$.

11   Models with time integrated as a 3rd order polynomial produced essentially the same results.

that are expected to be affected by the popularity cycle (cf. Schmitt 2005: 651–652), TIME enters the regression as an interaction term with the 'IN GOVERNMENT' variable, but *not* as a constitutive term, because TIME by itself is not expected to have any direct effect on vote share shifts (see Kam/Franzese 2005: 13–14, 64–69).[12] In the third model, I added the national vote intention variable.[13] In model 4, I substitute the timing variables with the national vote intention variable.

Table 1   **Determinants of vote share shifts between national and European elections, time versus vote intention**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
PARTY SIZE	−0.218 (0.000)***	−0.213 (0.000)***	−0.209 (0.000)***	−0.217 (0.000)***
IN GOVERNMENT	−3.143 (0.000)***	−0.161 (0.909)	0.037 (0.980)	−2.396 (0.000)***
IN GOVERNMENT ∗ TIME		−13.856 (0.035)**	−11.260 (0.088)*	
IN GOVERNMENT ∗ TIME^2		12.036 (0.042)**	10.063 (0.082)*	
NATIONAL VOTE INTENTION			0.218 (0.001)***	0.213 (0.000)***
Constant	4.881 (0.000)***	4.840 (0.000)***	4.304 (0.000)***	4.409 (0.000)***
Observations	652	538	387	443
Adjusted R-squared	0.322	0.321	0.374	0.365

Robust p values in parentheses. Since data inspection suggested that the homoscedasticity assumption is violated, robust p values are reported. Robust regressions also help handling the problem that the errors of the interaction term might violate standard OLS assumptions (see Kam/Franzese 2005).
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

As can be seen from Table 1, adding the time variable to the most simple model specification does not add any explanatory weight to the model, yet including the vote intention variable leads to a better fit of the model. But Table 1 (in columns 2 and 3) also suggests that government approval indeed varies systematically over the legislative term. Since the interpretation of interaction terms is not straightforward, and since the significance of the interaction terms cannot be evaluated by looking at the p-

---

12   In fact, were we to integrate simple time, it would measure two countervailing effects: the popularity losses of government parties over the term and corresponding popularity gains of opposition parties over the term – the model would be mis-specified. Since the inclusion of all constitutive terms of an interaction term is neither "logically nor statistically necessary" (Kam/Franzese 2005: 65 and passim), and since my theory clearly speaks against inclusion, time enters only as a – quadratic – interaction term. For a different view on the inclusion of all constitutive terms see Brambor/Clark/Golder (2005).

13   (3) ELECTDIFF $= a + \beta_1$ PARTY SIZE $+ \beta_2$ IN GOVERNMENT $+ \beta_3$ IN GOVERNMENT ∗ TIME $+ \beta_4$ IN GOVERNMENT ∗ TIME$^2 + \beta_5$ VOTE INTENTION $+ \varepsilon$. (4) ELECTDIFF $= a + \beta_1$ PARTY SIZE $+ \beta_2$ IN GOVERNMENT $+ \beta_3$ VOTE INTENTION $+ \varepsilon$.

**Figure 1   Marginal effects of government status on vote share shifts over the
legislative term, with upper and lower 95% confidence intervals**

Vote share shifts

values alone, some additional information is needed. The conditional effect of government status on vote share shifts should be evaluated across a meaningful range of values for TIME. Here, TIME is measured as the number of days that elapsed between the last national election and the European election divided by the number of days of the entire term. The time variable therefore runs from 0 to 1. If we are interested in the marginal effects of IN GOVERNMENT plus IN GOVERNMENT *conditional on* TIME on vote share shifts (ELECTDIFF), we have to first differentiate equation (2) [in footnote 10] for government status, which gives us: d IN GOVERNMENT$/d$ ELECTDIFF $= \beta_2 + \beta_3$ TIME $+ \beta_4$ TIME^2 (see Kam/Franzese 2005: 21–25). From Table 1, column 2 this gives us d IN GOVERNMENT$/d$ ELECTDIFF $= -0.161 - 13.856 *$ TIME $+ 12.036 *$ TIME^2. Values of time from 0, 0.1, 0.2 … to 1 lead to the following marginal effects graph (see Figure 1).

As Figure 1 shows, the data suggests the existence of a 'mid term' effect in European elections, with a maximal estimated vote loss for government parties of about 4 % around mid-term. If we also report a measurement of uncertainty, however, with a 95 % confidence interval, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the effect of the interaction variable is not different from zero (see Figure 1). Therefore, some skepticism as to whether such a European mid-term effect actually exists still seems justified.[14] Add-

---

14   For recent studies which found evidence for the cycle thesis in the old EU-member states, but not in the new accession countries for the 2004 EP-election, see Schmitt (2005) and Koepke/Ringe (2006, forthcoming).

ing the national vote intention variable improves the model quite a bit. Note that when comparing model (3) with model (2) and model (4) with model (1), the vote intention variable also reduces the strength of the 'in government' coefficient, a further indication that vote intention indeed captures very well changes in popularity which are supposed to adversely affect especially those parties currently in power.

The literature has come up with quite a long list of factors that may explain the second order effect in European elections. In order to test how robust the vote intention variable is to the inclusion of any of those variables and whether any of them adds significant explanatory value once national vote intention has been accounted for, I start with a parsimonious baseline model that combines those variables that proved to be significant across many different model specifications (see Table 2, below). The model reported here includes the time variable. Although inclusion slightly improves the R^2 of the model, it does not change the coefficients of the variables substantially. I will subsequently add sets of variables that capture a potential economic, electoral, or party political impact on vote shifts (see Table 3).

Which variables should be controlled for? The retrospective voting approach suggests including basic economic factors like unemployment, inflation and growth.[15] It is evident that it should also be taken into account whether electoral rules differ between domestic and European elections. Here, I will follow the classification proposed by Kousser (2004: 12) and distinguish between those countries in which electoral rules in European elections favor small parties as compared to the national rules (Belgium, France and UK since 1999), those countries in which they are more unfavorable for small parties (Denmark, Luxembourg, Netherlands and Portugal, in the 2004 elections also Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta and Cyprus), and, thirdly, those countries and elections in which the electoral rules neither favor nor discriminate small parties.[16] This impact of electoral rules is captured by two dummy variables (FAVOURABLE; UNFAVOURABLE), which need to be interpreted against the third group of countries,

---

15   Time can be included either as a continuous variable (days or months that have elapsed before the European election is held divided by the days / months of the entire term), or a differentiation can be made between post-election, pre-election year and midterm (see Kousser 2004). I included time as a continuous variable.

16   The 2004 EP elections were the first elections in which uniform electoral principles (if not identical rules) were applied in all member countries (see Corbett / Jacobs / Shakleton 2003: 1317). Basically, all countries apply a PR-list system (Malta, Ireland and Northern Ireland a singly transferable vote system, which has similar effects), some allow for preference votes, others have a closed list system (for an overview, see Hix / Marsh 2004: 5). Two differences between domestic and European election rules have to be highlighted. First, compared to majoritarian electoral rules (as for instance applied in general elections in the UK), the PR-system in European elections favors smaller parties. Second, given that small countries send only a very limited number of MEPs to Brussels or Strasbourg, the European elections set relative high electoral thresholds and thereby tend to be disadvantageous for smaller parties in these countries.

those in which electoral incentives do not differ substantially between national and European elections.

The literature further demands taking into account turnout, government status and party size. Turnout, however, should not be integrated as such, but as an interaction term both with government status and party size, since the prediction is that government parties have more and small parties fewer problems in mobilizing their voters in second order elections (INGOV; PARTY SIZE; TURNOUT∗INGOV; TURNOUT∗PARTY SIZE). As in the model specification above, government status is included as a dummy variable, and party size is measured as the vote share received in the last election.[17] Following a suggestion by Reif (1997) who pointed out that the second order effect can be expected to be more pronounced in polar as compared to multi-polar party systems, I calculated the number of government parties (PINGOV). As Hix and Marsh (2005: 20) suggest, we should also account for the fact that some parties which participated in European elections had not run previously for national office (NEWPARTY dummy). I also coded a party-family variable following the 10-fold classification (from 'communist' to 'special interest') as it was proposed in the Comparative Manifesto Project (cf. Budge et al. 2001) in order to find out whether political camps were differently affected by the second order effect in European elections. For instance, previous studies found Green parties to fare systematically better in European contests than at home.[18]

Table 2 reports the baseline model that includes 7 variables (NEWPARTY, IN GOVERNMENT, IN GOVERNMENT∗TIME, IN GOVERNMENT∗TIME^2, NATIONAL VOTE INTENTION, PARTY SIZE, TURNOUT∗PARTY SIZE). Compared to some of the standard models in the literature, the fit of the model is quite good (cf. Hix/Marsh 2005: 32; Table 3).[19] Neither the number of government parties nor the interaction term between government status and turnout proved to be significant; therefore, they have been dropped from further analysis (turnout as such was insignificant, too).[20]

---

17   Although Marsh found that size exerts a non-linear, cubic influence on the dependent variable, i.e. on the vote share changes from national to European elections (cf. Hix/Marsh 2005: 15; Marsh 1998), I do not report coefficients for PARTY SIZE, PARTY SIZE^2 and PARTY SIZE^3 here. Results basically stay the same, while their interpretation becomes less straightforward.

18   I have also checked whether it is necessary to control for country specifics (panel heteroskedasticity) or for specifics of the EP-elections under investigation (contemporaneous correlation of errors) via country- or EP-fixed effects, but could find no stable time or unit effects.

19   The baseline models in Hix/Marsh (2005) produce adjusted R^{2}s between .363 and .393 (see Hix/Marsh 2005: 32; Table 3).

20   The decision to exclude the interaction term of GOVERNMENT STATUS∗TURNOUT was based on the t-statistic for the coefficient of the interaction term, the f-statistic for the joint significance of GOVERNMENT STATUS and GOVERNMENT STATUS∗TURNOUT, the lack of change of the model's R^2 and a look at the marginal effect graph of the interaction term (IN GOVERNMENT plus in GOVERNMENT∗TURNOUT).

Table 2   Determinants of vote share shifts between national and European elections, baseline model

PARTY SIZE	−0.119
	(0.000)***
IN GOVERNMENT	0.584
	(0.708)
IN GOVERNMENT * TIME	−11.288
	(0.097)*
IN GOVERNMENT * TIME^2	9.007
	(0.137)
NATIONAL VOTE INTENTION	0.222
	(0.001)***
NEW PARTY	2.818
	(0.000)***
TURNOUT * PARTY SIZE	0.002
	(0.053)*
Constant	3.043
	(0.000)***
Observations	387
Adjusted R-squared	0.401

Robust p values in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Taking this as our baseline model, we now can add three sets of variables: controls for central economic parameters, for electoral rules, and for party families (see Table 3). Several findings in Table 3 deserve to be highlighted. First, the baseline model remains basically unaltered across different specifications. In particular, the vote intention variable is not affected by the inclusion of additional controls. Neither the economic variables nor the variables accounting for differences in the electoral rules variables help explain vote share shifts between national and European elections. The baseline model only improves significantly once party families are accounted for. In particular, while the coefficients for Christian Democratic, Conservative, and Nationalist/Ethnic parties are strongly significant, the coefficient for Green or ecological parties are weakly significant – a finding that is not altered much once the analysis is restricted to the old 15 EU member states (results not reported here).

As already briefly discussed above, using the vote intention variable has another advantage. Not only does it provide us with a more reliable estimate of the second order effect in EP-elections, but we can also look at its over time varying impact on election outcomes. My central motivation is to inquire whether European elections have become less national and more European in character and content. To answer this question, I estimated the coefficients of the vote intention variable for each of the general EP-elections (see Table 4). Coefficients for the European elections of '84, '89, '94, '99 and 2004 in Table 4 have to be interpreted by comparing them with the 'vote intention' coefficient simple which – in fact – reports the strength of this variable's influence in

Table 3   Alternative model specification accounting for economic performance (2), electoral incentives (3), and party families (4)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
PARTY SIZE	−0.119 (0.000)***	−0.115 (0.000)***	−0.129 (0.000)***	−0.170 (0.000)***
IN GOVERNMENT	0.584 (0.708)	0.520 (0.739)	0.728 (0.646)	0.226 (0.872)
IN GOVERNMENT * TIME	−11.288 (0.097)*	−10.010 (0.139)	−11.807 (0.094)*	−11.097 (0.075)*
IN GOVERNMENT * TIME^2	9.007 (0.137)	7.555 (0.211)	9.457 (0.134)	8.996 (0.114)
NEW PARTY	2.818 (0.000)***	2.880 (0.000)***	2.650 (0.000)***	2.551 (0.000)***
TURNOUT * PARTY SIZE	0.002 (0.053)*	0.002 (0.031)**	0.002 (0.056)*	0.002 (0.106)
NATIONAL VOTE INTENTION	0.222 (0.001)***	0.227 (0.001)***	0.212 (0.001)***	0.216 (0.001)***
FAVOURABLE		−0.699 (0.329)		
UNFAVOURABLE		0.573 (0.386)		
UNEMPLOYMENT			−0.142 (0.360)	
INFLATION			−0.066 (0.599)	
GDP			0.040 (0.368)	
GREEN PARTIES				1.300 (0.073)*
SOCIAL DEMOCRATS				0.999 (0.199)
CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS				3.560 (0.001)***
CONSERVATIVES				2.929 (0.033)**
NATIONALISTS/ETHNIC PARTIES				−1.732 (0.007)***
Constant	3.043 (0.000)***	3.037 (0.000)***	3.110 (0.000)***	2.902 (0.000)***
Observations	387 0.401	387 0.402	381 0.407	387 0.434

Robust p values in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

the 1979 election. As can be seen from Table 4 (Column 1), the strength of the impact of national vote intention on the vote share shifts in EP-elections decreased in each of the EP-contests, and this decrease was statistically significant at least in the 1999 election, and weakly so in 1994. Once the analysis is restricted to the old 15 member

Table 4   The influence of 'national vote intention' on European parliament elections over time

	All 25	Old 15
PARTY SIZE	−0.145	−0.106
	(0.000)***	(0.000)***
IN GOVERNMENT	−2.053	−2.217
	(0.001)***	(0.000)***
NEW PARTY	2.212	2.800
	(0.002)***	(0.000)***
VOTE INTENTION	**0.387**	**0.398**
	(0.003)*	**(0.003)***
1984 EUROPEAN ELECTIONS * VOTE INTENTION	**−0.109**	**−0.133**
	(0.752)	**(0.703)**
1989 EUROPEAN ELECTIONS * VOTE INTENTION	**−0.150**	**−0.164**
	(0.428)	**(0.412)**
1994 EUROPEAN ELECTIONS * VOTE INTENTION	**−0.228**	**−0.239**
	(0.143)	**(0.128)**
1999 EUROPEAN ELECTIONS * VOTE INTENTION	**−0.405**	**−0.387**
	(0.016)**	**(0.024)****
2004 EUROPEAN ELECTIONS * VOTE INTENTION	**−0.006**	**−0.231**
	(0.971)	**(0.124)**
PARTY SIZE * TURNOUT	0.002	0.002
	(0.035)**	(0.041)**
Constant	3.084	2.496
	(0.000)***	(0.000)***
Observations	407	374
Adjusted R-squared	0.386	0.368

Robust p values in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

countries (Column 2), this effect is more pronounced. Especially the comparison of the two EP2004 coefficients suggests that national vote intention was of some importance in the new member states, but much less so in the old EU-15.

Another way to investigate whether the national political agenda has become less important for European elections is to analyze the government status variable using the same methodological approach. Table 5 reports the strength of the 'IN GOVERNMENT' variable for the various EP-elections. Again, the baseline case against which coefficients have to be interpreted is the 1979 election.

Here, the picture is a bit more mixed, but in most elections since 1979 government parties could expect to lose more votes than they lost in 1979, with a particular strong effect in 2004. Again, coefficients become stronger if the analysis is restricted to the old EU-15. While not always at the level of statistical significance, the coefficients suggest that the anti-government party affect of participants in EP-election has rather increased in strength over the six European elections.

Table 5   **The influence of the 'in government' variable of European parliament elections over time**

	All 25	Old 15
PARTY SIZE	−0.150	−0.109
	(0.000)***	(0.000)***
IN GOVERNMENT	**−1.066**	**−1.155**
	(0.415)	(0.376)
1984 EUROPEAN ELECTIONS * IN GOVERNMENT	**0.775**	**0.556**
	(0.625)	**(0.728)**
1989 EUROPEAN ELECTIONS * IN GOVERNMENT	**−0.694**	**−1.016**
	(0.697)	**(0.581)**
1994 EUROPEAN ELECTIONS * IN GOVERNMENT	**−1.904**	**−2.108**
	(0.295)	**(0.248)**
1999 EUROPEAN ELECTIONS * IN GOVERNMENT	**0.250**	**−0.339**
	(0.874)	**(0.828)**
2004 EUROPEAN ELECTIONS * IN GOVERNMENT	**−3.438**	**−3.947**
	(0.071)*	(0.037)**
NEW PARTY	2.202	2.791
	(0.002)***	(0.000)***
VOTE INTENTION	0.246	0.172
	(0.000)***	(0.000)***
TURNOUT * PARTY SIZE	0.001	0.002
	(0.133)	(0.071)*
Constant	3.225	2.589
	(0.000)***	(0.000)***
Observations	407	374
Adjusted R-squared	0.382	0.376

Robust p values in parentheses; significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

What do these findings tell us? Table 4 suggested indeed that a creeping Europeanization of European elections might have taken place – at least we see a decreasing influence of the national vote intention variable. While this may indicate that voters have considered more and more European issues when participating in EP-elections, Table 5 suggests that this does not necessarily spell good news for the European integration project. A decreasing importance of the domestic political constellation for EP-election outcomes can also be caused by an increasing anti-European sentiment among Europe's voters. At least, a diminishing influence of the national vote intention variable seems to be compatible with an increasing interest of voters to punish their national political elite. Also a vote that expresses increasing dissatisfaction with the course of European integration would be a 'Europeanized vote.' The recent referenda on Europe's constitutional treaty in France and the Netherlands would lend further plausibility to this reading of the data. Part of the second order effect in European elections, namely the 'government parties lose vote shares' part, may then be less and less explained by voters dissatisfaction with their governments domestic political performance, and rather more and more an expression of a truly European vote, albeit

Table 6   Average vote share gains of pro-European parties, 1979 and 2004

	Average vote share gains of those parties that are 'strongly in favor' of European integration (cf. Ray 1999)	Average vote share gains of those parties for which European integration is 'one of the' or 'the most' important issue (cf. Ray 1999)
European elections 1979	4.192 (N = 25)	4.96 (N = 20)
European elections 2004	1.468 (N = 115)	1.95 (N = 108)

one sending a pronounced anti-European signal. Put differently, if the second order effect in European elections leads to 'opposed majorities' between Parliament and Council (Reif 1997: 120), these majorities may initially have been 'opposed' in the traditional left/right dimension, but now may be increasingly opposed in the national sovereignty/European integration dimension.

Of course, it is impossible to neatly separate voters' national preferences from their truly and genuinely European considerations at this aggregate level of analysis, but further examination of the data suggests that the Europeanization of EP-elections can indeed go hand in hand with their creeping 'anti-Europeanization.' In Table 6, I report the vote shifts of parties that are reported to be "strongly in favor" of European integration according to the expert survey conducted by Leonard Ray, Marco Steenbergen, Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks and their collaborators (see Ray 1999; Marks et al. 2006, forthcoming). I compared the relative gains of those parties that have values of 6.5 on the 'position on European integration' index (running from 1 to 7, from "strongly opposed" to "strongly in favor") at two points in time, in 1979 at the moment of the first direct election to the European parliament, and in 2004, the last EP-election (see Column 1). I also compared the electoral performance of those parties for which European integration was "one of the most important issues" or "the most important issue" (values of 3.5 or higher on an index running from 1 'issue of no importance' to 5 'the most important issue'; see Column 2). In Table 6, a clear difference between the 1979 and 2004 elections is visible: Being strongly pro-European and perceiving Europe as an important issue hardly translates into vote share gains in EP-elections anymore.

The reverse image is not exactly generated once the reverse analysis is run. As Table 7 shows, while nowadays an explicit anti-European position pays off at the ballot box, parties which show no interest in this issue cannot expect to gain vote shares in European electoral contests. It is further support for the 'anti-Europeanization'-thesis that voters apparently perceive Europe as important, and therefore do not reward parties that seem rather agnostic with respect to the future of EU-integration, but are dissatisfied with the course of European integration itself and therefore increasingly vote for parties with an anti-EU agenda.

Table 7   Average vote share gains of euro-skeptic or euro-agnostic parties, 1979 and 2004

	Average vote share gains of those parties that are 'strongly opposed' to European integration (cf. Ray 1999)	Average vote share gains of those parties for which European integration is of 'no importance' or 'only a minor issue' (cf. Ray 1999)
European elections 1979	0.15 (N = 4)	1.31 (N = 10)
European elections 2004	2.73 (N = 9)	0.838 (N = 8)

'Europeanization' or 'Anti-Europeanization' of European elections?

This article's contribution to the literature is threefold. First, I showed that changes in national vote intention prove to be a stable and strong predictor for the vote shifts between national and European elections. This contradicts the claim that mainly "factors other than government approval guide vote choice [in EP-elections; P.M.]" and that "there is likely a large unsystematic effect of approval" (Kousser 2004: 7). As the previous analysis showed, approval measured as national vote intention has a large *systematic* effect on EP-outcomes. Once it is included into the regression model, it significantly reduces the explanatory impact of many variables that have figured prominently in previous EP-election studies.

Secondly, I could not confirm that 'time', i.e. the location of the second order election within the legislative term that is demarcated by two subsequent first order elections, has a significant effect on EP-election outcomes. While there is some prima facie evidence that government parties lose more votes if the European election is held in the middle of the domestic turn, this evidence remains too weak to allow for the confirmation of the popularity cycle hypothesis. Finally, the vote intention data also allowed me to address the question whether voters increasingly took European issues into consideration when they took part in European elections. Whereas the data suggests that indeed such a 'Europeanization' of European elections took place, this must not necessarily be good news for the European integration project. My analysis also suggests that the decreasing impact of national vote intention might be primarily due to an increasingly strong anti-European and anti-elite sentiment among European voters. While an ultimate test of this hypothesis would require panel data that allows studying individual voting behavior over time, the empirical evidence presented here seems strong enough to buttress the claim that we are indeed confronted with both the Europeanization and Anti-Europeanization of EP-elections.

Data Appendix – Data Sources

1. National vote intention

Eurobarometer (EB) and *Candidate Countries Eurobarometer* (CC-EB) Surveys EB 2 (October – November 1974), EB 6 (November 1976), EB 7 (April – May 1977), EB 8 (October – November 1977), EB 9 (May – June 1978), EB 10 (October – November 1978), EB 11 (April 1979), EB 15 (April 1981), EB 16 (October – November 1981), EB 17 (March – April 1982), EB 18 (October 1982), EB 19 (March – April 1983), EB 20 (October 1983), EB 21 (April 1984), EB 22 (October 1984), EB 23 (March – April 1985), EB 25 (March – April 1986), EB 27 (March – May 1987), EB 28 (November 1987), EB 29 (March – April 1988), EB 31 (March – April 1989), EB 34.0 (October – November 1990), EB 36 (October – November 1991), EB 38 (September – October 1992), EB 39 (March – April 1993), EB 40 (October – November 1993), EB 41 (March – April 1994), EB 42 (November – December 1994), EB 43.1 (April – May 1995), EB 44 (October – November 1995), EB 45.1 (April – May 1996), EB 46 (October – November 1996), EB 47.1 (March – April 1997), EB 49 (April – May 1998), EB 51 (March – May 1999), EB 56.3 (January – February 2002), CC-EB 2001.1, CC-EB 2002.3 SCI, CC-EB 2003.1 YOUTH, CC-EB 2003.2, CC-EB 2003.3, CC-EB 2003.4

The vote intention question was asked in each of these Eurobarometer surveys on a regular basis until EB 51 (March – May 1999). It was posed again in the Eurobarometer 56.3 as well as in the diverse Candidate Country EB surveys.

The wording changed only slightly. Earlier EB-issues asked:

"If there were a general election tomorrow (say if contact under 18 years: and you had a vote), which party would you support?"

More recent EB issues asked:

"If there were a general election tomorrow (say if contact under 18 years: and you had a vote), which party would you vote for?"

While the number of the vote intention question and the SPSS variable number changed from Eurobarometer to Eurobarometer, the Coding Number (D4) remained the same in almost all surveys.

The 2004 New Europe Survey conducted by the Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde, asked again with slight variations in the wording: "*In this envelope is a ballot with the names of political parties. Please put a cross by the name of the party that you are likely to vote for if a parliamentary election were held this week [Latvia; Estonia] / next Sunday [Poland] / tomorrow [Slovakia]?*" (Question G 6 of the questionnaire, in some countries interviewers asked how respondents would vote in

the next parliamentary elections [Bulgaria] or simply how they would vote [Hungary; Czech Republic]).

Where none of these sources provided information on vote intention, we have tried to complement our data set with national opinion poll data. We used the following sources (especially for the 2004 elections):

– Germany: *Politbarometer Juni 2004*, <http://www.forschungsgruppe.de/Ergebnisse/ Politbarometer/Politbarometer_2004/PB_Juni_2004/> (accessed 9.6.2005);
– Belgium: own *calculations* based on David Coppi Bénédicte Vaes "*Le Blok, bon premier en Flandre*", in: "Le Soir," 25.10.2004 (accessed 9.6.2005);
– France: *Sondage CSA/Le Parisien/Aujourd'hui en France/France 3 Ile-de-France*, 'Intention de vote des Franciliens', 15.–16. March 2004, <http://www.csa-tmo.fr/ dataset/data2004/opi20040309a.htm> (accessed 9.6.2005);
– The Netherlands: *Politike Barometer,* <http://www.politiekebarometer.nl/index_ archief_polibar.*htm*> (accessed 9.6.2005);
– Sweden: *Demoskop Juni 2004*, "Väljarbarometrar i Sverige: TEMO: s samt övriga undersökningsföretags *publicerade* mätningar", <http://www.temo.se/upload/326/ valjbsamtliga.htm> (accessed 9.6.2005);
– Austria: *GALLUP June 2004*, <http://www.wahlumfragen.direct.at/> (accessed 9.6.2005); UK *MORI Political Monitor February*, <http://www.mori.com/polls/ 2005/mpm050221. shtml> (accessed 9.6. 2005);
– Denmark *GALLUP June 2004*, <http://www.gallup.dk/dynpages/Pol_Indeks_ Alt.aspx> (accessed 9.6.2005);
– Spain: *GALLUP June 2004* <http://www.pre.gva.es/argos/demoscopia/12.htm> (accessed 9.6.2005);
– Slovenia: Karl Peter Schwarz "*Alles in Muttersprache*", Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 25.5.2004.

2. Economic indicators (unemployment, inflation, gdp growth)

OECD, Economic Outlook, Vol. 73, June 2003 (pp. 202, 209, 211), and the Eurostat, Yearbook 2004.

3. Party names, abbreviations, IDs and party family

Ian Budge/Hans-Dieter Klingemann/Andrea Volkens/Judith Bara/Eric Tanenbaum, 2001: Mapping Policy Preferences. Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Governments 1945–1998. Oxford: Oxford University Press), Appendix I, pp. 193–213, complemented with information given in the Eurobarometer surveys.

4. Election dates, outcomes and turnout

- International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES), <http://www. electionguide. org>;
- <http://www.electionworld.org>;
- <http://www.parties-and-elections.de>;
- Interparliamentary Union webpage <http://www.ipu. org>;
- International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance <http://www. idea.int>;
- data set at the University of Essex <http://www2.essex. ac.uk/elect/database/database.asp>;
- Archiv der Gegenwart, pp. 22626, 27792, 33425 (accessed 17.11. 2004).

5. Vote shares in European Elections

- For the 2004 EP-election see <http://www.elections2004.eu.int>; FAZ No. 136, 15.6.2004, p. 8; EU Publication Office, list of EP-members from the 26.11.2004.;
- for the EP-elections between 1979 and 1994, see: The European Parliament, 3rd Edition, London: Cartermill International), Appendix 1;
- for the elections in 1994 and 1999 see: Wissenschaftlicher Dienst des Bundestages "Verteilung der gültigen Stimmen und der Sitze bei den Europawahlen 1999 und 1994 in den übrigen Mitgliedsstaaten der EU", <http://www.bundestag.de/bic/analysen/index.html>;
- for the 2004 election see also: Europäisches Parlament/Eurostat, Wahlen zum Europäischen Parlament. Ergebnisse 9.–12. Juni 1994 und Europäisches Parlament/Generalsekretariat (Hrsg.), Amtliches Handbuch des Europäischen Parlaments 1984; for the 1989 election: Europäisches Parlament. Generaldirektion Information und Öffentlichkeitsarbeit. Europawahl 1989. Ergebnisse und gewählte Mitglieder, 2. Ausgabe, 20.7.1989.

6. Government status

Woldendorp, Jaap/Hans Keman/Ian Budge, 2000: *Party Governments in 48 Democracies (1945–1998)*. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

References

Anderson, Christopher J./Daniel S. Ward, 1996: Barometer Elections in Comparative Perspective. In: *Electoral Studies* 15, 447–460.

Brambor, Thomas/William Roberts Clark/Matt Golder, 2005: Understanding Interaction Models: Improving Empirical Analysis. In: *Political Analysis*, forthcoming.

Budge, Ian, et al., 2001: Mapping Policy Preferences: Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Governments 1945–1998. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Burkhart, Simone, 2005: *A German Mid-term Loss? A German Mid-term loss? An empirical Analysis of the Relationship between Federal and Länd-Elections in Germany since 1976.* Manuscript. Cologne: Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.

Carrubba, C./R.J. Timpone, 2005: Explaining Vote Switching across First- and Second-Order Elections. Evidence from Europe. In: *Comparative Political Studies* 38(3), 260–281.

Corbett, Richard/Francis Jacobs/Michael Shackleton, 2003: *The European Parliament.* London: John Harper.

Dinkel, Reiner, 1977: Der Zusammenhang zwischen Bundes- und Landtagswahlergebnissen. In: *Politische Vierteljahresschrift* 18, 348–359.

Dinkel, Reiner, 1980: Die Interdependenz von Wahlen und Ihre Wirtschaftspolitischen Konsequenzen. In: Karl-Ernst Schenk (ed.), *Neue Politische Ökonomie als Ordnungstheorie.* Tübingen: Mohr, 66–81.

——, 1981: Diskussion: Zur Gesetzmäßigkeit der Trendverschiebungen zwischen Landtags- und Bundestagswahlen. In: *Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen* 1/81, 135–139.

Dinkel, Reiner, 1989: Landtagswahlen unter dem Einfluss der Bundespolitik: Die Erfahrung der letzten Legislaturperioden. In: Jürgen W. Falter/Hans Rattinger/Karl G. Troitzsch (eds.), *Wahlen und politische Einstellungen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Neuere Entwicklungen der Forschung.* Frankfurt a.M.: Peter Lang, 253–262.

Eijk, Cees van der/Mark Franklin, 1996: *Choosing Europe? The European Electorate and National Politics in the Face of the Union.* Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press.

Eijk, Cees van der/Mark N. Franklin/Michael Marsh, 1996: What Voters Teach Us about Europe-Wide Elections: What Europe-Wide Elections Teach Us about Voters. In: *Electoral Studies* 15(2), 149–166.

Feigert, Frank B./Pippa Norris, 1990: Do By-Elections Constitute Referenda? A Four-Country Comparison. In: *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 15, 183–200.

Ferrara, Federico/J. Timo Weishaupt, 2004: Get Your Act Together: Party Performance in European Parliament Elections. In: *European Union Politics* 5(3), 283–306.

Fiorina, Morris P., 2003 [1992]: Divided Government. New York: Longman.

Franklin, Mark/Cees van der Eijk/Erik Oppenhuis, 1996: The Institutional Context: Turnout. In: Cees van der Eijk/Mark Franklin, 1996: *Choosing Europe? The European Electorate and National Politics in the Face of the Union.* Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press.

Franzese, Robert J., 2002: Electoral and Partisan Cycles in Economic Policies and Outcomes. In: *Annual Review of Political Science* 5, 369–421.

Gaines, Brian J./Christophe Crombez, 2004: Another Look at Connections across German Elections. In: *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 16, forthcoming.

Hix, Simon, 1999: *The Political System of the European Union.* New York: Palgrave.

Hix, Simon/Amie Kreppel, et al., 2003: The Party System in the European Parliament: Collusive or Competitive? In: *Journal of Common Market Studies* 41(2), 309–331.

Hix, Simon/Michael Marsh, 2004: *Predicting the Future. The Next European Parliament.* Brussels: Burson-Marsteller/BKHs.

——, 2005: *Understanding European Parliament Elections: Punishment or Protest.* Conference Paper. Ninth Biennial Internatonal Conference of the European Union Studies Association, Austin, Texas, March/April 2005.
   <http://personal.lse.ac.uk/hix/Working%20Papers/Hix-Marsh-Understanding_EP_ Elections.pdf>; accessed 23.5.2005.

Hough, Daniel/Charlie Jeffery, 2003: Landtagswahlen: Bundestestwahlen oder Regionalwahlen? In: *Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen* 34, 79–94.

Hudson, John, 1985: The Relationship between Government Popularity and Approval for the Government's Record in the United Kingdom. In: *British Journal of Political Science* 15, 165–186.

Jacobson, Gary C., 1990: Does the Economy Matter in Midterm Elections? In: *American Journal of Political Science* 34, 400–404.

Jeffery, Charlie/Daniel Hough, 2001: The Electoral Cycle and Multi-Level Voting in Germany. In: *German Politics* 10, 73–98.

Kam, Cindy D./Robert J. Franzese, 2005: *Modeling and Interpreting Interactive Hypotheses in Regression Analysis: A Refresher and Some Practical Advice.* Manuscript. University of Michigan.

Kernell, Samuel, 1977: Presidential Popularity and Negative Voting: An Alternative Explanation of the Midterm Congressional Decline of the President's Party. In: *American Political Science Review* 71, 44–66.

——, 1978: Explaining Presidential Popularity. How Ad Hoc Theorizing, Misplaced Emphasis, and Insufficient Care in Measuring One's Variables Refuted Common Sense and Led Conventional Wisdom Down the Path of Anomalies. In: *American Political Science Review* 72, 506–522.

Koepke, Jason R./Nils Ringe, 2006: The Second Order Election Model in an Enlarged Europe. In: *European Union Politics* 7(3), forthcoming.

Kousser, Thaddeus, 2004: Retrospective Voting and Strategic Behaviour in European Parliament Elections. In: *Electoral Studies* 23, 1–21.

Laver, Michael/W. B. Hunt, 1992: *Policy and Party Competition.* London: Routledge.

Lewis-Beck, Michael S./Mary Stegmaier, 2000: Economic Determinants of Electoral Outcomes. In: *Annual Review of Political Science* 3, 183–219.

Lohmann, Susanne/David W. Brady/Douglas Rivers, 1997: Party Identification, Retrospective Voting, and Moderating Elections in a Federal System – West Germany, 1961–1989. In: *Comparative Political Studies* 30, 420–449.

Manow, Philip/Armin Schäfer/Hendrik Zorn, 2004: *European Social Policy and Europe's Party-Political Center of Gravity, 1957–2003.* MPIfG Discussion Paper 04/6. Cologne: Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.

Marks, Gary, et al., 2006: Party Competition and European Integration in East and West: Different Structure, Same Causality. In: *Comparative Political Studies*, forthcoming.

Marsh, Michael, 1998: Testing the Second-Order Election Model after Four European Elections. In: *British Journal of Political Science* 28, 591–607.

Miller, William L./Myles Mackie, 1973: The Electoral Cycle and the Asymmetry of Government and Opposition Popularity: An Alternative Model of the Relationship between Economic Conditions and Popularity. In: *Political Studies* 21, 263–279.

Mughan, Anthony, 1986: Toward a Political Explanation of Government Vote Losses in Midterm By-elections. In: *American Political Science Review* 80, 761–775.

——, 1988: On the By-election Vote of Governments in Britain. In: *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 13, 29–48.

Oppenhuis, Erik/Cees van der Eijk/Mark Franklin, 1996: The Party Context: Outcomes. In: Cees van der Eijk/Mark N. Franklin (eds.), Choosing Europe? The European Electorate and National Politics in the Face of Union. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 287–305.

Ray, Leonard, 1999: Measuring Party Orientations towards European Integration: Results from an Expert Survey. In: *European Journal of Political Research* 36, 283–306.

Reif, Karlheinz, 1997: European Elections as Member State Second-Order Elections Revisited. In: *European Journal of Political Research* 31, 115–124.

——, 1984: National Electoral Cycles and European Elections 1979 and 1984. In: *Electoral Studies* 3, 244–255.

Reif, Karlheinz/Hermann Schmitt, 1980: Nine Second-Order National Elections: A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of European Election Results. In: *European Journal of Political Research* 8, 3–44.

Schmitt, Hermann, 2005: The European Parliament Elections of June 2004: Still Second-Order? In: *West European Politics* 28, 650–679.

Schmitt, Hermann/Karlheinz Reif, 2003: Der Hauptwahlzyklus und die Ergebnisse von Neben-wahlen: Konzeptuelle und Empirische Rekonstruktionen am Beispiel der Europawahlen im Wahlzyklus der Bundesrepublik. In: Andreas M. Wüst (ed.), *Politbarometer.* Opladen: Leske+ Budrich, 239–256.

Smith, Alistair, 2004: *Election Timing.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Strøm, Kaare/Stephen M. Swindle, 2002: Strategic Parliamentary Dissolution. In: *American Political Science Review* 96, 575–591.

Stimson, James A., 1976: Public Support for American Presidents: A Cyclical Model. In: *Public Opinion Quarterly* 40, 1–21.

Tsebelis, George/G. Garrett, 2001: The Institutional Foundations of Intergovernmentalism and Supranationalism in the European Union. In: *International Organization* 55, 357–390.

Tufte, Edward R., 1975: Determinants of the Outcomes of Midterm Congressional Elections. In: *American Political Science Review* 69, 812–826.

Tufte, Edward R., 1978: *Political Control of the Economy.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Warwick, Paul V., 1994: *Government Survival in Parliamentary Democracies.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Woldendorp, Jaap, et al., 2000: *Party Governments in 48 Democracies (1945–1998).* Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Recent Titles in the Publication Series of the MPIfG

MPIfG Discussion Papers	MPIfG Working Papers	MPIfG Books
DP 05/10 P. Aspers **Status Markets and Standard Markets in the Global Garment Industry**	WP 05/10 M. Höpner **Politisch-institutionelle Determinanten aktionärsorientierter Reformen**	J. Beckert, M. Zafirovski (eds.) **International Encyclopedia of Economic Sociology** Routledge, 2005
DP 05/9 A. Broscheid **Ending Cooperation: A Formal Model of Organizational Change in German Pharmaceutical Interest Representation**	WP 05/9 Aurora Trif **Collective Bargaining Practices in Eastern Europe: Case Study Evidence from Romania**	W. Streeck, J. Grote, V. Schneider, J. Visser (eds.) **Governing Interests: Business Associations Facing Internationalization** Routledge, 2005
DP 05/8 J. Beckert **Trust and the Performative Construction of Markets**	WP 05/8 F. W. Scharpf **No Exit from the Joint Decision Trap? Can German Federalism Reform Itself?**	M. Schludi **The Reform of Bismarckian Pension Systems: A Comparison of Pension Politics in Austria, France, Germany, Italy and Sweden** Amsterdam University Press, 2005
DP 05/7 R. Mayntz **Forschungsmethoden und Erkenntnispotential Natur- und Sozialwissenschaften im Vergleich**	WP 05/7 A. Trif, K. Koch **Strategic Unionism in Eastern Europe: The Case of Romania**	A. Schäfer **Die neue Unverbindlichkeit: Wirtschaftspolitische Koordinierung in Europa** Campus, 2005
DP 05/6 J. Beckert **The Moral Embeddedness of Markets**	WP 05/6 F. W. Scharpf **Recht und Politik in der Reform des deutschen Föderalismus**	G. Falkner, O. Treib, M. Hartlapp, S. Leiber **Complying with Europe: EU Harmonisation and Soft Law in the Member States** Cambridge University Press, 2005
DP 05/5 S. Ganghof **High Taxes in Hard Times How Denmark Built and Maintained a Huge Income Tax**	WP 05/5 W. Streeck **Vom „kurzen Traum" zum langen Alptraum?**	L. Krempel **Visualisierung komplexer Strukturen: Grundlagen der Darstellung mehrdimensionaler Netzwerke** Campus, 2005
DP 05/4 R. Boyer **How and Why Capitalisms Differ**	WP 05/4 W. Streeck **Nach dem Korporatismus: Neue Eliten, neue Konflikte**	